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Gaerrang (Kabzung) (Ph.D., Department of Geography) 
Alternative Development on the Tibetan Plateau:  The Case of the Slaughter Renunciation 
Movement 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Emily. T. Yeh. 
  Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1980s, the Chinese state has extended and 
intensified its economic development agenda, trying to shape its citizens to become rational 
market actors who prioritize commodity production. In Tibetan pastoral areas, this takes the form 
of efforts to develop the livestock industry by encouraging herders to increase their off-take rate 
to intensify production. As a result, Tibetan herders have become involved in selling ever-larger 
numbers of yaks to Han and Chinese Muslim traders.  However, reforms also allowed a measure 
of religious freedom. Since 2000 many lamas (religious leaders) have become concerned about 
the mass sale of livestock for slaughter, because the Buddhist principle of cause-and-effect 
suggests that killing is a serious sin to be avoided.  Using their tremendous influence and 
authority, these lamas have initiated a slaughter renunciation movement, persuading people to 
take oaths to stop selling livestock for slaughter – precisely the opposite of what the state 
suggests they must do to become materially “developed.”  Many Tibetan herders have 
participated in these movements, even though their livelihoods depend heavily on the sale of 
animal products. The thesis explores the relationship between Tibetan Buddhist revival, secular 
neoliberal economic reforms, and the cultural transformation of Tibetan herders in the market 
economy since the 1980s. The research used mixed methods, including household surveys, in-
depth, semi-structured interviews, analysis of texts and visual media, and participant observation, 
conducted over a period of 12 months in Tibetan areas of China’s Sichuan province. 
       I argue that the slaughter renunciation movement is an effort by Tibetan khenpos to enact a 
moral correction of Tibetan herders that works as an intervention to the transformation brought 
by secular-based economic development. This intervention reflects a process in which Tibetan 
people are creating a Buddhist-informed neo-liberal development, which produces inequality on 
the one hand, and which is coded by Tibetan Buddhist norms and meanings on the other hand. 
With this movement we can also see how a Buddhist form of development departs from the 
dominant secular-based neo-liberalization process in contemporary China, through a process of 
contestation, incorporation, and rejection among multiple agents with different cultural agendas. 
 Thus, the dissertation demonstrates that what most scholars refer to as neo-liberalism in 
China is, indeed, a process of secularization and deepening of materialism; it is an uneven and 
culturally constituted process. Tibetan khenpos and their movements do not entirely reject this 
process, but rather selectively reject and embrace it by imbuing uneven processes with Tibetan 
Buddhist meanings, forming a Buddhist-informed neo-liberalization process. 
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Introduction 
“when I listen to the khenpos’ teachings [in tapes] about negative karma 
related to slaughtering, I feel that there will be nowhere to go but to hell after I 
die [because I have sold many livestock to the meat market]; however, when I 
experience everyday life, I feel there are so much things I need to have. 
Everyone is competing for something. It seems to me that these are two totally 
different worlds.” 
-- a herder from Hongyuan County, 2010 
 
This herder is rich by local standards. In addition to the income from selling livestock to 
the meat market, he has been making a good sum of money from his transportation business with 
his newly bought van. Now he is thinking about buying a house in the county town and going 
into a bigger business. Seeing many Han Chinese making a lot more money than herders 
convinced him that Han people have better ideas of making money than do Tibetan herders. At 
the same time, he is a very religious person. He performs Tibetan Buddhist practices such as 
chanting, propitiating mountain deities, and going on circumambulations. He also feels deeply 
sorry for the livestock he has sold to slaughterhouses but he feels he needs to sell them 
continually, because he feels there are so many things that he needs money to cover. He is not 
alone in this dilemma.  
This dissertation explores Tibetan herders’ moral dilemma about the need to be developed 
and the need to follow religious moral conducts. In other words, the dissertation is about how 
herders have been experiencing secular economic development since the 1980s, particularly the 
“Open up the West” campaign on the one hand, and the Tibetan Buddhist influence through 
religious teachings and new movements on the other hand. I am particularly interested in 
analyzing how these different forces compete to bring Tibetan herders into their own cultural and 
moral realms. 
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Herders’ dilemma reflects an era in which development has dictated the Chinese landscape, 
the state, and citizens for the last several decades. The dawn of this era was marked by Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous declaration in the early 1980s that “development is the first principle.” Since 
then, development has become a hegemonic goal for all government departments and their 
officials. This hegemonic goal is clearly reflected in state propaganda commonly found on 
billboards on the streets and along the roads, as such.  The majority of these billboards have 
something to do with “发展” (development) in one way or another. They involve all aspects of 
development issues, including the way to be developed, the speed of development, a strategy of 
development, the priority of development, and the role of development, involving all aspects of 
society. The most commonly seen propaganda includes “科学发展观” (scientific development 
view), “跨越式发展” (Great-leap-forward development), “又快又好的发展” (a better and faster 
development), “健康全面发展” (healthy and all-around development), “城乡统筹一体化发展” 
(integrated development in urban and rural areas), “绿色发展观” (green development concept), 
and many others. In short, in contemporary China, things are only imaginable when they are 
translated into terms of development. This translation turns human beings into market actors and 
productive forces, resources into commercial production, religion into tourism products, 
government agents into growth promoters and market protectors, the environment into 
sustainable development, and so forth. It is in this development world that people are 
commoditized with the discourse of “quality,” or suzhi (Anagnost, 2004; Yan, 2003; 2006; 2008), 
that ranks China’s citizens according to their achievement of development and modernity.  
Like all local governments under the decentralized fiscal system put in place with China’s 
economic reforms, governments in high-altitude pastoral areas of the eastern Tibetan Plateau, 
where most of the population are Tibetan herders and where animal husbandry is the primary 
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form of livelihood, are under tremendous pressure to promote development and generate income.  
Many governments have sought to develop the livestock industry by setting up economic parks 
for yak products, inviting outside investors, cultivating local entrepreneurs, promoting the sale of 
yak meat by branding it as “green,” environmentally-friendly and healthy, and most significant 
for this study, encouraging herders to increase their off-take rate. These efforts have prioritized 
the increased circulation of commodities and the cultivation of a “vision of commodity 
production” among Tibetans, or as one Chinese official working in eastern Tibet put it (in the 
context of tourism), “Tibetans must learn to turn themselves into commodities!” (Hayes, 2008). 
As a result of these integrated efforts, Tibetan herders have, over the past two decades, been 
selling ever-larger numbers of their livestock to Chinese and Hui (Chinese Muslim) middlemen, 
who transport hundreds of thousands of yaks to urban markets each year.   
Economic reforms thus appear to have successfully turned Tibetans into neoliberal, market 
subjects.  However, “opening up and reform” also included political reforms that allowed the 
return of a measure of religious freedom, producing contradictory effects. The overwhelming 
majority of Tibetan herders practice Buddhism.  According to Buddhist principles, killing is one 
of the most serious sins that can be committed and should be avoided if at all possible.1  Among 
the many social transformations in pastoral areas that Tibetan religious leaders are concerned 
about, one of particular importance since the early 1990s has been the increasing rate of selling 
livestock to slaughterhouses.  This has become a major problem for Tibetan lamas and khenpos, 
particularly of the Nyingma sect.2 Using their tremendous social influence and moral authority, 
                                                 
1 Note that in this dissertation I use the terms “sin” and “sinful” for convenience to translate the Tibetan term 
sdig pa, but it does not have the Christian connotations of sin, but rather is related to Buddhist understandings of 
negative karma and its effects on a being in samsara.   
2 Tibetan lamas or sprul skus are reincarnated Buddhist leaders. In Tibetan Buddhism, a lama is a particularly 
high-ranking spiritual leader, who can choose the manner of his (or her) rebirth. Normally the lama would be 
reincarnated as a human, and in the most cases, the first one of each lama’s lineage of reincarnations would be a 
very well known Buddhist scholar. These days, some lamas are well educated while others are not, but they all have 
  
4 
these Tibetan Buddhist elites have initiated a slaughter renunciation movement through their 
religious teachings, persuading local people to stop selling their yaks for slaughter – exactly the 
opposite of what the state says herders must do to achieve development. At the same time, 
Tibetan herders make a living by herding yaks and sheep, and the income from selling livestock 
to the slaughterhouses is about 50% of their annual income, with the other half derived from 
selling dairy products, and other sources. Despite the fact that the slaughter renunciation 
movement would reduce their income for most herders, many herders have responded to the 
appeals of Tibetan Buddhist leaders by taking oaths to stop selling their yaks for periods of time 
ranging from three years to the rest of their lives. At the same time, some other Tibetan herders 
have refused to continue or to take vows of not selling livestock for the meat market. Starting 
around 2002, the movement spread out from Seda County, in Sichuan province, where the 
largest Nyingma Institute is located, to many Tibetan pastoral areas on the Tibetan Plateau, 
covering Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). These include 
Guoluo and Yushu prefectures in Qinghai; Naqu and Changdu Prefectures in the TAR; and 
Ganzi and Aba prefectures in Sichuan.  It is particularly strong in counties of northern Ganzi 
prefecture including Seda, Shiqu, Dege, Luhuo, Daofu, and Ganzi counties, as well as in 
Rangtang and Aba counties in Aba prefecture.3  
                                                                                                                                                             
spiritual authority over people. In contrast to lamas, khenpo and geshes are titles of the highest degrees of Tibetan 
Buddhist studies, the former in the Nyingma school and the latter one for the Gelug pa.  Ordinary monks can get the 
degrees of khenpo and geshes if they have passed all exams and requirements. In the Nyingma sect, once a monk 
has received a khenpo degree, his degree of influence is similar to that of lamas, but the way in which they assert 
that influence is different.  The authority of lamas is based on the fact that they are recognized as reincarnations, 
while that of khenpos and geshes is based on their achievements in learning.  However, sometimes, there are cases 
in which the title of khenpo and lama overlap. For instance, Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok, who started the slaughter 
renunciation movement, was a lama as well as a khenpo. 
3 The movement has taken different forms, including voluntary participation by individual herders as well as 
cases where entire villages and tribes have participated, or where monasteries have enforced the movement upon 
entire communities.    
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Considering the simultaneity of the imperative force of secular economic development and 
variegated religious movements, there are several questions that need be addressed.  How should 
we understand the religious teaching about slaughter renunciation in the current context of China 
where development dictates everything from government administration, to its citizens, and the 
landscape? How do the imperative secular economic force and religious forces work together on 
herders’ decisions over their livestock? Why is it the case that many Tibetan herders embraced 
the slaughter renunciation movement while others did not?  How do these religious movements 
contribute to discussions on the critical studies of development? How do religious forces interact 
with other forms of power, forming particular conjunctures? 
Instead of seeing religious teachings as a separate category from discussions of 
development, I argue that the slaughter renunciation movement is an effort by Tibetan khenpos 
to enact a moral correction of Tibetan herders, that works as an intervention to the transformation 
brought by secular-based economic development. This intervention reflects a process in which 
Tibetan people are creating a Buddhist-informed neo-liberal development, which produces 
inequality on the one hand, and which is coded by Tibetan Buddhist norms and meanings on the 
other hand.  In other words, the slaughter renunciation movement works as a window through 
which we can see the formation of a new form of development informed by both Tibetan 
Buddhist modernism and the uneven processes of neo-liberal development. With this movement, 
we can also see how a Buddhist form of development departs from the dominant secular-based 
neo-liberalization process in contemporary China, through a process of contestation, 
incorporation, and rejection among multiple agents with different cultural agendas. 
Focusing on a case study of a pastoral village in the eastern Tibetan plateau where the 
slaughter renunciation movement began in 2006, the dissertation demonstrates that what most 
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scholars refer to as neo-liberalism in China is, indeed, a process of secularization and deepening 
of materialism; it is uneven process and culturally constituted process. In Tibet, Tibetan khenpos 
and their movements do not entirely reject this process, but rather selectively reject and embrace 
it by imbuing uneven economic processes with Tibetan Buddhist meanings, forming a Buddhist-
informed neo-liberalization process, that is, a capitalist expansion.  
My dissertation makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. By examining the 
role of Tibetan Buddhism in development, first, it contributes to analyses of the role of religious 
norms and idioms in the negotiation of development.  Particularly, my dissertation contributes to 
recent studies of the cultural politics of development from the perspective of human geography. 
Second, it contributes to our understanding of the intersection between globalized neo-liberalism 
and religious revival in local contexts.  In addition, through a focus on ethnographic and other 
field-based research methods rather than analysis of canonical texts, the project develops a 
geographical approach to the study of Tibetan Buddhism.  
This dissertation is constituted by eight chapters, including this introduction, a literature 
review (Chapter 1), discussions of the Chinese state and Tibetan pastoralism (Chapter 2), Tibetan 
Buddhist movements (Chapter 3), competing subject formation (Chapter 4), contested 
development in Tibet (Chapter 5), Tibetan herders’ experience of development and overlapping 
development (Chapter 6), and Tibetan Buddhist-informed neo-liberalism (conclusion). Here I 
introduce readers to the overall trend of the slaughter renunciation movement, my main field site 
of Rakhor Village, and my methods and field experiences.  
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The Slaughter Renunciation Movement and Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok 
Economic liberalization has brought a significant space for religious freedom in Tibet and 
in other parts of China. Within this space, Tibetan religious leaders including lamas (sprul sku), 
khenpos, and geshe have regained a strong influence over Tibetan people. Khenpo Jigme 
Phuntsok (hereafter, Khenpo Jigphun) was one of the most distinguished Buddhist leaders, who 
played an outstanding role in revitalizing the teaching of Tibetan Buddhism following the 
liberalization of religious practice in 1980.4 In responding to the problems of herders’ selling of 
massive numbers of livestock to slaughterhouses, he began the slaughter renunciation movement 
in Larung Gar, Kham Tibet (current Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province).  
Khenpo Jigphun (1933-2004) was the most influential lama of the Nyingma tradition of 
Tibetan Buddhism in contemporary Tibet. A Tibetan Buddhist meditation master and renowned 
teacher of the Great Perfection practice (Dzogchen) (Tsultrim Lodroe, Bsod Dar Rgyas, and 
Bstan’Dzen RgyaMtsho, 1990), he established the Seda Buddhist Institute in 1980, known 
locally as Sertha Gar or Larung Gar, a non-sectarian study center of study. The purpose of the 
institute was to provide ecumenical training in Tibetan Buddhism and to meet the need for 
renewal of meditation and scholarship all over Tibet in the wake of China’s Cultural Revolution 
of 1966-76. Despite its remote location, it grew from a handful of disciples gathering in the 
Khenpo’s home to become one of the largest and most influential centers for the study of 
Tibetan Buddhism in the world, numbering nearly 10,000 monks, nuns, and lay disciples at its 
peak 2000, mostly from other areas of Tibet, and from inner China. The student body of Larung 
                                                 
4 Khenpo Tsullo, who I discuss in detail in this dissertation, was one of the main disciplines of Khenpo 
Jigphun and drew many of his ideas from him.  For detailed studies of Khenpo Jigphun see the work of Germano 
(1998), Terrone (2002), and Gayley (2011).  
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Gar (Institute) was made up of monks, nuns, lay “vow-holders” of both Tibetan and Chinese 
origin, and practitioners of tantric Buddhism (Germano, 1998; Phuntso, 2004). 
Khenpo Jigphun made extensive travels across Tibet and China teaching Nyingma 
traditional Buddhism and rediscovering hidden treasures.5 In 1989, at the invitation of H.H. 
Penor Rinpoche, he visited India, where he taught at various monasteries, including the Nyingma 
Institute in Mysore. At Dharamsala, the Dalai Lama resumed the connections he and Khenpo 
Jigphun had in their previous lives by receiving teachings from Khenpo for two weeks 
(Germano, 1998).  
Khenpo Jigphun was also invited to tour and teach at Buddhist centers in Europe and 
North America.  But while he may have appreciated the opportunity to do so, he was saddened 
by what seemed like a commercialization of Buddhist teachings in the West (Phuntso, 2004) In 
1993, Khenpo Jigphun expanded his massive following during teaching tours of the United 
States, Canada, Germany, England, France, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, India, Nepal, and 
Bhutan. Financial offerings made to him during this tour funded a major building program at 
Larung Gar. On December 29, 2003, at age 70, Khenpo Jigphun was admitted to the Military 
Hospital 363 in Chengdu, the capital of China’s Sichuan province, with heart problems, and 
passed away there on January 7, 2004. 
Because Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok was a great teacher, he had a great many students 
dedicated to continuing his work. After he passed away, his students and many other lamas made 
similar appeals to herders to refrain from selling their livestock for commercial slaughter. Today, 
the movement that began in Larung Gar in Seda County, has spread across the eastern Tibetan 
Plateau.  Since the early 2000s, more than thirty khenpos from Larung Gar and monks from all 
                                                 
5 Treasure revelation is a tradition of Tibetan Buddhism in which Tibetan religious leaders uncover ancient 
Buddhist texts, objects for ritual, such as statues, or chests that may have been concealed by Padmasambhava or 
other Buddhist masters. It is a very important tradition of the Nyingma sect of Tibetan Buddhism. 
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over Tibet who have been studying in Larung Gar have been promoting the movement in their 
religious teachings. Other than religious teachings by khenpos and monks, the idea of the 
movement has spread across pastoral areas through various means, including the distribution of 
posters, videos, audio tapes, popular songs, and so forth.  Because Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok was 
such a highly respected lama in the pastoral areas of eastern Tibet, many Tibetan popular singers 
have sung songs praising him and circulating his message, some of which have been written by 
monks.  
Khenpos I interviewed stated that there are geographical differences in the level of 
difficulty in persuading herders into the vows. Herders from the pastoral areas that are closer to 
Larung Gar are more enthusiastic in participating in the movement. Moreover, the collection of 
caterpillar fungus (Tib. dbyar rtsa dgun ’bu), which has become the main and most lucrative 
source of income for herders in some areas, has also made it easier for khenpos to bring herders 
into the movement, because the impacts of the movement are slight compared to other areas 
where there are not such alternatives.  
Even though the movement has reached many parts of pastoral areas of Tibet, there are 
still places where herders have not participated in the movement as of yet.  Generally speaking, 
different Buddhist schools play important roles in the presence or absence of the slaughter 
renunciation movement. Tibetan herders under Nyingma monasteries are more active in 
participating in the movement, whereas herders under the monasteries of the Gelug School are 
less interested in the slaughter renunciation movement. This might be due to the fact that lamas 
in the tradition of the Gelug School are more interested in academic studies of Tibetan Buddhism 
than in engaging in religious teachings among ordinary Tibetans.  
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However, more important than religious sect in explaining why the movement has taken 
hold in some places than others is the degree of market influence on herders’ lives.  In areas 
where the influence of lamas and khenpos, particularly of the Nyingma School, is strong, the 
slaughter renunciation movement is popular, and resistance is slight or non-existent.  At the same 
time, the slaughter renunciation movement has not taken place in the economically more 
advanced places (mostly located near major cities) where the influence of the market economy is 
strong. Some khenpos attempting to initiate the movement in theses places have been facing 
difficulties and resistance. Khenpos I have interviewed said that they found it very difficult to 
persuade herders in the eastern Tibetan plateau close to Chinese major cities like Xining, 
Lanzhou, and Chengdu, places where herders also have a higher number of livestock compared 
to those in the north and west.   This includes Hongyuan, the site of my dissertation research, 
which is close to the capital of Sichuan, Chengdu.  
In pastoral areas of Tibet, Tibetan herders both slaughter livestock for their own 
consumption as well as selling livestock to slaughterhouses. Because the number of livestock 
sold to slaughterhouses is much higher than the number of livestock slaughtered for self-
consumption, in the most cases, khenpos’ slaughter renunciation movement is aimed at stopping 
the selling of livestock to the meat market.  This movement differs from the traditional and still-
practiced tshe thar ritual, in which livestock are ritually liberated from intentional slaughter. This 
includes a promise not only not to slaughter the yaks themselves but also not to allow others to 
do so through trade.  In the slaughter renunciation pledge, herders promise not to sell their yaks 
to the meat market for a numbers of years or for their entire lives, but it is still acceptable to sell 
calves to other herders, because the buyers do not sell any young yaks to the meat market until 
they have matured after four to five years. (That is, they may be sold by the buyer after the terms 
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of the owner’s pledge are over.) Traditionally, Tibetan herders normally have only one or two 
livestock as tshe thar, but if a family member falls ill, they may liberate more of their livestock 
(Bso Dar Rgyas, 1997). In contrast, the slaughter renunciation movement applies to the entire 
herd.  
 
Study Site: Rakhor Village, Hongyuan County 
Sichuan Province’s Hongyuan County, to which Rakhor Village currently belongs, is a 
nomadic county with a population of 40,000 located at the altitude of 3500m. The majority of the 
population are Tibetan pastoralists who make their living by herding yaks. The average 
temperature in winter is - 7°C with an average low of –36 °C, and the average temperature in 
summer is 7 °C with the highest temperature of 26°C. The annual precipitation is 753mm. It has 
a long winter with a short summer, spring and autumn. Eighty per cent of the annual 
precipitation occurs from May to October.6  
Aside from tourism, yaks are the main economic resource for Hongyuan County, therefore, 
the local government has been particularly enthusiastic about promoting the production of local 
yak meat sales as a development strategy, including through the Aba  (Tib: Rgna ba) Tibetan 
Plateau Yak Economic Park. Located at the eastern Tibetan plateau, Tibetan herders’ interaction 
with big market cities in western China has been increasing over the past two decades. 
Particularly with the improvement of roads, in 2011 it took about 6-8 hours by car to reach 
Hongyuan from Chengdu, the Sichuan provincial capital and the largest city in western China.   
Half of the population of Hongyuan is under Nyingma monasteries, and many herders under 
these Nyingma monasteries have been very active in the slaughter renunciation movement. 
                                                 
6   《红原县志》（1992—2005）2011. Hongyuan County Annals.  
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Within Hongyuan, the slaughter renunciation movement began in Rakhor (Tib: Ra skor) in 2006, 
where I spent one year conducting field research in 2010. 
The residents of Rakhor village migrated from Datang pa, Ganzi County, Ganzi Prefecture 
to its current location in 1942, and it became one sub-tribe of the Mewa tribe (currently under 
five townships in Hongyuan County) at that time, while maintaining its independent identity 
before 1959. In 1959, the state established Longrang Township, later renamed Qiongxi (Tib: 
Khyung mchu) Township, by combining the Rakhor tribe with two other tribes, one of which 
migrated from Qinghai and another from another place. As of 2010, Rakhor Village had a 
population of about 950 herders in 185 households. Because the other two villages that were 
merged to form Qiongxi Township were from Qinghai, Rakhor Village does not have a very 
strong affiliation with other villages even though they belong administratively to one township. 
In contrast with their loose ties to their township, Rakhor herders are much more comfortable to 
be culturally part of the traditional Mewa tribe, which is currently spread across three 
administrative townships in Hongyuan County.  
Rakhor has two main settlements, both of which are located about three kilometers away 
from Hongyuan County Town. The newer one was built beginning in 2006 on a piece of land 
they received from the state. The older settlement is located near their monastery, Rakhor 
Monastery. About 60% of Rakhor villagers have their new houses in the newer settlement while 
the remaining 40% are located near the monastery. Most of houses in the new settlement were 
built with state subsidies, mostly from the State Housing Project for Herders since 2009. Despite 
the implementation of the State Housing Project for Herders, most herders still cannot be settled 
for the whole year, because they still need to graze their livestock on their pastures. For many 
households, the newly-built houses are places where they store the possessions that they do not 
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need while they are away. In 2010, the county government included the Rakhor new settlement 
as one of Hongyuan County’s resettlement tourism sites.  These are included among the tourism 
sites are supposed to attract tourists from inner China, thus generating income for local herders. 
Another kind of support that Rakhor herders, like other herders in Hongyuan County, have 
been receiving from the state is rice (88 kg/person/year) and flour (75 kg/person/year) because 
the county is the site of a Kashin-Beck disease alleviation program, which started in 2007, and 
was completed by the end of 2011.  Rakhor herders have also been receiving grants from the 
Tuimu Huancao Program. Begun in 2008, Tuimu Huancao is an ecological program that aims to 
restore degraded grassland, using three techniques: banning of grazing on certain pastures for ten 
years, three month’s closing of some pastures annually, and seeding on some heavily degraded 
pastures. These grants have been distributed by the state to household members who received 
grassland allocations in 1996. There are also several social welfare programs in place, including 
a collective health-care system, through which herders get partial reimbursement of their health 
costs, depending on where they see doctors. The closer and lower the level of the hospital where 
they go to see the doctors, the larger the reimbursement they get.  The Minimum Living Standard 
Security System (guaranteed subsistence allowances) and Support for Disabled People Program 
are two other programs that help disadvantaged groups.  Another important program is the Nine 
Years Compulsory Education Program. With state education program, combined with Tibetan 
religious leaders’ support for the state education (discussed in Chapter 6), the school enrollment 
rate of Rakhor Village has become very high. 
Rakhor village have seven teams (natural villages) on seven pastures, and each team has 
between 10 to 30 households. All pastures were contracted to individual households in 1996. 
Every household has one allocation for all seasons; that is, their summer pastures, spring 
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pastures, fall pastures, and winter pastures are located in one place, so pastoralists in Rakhor do 
not need to move very far unless they rent pastures from other households. This is different from 
many other areas where winter pastures and summer pastures are located in two separate areas. 
Some pastures are located next to the Hongyuan County town and others are located as far as 
thirty kilometers from their new settlement. Recently the state has built many dirt roads that have 
reached many pastures of Rakhor herders, but there are still some pastures that cannot be 
accessed by car. While motorcycles have become the main form of transportation for most 
herders these days, there are some herders who still depend on horses and yaks as their only 
means of transportation.   
Rakhor Monastery, which belongs to the Nyingma School, has about 40 monks, with one 
head lama who died in the late 2000s. There are also three monks from Rakhor Village who have 
studied and received khenpo degrees from Larung Gar. Since their head lama died, these 
khenpos have been managing the monastery. Monks gather in the monastery for most months of 
the year to chant Buddhist texts and perform religious rituals, to pray for the betterness of 
community members and for the dead.  
As Rakhor Village is a very traditional community, herders are still very active in religious 
rituals and practice. These practices include making donation to monks and lamas, constructing 
Buddhist facilities (chanting halls, statues, and stupas, mani prayer wheels, putting up religious 
flags), doing prostrations, practicing simple meditations, making offering to Buddhist deities and 
mountain deities, recitation of Buddhist scripts, and others. It is very common to see many 
elderly people of Rakhor Village practicing circumambulation and prostrations.  
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Methods and Field Experience 
I conducted field research for eleven months, from the end of January to the end of 
December 2010.   Based on the nature of my research, which is related to the state and market, 
religion, and pastoralism, I conducted interviews with four groups of people: herders from 
Rakhor village, khenpos and monks, both local and outside of Rakhor village, local livestock 
traders, and government officials. In addition to the interviews with these different groups, I also 
collected books and videos about religious teachings and government projects, and observed the 
daily activities of herders and their interactions with lamas/khenpos, state projects, and Han and 
Hui livestock traders. The places where I conducted my research included Hongyuan County, 
Seda County, Chengdu city in Sichuan province; and Yushu prefecture, Dulan County, and 
Xining City in Qinghai province. 
 
Tibetan herders  
2010 was a very busy year for Tibetan herders in Hongyuan County, particularly for 
Rakhor village. Rakhor villagers, on the one hand, were busy with the State Housing Project for 
Herders, because many herders had participated in the project. On the other hand, 2010 was the 
year that they had to decide if they wanted to continue their vows for a second term of slaughter 
renunciation. In addition to that, they also were planning to invite a very prestigious lama from 
Guoluo prefecture to perform religious teachings and empowerment to reverse the downtrend of 
their community.  
In Rakhor Village, I used mixed methods, including 185 household surveys, in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with 45 households, and participant observation of herders’ everyday 
lives and religious rituals.  The survey covered general information about villagers and their 
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livestock, and the slaughter renunciation movement (Table 1). The in-depth semi-structured 
interview covered a wide range of topics, including their participation in the movement, 
interaction with state and state projects, participation in the market economy, participation in 
religious rituals, interaction Buddhist elites, livestock production, and income differentiation, 
among others. Among the 45 households I interviewed, there were 12 female herders, including 
5 above 60 years of age and 7 female herders between 30-55 years old. Among the 33 male 
herders I interviewed, 4 were over 60 years of age, and 29 were between 30-69 years old. In 
terms of their economic conditions, among the 45 interviewees, there were 5 very rich herders 
whose annual household incomes were over 60,000 RMB; 32 households had an annual income 
between 25,000-35,000 RMB; 5 had no livestock but were working in part-time jobs making 
roughly 20,000-30,000 RMB a year; and 3 of them had no livestock and whose livelihood 
depended upon the State Guaranteed Living Allowances Program and other support. In terms of 
their support for the slaughter renunciation movement, I noted no gender differences, but found 
that elderly herders were more supportive of the movement than the younger ones. 
Table 1 – Income of Households in the Survey, Rakhor Village, 2010 
Number of yaks per 
household 
Number of households at this 
income level 
Annual income from selling livestock 
and dairy products (RMB) 
< 15 20 3000 
15-50 45 3000-8000 
50-150 66 8000-35000 
150-280 23 35000-60000 
> 280 6 >60000 
No yaks at all 25 10000-30000 
 185 (total)  
 
In addition to the interviews, I found participant observation very useful, as it allowed me 
to understand many things that I could not get answers from interviews, such as herders’ 
relationship with Tibetan religious elites, and the way they have been influenced by religious 
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forces, state administration, and market forces.  Participant observation was much more useful 
than interviews for understanding how religion plays a role in everyday decisions of herders. I 
participated in five religious rituals. A religious teaching performed by a highly respected lama 
from a monastery in Guoluo prefecture, Qinghai province, was one of the most important 
religious activities for Rakhor village that year. Making offerings to the mountain gods is another 
very important annual religious ritual for Rakhor village as it is for other Tibetan communities. 
These were very important gatherings where I was able to get answers that I was not otherwise 
able to obtain through the interviews.  
Rakhor Village is under the same administrative township as the village where I grew up.  
I had several reasons to choose Rakhor village as my focused research site.  First, it was the first 
site of the slaughter renunciation movement in Hongyuan County.  Second, I wanted to choose a 
site where I had already had some knowledge and general understanding of the community. This 
was important because of the difficulty of fieldwork access particularly at the time of my 
research.  Third, while I wanted a community that was familiar, I felt it should be one that I was 
not intimately part of and where I still had a great deal to learn, because the process of learning 
and exploration is fundamental to research.  Rakhor was ideal given that it is, on the one hand, in 
a township I am familiar with, but on the other hand, a very different village than my own. 
Historically, Rakhor Village came from the Kham cultural region, whereas, my village migrated 
before 1959 from the Amdo cultural region. Therefore, the two villages have a very different 
history. They also belong to different religious schools. My village belongs to Bon School of 
Tibetan Buddhism whereas Rakhor belongs to the Nyingma School.  Because of these 
differences, the two villages historically do not get along very well. For all of these reasons, I 
began fieldwork not knowing very much about Rakhor village, particularly individual 
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households and their way of life. This situation had the advantage of reducing the risk of taking 
things for granted during my research.  
However, when I started my research, I faced a challenge. At the beginning of my research, 
some herders did not trust me very much. First, politically, it was still very sensitive when I was 
in the field. Second, they did not trust me because they did not understand why I was doing 
research in their village instead of my own, because historically, the two villages did not get 
along well.  This problem was resolved with my hiring of two local herders as assistants and as I 
spent more time with the villagers. 
In addition to interviewing herders in Rakhor Village, to understand the variation and 
general situation of slaughter renunciation movement in other pastoral areas I also found it useful 
to conduct informal interviews in other pastoral areas. I interviewed herders in Luhuo, Seda, and 
Shiqu in Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan; Zhenqin in Yushu Prefecture, Qinghai, and Gouli in Haixi 
prefecture, Qinghai. Within Hongyuan County, I also interviewed herders from places where 
there is no slaughter renunciation movement to see why there is none, how they view the herders 
who participated in the movement, and how they see themselves.  
Khenpos  
In contrast to the herders whom I interviewed, khenpos, lamas, and monks were all very 
enthusiastic to respond to my questions, because they are better educated and they were very 
concerned about the slaughter issue and other social phenomena. As the lamas and khenpos were 
the initiators of the slaughter renunciation movement, I interviewed ten khenpos, two lamas, and 
more than ten monks from different places during my field research in 2010. This included 
interviews with five khenpos and one lama in Larung Gar, where the slaughter renunciation 
movement started. These leading khenpos in Larung Gar, including Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe 
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(also referred to as Khenpo Tsullo) and Khenpo Bsod Dar Rgyas are experts in teaching 
Buddhism to herders and in promoting the slaughter renunciation movement in many pastoral 
areas of Tibet. Most importantly, I interviewed one khenpo and several monks in the monastery 
of Rakhor village.  I also interviewed one lama and one khenpo in Serde Monastery (Hongyuan 
County), where the terms of the pledge were completed in the summer and restarted by the end 
of 2010, and two khenpos in Zhenqin Town (Yushu Prefecture, Qinghai), where local khenpos 
and monks started the slaughter renunciation movement many years ago.  I also conducted 
formal as well informal interviews with monks from different areas, including four from Seda 
County, five from Rakhor monastery, and some from other monasteries. 
I collected books, tape recordings, and videos related to my project. The books were 
mostly written by Khenpo Jigphun, Khenpo Tsullo, Khenpo Bsod Dar Rgyas, and other khenpos 
from Larung Gar. Most of the data in my dissertation come from Khenpo Tsullo’s works and his 
religious teachings, but there are also cases in which I have used other khenpos’ works.  Even 
though I have not been able to attend khenpos’ religious teachings, I have drawn upon many tape 
recordings and videos of various Buddhist teachings performed by khenpos from Larung Gar, 
including the religious teachings by Khenpo Tsullo in Rakhor and other places for the last few 
years. These videos and recordings have become the main sources through which I can see the 
process of the religious teachings, including the interactions between khenpos and herders, and 
the ways in which herders took various oaths.  
Other informants   
Tibetan middlemen became a very important group in my field research. I was able to 
interview six Tibetan middlemen in Hongyuan. The middlemen are a very small and exceptional 
but important group. Middlemen are those whose main business is to purchase yaks from herders 
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and then sell them to bigger businessmen or assisting even bigger Han businessman from major 
Chinese cities. Traditionally, the trade in livestock for slaughter was a business that only Han 
and Muslims engaged in, so the Tibetan middlemen have become involved in the business only 
very recently, in the past ten years.  
Another new phenomenon related to the slaughter renunciation movement in Hongyuan 
County is the increasing number of slaughterhouses.  In order to understand where yaks have 
been sold, slaughtered, and consumed, I traced the yak-meat production line, investigating the 
slaughterhouses and livestock trade centers in Hongyuan County. In Hongyuan County, herders 
are required to sell their livestock in the livestock trade center, which belongs to the largest 
slaughterhouse, previously owned by the state but later purchased by the Bang Bang Ji Company 
in Chengdu. Yaks are sometimes brought there either by the herders themselves or by Han or 
Hui businessmen with the support of Tibetan assistants (middlemen). After they have gone 
through a livestock trade center, yaks are either slaughtered in local slaughterhouses or are 
transported to the larger markets in Dujiangyan, Lanzhou, and Xiahe.  In addition to the Bang 
Bang Ji slaughterhouse, which can handle 700 yaks per day, there are more than ten other 
privately-owned slaughterhouses in Hongyuan, the largest of which has a capacity of up to 200 
yaks per day. Meat products from those slaughterhouses are either transported to markets near 
cities right way or are stored in cold storage and transported to larger markets when the price is 
up.  Most of these slaughterhouses close in November and reopen in June or July each year. 
Regarding information about the state and related projects, in addition to the information 
that I collected by interviewing herders, official documents and local TV news were the main 
sources of information that I used. As discussed above, the state has been implementing many 
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projects that have targeted pastoralists for the last few years, most of which have very popular 
among Tibetan herders.   
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Chapter One 
Theoretical Framework and Structure of Dissertation: 
 
The slaughter renunciation movement has taken place in contemporary China where the 
discourse of development defines everything. Yet, there are relatively few academic discussions 
about development of China from the perspective of development studies in human geography 
and cultural anthropology. This is particularly true in studying religious movements and Chinese 
minorities’ relationship with the state from the perspective of critical development studies. This 
is important because the dominant recent Chinese development trend, economic reform that is 
characterized by neo-liberalism, has had a profound impact on the Tibetan pastoralists on the 
Tibetan plateau at the same time as religious revival and new religious teachings and movements 
have emerged in many pastoral areas. This chapter first reviews the recent academic shift in 
critical studies of development in the fields of human geography and anthropology, laying the 
academic debates to which the case of the slaughter renunciation movement can contribute. The 
second part of the chapter reviews recent debates and discussions about neo-liberalism and 
Chinese economic reform since the 1980s. It discusses how neo-liberalization the western China, 
with its specific different cultural backgrounds, is informed by Tibetan Buddhism and its 
religious movements, and how this relationship informs larger discussions of uneven 
development and religious revival on the global scale.  
 
Development as an entangled “knot” of cultural contestation 
The many mainstream development theories including those drawing upon Adam Smith’s 
notion of the invisible hand of the free market, Keynesianism, modernization theory, and the 
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recent neo-liberalism are based on the experience of North America and Europe’s economic 
fluctuations since the 1930s. Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the free market, Keynesianism, and 
the recent neo-liberalism debate the role of the state vs. free market in economic development, 
while modernization theory maintained that all countries follow one development path, that of 
the developed countries in the west. At the same time, many economists from South America 
theorized economic development based on the experience of Latin American countries’ 
economic development, resulting in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) approach, dependency theory, and world systems theory, among others. Most 
of these latter theories argue that the economic backwardness of these countries is associated 
with the developed Northern countries. Influenced by Marxism, these approaches frame the 
developed countries as exploitative capitalist agents and the less developed countries as exploited 
and marginalized (Porter and Sheppard, 1998; Willis, 2005). Studying development from a 
political-economic perspective, with a focus on labor, capital and the state, Marxist theory 
suggests a socialist development path as an alternative to capitalist development that has entailed 
capitalist exploitation of the poor (Marx, 1978). 
As a departure from these economic approaches to development studies, post-
Development critiques emerged in the 1990s in the fields of anthropology and geography. 
Drawing on Michel Foucault’s work, many scholars have studied development as discourse. 
Discourse refers to the nexus of knowledge and power through which particular concepts, 
theories, and practices for social change are created and reproduced (Escobar, 1995). 
Epistemological premises for this approach are grounded in poststructuralist concepts asserting 
language and discourse as systematically organizing power through the subjectivity of social 
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actors and their actions. Among the most prominent studies of development that drew on 
development as discourse in the 1990s were those of Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1990). 
Arturo Escobar (1995) examines why mainstream development, after numerous failures to 
deliver what it promised to provide for target groups, maintains its position. He argues that 
Foucault’s analysis of the power of representation and its ultimate creation of social reality can 
explain how development discourse becomes hegemonic and makes alternative ways 
unthinkable. He analyzes mainstream development theory as part of a discursive regime of truth 
that claimed universal expertise and denied its own cultural and historical specificities. 
Development discourse puts those with scientific and technocratic knowledge of development in 
a superior position, at the same time constructing the target group as a society full of problems 
that require development interventions. With the circulation of development discourse, problems 
such as ‘overpopulation’, ‘poverty’ and ‘famine’ become the essential truths about the Global 
south. In Encountering Development, Escobar's central argument is that there is no linear or 
universal model of economic and social development that can be objectively applied to the 
diverse local cultures of the societies that were grouped under the “the Third World.” Indeed, 
Escobar argues passionately that the construct of the Third World is an ethnocentric invention of 
the post-World War II West, and that development is an equally flawed "regime of 
representation" crafted by a constellation of ideology, group interests, and the attempt of “the 
West” to impose its power-driven interests on non-western peoples.  
Similarly, James Ferguson (1990), in his The Anti-Politics Machine, uses an 
anthropological approach and Foucault’s discourse theory to analyze the nature of “development 
discourse,” revealing how “experts,” when they formulate development projects, often 
demonstrate a startling ignorance of the historical and political realities of the locale they intend 
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to help. Ferguson noticed that the World Bank has constructed Lesotho as a traditional peasant 
subsistence society that was a predominantly agricultural economy and portrayed it as static and 
isolated. However, Ferguson’s examination of the political-economic history of the country 
revealed that farmers have long engaged in commercial trade and that the country had long 
exported wage laborers to the capitalist economy of South Africa. Therefore, the development 
experts’ conclusion about the need for external intervention to bring roads, markets and credit 
rest on a representation that ignores the fact that these already existed before the World Bank 
programs and are not the reasons for the country’s poverty. He sees development programs as a 
means to translate all political and structural problems that cause poverty into technical problems 
that need interventions from outside, so that the state apparatus is expanded and political 
problems are untouched. 
Though these discursive approaches to development have been successful in 
deconstructing development and in illustrating the inequality of power between the “First World” 
and “Third World,” they do not tell the whole story about development. A kind of discourse 
determinism that overemphasizes textual representation has not allowed them to pay much 
attention to meaningful local resistance that reworks the process of development (Moore, 2000; 
Pigg, 1992).  Responding to this shortcoming, geographers and anthropologists began to focus on 
treating development as contested cultural practices, going beyond textual analysis to in-depth 
studies on the ground where development projects are worked out through all sorts of struggles 
and contestations (Li, 1999; 2007; Moore, 2000; Pigg, 1992; Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal, 
2003; Yeh, 2007).  
It is Ferguson's (1990) influential formulation of development as an “anti-politics 
machine” that depoliticizes everything in its way that Moore (2000) critiques. For Moore, instead 
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of development being an anti-politics machine, it is a site for cultural politics, and he proposes 
the metaphor of development as a “crucible of cultural politics,” to indicate the ways in which 
development is debated, contested, and reworked. It is with this conceptualization of crucible of 
cultural politics that Moore criticizes post-structural accounts of development discourse, 
including his two pointed critiques of Escobar’s conceptualization of development. First, he 
argues that Escobar’s overemphasis on the textual analysis of World Bank planners’ and 
development technocrats’ documents take attention away from other equally important questions 
of how development confronts not docile bodies but the situated cultural practices and 
sedimented histories of people and place, and how the development ideas and its 
implementations are “reproduced, resisted, or reworked through rural livelihood struggles” 
(Moore, 2000: 658).  Second, the treatment of global development institutions as a post World 
War II project ignores the older historical patterns of these more recent interventions. The lack of 
attention to previous histories of development and regional political economy obscure the way in 
which the historical memories of both those who know how others should live and those they 
target, shape and rework the current development processes.  
While seeing the merits of Ferguson’s (1990) argument about the discursive effects of 
development, Tania Li (1999, 2007) argues that the transformation of failure into more 
development involves more complex cultural work at the interface between development 
projects and those they targeted. For Li, the framing of a "development" intervention is a 
“delicate cultural operation” (1999: 298). She points out that it is necessary to distinguish 
development as a government control project from how development is accomplished. To 
understand the latter is to see how development becomes an arena where both compromise and 
achievement are interwoven. Projects of rule and their compromises are enabled and constrained 
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by sedimented histories, contemporary social forces, and international resource flows 
configuring a particular national arena. In The Will to Improve, Li (2007) tries to bring 
Foucault’s governmentality, Gramsci’s concept of constellation of power, and Marxist political 
economy into one dialogue to see both the aspects of “conduct of conduct” in development and 
the conjectural contestation triggered by the development force with other forces. For her, the 
examination of the impacts of programs in the particular situation is to step beyond the studying 
of development from documents, maps, and the administrative apparatus. Attending to particular 
histories, landscapes, memories, and cultural ideas, she uses an ethnographic approach to 
elucidate conflicts, contestations, and uncertainties that characterize power relations in 
competitive forces within and around the will to improve (Li, 2007). 
While Moore and Li are particularly interested in moving from seeing development as 
discourse to the examining of it as contested practices, Stacy Pigg (1992) examined development 
that works to differentiate social categories and localized social meanings in contemporary 
Nepal. In an effort to modernize the nation-state, the Nepalese government, assisted by 
international donors’ agencies, turned rural landscapes into a new image of villages that become 
the target of development. The meaning of the current ‘villages’ are not the same meaning of 
villages that are usually defined with cities or townships, but rather they become a social 
category within the national developmental landscape.  Using extensive ethnographic 
observation and textual analysis, Pigg demonstrated how Nepalese internalized the concept of 
development. The conjuncture of village, development and nation, have reworked western 
development ideas into social relations and cultural norms within contemporary Nepal. In this 
way, the encounter of villages and development altered the original meanings of both 
development and the village. Development has become a reference for social differences through 
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the creation of village, which goes along with other social categories such as gender, religion, 
caste, and ethnicity.  
The common ground of all of these writings is their emphasis on the confrontation of 
localized forces with Western-oriented development discourse and the programs of trustees. 
They either entirely challenge the governmental aspect of development or place it on a more 
contested ground of development (Li, 1999; 2007; Moore, 2000; Pigg, 1992; 1996).  The 
Western development model itself was a cultural product that was generated from a specific set 
of processes and historical and social context. It is important to understand how different cultural 
stakeholders encounter each other in local settings, and how these encounters have reshaped 
development as a hybrid conjuncture (Moore, 2000). Neither a structural nor discursive analysis 
of development has been able to illustrate the specific process of development as cultural 
politics.  
Despite the strengths of the ethnographic cultural politics approach, which I adopt, most 
authors who analyze development as practice have focused their attention on the simplistic and 
dichotomous relationship between trustees and the target group. They tend to present two 
opposite positions: those who know how others should live, and the local, the target of 
development (Li, 2007). A problem arises in that there is a tendency to simplify the local as a 
united force, labeled as “indigenous,” “village,” “ethnic group,” or “community,” versus trustees 
that are also presented as singular. Indeed, this war-like conceptualization of the relationship 
between the local and the trustees also elides or ignores many other forces that often intersect 
and complicate the encounter of local and the state/trustees. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate, 
the positions of those encountering forces in development are dynamic and constantly changing 
in the way that some overlap at one time while others are opposites at other times.  
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While many scholars, like those discussed above, have been paying attention to post-
World War II development interventions, some scholars suggest the necessity of relating 
development studies to the persistence of capitalism on the global scale. Gillian Hart suggests the 
necessity to distinguish between “big D Development” from “small d development” (Hart, 2001; 
2002; 2004; 2010). The former refers to the post-World War II international project of deliberate 
interventions that targeted underdeveloped countries, while the latter refers to the uneven process 
of capitalist expansion. She points out that critiques of “Development,” such as Escobar’s, that 
lay their hope on alternatives such as civil society, the grassroots, social capital, community 
development, participatory development, and new social movements will lead to a dead end in 
their problematic conceptualization of local versus global, in which the former is a passive 
receiver and only the latter is an active agent.  Instead, she suggests it is much more fruitful to 
focus on the small “d development,” and to explore the constitutive and conjunctural processes 
of development through ethnographic studies. Drawing on Polanyi’s notion of the “double-
movements” in capitalist expansion in which society protects itself from market expansions 
through counter-movements, Hart’s idea is that these new social movements and alternatives to 
“Development” should not be seen as completely external to development but rather is part of 
the small “d development” process (Hart, 2002; 2004; 2010; Hart, 2007; Polanyi, 1957[1944]). 
In other words, if we stick with only large D “Development”, then we will lose sight of an 
important point, the process of expansion of capitalism, disguised in economic development or 
globalization. For Hart, the danger in the study of development is to miss the new forms of 
capitalism emerging in the new situations when scholars focus too narrowly on tracing authentic 
or alternative capitalism. At the same time, studies of the cultural politics of development can 
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tease out the complex conjunctures where capitalism has become invisible in the new discourses 
such globalization and development. 
 My dissertation, on the one hand, is built on Hart’s suggestion to trace ‘small d’ 
development in the contemporary Chinese context, and on the other hand, to address the 
generalization problem of framing trustees as diametrically opposed to the “local” (Moore 2000; 
Li 1999). That is, bringing religious forces into dialogue with development debates, my 
examination of the slaughter renunciation movement is an attempt to build on as well as extend 
these recent studies of development as practice, by looking at multiple agents and their entangled 
struggle over the articulation of development in material and symbolic terms. At the same time, I 
follow Hart’s suggestion of the need to pay attention to “how multiple forces come together in 
practice to produce particular dynamic or trajectories, as well as possible alternatives” (Hart 
2004: 91). Therefore, I pay particular attention to how the meanings as well as practices of 
development are contested and overlap among multiple groups in Tibet; and the process of 
“small d” development in Tibet, China. 
 In pastoral areas of Tibet, the multiple agents involved in development include not only 
the state with its intention to bring both material and ideological transformation to the 
pastoralists but also Tibetan Buddhist leaders who have more spiritual influence on herder. As I 
will show, although state and religious authorities are backed by fundamentally different 
ideology and agendas, their solutions have ironically converged in the end. However, the agents 
involved in development are in fact even more complex than this notion of state vs. local.  
Village leaders are the lowest level of the government apparatus to put state projects into 
practice. They are simultaneously the heads of traditional tribal communities. Tibetan radical 
secularists are mostly employed as government officials, but they may have different interests 
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and agendas that do not go along very well with state ideology. Local khenpos and monks 
presumably are part of the village, but their agendas and ways of thinking are different from 
those of the herders. Moreover, Tibetan herders’ decisions about their livestock and pastures and 
the debate regarding development issues in pastoral areas are all informed by multiple and 
dynamic forces, including state projects, the market economy, and khenpos’ religious teachings.  
 More importantly, teasing out the roles of multiple agents in the contestation is not only a 
matter of adding more numbers, but rather it is to understand their participation in contested 
development, how their interaction pushes forward a new form of development, and how they 
are related to each other in this process. The relationship between the trustees and the target 
group has never been a simple relationship of two. Instead, their relationship is formed by others 
who also participate in this entangled “knot.”  That is, the relationship of group A and B is 
always related to the group C, D, and many more, and furthermore the boundaries between the 
groups are always fuzzy. Many state projects are embraced by both the Tibetan religious leaders 
and Tibetan pastoralists, and at the same time, Tibetan religious movements are competing with 
the state secular based neo-liberalization project in forming Tibetan herders into certain kinds of 
subjects. In a similar way, Tibetan Buddhist movements, as a historically dominant power force 
in Tibetan regions, have emerged recently in the space of religious freedom provided by the state 
since economic reform. At the same time that herders embrace state projects and have strong 
desires for getting government jobs for their kids, the slaughter renunciation movement has 
placed them in a dilemma between giving up selling livestock to slaughterhouses and fulfilling 
their increasing desires for material development by selling livestock to the slaughterhouses. In 
short, the trustees and the target groups cannot be isolated from other forces, many of which are 
contested and overlap with one another in the articulation and practices of development. 
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 To capture these dynamic and multiple but mutually constitutive power relations in a 
meaningful way, I propose the conceptualization of development as a cultural “knot,” which is 
constituted by entangled multiple power relations. First, this knot is the intersection or linkage of 
many different agents with different agendas. In the case of slaughter renunciation, those agents 
include the state through specific projects and the state as the creation of conditions of a free 
market economy; religious movements; local village leaders; Tibetan radical secularists; Tibetan 
herder; and so forth. Second, multiple agents’ relations are not always those of exploitation and 
resistance, but rather other relationships can also be observed, including invisible tensions, 
cooperation, overlapping practices, and mutually benefitting agendas, among others. Some of 
their interests are overlapping and compatible. Furthermore, many state projects are embraced by 
both Tibetan khenpos and Tibetan herders, including education, health care, infrastructure, 
businesses without sins, and others (see Chapter 6). At the same time, other interests in 
development are incompatible. The state promotion of the yak meat industry is incompatible 
with Tibetan Buddhist teachings, which is the point where the slaughter renunciation movement 
and vegetarian movement took place (see Chapter 1).  
In addition, the positions of different agents, or parts of the knot, are not fixed. Some of 
them may contest each at one time while embracing each other at other times. Li (2007) argues 
out that a condition for any intervention of development is the differentiation between those who 
know how others should live and those who become the target of the inventions. It might easy to 
maintain these boundaries in texts or in a discursive way. In practice, however, these boundaries 
are fragile. When it comes to the state development, it is more so. In pastoral areas of Tibet, 
Tibetan religious leaders are not passive receivers of state projects nor are they dominant power 
holder, but they assert a certain power over the pastoralists through their religious performances, 
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in a way that cannot be accounted for by the trustee-local model of development. Indeed, these 
dynamic overlapping or contesting positions and agendas can be seen in Tania Li’s The Will to 
Improve (2007), in which she shows that different NGOs have different agendas  -- one pro-park 
and another against the park -- and the current state programs had to be revised due to pressure 
from international environmental organizations. Despite showing this empirically, however, 
these are not her main point; rather, she focuses on a framework of the local versus the trustees. 
Third, the shape of this entangled cultural “knot” is determined by the dynamic 
relationship of those agents involved. The form of the “knot” is not static, but rather it s a 
constantly changing format driven by the changing relationship of agents. For instance, Tibetan 
village leaders play two roles in the contemporary Tibetan society (see Chapter 4): on the one 
hand, they work for the state to implement state projects, and on other hand, they represent the 
interests of traditional tribal communities playing important roles in reinforcing their traditional 
identity and culture.  Tibetan radical secularists agree in some ways with the state on how 
Tibetan should be developed. Both think Tibetans should get rid of their tradition and totally 
embrace new cultures and new knowledge. At the same time, Tibetan radical secularists stand on 
the same ground with Tibetan khenpos in their concern about Tibetan identity and future 
development.   
Fourth, the contestation exists not only between the state and what most scholars call the 
“local,” but in the case of Tibet, contestation exists even among different groups of Tibetans. For 
instance, Tibetan Buddhist elites and Tibetan radical secularists have been having a fierce debate 
over the role of Tibetan Buddhist in the development (see Chapter 5). Finally, I maintain that the 
individual agents that constitute part of the “knot” possess different power so that some have the 
power to manipulate others while others are in disadvantaged positions. Nevertheless, the real 
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power in the “knot” of development is the process of persistent moving toward global 
penetration of capitalism, what Hart called small “d” development (see Chapter 6).  
In short, this conceptualization of development as entangled knot will enable us to see 
development as a complex relationship among different groups in the uneven process of social 
transformation, the heart of which is capitalist social relationships. This process will lead the 
society toward a space where disparity is increased and institutionally normalized, and resources 
are monopolized. But all of those problems are normalized and legitimized by different cultural 
norms (for instance secular neo-liberal culture or Tibetan Buddhist culture). Indeed, this social 
transformation is realized through the process of the cultural contestation, interpretation, and 
collaborations between different groups.  
As complex and dynamic as it is, my argument is not that there is nothing to be theorized 
about the massive and complicated power relations in development. Instead, the concept of the 
knot helps us to sort out these entangled power relationships in a useful manner, and to avoid 
reducing them to dichotomous or binary struggles.  This ethnographic study of the slaughter 
renunciation movement works as a window through which these entangled cultural struggles can 
be teased out and traced along the lines of each linkage, demonstrating how Tibetans as an ethnic 
group have been trying to promote their own culturally based development, in this entangled 
“knot” of cultural struggles.  
 
Neoliberal governmentality, Chinese market economy and religious forces 
As I will demonstrate, Tibetan khenpos seem to have a contradictory relationship with the 
neoliberal context of contemporary China. They, on one hand, have been competing with the 
neo-liberal market forces in their promotion of the renounce-slaughter movement. The abortion 
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of the second term of the movement in Rakhor village and their frustration in the promotion of 
the movement in many other parts of eastern Amdo is mostly due to the strong influence of the 
market economy that formed the Tibetan herders’ way of thinking and their ways of life, 
compared with the counties in northern Ganzi Prefecture where the religious influence has been 
much stronger than the influence of market economy. At the same, ironically, in their teachings 
of the renounce-slaughter movement, khenpos have also been making compelling suggestions for 
Tibetan herders to engage actively in the market economy and state education. Their frustration 
with neo-liberal market forces and their simultaneous active embrace of it require a new 
approach for the study of neo-liberalism in China. This dissertation adds to studies of 
neoliberalism in China by bringing another layer --Tibetan Buddhism and its movements -- into 
the neoliberal context of contemporary pastoral areas of Tibet, China.  
Even though the Chinese state officially denies that China is neoliberal, in both Chinese 
and Western academic circles, there has been debate over whether or not China is an example of 
authentic neo-liberalism, or whether or not it has the main features of neo-liberalism. To 
determine how neo-liberal China is, or how useful neo-liberalism is to understanding 
contemporary China, first one must define neo-liberalism and explain what kinds of basic values 
and characteristics neo-liberalism has. 
It is not easy to come to a consensus on the definition of neo-liberalism or what a 
neoliberal state is, due to the reason that this concept has been overused and has been used to 
mean many different things (Nonini, 2008). One reason for this is that many anthropologists and 
geographers have examined neo-liberalism from different perspectives, including the mainstream 
economic perspective that treats neo-liberalism as an economic strategy of a state policy, critical 
studies of neo-liberalism as a new version of capitalism, and the examination of the governance 
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aspect of neo-liberalism. In addition to that, different scholars use different definitions when they 
situate it in different societies with different cultural backgrounds, and for different purposes. 
Another reason is that neo-liberalism in practice is very different from neo-liberalism as defined 
in theories (Harvey, 2005). 
However, some of the key elements can be summarized. Neo-liberalism is a set of 
economic policies that have become widespread since the early 1980s. A general characteristic 
of neo-liberalism is the desire to intensify and expand the market, by increasing the number, 
frequency, repeatability, and formalization of transactions. A key condition for a functioning 
neoliberal system is the belief that the free market economy (with none or limited state 
intervention) is the main way to achieve social and economic development. Property rights and 
privatization are important components of the free market economy, and autonomous individuals 
should be protected in their freedom to make their own decisions and are responsible for their 
own lives. At the heart of the neo-liberal framework is the freedom for competition and 
individual self-responsibility. Foucault (2008 [1978-79]) suggests, “The society regulated by 
reference to the market that the neo-liberals are thinking about is a society in which the 
regulatory should not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanism of 
competition” (147) and, “ I think this multiplication of the “enterprise” within the social body is 
what is at stake in neo-liberal policy. It is a matter of making the market, competition, and so the 
enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society”(148).  
 It is from this basic understanding of neo-liberalism that many scholars have explored its 
different aspects in contemporary China. For analytical purposes, I want to distinguish neo-
liberalism as an economic development strategy and social-economic structure, and neo-
liberalism as a technique of governance. However, I make this distinction noting that in fact both 
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of them are interrelated and cannot be separated in practice. I first review the recent literature on 
neo-liberalism as economic strategy in China, followed by a discussion about neo-liberalism as a 
technique of governance.  
 
Political Economic Approaches to Neo-Liberalism 
 Geographer David Harvey’s A brief history of Neo-liberalism has become a target of 
critiques for his argument about neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics. When Harvey 
described contemporary China as part of neoliberal histories, he introduced the phrase neo-
liberalism “with Chinese characteristics” (2005: 120-151). The usage of this term suggests that 
China is not fully neoliberal or there is still something about China that doesn’t fit well with the 
neoliberal model that originated from the West.   
Harvey has observed that the domination of neo-liberalism on a global scale created space 
for China to participate in global financial markets and free trade, which made the achievement 
of Chinese economic development possible. He saw a range of internal and external changes that 
were keys for the Chinese state to move towards neo-liberalism since its economic reform of the 
1980s.  A condition is formed for the competition between township and village enterprises, the 
dominant state owned firms, and private firms in many sectors in the market, which, in turn, 
forced the state to reform the state owned enterprises by various methods including privatization 
of some, the imposing of market oriented management, and the state withdrawing welfare 
provisions for laid off workers. At the same time, land use rights reform started with agricultural 
land reform where farmers were allocated arable land through a ‘household responsibility 
system,’ followed by urban land reform that allowed urban citizens and real estate companies to 
transact land use rights in the free market. The establishment of the free labor market led to 
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massive rural migration to the cities to increase migrants’ incomes. The opening of domestic 
markets to foreign investors and Chinese participation in the international market were enhanced 
by its entry into the WTO, allowing China to become one of the largest import and export 
countries.  
At the same time, Harvey also observed that the strong Chinese state and it political 
structure remain unchanged. All the economic changes were top-down state led changes, and the 
market was manipulated significantly by the state. Major sectors such as banking and petroleum 
continued to be owned by the state. The major driving force of the Chinese economy has been 
the state sectors even though there were significant increases in contributions from the private 
sector and foreign investment.    
What all these transformations mean to Harvey is that the formation of the market 
economy coexisted with a strong state, and at the same time it has been creating a new class 
formation.  Inequalities have been increasing while the overall economy has been growing at the 
rate of 10% annually. Rural farmers were dispossessed from their land by state and real estate 
companies. Their labor was exploited by the enterprises when they migrated to the cities to work 
in the factories, while most of the economic development benefits went to the urban residents 
and government and Party members who have become the new facilitators of the new surging 
consumer culture in China. Thousands of workers who have become jobless with the reform of 
the state firms are another labor pool ready for exploitation. At the same time, the increasing 
inequalities with economic reforms have led to various riots and demonstrations when peasants 
lost land and workers lost their jobs. 
As Harvey summarized, even though the party has tried to prevent the formation of a 
capitalist class, the marginalization of China’s workforce, the dismantling of the ‘iron rice bowl,’ 
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the state withdrawal from social welfare provisions and protection, the creation of flexible labor 
markets, and privatization of formerly commonly owned assets have created a space where 
capitalist enterprises can emerge and make profits. Thus, within this space, social wealth has 
been concentrated in upper classes including rich private owners, corrupt government officials, 
and foreign companies, while the powerless farmers and laid-off workers have been further 
marginalized. He concludes, “China, we may conclude, has definitely moved towards 
neoliberalization and the reconstitution of class power, albeit with ‘distinctively Chinese 
Characteristics’ (Harvey, 2005: 120-151). 
We can see from this formulation that for Harvey, neo-liberalism has a preexisting model 
that originated in the west. He sees many similarities between China and other neoliberal nations, 
but the strong Chinese state made it difficult for him to conclude that China is an authentic 
neoliberal state. He therefore used the term ‘distinctively Chinese characteristics’ to avoid 
excluding China from this category on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has become hard to 
include China into this category completely because of his preexisting model of neo-liberalism.    
While Harvey has an ambiguous attitude toward Chinese neo-liberalism, anthropologist 
Donald Nonini (2008) made a direct conclusion that China is not in the trajectory of a 
neoliberalization process. For Nonini (2008), any neo-liberalism has four distinctive features: 
markets are excellent; state controls over markets are horrible; globalization is best; and the 
rational self-interested individual market actor is best. Measuring China by these features of the 
Western model of neo-liberalism (similar with Harvey), Nonini criticized those anthropologists 
and others who argue that China is dominated by neoliberal ideology and its citizens have 
become the subjects of neoliberal economic governance.  
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Nonini suggests that it is more appropriate to analyze contemporary China in terms of the 
oligarchic Party and guanxi (personal relationship). This would lead to a more open and 
proactive analytic space. He asserts that China has become a certain kind of capitalist system, 
which he calls ‘cadre capitalism.’ He implicitly agrees that China has launched a market 
economy, which he sometimes calls a ‘socialist market’, or a liberal market economy. He has in 
common with Harvey the argument that China has become capitalist but he departs from 
Harvey’s assertion that China has neo-liberal features. Instead, he decisively concludes that 
China is not neo-liberal. He does not explore the relationship between capitalism and neo-
liberalism, or socialist market/liberal market economy and neo-liberalism. 
For Nonini, neo-liberalism emerged from Anglo American and other western countries, 
and it could become a dominant ideology in non-western countries only through American’s 
coercive intervention either through international institutions or through military invasion. The 
Chinese market economy was not imposed by any forces that came from the West, but rather is a 
top-down project that the Communist Party used to deal with its social economic disaster during 
Mao’s rule of China.  Thus, it is not neo-liberal.  
Counterarguments to Nonini’s position have been made by other scholars who see China’s 
transformation as a process of neo-liberalization.  Fulong Wu (2008) argues that neo-
liberalization in China is the process in which the state has sought an alternative ravenous 
accumulation strategy through the establishment of a market oriented society. In order to solve 
the problem of ‘over-accumulation’ of the Maoist period and to turn the pool of idle production 
workers into a productive force, the post-socialist state had to launch an economic reform to 
establish a market oriented society, within which the internal and external spaces were “created 
for accumulation” (2008:1094). In this process, Wu has observed a shift between the roles of 
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market and state. Initially, the market was a strategy adopted by the state to deal with problems 
including the increasing competition in the international market as a result of globalization and 
the ‘inevitability’ of market reorientation. The state needed to find a new space for the 
accumulation of wealth, and thus to legitimize its ruling position. However, with the deepening 
of the neo-liberalization process, the market became the dominant mechanism for resource 
allocation and social relations, and the state has become a force by which the market order is 
protected and the problems accompanying neo-liberalization were dealt with.  Here, the state did 
not vanish with neo-liberalization, but changed its function. The benevolent state has transferred 
its social welfare responsibilities to the individuals who depended on the state in the previous 
social system, and now become the guardians of the market social system. In this way, Wu 
provides a solution to Harvey’s problems of Chinese neo-liberalism that has strong state 
intervention. 
Economist Barry Naughton observed a similar phenomenon to that in Wu’s argument that 
in the process of neo-liberalization the state has shifted its role from planning to the regulation of 
elements of the market (Naughton, 1996). He observed a process of an earlier stage of Chinese 
economic reform that transformed the planned economy into a market oriented economy, 
distinguishing the Chinese dual-track approach from the “big bang” approach that took place in 
Poland and Russia in the 1990s. China’s different dual-track approach meant that in the reform 
process, both the planned economy and a market function for allocation of goods are coexistent 
in the early stage. The transformation has occurred with several key steps: the central 
government’s monopoly over industry was relaxed and the protected industrial sectors were 
opened to newcomers such as new state firms, private enterprises, and foreign investors.  The 
state retreated from its planned and monopoly position and allowed newcomers’ participation in 
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the industry, creating market conditions where different firms compete for profits, and thus 
improved the efficiency of state owned enterprises. At the same time, with the gradual 
deregulation of prices to reflect supply and demand, the production flow between the state and 
non-state sectors was permitted. To reverse the decrease of state revenues that resulted from the 
release of state dominated industries to the market, the state has imposed new management 
systems for state enterprises to promote better performance in the market economy.  The success 
of reform increased household incomes, which in turn increased national savings, and this 
increased savings has been channeled to other enterprises for further investment through 
restructured banks. In sum, with the deepening of the reform process, Barry Naughton saw that 
the plan itself and state sector have become less dominant elements in the economy as a whole. 
He also observed that reform proceeded in a “series of feedback loops – reform begets further 
reform” (320). The reduction of state dominance in goods allocation has led to its reduction of 
revenue, which forced the state to initiate another reform to improve the performance of state 
owned sectors.  
The discontinuity of economic transformation and continuity of political systems give the 
Chinese neo-liberalism a special character, but Wang Hui (2004) argues that neo-liberalism 
inherently depends on international and national policies, and without the state/policies 
neoliberalism as a practice does not have the capability to conceal social problems it brought: 
unemployment, the decline of social security, and the widening gap between rich and poor. 
Therefore, the existence of state interference in economic development does not prove the 
absence of hegemonic neo-liberalism in China. Indeed, it is the other way around: neo-liberalism 
has gained its dominant position in the process of economic reform through which the state has 
been able to overcome the crisis (1998 students’ movement in Beijing) of its legitimacy.  After 
  
43 
the Tiananmen incident that challenged the Communist Party’s legitimacy, the state extended 
economic reform and globalization to overcome its unstable position.  
In sum, some authors like Nonini (2008) and Kipnis (2007) define neo-liberalism with 
specific criteria that originated from the west. For instance, Nonini uses four features to see if 
China fits these criteria, while other authors like Harvey, Fulong Wu, and Wang Hui, argue that 
China is in the process of neoliberal transformation, despite the fact that the Chinese state has 
been deeply manipulating the economy and state owned enterprise remain dominant in major 
sectors.  
From these observations, I suggest an integrated way to evaluate if China is neoliberal or 
not and how or if it is useful to use this conceptualization in China.  First, I suggest that any neo-
liberal project has a core belief that competition between individual entities (either as enterprises 
or real individuals) in a free market enhances productivities and prosperity. The conditions and 
other forces to achieve these goals could be varied from place to place based on their historical 
and cultural background. For instance, privatization is viewed as a very important condition for 
neo-liberalism in America, whereas in China this may not be the case. This condition could be 
substituted by other similar functions such as use rights (both agricultural lands and grassland) 
contract system between the state and ordinary people combined with a small portion of 
privatization. For instance, the land use rights transaction in China has become one element of 
neo-liberalism. The competition in the free market to improve efficiency has become a very 
fundamental strategy for economic development in America as well as in China (Foucault, 
2008[1978-79]). Second, and in addition to this basic belief, there is another very important 
aspect to consider, that is, to see the consequences of this neoliberal belief and its practice in the 
nation in question.  In particular, I agree with Harvey’s (2005) argument that neo-liberalism is a 
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new version of global capitalist development. Neo-liberalism always creates class differentiation 
if it was absent previously, or reinforces class differentiation if it did exist in previous social 
condition like during the Maoist China. 
My dissertation argues that, according to these main values and functions of neoliberal 
rule, China is not a derivation of neo-liberalism, but fits well into neo-liberalism, and its process 
obscures class creation. In China the competitors in the free market have not been exclusively 
private enterprises, but include state owned enterprises and foreign companies. The general logic 
behind Chinese economic reform is similar to the one in the west. That is, the competition 
between enterprises and individuals would enhance production and creativity. 
 In any major meeting of top Chinese leaders and in documents issued in those 
meetings, the Gaige Kaifang (Opening Up and Reform) and Yi jingji jianshe wei zhongxin 
(economic development is the top priority) have been prominent, and there is no reason to think 
that the state will change this strategy in the foreseeable future, because the state has recognized 
that its increasing role on the international stage and being able to maintain its ruling position are 
inseparable from its achievements in the economic domain. Ideologically, it has become 
‘common sense’ (Gramsci, 1999[1971]) for both Chinese leaders and ordinary people that 
China’s achievements over the last decades have benefited from its promotion of a free market 
economy, with its open and reformed policies.  This ‘common sense’ does not preclude the 
existence of problems and issues associated with neo-liberal rule, and one can see this from the 
top leaders’ concern over the gap between rich and poor among individuals and regions and their 
political implications. The fact that one ideology becomes dominant does not mean that other 
voices completely disappear.  
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From a political economic perspective, neo-liberalism is a useful concept to capture the 
recent political economic changes on the Tibetan Plateau. In the pastoral areas of Tibet, this neo-
liberal economic strategy started with livestock privatization and the implementation of the 
grassland use rights contract system. To further integrate the pastoral regions into larger national 
economic development, the previous programs were followed by a larger national plan of the 
“Open up the West” (Xibu da kaifa) strategy, which has been translated into many specific 
projects in pastoral areas of Tibet, including sedentarization of herders, the promotion of the yak 
industry, tourism industry, and infrastructural projects like roads, electricity, mobile phone 
service coverage, and so forth. The goals of all of these projects are to transform primitive 
herders into competitive human capital, and natural resources into commercial products. This 
will be explored in detail in Chapter Two. 
 
Neoliberal governmentality and religious movements 
In contrast to those who examine neo-liberalism as an economic structure, other scholars 
have studied the governance aspect of neo-liberalism. Most of these ethnographic studies explore 
the complexity of the social transformation taking place in contemporary China, covering topics 
of the state, market economy, privatization, globalization, and so forth. Most of these writings, 
drawing from Foucault’s term governmentality, meaning governmental rationality or more 
generally “the conduct of conduct” examine how individual acts are informed by the current 
economic reform, which they conceptualize as a tool for the state to achieve the governing of its 
citizens.   
Conceptualizing neo-liberalism as desire, Lisa Rofel (2007) examines the transformation 
of China and how Chinese citizens as the subjects of neo-liberalism have emerged from the 
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social and economic reforms of the 1990s. She observes that neo-liberal subjectivities are created 
through struggles and debates about appropriate desires of Chinese people, including material, 
sexual and other desires. The appropriateness of desire is formed and imagined by Chinese 
people through their engagement with forms of public culture such as soap operas, women’s 
museums, gay bars, newspapers, court cases, and others. All of these took place in the context of 
Chinese economic reforms and its increasing participation in global dynamics. 
In a similar vein, Lisa M. Hoffman (2006) examines young professionals as new subjects 
who have both neo-liberal elements as well as post-socialist patriotic elements that were formed 
in the new market and in the new post-socialist employment system manipulated by the state. 
She points out that the power of government and the formation of subjects has taken place 
through individual choice in the free job market. This analysis of young professionals echoes 
Aihwa Ong’s (2008) writings about Shanghainese who perform self-fashioning as a cultural 
translation between foreign companies and state bureaucracies. For Ong, these Shanghainese are 
governed through neo-liberal techniques of self-ownership that are not free from state political 
constraints.  
Rather than seeing it as a strategy of state economic growth, Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang 
(2008) argue that the state provision of the individual with ownership of their property and 
optimizing their abilities in the free market with the various Chinese privatization programs is a 
set of calculative techniques that governs Chinese citizens. Now, instead of the state taking care 
of their lives, individuals are responsible for their own lives by governing themselves. Thus, they 
call this Chinese neo-liberalism, “socialism from afar” (5). 
In general, these concepts are powerful contributions to capture the social transformation 
of China in its process of modernization. However, I argue that all of these neo-liberal 
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discussions have been framed around the secularized and material concerns of contemporary 
China. Whether framing neo-liberalism as an economic strategy or as a technique of governance, 
both are framed as relations between the state and its citizens. However, an equally important 
topic that is absent in these discussions is the phenomenon of religious resurgence in China that 
has accompanied neo-liberal economic reform and that has swept across the landscape of China 
for the last few decades. Religion has been ignored as a factor or force in Chinese neo-
liberalization despite the fact that religions have become important aspects of the nation’s 
socioeconomic transformation and plays a significant role in people’s everyday lives. 
In an attempt to fill the gap in this literature, this dissertation brings Tibetan Buddhism and 
its movements into dialogue with contemporary neoliberalism in China.  I explore how strong 
neo-liberal penetration is in pastoral areas of Tibet, how Tibetan khenpos engage with this neo-
liberal penetration, and how Tibetan herders experience neo-liberal development. In examining 
the competing powers of neo-liberalism and Buddhism in the formation of subjects through the 
renounce-slaughter movement, my project contributes to studies of the intersection between 
neoliberal subjectivity and religion.  Specifically, I ask: how do Tibetan Buddhist khenpos and 
their movements speak to the neo-liberal economy in pastoral areas of Tibet, China? Particularly, 
how do Tibetan khenpos respond to the uneven process of development that neo-liberal ideology 
is often in the best position to obscure? And how do they negotiate with the cultural values that 
come along with secular neo-liberalism? 
As I will demonstrate throughout the dissertation, Tibetan khenpos compete with secular 
neo-liberalism that the state has promoted through their renounce-slaughter movement, but they 
also embrace neo-liberal elements that are compatible with Tibetan Buddhism, giving them 
religious meanings. They feel frustrated in their efforts to persuade herders into the renounce-
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slaughter movement in some parts of the eastern Tibetan plateau, because, herders in the eastern 
plateau have been strongly shaped and constrained by the current market economy. But in order 
to stop sinful activities such as massive slaughter, khenpos have been suggesting herders to 
engage actively with current neo-liberal activities that are compatible with Tibetan Buddhist 
norms. These suggestions include accessing state education for the younger generation of 
herders, engaging with business, and becoming employed in part-time jobs in towns. All of this 
advice would lead herders into a social relationship in which those with capital can hire others, 
and those without can sell their labor power. In addition, Tibetan herders tend to interpret their 
experience of development as lagging behind in both secular and spiritual terms. Tibetan 
Buddhist norms and idioms have been used to interpret the differences in material development 
among regions, tribes, and individuals. Khenpos say that positive karma will lead to the 
prosperity of regions or individuals, whereas negative karma such as accumulated through the 
massive slaughtering of livestock would bring disaster to the communities and individuals. In 
order to reverse their condition of lagging behind, Rakhor village has frequently invited spiritual 
leaders to perform religious teachings and make offering to deities.   
Because of khenpos’ contradictory interaction with neo-liberalism as process, I want to 
draw a distinction between two types of neo-liberalism: a state neo-liberalism that is based on 
secularization backed by science and materialism, and one that is formed through a conjuncture 
with Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan cultural meanings. Khenpos’ suggestions for herders to 
engage with the current market economy appears to overlap with neo-liberal conditions produced 
by the state (which is secular and materialist based) that khenpos are now competing with. But I 
argue that, what khenpos have been doing is to tame the force they are competing with to make it 
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more compatible with Tibetan Buddhism, transforming many of its original elements and 
forming a constellation of a new shape, which I call “non-secular neo-liberalism.” 
A number of western scholars have made efforts to bring neo-liberal development and 
religion into one dialogue. Comaroff and Comaroff (1999; 2000) have discussed the neo-liberal 
experience and religious revival of activities including magic, witchcraft and the killing of 
accused witches, the resurgence of zombies, pyramid schemes, and the illicit sale of body parts. 
They argue that the “occult economies” and new religious movements were triggered by the 
global rise of neo-liberalism, which has been accompanied by structural inequalities, the 
imagination of endless wealth, and the frequent failure of development to deliver on its promises. 
In other words, the destruction of structural adjustment and other neo-liberal reforms has 
engendered various religious movements as a refuge for marginalized groups fooled by the 
promises of development. At the same time, Comaroff and Comaroff observed a commonality of 
neo-liberalism as millennial capitalism and its ugly products of the occult economy. That is, both 
make profit out of nothing and both have been marked by an enchantment with gambling. These 
religious activities and occult practices have often involved the conjuring of wealth through the 
deployment of magical means and mysterious techniques. And, they argue, this is astonishingly 
similar to how modern stock market works, relying on the spiritual belief that the magical force 
of production and consumerism will lead to prosperity.  Yet, the techniques for both involve 
practices destructive to others and their capability of creating value.  
While Comaroff and Comaroff focus on occult phenomenon and their relationship with of 
neo-liberalism as capitalism from a structural perspective, Meyer studied Pentecostalism in the 
context of globalization. Meyer (1998) observed that Pentecostalism in Ghana, Africa, 
emphasizes the risk of globalization and the commodities that come with it, but suggests that the 
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only way to protect people from dangers attached to the commodities is to perform the ritual of 
prayer. That is, through prayer, instead of commodities possessing their owners, the owner will 
possess the commodities. Affirming that the global market is imbued with an invisible satanic 
force, Pentecostalism presents itself as the only agent that can truly tame the satanic danger of 
globalization when people access foreign commodities; neither the state nor the former mission 
churches are believed to be able to achieve this. In order to transform the risk into profit in the 
increasing globalization, the claim is that a Pentecostal religion is irreplaceable. This is different 
from the “occult economies” that has become a refuge for the victims in the sense that 
Pentecostalism positions itself as the protector of people in risky globalization rather than 
becoming the destructive “occult economies”. 
 Unlike these studies of occult phenomenon as being in a cause and effect relationship with 
neo-liberalism, and Pentecostalism, which presents itself as a protector of people from becoming 
victims of globalization, Daromir Rudnyckyj (2008; 2009) argues that Islam can have a 
harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship with neoliberal globalization. Challenging the 
widespread assumptions about Islam’s conflict with modernity, he shows how moderate Muslims 
in Southeast Asia are reinterpreting Islam not to reject modernity but to create a "spiritual 
economy" consisting of practices conducive to globalization. Presenting self-styled “spiritual 
reformers” seeking to enhance the Islamic piety of workers across Southeast Asia and beyond, 
Rudnyckyj (2008, 2009) examined a program called Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ) 
training that reconfigures Islamic practice and history to make the religion compatible with 
principles for entrepreneurial success found in Euro-American management texts. The prophet 
Muhammad and the five pillars of Islam are all incorporated into the training course as guidance 
for self-discipline, personal responsibility, and achieving "win-win" solutions. Spiritual 
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economies reveal how capitalism and religion are converging in Indonesia and other parts of the 
developing and developed world. Rudnyckyj makes a counter-argument to the commonly held 
view that religious practice serves as a refuge from or means of resistance against modernization 
and neo-liberal capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 2000).  
 My project builds on this work by analyzing a case that is captured by neither the 
“occult economies” nor the Pentecostals’ role of protectors, nor the “spiritual economies” 
approach.  The slaughter renunciation movement is not an “occult economy” that conjures profits 
from nothing, as a result of neo-liberal structure problems. Nor does it present Buddhism as the 
protector of people from the threats of globalization. Instead, my research suggests a more 
complex relationship between religion and development/neo-liberalism, in a framework that 
allows for the possibility of variation and of selective interpretation, more so than is the case 
with the “spiritual economy” of Islam that Rudnyckyj presents. That is, through the Tibetan 
Buddhist movements and religious teachings, Tibetan Buddhism has become an agent that 
remakes neo-liberal development by giving it religious meanings to make it less culturally 
destructive, and more consistent with Buddhist norms and moral standards. Tibetan Buddhist 
movements and religious teachings enabled global capitalist development to work through 
Tibetan Buddhist norms and moral standards. In the process, some forms of neoliberal practice 
are advocated by some Tibetan religious elites and herders, as they are useful for the task of 
spreading Buddhism and encouraging alternatives to herding, while others are rejected as going 
against the ethics of Buddhist selfhood. Unlike Comaroffs’ analysis of “occult economies,” 
which is pretty much based on the structural Marxist view, my research is focused on the cultural 
politics of development in relating neo-liberalism with religious movements. In relating the 
“spiritual economies”, while Tibetan khenpos suggest herders to improve their living condition 
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by embracing some neo-liberal practices, they still maintain that it is Tibetan Buddhism that can 
bring people real happiness and peace. Therefore, Tibetan khenpos’ first priority is to encourage 
Tibetan herders to learn and practice Tibetan Buddhism becoming more religious subjects while 
they can still enjoy material comfort brought by the science and technology.  My argument is 
based three aspects of Tibetan Buddhism: newly emerged Tibetan Buddhist movements, some 
leading khenpos’ writings, and Tibetan herders’ religious rituals and practices, all of which will 
be discussed in the conclusion of the dissertation. 
 
Human Geography Approach to Tibetan Buddhism 
In contrast to an Orientalist approach that treats Buddhism as essentialized and textualized 
(Hallisey, 1995; King, 1999; Rahula, 1974), in this research, I treat Buddhism not as an 
unchanging entity, but rather as a value system that is in the process of constant change, which 
has adapted to new situations and new cultural encounters throughout history.  Furthermore, 
rather than focusing on classical religious texts and large religious institutions, I concentrate 
more of my attention on the day-to-day decisions and experiences of herders and lamas from a 
perspective of Tibetan Buddhism while also firmly grounded in attention to political economy.   
In addition to this, I see Tibetan Buddhism as a discourse with a power to create its own 
subjectivities and social orders. That is, Tibetan Buddhism as a cultural model (Costello, 2008a; 
b), a node of political-economic interests, and a powerful discourse has always encountered and 
competed with other value systems and cultural models such as hybrid neoliberalism. In 
contemporary China, where development models have been driven by secular market 
competition, Tibetan Buddhism has been incorporating some new elements from these 
discourses. Learning science and technology for the improvement of living conditions is seen as 
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acceptable and encouraged with Buddhist guidance, especially when they can be used to serve 
both secular interests and the expansion of Buddhism itself. However, according to Tibetan 
Buddhism, there are still many fundamental principles that must be defended, such as 
reincarnation, the law of cause-effect, the contentment with one’s lot, loyalty to lamas and 
parents, and the sin (negative karma) of killing and of certain kinds of disturbances to the natural 
environment.  
A social-improvement vision based on those principles will be different from a secular one 
that is based on science and competition, converging in some places and diverging in others. As 
discussed above, three particularly important idioms that will be used to explore these 
convergences and divergences with respect to the slaughter renunciation movement are 
compassion, karma, and happiness. According to Buddhism, all beings including humans and 
animals are circulating in samsara. Samsara is the six realms of existence in which all sentient 
beings suffer through the cycle of rebirth (Rdza Dpal Sprul, 2008). The six classes of beings in 
samsara are gods, asuras, humans, animals, pretas, and hell beings, and sentient beings can be 
born in any form of life in these classes based on their collected karma. Heaven, the human 
realm, and the asura realm contain less suffering than the other three realms - hungry-ghost 
realm, animal realm, and the hell realm (Rdza Dpal Sprul, 2008; Khenpo Ye Shes Phun Tshogs, 
2006). The reincarnation of all beings is so frequent and abundant that there is a great chance that 
all beings have at another time been one’s mother by the law of karma. In this circulation of life, 
compassion is a very important factor for achieving enlightenment and gaining permanent 
happiness.  The principle of karma also guides Tibetan peoples’ decisions and day-to-day lives. 
It is believed that through the law of karma, the effects of all deeds actively create past, present, 
and future experiences, thus making one responsible for one's own life, and the pain and joy it 
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brings to oneself and others. The results or 'fruits' of actions are called karma-phala (Tib: sngon 
las or bsod nams). Karma extends through one's present life and all past and future lives as well 
(Khenpo Tsullo, 2003a; 2003b).  Finally, Tibetan lamas teach the difference between “other-
worldly happiness” (Tib. tshe ’d’i bde skyid) and “this-worldly happiness” (Tib. tshe phyi ma’i 
bde skyid). What Buddhists call “other-worldly happiness” is the final truth that requires people 
to refrain from any attachment to worldly things for Buddhist enlightenment, and what they call 
“this-worldly happiness” is the comfort and happiness people will enjoy in this lifetime. Tibetan 
khenpos teach herders to have a balance between the two. On the one hand, they should try to 
collect merit for their future lives and ultimately for enlightenment. On the other hand, they are 
also encouraged to improve this life without sacrificing their long-term goal (Khenpo Tsullo, 
2003a; 2003b).   
 In conceptualizing and researching Tibetan Buddhism in this way, I attempt to develop 
a human geographical approach to Tibetan Buddhism.  In part because of the textual origins of 
Tibetan studies as a discipline, as well as the difficulty of fieldwork access, ethnographic study 
of contemporary Tibet remains limited. The field is distinctly bifurcated between those who 
study religion, often from a textual perspective, and those who study economic development and 
politics. To date, very few studies have brought religion and development into a common 
theoretical framework of study. Exceptions include Yeh’s writing about the case of Tibetan 
farmers’ greenhouses and hegemonic state development in Lhasa (2007), Makley’s (2006) work 
on zhidak (mountain deity), Holly Gayley’s study of a Tibetan religious leader and globalization 
(Gayley, 2011b), and Costello’s (2008a,b) study about cultural models of the “good man” among 
Tibetans in Amdo.  
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Through an ethnographic case study of greenhouse vegetable cultivation in the TAR, Yeh 
(2007) analyzes how Tibetans experience the hegemonic state development project. She argues 
that the discourse of indolence and being spoiled cannot be understood merely in economic or 
political terms, but rather involves culturally constituted notions of time and proper labor, as well 
as religious expression. The discourse of Tibetan indolence is not a fact; she observed during her 
research that greenhouse work was not been culturally familiar to Tibetan, but that Tibetans 
work as hard as Chinese when they work in their traditional tasks such as planting barley and 
other things. But the expression of Tibetans as indolent is everywhere among government 
officials, Han migrants, and Tibetans themselves. She suggests that Tibetan’s expression of 
being indolent works as both “common sense” and “good sense.”  The expression of being 
indolent represents a normalization of Tibetans’ marginalization in development and the state 
discourse about Tibetan laziness, but it is also interpreted in positive ways by Tibetans, for 
example when Tibetans use it to culturally distinguish Tibetans from Han migrants with their 
expression of being proud of knowing how to enjoy the life that is impermanent from a Tibetan 
Buddhist perspective.  
Focusing on the ritual of Zhidak worship in one Tibetan area in Qinghai Province, 
Charlene Makley (2007) examines economic development in western China from the perspective 
of enchantment and infrastructure, seeing the development process in western China as a cultural 
politics between spiritual enchantment of and the enchantment of the market economy, arguing 
that Tibetans are caught up in intensifying conflicts over the local ‘tradition’ (Ch. chuantong) or 
‘religion’ (Ch. zongjiao) versus the seemingly objective and universal facts of modernizing 
‘economic’ advance.  Holly Gayley (2011) analyzes how Khenpo Jigphun responded to 
globalization and state development through his active reformulation Buddhism, redefining 
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Tibetan identity and laying down guidelines for Tibetans in contemporary times. Similarly, 
Susan E Costello (2008a,b) focuses on two Tibetan herders’ values in the model of a good man: 
Tibetan tribal value and Tibetan religious value, exploring the impact of these values and their 
relationship to economic development. She claims that the local people (here Tibetan herders) 
are more active and have their own culture and own idea of developments different from those of 
the state.   
Through an ethnographic study of herders’ life and their abstention from livestock 
slaughter, my research will try to explore the conjuncture of Tibetan Buddhism and development 
in Tibet, attempting to combine two different fields of Tibet study usually separated in the 
literature: the study of development, and that of religion. My study will contribute to the 
development of an analytical approach that does not separate the economic, political, and the 
religious, but rather brings them together to explore alternative development, modernity and 
subjectivities created in the encounter between Tibetan Buddhist authorities, state imperatives of 
development, and the pressures of neoliberalizing market reforms. 
 
Structure of Dissertation 
As the state and Tibetan pastoralists are two very important threads in this entangled 
“knot” of cultural struggle, in Chapter Two, I will discuss the relationship between the Chinese 
state and Tibetan pastoralists, situating the slaughter renunciation movement in the Chinese 
political-economic situation.  I will discuss the changes in the slaughter rate and livestock 
production system during three production systems – before 1959, during the commune system, 
and since the economic reform. In the latter I will focus on the “Open up the West” campaign 
including the recent housing project and yak-based economic development. I argue that the 
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“Open up the West” campaign is an extension of secular-based neo-liberalism in western China, 
that is, a cultural project of secularization and deepening of materialism of western China for 
economical, political, and ecological purposes. 
Chapter Three will discuss the historical changes in Tibetan Buddhists’ interaction with 
the state, and their current movements in Larung Gar in relation with development and 
nationalism. The sections include historical changes of Tibetan Buddhist interaction with the 
state, three related movements (slaughter renunciation movement, fur renunciation, and 
vegetarian movements), and Tibetan Buddhist elites’ engagement with social activities including 
the ten-virtuous-rules, purification of Tibetan language, and literacy education. The chapter 
demonstrates that Tibetan Buddhism, mediated by Buddhist elites, is a force that makes its own 
cultural landscape by intervening in a constantly changing world. As such, it is inherently 
adaptable and flexible, rather than a stagnant remnant of the past. 
In Chapter Four, I will examine the renunciation movement in Rakhor Village, including 
herders’ experience in the previous three years’ vows and the reasons why most herders gave up 
the movement in the second term. I argue that herders’ decisions about their participation in the 
movement reflect their negotiations between the force of religious power and that of the secular 
neo-liberal market. The chapter demonstrates how Tibetan Buddhism and secular neo-liberalism 
act as competing forces in their projects to produce Tibetans as governable subjects. I argue that 
Ong’s technique of self in the Chinese neo-liberalization process is also a process of the 
secularization and deepening of materialism in contemporary China. In the slaughter 
renunciation movement, this governmentality (a secularism and materialism) has also been 
contested by a religious (Tibetan Buddhism) force, which forms Tibetan herders as religious 
subjects.  
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Chapter Five demonstrates that development is not only contested between trustees and 
local, but also between locals. The debate between Tibetan Buddhist elites and Tibetan radical 
secularists over the role of Tibetan Buddhism in development exemplifies how the meanings of 
development are contested among different groups of the “local”. At the same time, it is through 
the process of contestation and debate that Tibetan Buddhist elites give meanings to new 
discourse and new cultures, including economic development, science, technology, and so forth.  
In Chapter Six, I will demonstrate that Rakhor herders are influenced both by state 
neoliberal development ideologies as well as Tibetan Buddhist conceptions of development, but 
that though different, these often converge toward similar recommendations that encourage 
entrepreneurship as well as closer integration with the Chinese state and Chinese citizenship. 
Thus, the chapter shows how two very different forms of governmentality can ironically 
converge and how Tibetan Buddhism has become the cultural form that gives meaning to 
neoliberal development.  
In the conclusion of the dissertation, I argue that what most scholars refer to as neo-
liberalism in China is, indeed, a process of secularization and deepening of materialism; it is an 
uneven and culturally constituted process. In Tibet, Tibetan khenpos and their movements do not 
entirely reject this process, but rather selectively reject and embrace it by imbuing uneven 
processes of “small d development” with Tibetan Buddhist meanings, forming a Buddhist-
informed neo-liberalization process. 
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Chapter Two  
 
The Chinese State and Tibetan Pastoralism 
 
“Before settling, our life was very simple, and we did not have many 
thoughts [about making money]. After we settled, our living condition 
improved, and we now have a higher living standard. Next year, I want to 
take a loan from a bank to start a “Tibetan herders’ home for the tourists” (藏
家乐) so that I can sell yak meat and milk for more money.” 
                -  a herder in Hongyuan who was settled in the state housing 
      project, 2010  
 
The years 2010 and 2011 saw three very important central government forums that were 
crucial to Tibetan pastoralists and their landscape: the Fifth Work on Work in Tibet, a form on 
the Open up the West Campaign, and the National Conference on Pastoral Regions. These dealt 
with political, economic, and ecological issues, respectively. The expression of the herder quoted 
above is shaped by the state policies and programs that came with those forums. 
 In January 2010, the Central Government held the Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet, which, 
for the first time, included not just the TAR but also the other four provinces (Sichuan, Qinghai, 
Gansu, and Yunnan) that have a Tibetan population. This highlighted the importance of eastern 
Tibet in the political stability of the entire region relating to the “3.14” political event of 2008 
(that is, the violent protests that took place on March 14, 2008 in Lhasa).   
Then, in July of 2010, at the tenth anniversary of its economic development program 
targeted at the west, the central government held a forum on the “Open up the West” campaign. 
There, they discussed the great concerns of the state about the continued economic disparity 
between regions in the east and west, and their intention to extend economic reform in the west. 
The "Open up the West" campaign has had and will continue to have a profound influence on the 
Tibetan pastoralists and their landscape.  
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A year after, in August 2011, the National Conference on Pastoral Regions was held in 
Hulunbeier, Inner Mongolia. That conference reframed the development strategy in pastoral 
regions as it relates to the ecological safety of the entire nation. The issues regarding Tibetan 
pastoral areas are development versus rangeland ecological security, and the ecological results 
downstream of the major rivers of the Tibetan plateau.  
Interestingly, though the problems that those forums attempted to address are separate and 
distinct ---political stability, economic disparity, and ecological security -- the remedy discussed 
by those conferences was the same in each case. The solution, it was suggested, could be found 
in the projection of economic reform deeper into the western regions, as described in the 
umbrella strategy of the "Open up the West" campaign. 
The National Conference on Pastoral Regions highlighted the importance of ecological 
stability in pastoral areas, but insisted that it should be achieved not by reducing economic 
development, but rather through the transformation of traditional pastoral production into more 
intensified livestock industrialization, and by removing herders from pastures with urbanization 
projects.7 This would be a change from “extensive” herding to “intensive” market oriented 
livestock industry. At the same time, the conference suggests restoring the rangeland eco-system 
by launching a monetary incentive system, which it calls “The Rangeland Ecological 
Compensation Mechanism.”8 
At the Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet,9 one part of President Hu’s speech summarizes the 
main theme of the gathering:  
                                                 
7  《国务院关于促进牧区又好又快发展的若干意见》(国发〔2011〕17号)Some Suggestions by the 
State Council on the better and faster development in pastoral areas of China. The State Council [2011] No.17.   
8  《关于建立西藏草原生态补偿长效机制的调研报告》. (A Report in the pre-feasibility study of 
Rangeland Ecological Compensation in Tibet Autonomous Region by Committee of Population, Resources and 
Environment of CPPCC. 2008.) 
9 http://www.shouguang.gov.cn/tzb/show_news.asp?id=2183 
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by firmly sticking with the two major tasks of development and 
stability, they [the local governments in Tibetan populated regions] should 
promote the leap-forward development to ensure the national safety and 
stability of Tibet; [to achieve this], economic development is the top 
priority, national unity is the foundation, and the improvement of people's 
livelihood is the starting point.” 
 
In a similar way, the “Open up the West” campaign is a piece of rhetorical discourse to 
push the early economic reforms deeper into the western regions to address issues that the state 
faces, including the economic disparity between regions, political instabilities, ecological threats, 
and international market shrinkage. As President Hu states in the Forum of 2010,10  
The next ten years is the critical time period to build a well-off society, 
and it is also the critical time to extend the “Open up the West” campaign to a 
greater depth into the western regions. All the nation-state should be aware of 
the significance and urgency of the “Open up the West” campaign in the 
overall national strategy. The “Open up the West” campaign is to reshape the 
western region into a beautiful landscape where economic prosperity, social 
progress, social stability, and national unity are ensured, thus allowing a 
greater contribution to the emergence of a well-off society and to the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. 
 
The message that all of those forums and conferences deliver is that the state made 
great achievements in its economic reform since the 1980s, particularly since the “Open 
up the West” campaign was initiated. And, the state will continue to extend the economic 
reform further into the western region, including the pastoral areas of Tibet. It indicates 
that economic development is both “the first principle”, and the only solution for all 
challenges the state faces. 
The neoliberal Chinese economic reform process since the 1980's and intensified in 2010 
has had a profound impact on Tibetan pastoralists and their landscape. The recent Tibetan 
pastoralists’ increasing slaughter rate and the reaction to this in the slaughter renunciation 
movement can only be fully understood if we situate them in the larger context of Chinese neo-
                                                 
10 http://www.most.gov.cn/yw/201007/t20100707_78324.htm 
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liberal economic reform since the 1980s. In pastoral areas of the Tibetan plateau, this neo-
liberalization process was started with livestock privatization, followed by the grassland use 
rights contract system. This neo-liberal process was extended by the “Open up the West” 
campaign, which has translated into many specific projects, including infrastructure 
improvements that link the pastoral areas with the larger market, housing projects, yak-based 
economic parks, ecological programs, and others. In short, the economic reform of the 1980s is 
the fundamental strategy of the state and it has deeply influenced Tibetan pastoralists for the past 
few decades by changing their nomadic culture in general, including their ways of thinking, their 
production systems, and their herding practices. To this end, it is fruitful to see the economic 
reform not as merely economic activities, but also as a tool of governance for controlling the 
target population. 
From the perspective of development as a project of rule (Li 1999, 2007), one useful 
conceptualization is Aihwa Ong’s treatment of Chinese economic reform as a technology of self-
governance of Chinese citizens. Following Nikolas Rose’s (1999) conceptualization of neo-
liberalism as a technology of rule that relies on the power of freedom in the market to govern 
individual activities, Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang (2008) see the various Chinese privatization 
programs not as pure state economic activities, but rather as a set of calculative techniques that 
govern Chinese citizens by providing individuals with ownership of their property and 
optimization of their abilities in the free market. This technique of self-governance has replaced 
the previous state presence in every aspect of people’s lives. Yet, I want to extend their 
conceptualization by adding that the giving of freedom in economic activities produces a certain 
cultural result on the individual level. That is, the Chinese economic reform produces not only 
market-oriented actors, but it also acts to transform spiritual beings into materialists and 
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secularists, which is assumed to contribute to the Tibetan herders’ national loyalty and regional 
stability. In making this argument, I want to extend Ong’s formulation of neo-liberalism as a 
technique of self- government by drawing on Lisa Rofel’s (2007) conceptualization of Chinese 
neo-liberalism as a cultivation of appropriate desires. That is, the state neo-liberal arrangement is 
not only a technique of governance, but it is about the production of culturally governable 
subjects, who are materialistic and secular. For this point, Rofel examines how the Chinese 
citizens are cultivated with appropriate desires through the state media and entertainment in the 
Chinese neo-liberal context. This is useful for analyzing the case of pastoral areas of the Tibetan 
plateau. In what follows, I will explore the economic reform in pastoral areas by focusing on 
two aspects: the changes in slaughter rate in Rakhor Village in three distinct periods, and the 
relationship between the “Open up the West” campaign and neo-liberal subject formation. First, 
focusing on Rakhor Village, I will address the question of why herders have been selling more 
and more livestock to market after the 1980s, by situating the historical changes in the slaughter 
rate in three distinct time periods: before liberation, during the commune system, and after 
economic reform.  Second, I will discuss the “Open up the West” campaign, the academic debate 
over its rationales, and the formation of the neo-liberal governable subject. By examining three 
stories of herders in the Housing Projects for Herders and Yak Economic Development, I will 
argue that the “Open up the West” campaign at its core is a neo-liberal governance technique of 
the state that is consistent and pervasive on the ground. 
 
Slaughter rate changes in three socioeconomic systems 
Why have Tibetan herders been selling more and more livestock to the meat market over 
the last few decades? To answer this question, I want to trace the historical changes in the 
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slaughter rate in Rakhor Village, by framing the recent political, economic, and cultural shifts in 
the Tibetan pastoral areas during three different time periods during the preceding century: these 
are the pre-commune (1908-1958) time, then the commune system (1958-1983), and the period 
from 1983 to the present day.  These three periods have been distinguished by very different 
kinds of production, political environments, and economic systems.  
While the subsistence economic system and tribe-based social structure are the main 
characteristics for the years before 1958, the period of 1958-1983 was marked by a top-down 
planned economy with strong government control and intolerance of religious traditions. The 
years since 1983 can be characterized by the market economy system and continuing strong 
government control in the economy, politics, and religion of the region. The differences in the 
production system and the socio-political structure have reshaped the Tibetan pastoralists’ view 
of their livestock. 
 
Slaughter rate pre-1958 
When Rakhor community first moved to its current place in 1942 from Bda’ Tang, 
(currently Datang Ba Township, Ganzi County, Ganzi Prefecture), Rakhor became a sub-tribe of 
Mewa Tribe which was an autonomous tribal society with eight sub-tribes under its rule. For the 
few decades before the Chinese liberation of this region, the people of Rakhor made a living by 
herding yaks. Their foods included milk, butter, cheese, Tibetan barley flour, and yak meat that 
they slaughtered by themselves. There were a few rich households who had about 200 yaks 
maximum, and the average for the majority of other households was 20-40 yaks. There were also 
some who did not have any livestock, who made a living by working for the rich households. 
Before 1958, Rakhor herders, like other communities in the region of the current Hongyuan 
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County sold their surplus livestock to the meat market in the nearest agricultural areas. 
 According to some elderly herders in Rakhor Village, there were three places that herders in 
Rakhor could trade their excess butter, cheese, and yaks for other goods, which might include 
barley, tea, clothes, bows, personal ornaments, to name a few.   The first was in Shar Khok, the 
current Songpan County (松潘县) to the east of Hongyuan. Second one was in the current town 
of Aba (Tib. Rnga ba, 阿坝县) County in the north, and the last at Watse in the current Gannan 
Prefecture in what is now Gansu province, to the northeast of Hongyuan. Compared with the 
modern slaughterhouses in Aba and Ganzi Prefectures, these traditional slaughterhouses were 
very small. Located about two kilometers away from the old Aba Town (the current Aba County 
Town), the slaughterhouse in Aba was the place where pastoralists near old Aba town brought 
their livestock, mostly yaks and sheep, to sell. Elderly herders say that there were about 7 
Tibetan bachelors who had some very simple shelters and tents where they could store and sell 
meat. That mechanism worked well when yak meat was mostly consumed by the local Tibetans.  
Unlike the current situation in which meat and yaks are transported and consumed by Han 
or Hui Chinese to big cities near Tibetan pastoral areas, in the old days, Rakhor herders took 
their yaks to one of those three meat markets located hundreds kilometers away once or twice a 
year. It was mostly those herders with lots of livestock who sold to those markets. They mostly 
did trips to this market by taking the livestock to sell and other yaks for transportation. It was 
usually the case that poor households either asked their relatives to take their small amount of 
butter and cheese to the markets and to purchase things thing they needed, or they went with the 
rich households as their paid helpers. 
In those markets, people exchanged various goods like butter and cheese primarily for 
barley, and they exchanged livestock or meat for the old Chinese silver dollars (银元) to 
  
66 
purchase things they needed in those markets. It is said that some of those rich households would 
also accumulate silver dollars for savings by selling their yaks or dairy products. Generally 
speaking, only a few of the wealthier households had extra livestock to sell to those meat 
markets. Most households just sold dairy products, and accordingly, the selling of livestock to 
the meat market wasn’t nearly as common for most of the herders as it is today. This small scale 
selling was not a serious issue for Tibetan religious leaders, and it never generated a slaughter 
renunciation movement. In addition to that, in the old days, Tibetan herders did not have many 
options to make a living other than herding and selling livestock. That may also have been 
another reason why Tibetan Buddhist leaders did not ask herders to stop selling their livestock. 
As Khenpo Tsullo often states in his religious teachings, “unlike in the old days, now there are 
ways for herders to make a living if they stop selling their livestock in meat market.”  
 
Commune system 
In 1959, with the establishment of the collective production system in the pastoral areas of 
Hongyuan County, a livestock population of around 1,800 yaks and about 500 sheep owned by 
350 people of the Rakhor tribe was collected by the state and reallocated as the commune assets. 
The new system broke the traditional family-based working system and labor units that were 
within the private social structure, and established in its place a new working system and new 
labor units in which all the livestock and labor were divided among several groups, based on 
gender, age and ability. As yaks were the dominant livestock, they were managed by different 
work teams that worked with different categories of yaks: 1) female adult yaks were divided 
among several work teams within which Tibetan female herders milked about 25 milking yaks 
each; 2) the young female yaks were herded by a couple of male herders on different pastures; 3) 
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another several hundred young male yaks were divided into several groups and managed by male 
herders; 4) about 200 crossbred milking yaks was worked by another team of men; and 5) 100 – 
200 adult male yaks used for transportation were herded as one unit  by one or two herders. In 
Rakhor, as in many other places, there were other jobs called shor las, the non-herding-and-
milking occupations. Those jobs included the construction of buildings, walls, livestock and 
grass storage yards, the collection and transportation of firewood, and the shearing of sheep 
wool, to name a few. It was the village leaders who arranged all of those assignments based on 
labor availability. 
During the commune system, people collected points by working for the commune to 
make a living. The points were usually translated into cash income at the end of every year, and 
with the income herders bought food and clothes from the commune and from the very few state-
owned stores. In that commune production system, workers were divided into three categories: 
those under 18 and above 60 who could work were considered as half labor; those between the 
ages of 18 and 60 were full labor; and school children and very old people who physically could 
not work were considered as non-labor. One day's work for the full laborers would earn 10 points 
per person, which was equivalent to 1 RMB in Rakhor Village, and this amount varied among 
villages based on their livestock numbers and collective annual incomes. The income of each 
household depended on the available number of laborers, and households with income of over 
1000 RMB per year were considered to be rich in Rakhor. All income from livestock products 
including dairy products, meat products, and others, was collected by the commune first, and 
then they were redistributed to herders based on their contribution to the commune. The families 
needed to buy yaks from the commune for their own meat consumption, and they needed to pay 
for that from the points they collected from their labor. Rakhor herders could slaughter one yak 
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per four household members. The prices for the livestock in the late commune system were about 
60 RMB for a male yak, 40 RMB for a female yak, 25 RMB for a sheep, and 300 RMB for a 
horse.  
With the new political and socioeconomic system, all decisions about labor allocation and 
livestock disposal were controlled by the state, as livestock was owned by collectives. In terms 
of livestock off-take rate, the state had the yearly quota for each of the work teams on how much 
livestock the work teams should sell, and the village leaders decided what type of yaks were to 
be sold. Generally speaking, productive female yaks, small yaks younger than three years old, 
and adult male yaks for transportation would not be sold. The livestock that was sold to the meat 
market were male yaks, and old female yaks from milking teams. Yaks were slaughtered in the 
local slaughterhouses, and meat was transported to the big cities near the Tibetan plateau. The 
income from that livestock went to the commune and was redistributed to the community 
members based on the points they collected with their work.  
During the commune time, there was only one slaughterhouse where all yaks for meat 
products from all townships (then communes) under Hongyuan County were slaughtered. This 
was different from pre-1958 and from post-1983, when more than half of the yaks for meat 
products were transported to big cities close to Hongyuan County. The slaughter rate during the 
commune system was very high. When I was young I observed that the local slaughterhouse had 
been slaughtering several hundred yaks per day in the fall of every year. However, this high rate 
of slaughter was not been a problem for Tibetan religious leaders. There are two reasons for this: 
first, all the decisions over livestock were made by the state; second, Tibetan Buddhist elites 
were severely repressed, and Tibetan Buddhism was facing an existential crisis.  Therefore, the 
social and political space for the emergence of any slaughter renunciation movement was zero. 
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The early phrase of economic reform in pastoral areas on the Tibetan plateau: 
Livestock privatization and Pasture Contract System 
 
 The stagnant economy caused by the state-planned system during the Mao era became the 
main cause for the economic reform of the Deng government, which began in the pastoral areas 
of Tibet in 1983. As it was with the agricultural land privatization in other parts of China, the 
livestock privatization was the first step for the state to establish the market economy in the 
pastoral areas of Tibet.  The livestock privatization of 1983 in Rakhor ended the commune 
system, as it did in most other pastoral areas in the Tibetan plateau. All collectively owned 
livestock, including over 6233 yaks, 2068 sheep, 209 horses, all numbers which increased 
significantly during the commune system, were distributed to the population of 474 people of 
Rakhor Village. At that time, herders privately owned livestock and herded them on pastures 
shared by 10 to 20 households as one group. Herders made their own decisions regarding 
livestock, their time allocation, production plans, and resources. In short, once again, production 
units were household-based systems that were private social structures, very similar to the 
traditional social structure before 1959. With privatization of livestock and with the state’s more 
liberal religious policies, many religious traditions and nomadic traditions were revived. Thus, 
herders could practice their religion and perform their traditional rituals. However, this apparent 
return to the herders’ traditional society was accompanied by a larger process in which they were 
increasingly integrated into the larger intensified economic reform.  
At the same time, with the privatization of livestock, Tibetan herders became self-
responsible, and had to make a living by themselves. With the economic reform, they started to 
sell their livestock to the meat market, which became a very important income source, separate 
from the cash income from selling dairy products. They produced butter, cheese, and milk by 
themselves, but they had to purchase clothes, Tibetan barley, rice, tea, and other foods. In 
  
70 
addition, they also spent lots of their income to go on religious practices and pilgrimages, as well 
as to buy traditional animal furs, jewelry, and appliances.  
In 1996, thirteen years after the livestock decollectivization, the Pasture Contract System 
was introduced, and winter and summer pastures were allocated to each household. The pastures 
were distributed based on the number of livestock that each household received in 1983 and on 
the number of household members in 1995. There were 6233 yaks, 2068 sheep, and 209 horses 
in 1983, and there were 9800 yaks (no sheep) and 643 people in 1995. The government 
guaranteed that the allotment as made at that time would remain valid and unchanged for 50 
years, and every household would have a grassland use right certificate on which is clearly stated 
the owner of land use rights, their exclusive right, the size of pastures, and the purpose of land 
use. 
Since then, every household has had all of their seasonal pastures (winter, summer, fall, 
and spring pastures) in a single parcel, so they do not need to make seasonal movements of their 
herds and tents as they used to do before 1996. Having all pastures in one place in Rakhor is 
different phenomenon from the other two villages under Qiongxi Township, and from many 
other pastoral areas on Tibetan plateau (Yeh and Gaerrang, 2011). 
The introduction of the Pasture Contract System made people aware for the first time that 
they can now only manage and use a certain part of the grasslands, with the idea that the pasture 
use right can be used as an exclusive private property. Before the policy of the Pasture Contract 
System was implemented in 1996, nomads generally felt that the grasslands were endless, and 
that they could have as many animals as they wanted. There was no limit to the possibilities of 
expansion, because after the livestock decollectivization, grassland had been used commonly by 
work teams of 10-20 households each. The Pasture Contract System caused people to think of 
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more efficient ways to manage both the herd and the grassland, forcing them to calculate the 
capacity of their pastures in order to achieve more sustainable growth of livestock. As they have 
gained the sense of ownership of pasture, they tend to not allow outsiders on their land any more 
for activities such as fishing, woodcutting or gathering of medicinal herbs. Before the Pasture 
Contract System, there was a sense of the grasslands as open access with respect to non-pasture 
resources, so that fishing, wood cutting etc. occurred whenever one wanted by whoever wanted 
to. In short, the Pasture Contract System has cultivated the herders’ ownership of pastures.  Now 
a sense of individual ownership has made people interested in looking after and protecting 
valuable resources and using those resources to their best advantage. 
Livestock privatization and Pasture Contract System in China has been studied primarily 
in ecological and economic terms so far (Richard, Yan and Du, 2006; Yan, 2005) and very few 
studies have been done from the perspective of social and cultural transformation. The 
privatization of livestock and land use right programs were early state efforts to produce market 
actors, the most important elements of market economy. There are several neoliberal logics 
within these efforts. First, the program is a direct response to the inefficiency in production and 
resource distribution that caused economic recession. By contracting farmland to each household 
in agricultural areas, and by privatizing the livestock and grassland to individual household in 
pastoral areas, the program aimed at stimulating individual productivity by providing 
autonomous decision power to individuals, thus making each individual responsible for 
themselves (Ong and Zhang, 2008).  In a sense, the state goal was to create individuals who are 
self-responsible, self-managed, competent and efficient in the newly formed market.   So the 
project is a process of the establishment of the market by creating a free individual through 
withdrawal of state interventions from every individual.  At the same time, all of these projects 
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were never free from the propaganda and education that promoted China as a unified nation in 
which all minorities belong to one family over which the Chinese Communist Party is the only 
legitimate and capable ruler.  So the outcome of the privatization projects and political 
promotions is expected to be individual subjects who are efficient in the market for material 
development with full loyalty to the unified Chinese nation and Communist Party. If we see 
livestock privatization as a pilot project to create market actors, the most active elements of a 
market economy, then the Pasture Contract System is an extension of that effort wherein the state 
regulation of the relationship between the herders and their pastures creates herders’ ownership 
over land that used to belong to everyone. 
These two major projects have built a foundation for economic reform in the pastoral areas 
on Tibetan plateau. Following these two projects, the state has implemented many more projects 
that have been deeply manipulating the Tibetan pastoralists' way of life. Many of these projects 
have come under or with the discourse of the “Open up the West” campaign strategy 
implemented in 2000. In what follows, I will examine the “Open up the West” campaign and 
subject formation, drawing on the governmental process with a discussion of three state projects 
as cases.  
 
Open up the West Campaign 
With the “Open up the West” campaign strategy and discourse, local governments at both 
the provincial and prefectural levels have launched many projects and policies that have 
effectively reshaped the landscape of Tibetan pastoral areas and the people on these lands. Based 
on its profound impacts on the ground, I argue that the “Open up the West” campaign, in its 
nature, works to extend the neo-liberal social arrangement in pastoral areas, which was started 
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with the redistribution of livestock to households in 1980s, and followed by the Pasture Contract 
System. Next, I will explore the background of “Open up the West” campaign, the debate over 
the rationales of the launching of “Open up the West” campaign, and the neo-liberal subject 
formation with this strategy. These examinations will provide a larger picture of how the “Open 
up the West” campaign was formed and has been operating in western regions for the last few 
decades. 
 
“Open up the West” campaign 
The “Open up the West” campaign (西部大开发) is a policy adopted in 2000 by the 
People's Republic of China to develop its less-developed western regions. In 1978, the Chinese 
government led by Deng Xiaoping launched an economic reform and open-door policy. The 
coastal regions of eastern China benefited greatly from these reforms, and their economies 
quickly raced ahead. The western half of China, however, lagged far behind. In order to help the 
western half of China catch up with the eastern half, a Leadership Group for the “Open up the 
West” campaign (西部地区开发领导小组) was created by the State Council in January 2000, 
led by then-Premier Zhu Rongji. The policy covers six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, 
Tibet, and Xinjiang), and one municipality (Chongqing). This region contains 71.4% of China's 
area, but only 28.8% of its population, as of the end of 2002, and 16.8% of its total economic 
output, as of 2003. To frame the larger picture in which "Open up the West" campaign emerged, 
some aspects of Chinese socioeconomic changes need to be highlighted. First of all, the "Open 
up the West" campaign was launched during the era of economic reform, which was generally 
characterized by market function as the basic mechanism in which products and resources are 
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distributed under the state’s surveillance. With this economic reform, there were some changes 
in the relationship between the central government and local governments. The retreating role of 
the central government in regional economic development was realized with fiscal 
decentralization and the slow process of adjustment of the institutional structure (Huang, 1996; 
Naughton, 1996). Under China’s highly decentralized fiscal system, sub-national governments 
began to play a key role in implementing national policies. Local officials were no longer merely 
servants who obey the commands of the central government, having become distinct political 
and economic actors who adopt various strategies for maximizing their interests and gaining 
autonomy within their jurisdictions (Holbig, 2004). This means that local governments have their 
own way of framing and implementing the “Open up the West” campaign, so that "Open up the 
West" campaign is interpreted differently in different localities. 
 This has also been a period during which the Chinese economy has been increasingly 
integrated into international society, clearly marked by its entry into the WTO (Harvey, 2005; 
Lai, 2002; 2003). The rate of foreign investment grew rapidly on the eastern coast, and the 
private sector gained an increasingly important role in the national economic growth (Harvey, 
2005).  The 2010 Forum on the “Open up the West” campaign coincided with the recent global 
economic stagnation, particularly in the Western countries that comprise China's vitally 
important export market and capital resources. As a result of this global economic recession and 
the concomitant shrinkage of international trade, China finds itself in urgent need to cultivate 
new consumer markets, especially domestic ones. For all of these issues, the remedy lies in 
increasing the neo-liberal economic development, which is embodied in the “Open up the West” 
campaign.  
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The increasing globalization of the Chinese economy and the recent major floods 
downstream from Tibet in some major Chinese cities has also brought about a new greening state 
initiative (Yeh, 2005) that has made a commitment to national environmental protection and 
ecological reconstruction (Economy, 2005). It may simply be rhetoric that the state has 
incorporated environmental concerns into the “Open up the West” campaign program, because 
the effectiveness of these environmental projects in the west is limited and has had unintended 
consequences (e.g., Tibetan herders impoverished by the Tuimu Huancao – Rangeland 
Restoration Project). These results demonstrate the limitations of the state’s ecological 
modernization framework, and indicate the need for new research paradigms which include 
critical political ecology and governmental processes (Yeh, 2009). In responding to the failure of 
previous ecological projects, the state has extended Tuimu Huancao with the more recent 
Rangeland Ecological Compensation Mechanism.  
In sum, "Open up the West" campaign is related to the various uncertainties that the state 
has faced over several decades. Those have included: the mounting disparity between the rich 
and the poor; the discontent due to the resulting disproportional wealth of the east and west; the 
potential unrest of laid-off workers in the west; the rebelliousness of minorities (Tibet and 
Xinjiang) in the west (Lai, 2003);  the increasing competition in the international market with the 
entrance into the WTO (Harvey, 2005; Lai, 2002); and the threats to the natural resources that 
are the vital foundation for overall national economic development. 
 
“Open up the West” campaign and neo-liberal social arrangement 
The “Open up the West” campaign is commonly understood as an economic strategy of 
the Chinese state that was designed to narrow the gap between the more developed regions in the 
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east coast and less-developed regions in the west and central China. However, there are debates 
in academic circles regarding the original rationales for the initiation of the campaign. In this 
section I will discuss the most recent theoretical debate among scholars about “Open up the 
West” campaign and its formation, and its impacts on the ground as a neo-liberal technique of 
governance. I argue that the “Open up the West” campaign, as an integrated effort of the state, is 
an intensive neo-liberalization process that works as “socialism from far” (Ong and Zhang, 2008) 
in the western regions. That is, many projects implemented under the discourse of “Open up the 
West” campaign have been designed to shape a particular social arrangement that will further 
affect and change the conduct of people in the western regions. Those specific projects and 
policies have been framed according to the general discourse of “Open up the West” campaign. 
In the case of the Tibetan pastoralists, the strategy is designed to create conditions for Tibetan 
pastoralists to think and act in certain ways by changing their relationship with the land and their 
livestock. How they make decisions about their pastures and their livestock is reflected in some 
Tibetans’ engaging in livestock trading businesses, and the resulting increases in the slaughter 
rate. But first, I want to go over the debates about the formation of “Open up the West” 
campaign. Among the many complex factors that affected the emergence of the “Open up 
the West” campaign, the economic and social welfare disparities between west and east have 
been the primary explicitly expressed reasons for the “Open up the West” campaign.   At the 
same time, other factors have also been considered. These include the increasing globalization of 
the Chinese economy, nation-building efforts, the concern for social stability in the west where 
culturally distinctive minorities are located, the changing of the fiscal system, and the 
decentralization of government control.  Other rationales include resolving the interior regions’ 
discontents, stimulating domestic demand, forging structural reforms for non-state firms, entry 
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into the World Trade Organization, improving the environment and resource supplies, and 
securing national security and unity (Lai 2002). 
Lai (2003) suggests that the government is more concerned with ethnic discontent in the 
vast western regions, and shortages in strategic resources, than it is in the growth in the 
underdeveloped areas for the sake of overall national growth. That is to say, maintaining political 
stability and tapping strategic resources in the western region are the government’s top priorities, 
and the achieving of higher economic returns by developing and supporting the central region is 
subordinate. Lai (2003) argues that the ideas of national security and unity have been very 
important in the central government’s decision to focus on the west rather than the central region, 
suggesting that the central region enjoys better economic returns on state investments than do the 
western region, but that the state gave priority to the west out of concern for its instability. The 
disturbances among Uighurs, Tibetans and other minorities have highlighted the importance of 
integrating those minorities into the national socioeconomic mainstream. The western region’s 
advantage is both political and strategic, because of its size, concentration of ethnic-minority 
populations, long international borders, international implications of ethnic tension, and 
possession of strategic resources (Lai 2003). 
While some scholars emphasize the pressure from the discontentment of provincial 
governments and academic circles in western China with the central government’s ignoring of 
the west region for decades, other scholars focus on the power struggles that have occurred 
inside the central government during transitions of leadership – in this case from Jiang Zemin to 
Hu Jintao.  Laying out the way in which the ideology of “Open up the West” campaign was 
formed and the dynamic interaction between provincial governments and the party-state, Holbig 
(2004) argues that the “Open up the West” campaign can hardly be described as a coherent 
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project with specific goals and measurements. Instead, she suggests that is a “soft policy--- a 
fragmented cluster of diverse agendas” that appeals to different actors. In her analysis of the 
formation of the policy, she emphasized factors such as the pressures of the government’s 
lobbying from western China, academic voices, and potential economic challenges associated 
with entry into the WTO.  
Other scholars have focused on very different aspects of the emergence of the “Open up 
the West” campaign policy. Shih (2004) is skeptical about the bargaining power of the western 
provinces. Instead, he situates the “Open up the West” campaign in the internal individual power 
struggles among the top leadership, particularly during the generational transitions. He 
speculates that the “Open up the West” campaign policy could represent the third generation of 
Jiang Zeming’s effort to preempt the future leaders of the CCP, Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao, who 
have strong connections with the west. He suggests it is Jiang’s effort to maintain a certain 
degree of power through his followers after he retires. The tradition of usage of policies such as 
the “Open up the West” campaign to serve personal political interests is a characteristic of 
Chinese statecraft, with which Shih further differentiates the development of the Chinese state 
from that of other East Asian states.  In a similar vein, Goodman (2004) also examined the 
underlying themes of equality, nation building, and internal colonization embodied in the “Open 
up the West” campaign that would appeal to party leaders in support of a generational change of 
leaders.   
I have two points to make concerning these debates and arguments. First, all of them are 
important in pointing out the different aspects of the "Open up the West" campaign and in 
showing how the different forces played their role in the "Open up the West" campaign 
formation. However, I still think that it is more fruitful to look at what the "Open up the West" 
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campaign does in the real world to impact the individual lives of people on the ground, rather 
than to see how it came into being or to determine which factor was more important than other in 
its formation. Secondly, I have a different opinion on two other points made by Holbig and 
Goodman. As mentioned above, Holbig argues that the “Open up the West” campaign is a “soft 
policy: a fragmented cluster of diverse agendas” that appeals to different actors (Holbig, 2004: 
355). Goodman (2004) argues that the economic success gained by integrating the east coast 
regions into the global market did not allow China to make such a fundamental shift in its 
geographical economic strategy, suggesting that "Open up the West" campaign adopted a 
market-solution approach by channeling foreign and private investment to the west, combining 
state investment with infrastructure improvement, and mostly local-government investment.
 First, I suggest that we should see the “Open up the West” campaign as a discourse or 
integrated state effort rather than seeing it as a single policy or a state project. Seeing it as 
discourse, I argue that it is coherent and that all the projects implemented under this discourse 
are consistent with one another. For this, several aspects of "Open up the West" campaign are 
very important to note. First, it is assumed by the state that various issues that the nation state 
faces can be mitigated by economic development in the western regions, and the market 
economy is the only remedy for all of the issues the state faces; to achieve this goal, the people 
and the landscape of the west required a fundamental transformation, a deep cultural, economic, 
and social change.  Finally, the discourse of "Open up the West" campaign and the related 
projects produce a certain type of subject and cultural space in the west, and this subject that is 
formed is material, market-oriented, and secularized, all of which will give the state more control 
over the people and material they targeted. In this sense, the state has a real intent and consistent 
actions in the west. In short, it is discourse that provides condition for the local governments and 
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market economy to carry out the state agendas. Indeed, viewed as discourse and integrated 
efforts of the state, the “Open up the West” campaign is a process of reshaping the western 
regions into a specific cultural landscape, instilling people with certain beliefs, desires, and 
behaviors, replacing the traditional spiritual culture with the market-oriented, materialized, and 
secularized culture. 
The result of the rhetoric of “Open up the West” campaign in the pastoral areas on the 
Tibetan plateau is political and ecological stability, with economic process lagging behind. All of 
these abnormalities are assumed to be solved by intensifying the economic reform that started 
with livestock privatization and the Pasture Contract System. Indeed, for several decades, the 
pastoral areas in the eastern Tibetan Plateau have been addressed and deeply influenced by the 
“Open up the West” campaign strategy through numerous projects. The projects and policies 
under this umbrella include, among others, infrastructure improvement for the market 
integrations between pastoral areas and larger cities, education and health care improvements, 
livestock (yaks) industrialization, ecological construction (Tuimu Huancao- converting pastures 
to grasslands and the recent Rangeland Ecological Compensation Mechanism), and livelihood 
improvement (Housing Project for Herders and New Life in the New Tent). All of those projects 
work together as cultural projects to transform Tibetan pastoral areas and the people there into 
market-oriented social relationships and a materially driven cultural landscape. In the following 
section, I will discuss two cases of the state projects under "Open up the West" campaign on the 
ground: 1) the Housing Projects for Herders with an analysis of a state report on this project; and 
2) the integration of yaks into the larger market system in which the resulting demand led herders 
to sell more and more yaks to the meat market. Both of these projects are designed to transform 
  
81 
the traditional culture and production system into the industrialization of livestock production 
and the commercialization of social relationships. 
 
Two Cases of State Projects in Pastoral Areas on Tibetan Plateau 
Housing Project for Herders 
For the last few years, the most spectacular project in pastoral areas of Sichuan Province 
has been the Housing Project for Herders, an urbanization and livelihood project started by the 
Sichuan provincial government in 2009. According to the government reports,11 it is a four-year 
project from 2009 through 2012, involving 90,000 of the 112,000 area households to improve 
(and establish, in some cases) a total of 1409 settlement sites under 29 nomadic countries. It is 
said that the plan will benefit about 480,000 people who do not have houses or who have 
substandard houses, which amounts to about 88.6% of the total population of 533,112 Tibetan 
pastoralists in Sichuan Province. The project goal is to make sure that all nomadic households 
have their own houses, new tents, and the community square upon the completion of the project. 
Unlike the settlement project in other part of pastoral areas where herders are encouraged or are 
forced to be settled, in the housing project of Sichuan province, pastoralists have participated 
voluntarily, and the project deployed dual strategies: the project is an effort to transfer laborers 
from pastures to secondary and tertiary industries, encouraging herders to be settled in towns and 
making their living by other means; at the same time, the project encourages the remaining 
herders to increase their livestock production by modernizing and intensifying the system 
through grass cultivation, building shelters for livestock and grass storage, constructing roads 
between the pastures, improving yak breeding, and so forth. The state distributed new tents to 
                                                 
11  《四川藏区牧民定居行动计划总体规划》. (The General Plan of Sichuan Housing Projects for Herders)  
http://sc.people.com.cn/news/HTML/2009/2/8/20090208102626.htm  
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those who continued their herding practices on their pastures. The cost of houses under the 
plan included about 20% through state subsidies, 30% from loans, and 50% from the herders 
themselves. According to the report from a Meeting of The Housing Project for Herders,12 
68,647 houses were built as of February 2011, which is 69.15% of what was planned. And, 504 
of the 915 improved settlement sites have community centers. By the end of 2010, there were 
about 130 newly built houses in Rakhor Village of Hongyuan County, including 41 houses that 
had been built through another project in 2007 and 2008, and another 90 built in the housing 
project in 2009 and 2010. According to a village leader, there were still about 40 remaining 
houses that would be built in the 2011-2012 cycle. In short, the years of 2009 and 2010 had a 
vigorous housing construction movement that mobilized all levels of government, the Tibetan 
herders, and the housing industry in the region. Many communities, just like Rakhor Village, 
have been renewed with new houses (inside and out), village centers, village offices, tourism 
centers, clinics, and running water systems. The state expects to have more Tibetan herders 
living this new landscape. 
Now, the question is, what do all of these mean to the Tibetan herders and their life? How 
does this fit in with the discourse of the “Open up the West” campaign and the formation of the 
neo-liberal governable subject? In what follows, I explore these questions through a government 
journalist's online report about the housing project and the actual real world changes brought 
about by the project. The report is titled, “Three stories of Tibetan herders: a witness of the 
tremendous changes over two years”  (三个红原牧民的故事：见证藏区两年巨变).13 
                                                 
12 全省藏区牧民定居行动计划工作会议召开). “A meeting on the Sichuan Housing Project for Herders” 
February 25.2011. www.abazhou.gov.cn  
13  http://www.abazhou.gov.cn" www.abazhou.gov.cn. (2011-07-30) 
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Story one: DkonMchog BkraShis: headed for his “second house” (二套
房)14 
 
As he was in the first group of herders who participated in the housing 
project, in Oct, 2009, DkonMchog BkraShis, a herder of Serde Township, 
has moved into his new house of 70 square meters. Located near Provincial 
Road 301, the house has changed the entire life of DkonMchog BkraShis. 
His old plank-shelter collapsed under a heavy snow, and later that winter he 
and his family were sitting around the warm stove in his new house, and the 
new house enabled his family to enjoy a comfortable new life. The accident 
firmly lodged in his memory, and it has changed his way of thinking since 
then.   By December, 2010, with the income from livestock of that year, 
DkonMchog BkraShis has not only been able to pay up the loan he took for 
the new house, but he has also bought a new van from the county town,15 
starting a transportation business from his township to the county seat. His 
settlement brought by the housing project has enabled his family to release 
the extra labor for other work, so that the plan he has had in mind for a long 
time has now been put into practice. Now he is much more hopeful about his 
future life.      Beginning in July 2011, regardless of how busy he was in his 
transportation business, he always managed to work for another several 
hours on the construction of his second two-storey house during the several 
months of construction. Looking at his second house that was about to be 
completed, he could not hide his satisfied smile.     In June 2010, he boldly 
sold most of his 100 yaks and kept only a dozen female yaks and few 
breeding yaks, so that his wife did not need to stay on their pasture for the 
whole year. With the income of over three thousand RMB from selling his 
yaks and from his transportation business, he decided to build another two-
storey house of 300 square meters in this yard. His plan with this new house 
is to run a home-stay hotel, and with the advantage of its location near the 
provincial road, the future hotel is expected to earn over a hundred thousand 
RMB a year.    “Before we settled, our life was very simple, and we did not 
have much thoughts [about making money]. After we settled, our living 
condition has been improved, and we now have a higher living standard. 
Next year, I want to take a loan from a bank to start a “Tibetan herders’ 
home for the tourists”   (藏家乐) for tourism business, so that I can sell yak 
meat and milk for more money”. So said DkonMchog BkraShis, giving a 
brilliant smile on his hard face while his white teeth sparkled in the shining 
sunlight.   
Story Two: BdeSkyid SgrolMa: from a poor household to becoming a 
boss of a chain store of yak yogurt 
   “She is the richest ‘poverty-stricken’ household in our village.” The 
village secretary told this interesting story to the journalist.     Five days ago, 
                                                 
14  In Chinese, 二套房 refers to the upper-middle class in cities who are rich enough to have a second house. 
15 It is a common to see Tibetan herders running vans for local transportation business, selling yogurt, and 
running small hotels, and so forth. 
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a leader from the prefecture government, during his second visit to this 
village, wanted to see BdeSkyid SgrolMa who was still a ‘poverty-stricken’ 
household when the leader visited her last time. This time, when the leader 
saw BdeSkyid SgrolMa and her new house, he thought he went to the wrong 
place, for what he has seen this time was a totally different view compared 
with his previous visit: this time, she lives in a fully equipped, very well-
furnished house. The leader asked why there was such an astonishing change 
to her and living condition. The village secretary told the leader that she is 
not a “poverty-stricken household” any more.    What happened was that 
with support of the government BdeSkyid SgrolMa has not only been able to 
build her new house through the housing project, but she has also started her 
yogurt business. Because her yogurt has been very popular in the market, she 
recently partnered with other people, and expanded her business into another 
larger tourism site.     The growth in her business has led her to a wonderful 
plan for the future. She wants to start a factory to produce new products of 
yogurt ice cream and popsicles, leading her fellow-villagers in a drive for a 
relatively comfortable life  (奔小康) 。Story three: Ajam RdorRje: to record 
this era brick by brick!     Returning home after working outside, he 
encountered the implementation of the housing project. Ajam RdorRje 
decided to build a house for his family with the skills he learned outside and 
with money he earned with his part-time work.    He told his idea to local 
government officials who helped him to find construction materials and sent 
a consultant to him. In October 2009, he finished his house, and the quality 
and design of the house surprised the quality control officials upon their 
inspection.     Seeing a business opportunity in the housing project, Ajam 
RdorRje decided against going out for part-time work. Instead, he decided to 
establish a construction team, for which he has gotten great support from the 
local township government. As expected, his work has been highly 
recognized by the local herders whose houses were built by Ajam RdorRje. 
In this way, he has been able to dig up the first gold in his life in the housing 
project.   Ajam RdorRje, a former part-time worker, has now become a 
small contractor with a good reputation in his community. Though this is just 
the start of his career, he set a lofty goal for his future, saying, “I want to 
record the great change and time we are experiencing, with my brick by 
brick construction work.” 
..……….. 
 
The journalist ends the stories by saying:  
From mobile nomads to settled herders, it is a Millennium leap-forward: 
sedentarization has become a driving force for economic development, which is a 
realistic option. The vast grassland of Hongyuan is reverberating with a new song of a 
new era.  
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One thing to note is that these stories are both representational and material, 
because all of those integrated efforts of the housing project have had and will continue 
to have material impacts on herders' lives in addition to those changes that have already 
been taking place. But, at the same time, the stories also become state propaganda 
about the successful housing projects and new image of Tibetan herders emerging with 
it. In other words, this is a typical state update piece of news about the State Housing 
Project for Herders, and the herders in the stories represent an ideal model of herders 
that the state wants to produce with its projects. Those stories are a window through 
which we can see how the state projects a scenario for the future Tibetan pastoralists 
with the housing project, the yak economic strategy, and other efforts. All of these are 
framed by the larger economic reform, particularly “Open up the West” campaign, an 
extension of neo-liberal economic structures into western China, and the Tibetan 
pastoral areas and Tibetan herders are deeply influenced by that reform and its 
extension. I argue that the three stories of herders relating to the recent state Housing 
Project show the type of subjects that the state wants to produce with its strategy of 
“Open up the West” campaign, which is translated into many specific projects at the 
local government level. What follows is an analysis of three aspects of those stories in 
the light of neo-liberal techniques of governance.  
Housing Projects as a Condition for Change 
The number one message the author wants to deliver with these stories is that the newly 
settled life has become a condition in which herders have become new people, with new ways of 
thinking and acting. That is, the new houses, new villages, new tents, and new community 
centers, have produced new herders who have not only left their old black tents and pastures and 
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have settled in their new houses happily, but who have also now become more market-oriented 
actors with many more material desires (Rofel, 2007), and with imaginative minds that the 
mobile nomads did not have.  They are now no longer muddleheaded and primitive herders, but 
have become open-minded market-oriented actors who can participate meaningfully in the 
market economy. All of the new ways in which they can make a living, including DkonMchog 
BkraShis’s purchasing of a small van by selling most of his yaks, the Tibetan woman’s new 
business establishing a trans-regional yogurt chain, and the first Tibetan construction contractor, 
are only possible with the settled life brought by the housing project.  DkonMchog BkraShis has 
become a new model of Tibetan herders in a variety of ways; his desire for a second house, his 
engaging in the local transportation businesses, his bold sale of most of his yaks for the material 
comforts and business ventures, and all of his business ideas including that of running hotels and 
stores in his newly built second building, the home-stay tourist home on his pasture, and the 
commercialization of his butter and yogurt. All of those new ideas formed as a result of the 
settled life. Similarly, with the housing project, the other two herders have been able to achieve 
the transition from their previous lives of herders in poverty, to that of business entrepreneurs 
who have the ability to lead their community into the splendid future. All of those ideas and 
changes have come not as a result of the state campaign or educational movements, but by the 
condition of the settled way of life. It is that condition with which herders have naturally made 
the changes that the state wants to see.  As DkonMchog BkraShis says, “Before we settled, our 
life was very simple, and we did not think much about making money. After we settled, our 
living condition has been improved, and we now want to have a higher living standard.”  That is, 
the herders’ move away from their old tents to new houses does not only represent a more 
comfortable and happier life. It also means a complete transformation of their lives internally and 
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externally, a historic transformation of primitive and backward nomads who subsisted on 
livestock production into market-oriented entrepreneurs or members of the labor force in the 
towns. And, the state asserts its power over them by cultivating herders as subjects with a new 
desire for material comforts and the ability to make ventures in market competition in the settled 
communities. Therefore, the Housing Project for Herders is not simply a project to settle herders 
in towns, but it is designed to discipline (Ong and Zhang, 2008) the herders’ way of thinking and 
behaviors by creating the condition of settlement life.  
Indeed, the local government employed various means to further integrate herders into the 
market economy. One strategy that the local government took for ensuring the stable settlement 
of herders was to transform the traditional extensive yak production system into one of modern 
intensive production. That is accomplished by improving the quality and quantity produced by 
the process through grass cultivation, upgrading the livestock shelter and grass storage, and the 
construction of roads which link the small towns with the pastures; other measures include 
improving yak breeding, encouraging herders to maximize female livestock numbers and the off-
take rate of male yaks, and promoting the large-scale commercialization of yaks and related 
products.  
The second strategy is to permanently settle the herders in the towns through the tourist 
industry and new highland agricultural practices. The local government encourages herders to 
engage in the service sector by providing support towards their participation in the local culture-
based tourist businesses, including accommodation, catering, entertainment, nomadic home-
staying, and others.  The local government also encourages herders to engage in some highland 
agricultural practices such as grass plantation, off-season vegetable cultivation, Tibetan herb 
cultivation, highland potato, highland mushrooms, and other crops that are suitable to the local 
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ecological conditions. In addition, it is also the state's long-term plan to provide vocational 
training for herders, aiming to ensure a steady transfer of extra workers from pastures to the 
urban towns to engage them in the market system. 
 
The Cultivation of Loyalty 
This transition from mobile nomads to entrepreneurs is framed by posing the state as the 
benevolent savior of the simple-minded and culturally retarded Tibetan herders. The bright new 
image of Tibetan herders as market actors is portrayed in contrast with the darkness of their life 
in the past, reflected in the collapsed wooden shed, the old tents, and the seasonal movements on 
their pastures, all characterized by poverty and harshness  The gradual departure from the 
darkness of the past and the beginning of new life is attributed to the benevolent state and its 
projects. The local government’s support for the first Tibetan construction contractor, the higher 
official's visit to the former poor lady, and the housing project itself, are all key agents in this 
transformation, for which Tibetan herders owe great gratitude and loyalty to the state and Party. 
In other words, the portrait of the happy Tibetan herders in the housing project is the mirror of 
the state benevolent agenda, which is the legitimate foundation of its ruling position. This 
political agenda was clearly stated by the Sichuan provincial governor Jiang at the opening 
ceremony of the Housing Project for Herders when it took place in Tagong township in Ganzi 
Prefecture in 2009,16   
The Housing Project for Herders and the Action of New Life in New Tent 
is an effort to promote the economic development and ensure the long-term 
stability in Tibetan populated regions. It is a livelihood improvement program 
related to the immediate interests of the public, and it is a primary project for 
the overall strategy of development, reform, and stability of Tibetan populated 
regions. 
                                                 
16   http://www.sichuandaily.com.cn/2009/02/20/20090220558524771749.htm  
  
89 
…..the project should highlight the themes of harmony and stability; it 
should be integrated with the work for the unity of nationalities; through 
strengthening of propaganda, the project should fully implement the Party's 
policy towards nationalities and religions to build the foundation for the 
realization of unity and common prosperity among all the nationalities 
together. 
 
In similar way, Party Secretary Shijun of Aba Prefecture government emphasized 
during a meeting on the Housing Project for Herders in 2010,17  
The Housing Project for Herders & the Action of New Life in New Tent 
and other provincial livelihood programs are the provincial strategy and basic 
programs to achieve the leap-forward development and long-term stability in 
the Tibetan populated regions. 
 
As clearly stated regarding the political investment in specific project 
implementation by those leaders, The Housing Project for Herders & the Action of New 
Life in New Tent project has also been accompanied by the campaign of “Gratitude 
Education” (感恩教育), whereby the recipients are encouraged to show their great 
gratitude for the state and Party. In mobilizing the county government leaders to integrate 
the “Gratitude Education” campaign as they deliver new tents to herders, the Party 
secretary and the governor of Aba prefecture state,18 “all county government should do 
well in delivering new tents to herders’ hands, and they should also deliver the love and 
care that the Party and government have for their people to the hearts of Tibetan herders 
at the same time” (emphasis mine). Therefore, the changes that are targeted by those 
projects are not only physical, but also psychological and symbolic. 
 
 
                                                 
17   www.abazhou.gov.cn  
18  “阿坝州委 州政府要求切实做好新型帐篷发放和感恩教育”,“the campaign of “Gratitude 
Education” (感恩教育) with the Housing Project for Herders & the Action of New Life in New Tent project.”	  
www.abazhou.gov.cn  
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Neo-liberalization as Materialism and Secularization 
In addition to all of these, there is one other point that needs to be highlighted. That is, the 
state not only wants herders to become market actors, but also would like to see them become 
very materialist and secular. The assumption is that if herders become materialists and secular, 
they will be in the same cultural realm of the Chinese nation-state and its mainstream ideology 
and agendas. This cultural shift is based on the assumption that much of the instability in the 
region is attributed to cultural and ideological conflicts. In the Tibetan pastoral areas, having 
appropriate desires is a very important aspect of the “technique of self” necessary for the state to 
govern people with different cultural backgrounds. For Tibetan herders, some desires are highly 
encouraged and others are marginalized or discouraged.  The desires for worldly 
comfort/enjoyment and the collection of wealth are highly encouraged, while spiritual interests 
are labeled as superstitious and dissident, and are discouraged or even criminalized. For instance, 
the state is irritated when herders don't slaughter their yaks for spiritual reasons. The herders’ 
willingness to sell most of their yaks to improve their living condition and/or for venturing in 
business is highly valued.  With those material-based values it is very common for many 
government officials, including some Tibetans, to say that Tibetan herders are very irrational for 
keeping so many yaks on their pastures instead of selling them to improve their living conditions 
and educate their children. For instance, in Rakhor Village, two permanently settled herders who 
were previously considered poor have recently been designated models for others because the 
state officials see them as properly adjusting to the material comforts by decorating their new 
houses.  Because they never had enough yaks to make a good living before the programs, those 
two herders have recently settled in town and are working part-time in the slaughterhouses. With 
the income from their part-time jobs, they have been able to build their new houses and decorate 
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them very well. In the view of other herders who have many yaks, those two herders with well-
furnished houses are still considered to be very poor, while the state officials see them as the 
ones who have learned how to improve their living condition and enjoy material comfort. Using 
those two as examples, the officials suggest that other herders who have hundreds of yaks but do 
not live in well-furnished houses lack adequate values and appropriate desires.  
 
 
 
Tibetan herders’ newly furnished houses 
 
This secularization process is also reflected in the landscape of newly built communities 
and the way they are designed. Rakhor Village moved to its current location five years ago, and 
the state has subsidized the construction of over 130 houses in the community. The village is 
located next to a provincial road that links Rakhor to Hongyuan and other counties.  At the very 
center of the village are the newly built village administrative offices for the village leaders, and 
the central square where herders are expected to exercise. What doesn't appear are the usual 
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religious sites such as a temple or mani wheel.  I suggest that this pattern of the village is 
designed to reflect the emphasis on the secularization of the community. That pattern is common 
across new villages established with the housing project. At the same time, the state has put great 
emphasis on the local (Tibetan) architecture in the design of those new houses to make the 
villages attractive for the tourist industry. In one case, a provincial leader asked the township 
government to reconstruct ongoing projects because Tibetan characteristics were lacking in the 
design of those buildings. 
 
. ….  
Tourism center 
 
… …  
The village administrative Office and activity center for herders 
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Yak economic development 
Yaks have been one of the main industries in most pastoral areas of Sichuan province 
since the economic reform of the 1980s. With the implementation of the “Open up the West” 
campaign, the local governments have intensified their efforts to promote the yak economy, 
seeing it as very important economic sector in the region.  The Aba Prefectural government, 
having one of the most productive pastures on Tibetan plateau, has been promoting yak economy 
as a very important economic strategy for the last thirty years. It established the prefectural Yak 
Economic Park, which includes the pastoral areas in the five counties of Aba Prefecture, when it 
issued the Eleventh Five Year Development Plan of 2006-2010,19 the grand blueprint of 
economic development in the region. It states in the economic plan of 2006-2010,  
The economic development plan establishes the Aba Tibetan Plateau Yak 
Economic Park to promote the five core demonstration zones of Hongyuan, 
Ruoergai, Aba, Rangtang, and Songpan County, the five counties with Tibetan 
herder populations. These efforts are to oversee the animal husbandry industry 
in Aba Prefecture, and to further facilitate the largest yak-related production 
area in the region, which will have a considerable impact on the entire Tibetan 
plateau.. …to extend the industrial chain by developing products of yak 
leather, meat, milk, bone, blood and hair.... 
 
Both prefecture and county governments have been very active in promotion of the yak 
economy. The local government in Hongyuan County, like many other local governments under 
pressure to promote development, is stimulating the yak economy with many specific efforts. For 
instance, the two largest state-owned factories of yak milk and meat are contracted to companies 
from the outside. With the government support for cultivating local entrepreneurs, the number of 
local slaughterhouses has increased to 15, with a capacity of 10 to 200 yaks each. There are also 
a number of companies that have been producing dried yak meat as “green” product of the 
Tibetan plateau to sell in the large cities and in well-known tourist sites. Other yak products 
                                                 
19 《阿坝藏族羌族自治州国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要》。	  www.abazhou.gov.cn  
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include yak milk, yogurt, butter, and yak horn products. In order to integrate the pastoral 
economy with the markets of larger cities, the roads between those nomadic counties and larger 
cities have recently been significantly improved. All of these efforts to promote the yak economy 
have been realized and circulated through the significant improvement in the infrastructure of 
transportation and communications, including the newly constructed road from Hongyuan to 
Chengdu, internet, mobile phone service, and so on. The improvement in infrastructure 
channeled tourists from major cities to the pastoral areas, for many of them are located near 
some well-known tourist sites like Jiuzaigou and Huanglong. It has also sped up the integration 
of pastoral areas into larger market cities. In short, all of those economic promotions and 
infrastructure improvements have stimulated the yak prices with the increasing demand for yak 
meat and other products, which has become the incentive for the herders to sell more yaks. At 
the same time, the government, by issuing policies and regulations (the imposition of carrying 
capacity) on the number of livestock herders can keep on their pasture, has been encouraging 
herders to increase their off-take rate for both ecological and economic reasons. All of those 
policies and market factors have had profound impacts on herders’ recent increase in their 
slaughter rate.  In the meantime, the general Chinese market economy promotion has created 
other social phenomena: domestic institutes and international organizations are doing research on 
yak breeding, genetics, etc.   Such programs are predicated on the idea that trade in yaks will 
bring great economic benefits. Those activities have been accompanied by the recently 
established Aba Prefecture Yak Affairs Office in the government administration, the turning of 
five pastoral countries in Aba Prefecture into a Yak Economic Park, and festivals such as the 
Hongyuan Yak Festival and yak workshops, etc. As a result of these integrated efforts, Tibetan 
herders in this region are increasingly selling more and more yaks to Han Chinese and Muslims, 
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transporting hundreds of thousands of yaks to large markets; the numbers of yaks slaughtered is 
increasing yearly. One clear indication of this increase is that, nowadays, many Tibetan herders 
sell male yaks as young as three years old, which was rare during the commune system and right 
afterwards.  The tradition for selling yaks was that herders would wait to sell the male yaks until 
they were six year old or older, and during the commune time, herders would keep many male 
yaks in their herds. However, today there are very few herders who keep male adult yaks in their 
yak herds, for both economic reasons and the shortage of pasture. Now Tibetan herders keep 
only those male yaks that are tshe thars and yaks for transportation. It is estimated that there are 
about 400,000 yaks in Hongyuan County, and herders are now selling over 20,000 yaks to meat 
market yearly. In addition to the local market, Han and Hui businessmen have been transporting 
yaks to the market in the cities like Chengdu, Changdu Prefecture in TAR, Linxia, Lanzhou, and 
other places.  
The belief in the economic potential for yaks is so strong in Aba Prefecture that even the 
recent national concerns about ecological security in the pastoral areas of Tibetan plateau have 
no real impact on those economic forces. In northern Sichuan, particularly Aba Prefecture, there 
is no real change in yak economic development strategy in facing the central government 
concern about rangeland ecological security, and the local government still sees yaks as a very 
important industry. Indeed, in the Housing Project for Herders, the yak economy has been one of 
those support programs20 for the overall development of those nomadic communities in the 
pastoral areas of Sichuan province.  The general idea of the state is to change the extensive 
livestock production system into an intensive production system, introducing science and 
                                                 
20 Other economic strategies integrated in the Housing Project for Herders include tourism businesses 
associated with herders’ houses and new villages, industrializations of yaks and Tibetan sheep economy, 
improvement of facilities for local livestock production, and transfer of labor to the secondary and tertiary 
industries. 
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technology, bringing corporations into the yak industry, and commercializing the livestock 
production. There are very specific measures for this, including connecting pastures to the towns 
by constructing roads, building shelters for livestock and grass storage, grass cultivation, and 
improving yak breeding skills and technologies. Another effort is the professionalization of 
Tibetan herders in the yak production system, by encouraging them to establish their own 
professional cooperatives such yak dairy products professional cooperative, yak breeders 
associations, and so forth. 
This economic structure and the increase in the rate of yak sales for slaughter rate have 
become a force through which herders’ traditional spiritual relationship with yaks has gradually 
been replaced by a commercial relationship in a market arrangement. That is, their awareness of 
a karmic relationship with their yaks has increasingly become weaker and weaker, and the 
religious relationship is in danger of being replaced by market oriented, material, and secular 
relationships with yaks. In other words, the very process of their increasing selling of yaks makes 
them feel less fear and care about sins (negative karma) and the related negative results of their 
misconduct of slaughtering yaks.  Now, the Tibetan herders’ view of yaks as sentient beings in 
the realm of samsara is in danger of being replaced by another cultural view of yaks as 
commercial products and economic resources.  
 
Conclusion 
In the pastoral areas of Tibet, the power of the state has extended to all aspect of herders’ 
lives, including their access to resources and their way of thinking. This power extension has 
manifested differently in different periods of time. During the commune period, it was the top-
down approach and political mobilization. But after the economic reform it has manifested as a 
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kind of economic spirituality,  in which their conditions have been manipulated to better arrange 
the governance of their souls (Foucault, 1991; Ong and Zhang, 2008).  The Chinese economic 
reform was a response to the economic stagnancy resulting from the commune system. For this 
reason, it was started with an economic strategy per se. In pastoral areas of the Tibetan plateau, it 
was started with livestock privatization, which was followed by the grassland contract system. 
These have become a technique of governance through which herders’ relationships with the 
state, with livestock, and with themselves have increasingly become more governable from the 
government perspective. It is the launching of the “Open up the West” campaign strategy that 
has sped up the process in which other goals beyond simple economics were included in the 
program. Now the reform extends deeply into the Western regions to achieve other state 
agendas, including simulation of domestic consumption, political stability, ecological security, 
and overall nation-building itself. The “Open up the West” campaign is a state effort to extend 
the neo-liberal technology of governance to the depths of the western region, where all political, 
economic, social problems are addressed through the creation of governable subjects by creating 
conditions that engender the loyalty and appreciation of the people. It politically and 
economically integrates the western frontier regions into the larger Chinese economic realm by 
the ‘socialism from afar’ technique (Ong and Zhang, 2008).  
In the Housing Projects for Herders, by creating the condition of settled life, herders have 
automatically started to engage in the new ways to make money other than the herding practice. 
With their experience in this process, herders have become subjects with market-oriented minds 
with a stronger desire for the worldly material comforts and successes, a definite secularization 
process. At the same time, the housing project has increased the herders’ livestock off-take rate 
by increasing their expenditures, including their contribution of 70 % of total cost for the new 
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house, the inside decoration, and furniture. Then there are additional costs, including education, 
health, vehicles and transportation, communications fees and so on. This increase in off-take rate 
is another state agenda to reduce the ecological damage resulting from keeping excess livestock 
on the land, while improving the living condition of the Tibetan herders.  And again, the overall 
economic structure has all channeled yaks into a market circulation, which has become another 
force in the increasing slaughter rate, a rise in yak prices and more demand for yak-related 
products. However, this increase in the slaughter rate has become an issue for Tibetan Buddhist 
culture, and it has attracted the slaughter renunciation movement by Tibetan khenpos in recent 
years. In short, it is the larger economic structure and specific projects that have produced the 
new cultural conflicts between different groups, which are reflected in the recent renounce-
slaughter movement, and have conjured another new phenomenon. That is the appearance of 
Tibetan middlemen in the livestock trading business for the slaughter market during recent years, 
a newly emerged small group now found in the Tibetan pastoral areas, which will be explored in 
more detail in Chapter four. 
In sum, through livestock decollectivization, grassland decollectivization, housing 
projects, and the "greening" of yak-meat products, the state has taken further steps toward the 
fullest integration of the herders and their traditional style into the neoliberal market economy, 
extending administrative forces into the rangeland, and making the herders’ lives more 
manageable in town through a “socialism from afar” technique (Ong and Zhang, 2008). 
However, this technique of self or the “socialism from afar” conceptualization is not a one- way 
driving force, but it is contested and compromised by other cultural forces and historical 
memories. This is my departure from conceptualizing neo-liberalism as governance technique to 
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a new cultural contestation of “knot”, where the state subject formation is contested by other 
forces that form their own subjects, all of which will be explored in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter Three 
Tibetan Buddhist Teachings in a new social context:  
Tibetan Buddhism and neo-liberal China 
 
In 1980, in an empty valley in eastern Tibet, a Tibetan lama started a small Tibetan 
Buddhist study center with a few of his disciples. Today, this religious center has become one of 
the most influential Tibetan Buddhist institutes in Tibet, educating thousands of monks and nuns 
from across the Tibetan plateau. Many religious teachings and initiatives started by the leading 
Tibetan khenpos from the institute have been having profound impacts on Tibetan pastoralists 
across the Tibetan plateau. These include the slaughter renunciation movement, vegetarian 
movement, fur renunciation teachings, ten-virtuous-rules, humanitarian killing of livestock, 
illiteracy eradication, purification of spoken language, and others. Having been carried out by 
over thirty khenpos from Larung Gar, those religious teachings have become movements that 
cover many aspects of Tibetans’ livelihood and their daily cultural practices, including diet, 
costume, language, and religious practices.  How should we understand these religious teachings 
in the current social context and conditions of Tibetan pastoral areas? In other words, how are 
they informed by the current social transformation brought by secular neo-liberal processes in 
western China? How are these movements related to one another? Finally, how are these 
religious movements informed by Tibetan Buddhism as a historical force? This chapter addresses 
these questions with reference to Buddhism and modern social transformation. 
By examining a wide range of popular and scholarly writings produced by Buddhists 
around the globe, David McMahan (2008) observed that the encounter of Buddhism with modern 
popular culture has produced a hybrid of Buddhism that is both modernist as well as Buddhist. 
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The new forms of Buddhism have been constructed by westerners and Asian Buddhist leaders 
through their experience in modern society. McMahan shows that much of what has been written 
and said about Buddhism in the modern era can only be understood against the background of 
dominant western discourses, including Western monotheism, rationalism, scientific naturalism, 
and romantic expressivism, all of which are embedded in the common sense western ideals of 
individualism, egalitarianism, liberalism, democratic ideals, and the impulse toward social 
reform. In other words, by resonating with these popular Western cultural norms, Buddhism has 
“re-created itself as Buddhist modernism” (2008:16) in the modern world, which is constituted 
by both “tacit understandings and social practices” and “explicit theories” (2008:15). This re-
creation process includes both active adaptations to some discourses (scientific rationality, 
human rights, individual freedom, social protection, and individual and cultural autonomy), as 
well as rejection of other forces (economic imperialism, militarism, colonialism, Christian 
missionization) (McMahan, 2008). In short, McMahan suggests that the popularization of 
Buddhism in modern society is dependent on its ability to present itself by resonating with the 
dominant culture through a selective interpretation and presentation, so that Buddhism finds “a 
niche in the new situation and mold itself to its contours” (2008:16).  
Another phenomenon of Buddhists’ encounter with modernization is its social engagement 
in the various forms of development programs throughout Asia for the last century (Queen and 
King, 1996). Labeled as “Engaged Buddhism” by Queen and King (1996), those Buddhist 
activists included Thich Nhat Hanh of Vietnam, Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and Sulak Sivaraksa of 
Thailand, Ariyaratne and the Sarvodaya Shramadana movement of Sri Lanka, Daisaku Ikeda and 
the Soka Gakkai movement of Japan, among others. The massive social development programs 
and campaigns initiated by those Buddhist leaders were mostly their responses to the social and 
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economic justice in their societies, which have been in a clear contrast with the traditional 
practices of Buddhism. Two important themes emerged in those Buddhist social movements. 
First and most compelling is their complete reinterpretation of the fundamental teachings. Even 
through each movement corresponds to a separate country and is the product of unique cultural 
and historical circumstances, the historical development and institutional forms of engaged 
Buddhism are considered in light of traditional Buddhist conceptions of morality, 
interdependence, and liberation. Those Buddhist leaders reinterpreted and re-focused on 
particular parts of Buddhist doctrine to justify in appealing to Buddhist principles to support of 
their work. Second, those movements are informed by Western ideas of freedom, human rights, 
and democracy. In other words, the more socially engaged activities, the more Buddhist they 
become. They concentrate on issues of social justice and poverty, endorsement of democracy, 
and some forms of socialism, but they universally reject capitalism as thoroughly inconsistent 
with Buddhist ethical principles. Those reinterpretations and integration of Buddhist teachings 
with social concerns include the shift from other-worldly enlightenment to this-worldly social 
issues, and scaling up the individual enlightenment to the society as a target of liberation (Bond, 
1996); reinterpretation of the Buddhist idea of suffering as a social category, in which those in 
poverty suffer from capitalist corporations and elites, the environment suffers from capitalists’ 
endless consumerist culture, and non-human beings suffer from human beings’ self-centered 
nature (Sivaraksa, 2005); and Ambedkhar’s reinterpretation of the four noble truths. In the latter,  
the first noble truth for the present age was the widespread suffering of injustice and poverty; the 
second truth was social, political, and cultural institutions of oppression, the third truth was 
expressed by the European ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity; and the fourth truth was the 
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threefold path of Ambedkhar's famous slogan, 'Educate! Agitate! Organize!' (Queen and King, 
1996: 62).  
In Buddhist modernism, Buddhist intellectuals proactively adapt popular cultural ideals 
(Western monotheism, rationalism and scientific naturalism, and romantic expressivism) to 
maintain as well as to promote it in new situation of modern society.   Engaged Buddhism in 
various forms of social movements becomes another way in which Buddhism posits itself in a 
leading position in modern society, a society that is articulated and framed differently compared 
with previous societies. What these new phenomenon tell us is that Buddhism has never been a 
religion that is isolated from society, but rather Buddhism recreates itself in new circumstances. 
It has been articulated as well as practiced in new conceptualizations and frameworks when it 
has encountered modern culture and theories (McMahan, 2008).  
 Drawing on ideas of Buddhist modernism and engaged Buddhism, I argue that recent 
religious movements in Tibet have been largely triggered by the current secular neo-liberal 
process of Western China, mediated by the discourse of the “Open up the West” campaign 
(ironically, the very reform that provided the space for the formation of religious agents). In 
other words, it is the current social transformation in pastoral Tibet that has engendered these 
religious movements. Second, the dynamic process and various social aspects that those 
movements are involved in show a process in which Tibetan Buddhism is reshaped by its 
adaptation to the social-economic situation by reinforcing its core values and main ideologies, 
modifying its outdated elements, and incorporating as well as rejecting new popular discourses 
and mainstream cultures. To this end, I argue that, rather than seeing Tibetan Buddhism as 
stagnant and a tradition of the past that need to be preserved, I will demonstrate that Tibetan 
Buddhism is constantly reconstructed by a combination of forces including some of its core 
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values, popular discourse, and other local and global social and political forces. In this chapter, I 
demonstrate the modernist aspect of Buddhist movements in Tibet from three perspectives: 
historical changes in the relationship of Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese authorities, the religious 
movements as an ethical correction of Tibetan herders, and convergence of Tibetan Buddhism 
and Tibetan identity.  
In the first section of the chapter, I review the transition, continuity, and changes in the 
historical relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and authorities in inner China since the Yuan 
Dynasty, to give a full picture of the historical context of the current political situation. In the 
second section, I will demonstrate how Tibetan Buddhism has become a social agent, by 
exploring the encounter of Tibetan Buddhism with the social-cultural transformation in the 
context of the secular neo-liberal development, and Tibetan Buddhists’ adaptation to the new 
discourses. By introducing three related movements -- the slaughter renunciation, vegetarian, and 
fur renunciation movements -- in the first subsection, I demonstrate how those movements are 
triggered by the social transformation brought by the neo-liberalization process of contemporary 
China, and to show their movements as also related to increasing trans-regional interaction and 
globalization. In this subsection, I will also discuss how Tibetan Buddhism is an on-going 
process of giving meanings to the new world it encounters and experiences by introducing the 
humanitarian killing movement and dynamic interpretation of sins of slaughter (the 
differentiation of the sins involved with selling, killing, and trading livestock, and eating meat). 
The last subsection demonstrates an overlap of Tibetan identity with Tibetan Buddhist identity 
that enables Tibetan Buddhists to readjust themselves to reinforce their leading position in 
Tibetan society. The incorporation of a discourse of Tibetan identity into Tibetan Buddhism is 
reflected in Tibetan Buddhists’ active engagement in social programs, such as the reactivation of 
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the ten-virtuous-merits as standards of conduct for Tibetans, education promotion, language 
purification, and others. 
 
Tibetan Buddhism and Authorities of Inner China : Changes and continuity in 
 Chinese religious policies 
 
From Yuan to Qing Dynasties 
Since Buddhism was officially introduced to Tibet in the eighth century, Tibetan 
Buddhism has slowly gained a dominant position both spiritually and politically in Tibetan 
society (Kapstein, 2006)(Dkon Mchog Bstan Pa Rab Rgyas, 1987; KalsangGyal, 2006). For over 
four hundred years after the collapse of the Tibetan empire that had unified the entire region of 
the Tibetan plateau, Tibet remained fragmented, ruled by different Tibetan Buddhist schools and 
local elites without any single authority until the Yuan Dynasty. It was during the Yuan Dynasty 
that Tibetan religious elites in different schools had started to engage with inner Chinese political 
powers to compete for a dominant position among the competing religious schools in Tibet 
(StagTshang RdzongPa 1985; Kun Dga’ Rdo Rje 1981). Since then, linkages between Tibetan 
religious leaders and powers of Chinese emperors have continued, with some changes, to the 
current Chinese religious policies in which Tibetan Buddhism and it leaders have been 
embedded since 1958. 
During the Mongol Yuan dynasty in the thirteenth century, Tibetan Buddhists’ relationship 
with the rulers in inner China started with the establishment of a patronage relationship between 
the Sakya School and the Yuan dynasty. Through this relationship, the Sakya School gained a 
dominant position among other Tibetan Buddhist schools for several hundred years. This 
tradition of relying on outside powers to empower certain Buddhist schools was continued by the 
Phamo Drupa Kagyu lineage that overthrew the Sakya Schools’ rule over Tibet in the early Ming 
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Dynasty (GtsugLag PhrengBa, 1986; NgaWang LobsangGyatso, 1957). During the Qing 
Dynasty in the seventeenth century, facing the threat from the Karma Kagyu School supported 
by a Mongol military power, the Gelug School, led by the Fifth Dalai Lama, used another 
Mongolian military to establish its dominant role among the other Tibetan Buddhist schools in 
Tibet. That leading role, politically before 1958 and spiritually after the Peaceful Liberation of 
Tibet has continued through contemporary Tibetan society. While the Yuan Dynasty relied on a 
single school as their representative ruler of Tibet, both Ming and Qing Dynasties used rituals 
and performances of entitling of religious or political positions to the Tibetan religious leaders to 
demonstrate their rule over Tibet (Rgyal Mo ’Brug Pa, 2004; Thub Bstan Phun Tshogs, 1996; 
Dung Dkar Blo bzang ‘Phrin Las, 2007）.  
The situation in those periods was that the power of the dynastic emperors from inner 
China did not meaningfully reach Tibetan society on the ground, and Tibet was being ruled by a 
single religious school or competing religious schools. Therefore, a mutual cooperation between 
the various dynasty emperors and certain Tibetan Buddhist schools was necessary for both 
parties in their desire to achieve their own goals. Emperors of dynasties needed Tibetan head 
lamas to maintain the stability of the frontier areas that sometimes threatened the inland or to 
maintain a symbolic political affiliation. That is, Tibetan religious elites became an authorized 
agent, or acted as a lubricant for the Chinese emperors of various dynasties in their dealing with 
the frontier areas. During these periods, religion had not only been recognized as important for 
the rulers but also had been a very useful tool to achieve rule and be ruled, at least symbolically.  
In addition to that, many power holders in inland of China also needed spiritual services from 
Tibetan lamas. Many of those Mongolian, Han, and Manchu rulers were very religious and some 
of them had assigned Tibetan religion leaders as their religious teachers, in Chinese called “帝师” 
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(Emperor Preceptor) (Kun Dga’ Rdo Rje, 1981；石硕，1994)，and as religious ritual 
performers to enhance and protect the prosperity of the kingdom, which suggests the opposite of 
the ‘separation of the state and Church.’ This form of imperial power was different from the 
modern state, which was based on the modern belief or the very western cultural belief that 
secularization of the political system is necessary for development, a belief largely embedded in 
the modern enlightenment in science and technology in the west. Those political entities in inner 
China were different from the modern nation state in the sense that during those dynasties, the 
logic of rule were dependent on the will of the emperors whose relationships with the masses of 
people were different from that found in the modern nation-state. That is, in the latter, the people 
or public owns the nation-state, and the state should serve the people’s well being. In contrast, 
the early emperors’ relationship with the masses were different from those found in the nation-
state in the sense that the emperors had the absolute power over their people and in many cases 
the masses were symbolically owned by the emperors. 
The support that Tibetan spiritual leaders gained from the outside enabled them to be the 
dominant power holders among other competing religious schools in Tibet. In other words, 
outsiders’ intervention in Tibetan society and political affairs was not destructive, but rather it 
modified power structures in Tibetan regions, by disturbing the balanced power relations among 
the different religious schools, as was the case during the time period between the Tibetan 
dynasties and Sakya’s rule of Tibet. In other times, it was through these outsiders’ military 
intervention that Tibet was a politically unified region. During those periods of times, Tibetan 
religious elites who took power positions with the support of outsiders had an absolute political 
power over their people and over their economic affairs, and the interventions from outside only 
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consolidated or restructured those power relationship but without any changes in Tibetan culture 
and identity. 
During those periods, for both Tibetan rulers and Chinese dynasties, it wasn’t necessary to 
separate the state from the religion. Instead, Tibetan Buddhism and its figures played an 
important role in the political ends for both parties, so Tibetan Buddhism was encouraged and 
supported by both parties. It was matter of emphasizing or recognizing one school over other 
ones. In the meantime, those Buddhist leaders were more concerned about the survival of their 
religious school rather than with Tibet as a nationality or political entity.  This tradition of 
relying on outside power by Tibetan Buddhist elites was to serve their school’s interests by 
gaining resources they needed from the inland. At the same time, their active engagement with 
the authorities from the inland was utilized by the latter to assert their symbolic or actual rule 
over Tibet. 
 
Republican period 
Since 1912, facing internal conflicts and invasion from external forces that absorbed most 
of the military powers of the state, the Republican (Guomingdang) state did not have the ability 
to use military force to include Tibet in the Chinese state. Nor did the Republican state use the 
methods of appointment of positions or performance of diplomatic etiquette for the Tibetan 
religious leaders to achieve symbolic rule over Tibet as it had during previous dynasties (Tuttle, 
2005). This is because those entitlements and ritual performances needed military back up. 
Instead, based on the ideology of secularization and nationalism that the Republican state was 
built on, it used a very different approach of dealing with the Tibetan issue than that deployed by 
the former dynasties. The Chinese Republican state employed several secular strategies one after 
  
108 
another. The racial discourse of “Five Races Harmoniously Joined” (Han, Mongolian, Tibetan, 
Manchu, and Muslim) Wuzu Gonghe, is the first approach in which five ethnic groups equally 
constituted the Chinese nation and it was assumed that Tibetans would join the Chinese state 
voluntarily, rather than joining with force (Tuttle, 2005). However, as this approach was 
ineffective, the Republican government reinforced this approach by influencing Tibetan elites 
with Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People.  With this principle Tibetans as an ethnic 
group could be administered as an autonomous region with the Chinese government’s support 
(石硕 1994). However, this strategy also ended up with failure, because the state did not have 
ability in terms of military force (Tuttle, 2005). 
After the failure of these approaches, another approach deployed by the Republican state 
was to achieve cultural intimacy between the two regions. This time, the Republican government 
encouraged Buddhism as a bridge to link Chinese Buddhism with Tibetan Buddhism within the 
global discourse of Buddhism as world religion. Dai Jitao, then a Nationalist Party leader, 
strongly advocated this strategy in the belief that the Buddhists’ interaction of both regions was 
the key to integrate two cultures as an important process of Chinese nation building. These 
initiatives and interactions of Tibetan Buddhists and Chinese Buddhists included the religious 
teaching of top Tibetan lamas in China, Chinese Buddhists in Tibet studying Tibetan Buddhism, 
sponsoring of monasteries in Tibet by the Republican state, sending government officials to 
Tibet to show their respect to Tibetan Buddhism, distributing cash to monks in monasteries, and 
so forth (Tuttle, 2005). 
During the Republican period, the Chinese government’s attitude toward Tibetan 
Buddhism was a clear departure from the former dynasties’ approach toward religion. With the 
ideology of nationalization of the regions and secularization of the state, the Republican state 
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deployed a tough approach to the religions in inner China, including threatening the religious 
institutions and confiscating and transforming religious properties into secular programs such as 
school facilities (Duara, 1991).  However, when the state found Buddhism useful to integrate 
Tibet into inland Chinese culture to further achieve the political goal of unification, the tough 
approach to religion was reversed to some extent. At that point, Chinese Buddhists found a 
chance to legitimate their existence in China. At the same time, the situation in Tibet was that 
much of central Tibet was ruled by the Gelug School, the leader of which, the Dalai Lama, had 
established a dominant position in Tibetan world. With their increasing interaction with the 
British and the Republican government of China, the Dalai Lama and his political system were 
not only struggling with religious schools, but also dealing with added elements of nationalism in 
the contemporary world (Rgyal Mo ’Brug Pa, 2004; Thub Bstan Phun Tshogs, 1996). Therefore, 
the linkage between the Republican state and Tibetan Buddhists was different from the former 
dynasties. With the secularization of the state, the Republican state approach to Tibetan 
Buddhism was cultural integration rather than political cooperation. 
 
Eastern Tibet 
Most of these power relations between Tibetan religious leaders and authorities of inner 
China focused on central Tibet (today’s Tibet Autonomous Region) and its link with inner China.  
However, the situation in southeastern Tibet was somewhat different. For the past few hundred 
years, there were many regional kings, and sometimes some of them were independent from both 
the central Tibetan government and authorities in inner China, but at other times, some of those 
kings were affiliated to dynasties or the Republican state (Rgyal Mo ‘Brug Pa, 2004). 
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One common thing for those local kingdoms is that most of these rulers were kings but 
they believed in Tibetan Buddhism. Under those kings, there were many monasteries. Each 
kingdom could have many tribes and those tribes also had their own monasteries. Many of these 
monasteries, belonging to different schools, were branches of main monasteries in central Tibet. 
Generally speaking, the relationship between those kings as well those chiefs of tribes with local 
Buddhist lamas was that monasteries and lamas were politically and financially subordinate to 
the local kings’ political systems but spiritually head lamas had higher positions than these kings. 
Therefore, many of those kings worshiped the head lamas of their own kingdoms. In other words, 
kings were responsible for secular matters within his kingdom and lamas were responsible for 
things related to monasteries and spiritual things. Theoretically, the kings and lamas had no 
fundamental conflicts in their interests, because those monasteries were owned by those kings or 
tribes, and in most cases lamas did not engage in secular matters, so in general, the kings and 
their lamas would have had good relationships. Yet, the Tibetan Buddhist leaders in southeastern 
Tibet had a strong influence on Tibetan people through religious performances, which, in many 
cases, was inseparable from secular concerns. That is, religious teachings and movements have 
political and economic implications, as is the case with the slaughter renunciation movement, 
which existed on a small scale in Kham Tibetan areas in the early twentieth century. Another 
example is the local laws on hunting and environmental protections (Tib. ri rgya rngon khrim) in 
many Tibetan communities. 
This situation was different in many ways from that of central Tibet, where the 
government had been ruled by Buddhist lamas (their schools) and Tibetan noblemen since the 
thirteenth century. However, one important issue to note is that many of the largest monasteries 
in eastern Tibet were branches of the largest monasteries in central Tibet. Therefore, spiritually, 
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Tibetans in the east were ruled by the religious leaders in central Tibet who were struggling for 
the dominant ruling position among other schools. That is, during the dynastic periods, the 
Tibetan people in the eastern Tibet were politically and economically localized and autonomous 
but spiritually were highly integrated with the religious power system of central Tibet. 
 
Religion and the Communist state 
Religion across the PRC 
When Deng Xiaoping, a second-generation Chinese Communist leader, took power in the 
late 1970s, citizens of China regained religious freedom as part of economic reform. Once more, 
religious sites were reopened and reconstructed, and people were allowed to practice religious 
rituals in specified sites. Once again, “religions,” unlike during the Maoist period and 
particularly the Cultural Revolution, has become a natural feature of the Chinese nation and a 
part of the state administrative system (Ashiwa and Wank, 2009). 
Administratively, the highest department of the Communist Party in dealing with religion 
is the United Front Work Department (统战部)，which was established in the early stages of the 
Communist Party to unify non-party social resources to stand with the Communist Party’s line 
for revolutionary works and wars, for instance wars with the Kuomintang, but recently its main 
purpose has turned to unifying non-party members for economic development. Under the State 
Council, the Religious Affairs Bureau is the institution that actually manages religious affairs at 
the central government level. There are also other associations (Xiehui) that are financed by the 
state and that represent each officially recognized religion.  These associations are supposed to 
link religion to state power professionally such as through academic work and the development 
of religion itself. Each of these state offices has their branches at all local government levels. 
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While the Religious Affairs Bureau is designed to manage the physical aspects (monks, 
monasteries, and related regulations) of religious affairs in the Chinese administrative system, 
the state-owned religious associations have two functions: they are designed to deal with the 
religions professionally from the state perspective, and they also work as a bridge to protect the 
interests of the specific religious categories, as most of these associations are headed by religious 
leaders (Ji, 2008). 
Since the economic reform in the 1980s, for the Chinese state, religion is no longer 
something that should be eliminated as was the case during the Cultural Revolution, or 
something that could be used to mediate the authority (Communist Party) of inner China to 
maintain its political power over ethnic groups on the frontiers, as was the case during previous 
dynasties. As is the case in many modern states, the Communist Party maintains the position that 
the state as well as public affairs should be separated from religious affairs, recognizing the fact 
that its own ideology is different those religious ideologies. However, the current state sees 
religion as a reality of the country that needs to be managed properly by the state. That is, 
religions are a natural part of the Chinese nation-state today, and the state needs to manage them 
correctly in keeping with the nature of a modern state. At the same time, the state needs to adopt 
the proper approach proper to these religions, because they could become potential problems for 
the nation’s stability and for the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party’s ruling position. 
The Party believes that religions and people’s beliefs in those religions will exist until the full 
realization of the Communist society21 (Dunch, 2008). 
There are two themes for this proper management of religions.  First, religion is 
conceptualized as a different category from the non-secular and the non-“superstitious,” with 
                                                 
21  《中共中央关于我国社会主义时期宗教问题的基本观点和基本政策》（1982年3月31日，中共中央
19号文件）(Chinese Communist Party’s basic viewpoint and policies on religions). 
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these terms politically defined. Second, the existing religions in current China should be 
managed with some kind of control, and no new religion is to be tolerated and recognized 
(Dunch, 2008; Yang, 2008).  The differentiation is made by the categorization of what is 
“religion”, a relatively positive systematic set of beliefs and practices, and what is not a 
“religion”(宗教), but rather mixin (superstition) (迷信) and xiejiao（邪教) (evil cult), negative 
beliefs or practices that would bring harm to people’s life and to society. With these categories, 
the Chinese state has legalized five officially recognized religions: Buddhism, Islam, 
Catholicism, Christianity, and Taoism.  To believe in these “religions” and to practice these 
religions are allowed for non-party member citizens, but to believe in mixin and to practice 
xiejiao are illegal (Palmer, 2008). Mixin is equivalent to “superstition” in English, meaning in 
Chinese to believe in something without full knowledge or full understanding. Mixin and xiejiao 
has connotations of containing harmful aspects and inauthentic parts compared with real 
religions even though both religion and mixin and xiejiao are based on faith (Penny, 2008). In 
most cases, mixin is related to fortune telling in accordance with divinatory symbols (e.g. 算命
suanming 或打卦dagua). xiejiao is an official term that the state used to ban the Falungong （法
轮功） in July 1999. Falungong emerged in the late 1990s in China as a new spiritual belief and 
set of practices.  In the term xiejiao, xie (邪) in Chinese means evil，jiao (教) means religious 
school or sect (Penny, 2008). An implication of both mixin and xiejiao is that because these 
categories are not real religions, they would ultimately cheat people and their assets, and 
therefore, it requires the state to protect people from damage caused by these evil or fake 
religions. 
When religion as a general category is used to bring non-scientific belief system under the 
umbrella of modernization or under state control, mixin and xiejiao are sub-categories that 
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further stagnates the existing religions and prevent new potential belief systems from taking 
shape. In other words, this is a strategy to limit the emergence of new religions, making religion 
something stagnant and of the past, denying the possibility of future religion. 
In light of the modernization of the nation, the notion is that those real religions would 
bring positive contributions to the realization of modernization if they are managed properly by 
the state. One way that the state makes sense of religions in modern times is to integrate the 
religious into economic development. The commercialization of religions and its related assets in 
the tourism industry is one of the main approaches toward religion by the state. In recent decades, 
many religious sites in China have been attracting tourists both domestic and international, which 
has made a very important contribution to the economic development of the country (Oakes and 
Sutton, 2010). Temples, monasteries, stupas, and Buddhist statues are a very familiar icon of 
Chinese tourism sites, and this is particularly true for Tibetan populated regions where 
monasteries and temples are typical of the cultural landscape of Tibet. Transforming religious 
sites into tourism assets is a process of materialization as well as secularization of religions and 
their assets (ibid). 
 
Religion policies in Tibetan populated areas 
When the Chinese Communist government formally took over the central Tibet 
government, marked by the Seventeen-point Agreement of 1951, the Chinese government kept 
Tibetan religious elites in their positions in central Tibet, and Tibetan religious culture was 
maintained as it had been, until 1959. With the extension of the Communist government’s rule 
over Tibetan society, the contradiction between many Buddhist ideologies and materialism and 
revolutionary ideals that the Communist Party was embedded in became visible and needed be 
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resolved for the Communist Party. The Cultural Revolution, which began in May 1966, brought 
devastating damage to religions including Tibetan Buddhism and its practitioners. Many 
monasteries and temples were destroyed along with their statues and stupas; religious rituals and 
practices were banned; and many monks and religious leaders were disrobed by force and others 
jailed.  All visible religious sites and their assets vanished in Tibet as was the case throughout 
China (Goldstein, 1998). 
The Cultural Revolution, as an extreme of this cultural politics, marked a clear 
discontinuity in all the traditional relationships that had existed between central Tibet and 
authorities in inner China during the dynasties and Republican government, dislocating the role 
that Tibetan religious leaders had played in the bridging of Tibetan populated regions with the 
inland. Opposite to this, during the Cultural Revolution, Buddhist religious leaders and their 
teachings were treated as an obstacle to the county’s socialist development that should be 
eradicated by the Communist government. 
With the liberalization of religious practices in Tibet in the early 1980s, Tibetan Buddhism 
started to revive. Many jailed lamas and monks were released from prisons, and most 
importantly, the Tibetan traditional social relationship of lamas and laypersons was reestablished. 
All non-Party Tibetans were allowed to practice their religion and to worship their lamas, and 
lamas regained freedom to activate their monasteries and to give teaching to believers. With the 
improvement in the economic condition of the Tibetan people, particularly with the increasing 
interaction of Tibetan lamas with Han Chinese disciples, monasteries and temples have been 
renewed and expanded.  Indeed, this religious resurgence in Tibet took place within the context 
of the state regulation of religion in Tibet, including limitations on monk population in 
monasteries, age requirement of monk recruitment, and so on (Cabezon, 2008; Goldstein, 1998). 
  
116 
However, there is a difference in the state emphasis on regulations between Han populated 
regions and Tibetan populated regions. In Tibetan populated regions, it is not so much about 
mixin and xiejiao as it is in southeastern China. In Tibetan populated regions, the sensitivity in 
religious issues is more about Tibetan separatists related to the international Tibetan 
independence movement. On the one hand, that majority of Tibetans are Buddhists and Tibetan 
Buddhists leaders still have a strong influence over Tibetan people, and this could be a potential 
challenge for the state. On the other hand, the Tibetan exile government, assumed to be the 
driving force of the Tibetan independence movement, was headed by the Dalai Lama, who is the 
head lama of the Gelug pa, the dominant religious school of Tibetan Buddhism, and who has also 
become an icon of Tibetan Buddhism internationally. For those reasons, in Tibetan populated 
regions, the Buddhist leaders’ religious activities, performed in the space of religious freedom, 
always runs the risk of being treated as a political problem by the authorities. The lamas/khenpos 
and monks have to be very careful in any of their religious and social activities, otherwise, their 
activities could be potential or real political problems. Therefore, it is the state’s responsibility to 
lead lamas, monks, and laypeople along the right track of loving their country and their religion, 
cultivating their loyalty for the Communist Party and the state and leading them to a positive 
contribution to state development projects. 
Those positive contributions include commercialization of religion in the tourism industry, 
mobilization of people to participate in state agendas, reconstruction of monasteries with 
lamas/khenpos’ contribution, and so forth. For instance, many khenpos in Larung Gar have many 
rich donors, and with those donations khenpos can construct not only monasteries, but also the 
schools and clinic for their communities. Indeed, it has been for the recent two decades that 
many Tibetan lamas and monks who speak Chinese have been giving religious teachings in 
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Chinese cities, recruiting many donors including rich businessmen, movie stars, popular singers, 
and others (Yu, 2012). 
Tibetan lamas have also been useful in mobilizing Tibetans to participate in state projects, 
for instance, recruiting students to enroll in state schools. There are also cases in which lamas 
have been able to resolve conflicts between groups of people who had disputes over their 
pastures (Yeh, 2003).  Culturally lamas are in a better position than the state to resolve these 
disputes. Another case in which lamas and monasteries have been used by the state is to 
eradicate the thieves who have been stealing livestock in pastoral areas in the southeastern 
Tibetan plateau. In this case, several local governments (counties) have organized trans-regional 
monasteries and lamas to mobilize people under these monasteries to take oaths of not stealing 
livestock of their neighbors. The cooperation of the local government and religious figures has 
been very effective in term of stopping the stealing livestock phenomenon. 
The emperors of former dynasties and the Republican government did not have full control 
over Tibetan society and their spiritual leaders, but they used Tibetan Buddhist leaders to assert 
political affiliation. The Communist state, which has full control of Tibet and a tight regulation 
on religions, has utilized Tibetan Buddhist elites to achieve its own goal, delineating religion 
from separatists. A total departure from this approach was during the commune system time, 
when the state was completely anti-religious. During the dynasties, religions were integrated into 
the political system without intention to separate religions from the state political system, but the 
Republican government and the Communist state have made great efforts to distinguish religion 
as a separate category from state and public affairs, based on the idea of secularization of the 
state and public, and the differentiation of real religions from mixin, xiejiao, and fake religions. 
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Larung Gar 
Many of the state religious policies in Tibet are reflected in the case of Larung Gar, where 
the slaughter renunciation movement started. Larung Gar, called Lnga Ring Slob Gleng (五明学
院)，was established in 1980 by the Khenpo Jigphun with the state’s approval, and now is home 
to many who want to study the Tibetan Buddhism of different Tibetan Buddhist schools. The 
institute was once populated by over ten thousand nuns, monks, and lay vow-takers from all over 
the Tibetan plateau, which was the maximum number that the state allowed the institute to reside. 
The institute has produced many khenpos with outstanding achievement in Buddhist study, and 
with those khenpos, now the institute has become a center for the promotion of Tibetan culture 
and Tibetan Buddhism. Many khenpos have been giving religious teachings not only in many 
areas of the Tibetan plateau, but also in southeastern Chinese cities. There are thousands of Han 
Chinese monks studying Tibetan Buddhism in the institute.  Khenpos have been gaining 
increasing social influence not only in Tibetan populated areas, but also in cities in southeastern 
China. However, khenpos and monks/nuns must be prudent in what they do in terms of politics. 
Their religious practices and teachings should not go against the state and its agendas. 
Particularly for their political positions, they have to keep a distance from those that might be 
considered Tibetan separatists and the Tibetan independence movement abroad. Moreover, 
khenpos’ social influence should not exceed the limit past which the Chinese state thinks it will 
bring a challenge to the authority’s power. 
It is within this political context that the slaughter renunciation teaching and other 
religious initiatives took places and spread out most of pastoral areas of the Tibetan plateau. In 
other words, khenpos and Tibetan lamas have been performing their religious practices in an 
interwoven space.  The general religious freedom provides Tibetan religious elites with the space 
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perform as active agents in the current society. That is, within the space of religious freedom, for 
the last few decades, khenpos/lamas have not only regained freedom but also have retaken the 
spiritual leading position in Tibet as they had before the 1950s.  More importantly, this liberal 
space has enabled Tibetan religious elites to access many new cultures and discourses such as 
globalization of Tibetan Buddhism and the identity of Tibetans as a nationality, all of which have 
reshaped these spiritual leaders and their way of thinking. This reshaping process led them to 
deploy new strategies and discourses to reach and to lead their people in a context in which 
economic development has been penetrating into every part of herders’ life and their way of 
thinking.  
It is important, here, to note the dialectical relationship between Tibetan religious leaders 
and mainstream discourses in the modern world. At the macro level, these discourses such 
nationalism, development, and science, have shaped khenpos’ and lamas’ narratives and their 
ways of thinking, but at the same time, it is equally important to see at the micro level how 
khenpos/lamas actively engage with those new ideas by imposing religious meaning to those 
new cultures. The process of giving meaning includes the incorporation of new ideas and total 
rejection or compromise with other ideas, which will be explored in Chapter Five.  At the same 
time, they also have to perform religious practices with space that is highly regulated by the state 
policies, particularly in the case of Tibet, where political issues make Tibetan Buddhist leaders 
politically sensitive. Khenpos’ religious teachings about slaughter renunciation and other 
movements took place in this interwoven space of Chinese religious policies. 
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Religious movements from Larung Gar 
Slaughter Renunciation Movement 
First religious teaching on the slaughter renunciation movement 
In the 1990s, Khenpo Jigphun saw an increasing slaughter rate of livestock from Tibetan 
households and the suffering of livestock in transportation to markets in China. One of his 
religious teachings held in Larung Gar in 2000, marked the start of the slaughter renunciation 
movement, and began an appeal to traditional Tibetan yak herders to refrain from commercial 
sale of their livestock for spiritual and cultural reasons that grew into the Slaughter renunciation 
movement.  The religious teaching took place in the Larung Gar.  The following discussion is 
based on an analysis of a video of this teaching.  
During the religious teaching, Khenpos Jigphun sat on his throne that was located on the 
relatively higher part of a slope that faced toward the east, and was giving his teaching about the 
slaughter renunciation movement through microphone and speaker, while thousands of lay 
people from nearby places were seated on the ground covered with light snowfall on a slope 
facing toward the west, and many more monks were seated on ground that was below the 
khenpo’s throne.  
He promoted the slaughter renunciation movement from two perspectives: one from a 
religious perspective and another from a this-worldly perspective. What he was concerned about 
most was about how livestock have been suffering during transportation, in the slaughterhouses, 
and at the time of the actual slaughtering process. He began his teaching, stating that it was very 
cruel for herders to be selling more and more livestock to the meat market in an extremely cruel 
manner, causing a great deal of suffering for livestock.  Using his terrifying and vivid words, he 
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described the suffering of livestock during transportation, in the slaughterhouses, and at the 
moment of killing. Here I present three excerpts from Khenpo Jigphun’s speech: 
During the transportation of animals to some cities (such as Chengdu and 
Lanzhou) neighboring the pastoral areas of the eastern Tibetan plateau, the animals 
have suffered as much as if they were killed many times over. For instance, after many 
days on trucks without being able to drink a drop of water, the deathly thirsty animals 
jumped out of running trucks without any hesitation when they saw a river near the 
road, resulting in whole legs being broken when they landed on the ground… many 
other animals lost their hooves, because they used all of their energy on their feet for 
such a long period of time, because they were so terrified by the bumpy truck…. 
Others were so hungry that they had been eating each other’s fur… in other cases, in 
order to prevent loss in the weight of animals, the Han or Hui livestock traders sealed 
their mouths with long nails, or penetrated their tongues through their jowls to prevent 
them from ruminating. 
After many days of waiting for the last torture, the killing, finally, the animals 
were brought to the place where their throats were cut with butchers’ knives. To tie 
animals’ feet on the ground, the butcher slices the throat of the animal, the hot blood 
from the heart ejecting out of its throat, pouring blood everywhere; and still the blood 
and breath come together from the throat while the animals struggle in a hop to stand 
up, but a foot of a butcher holds the head of the animal down on the ground; the animal 
was suffering in this way for a long period of time before it completely died…. 
 
Inside of some local slaughter buildings the scene is similar to what we imagine 
as the town of death, full of terrifying noises including the sound of machines used to 
process meat, the sound from sliced throats, the sound of running blood, and moos of 
livestock in a deadly panic. Some yaks were too frightened to go inside the building, so 
butchers have to pull their eyes out so that they would become easier to move into the 
building...once they are in the building, a machine with lifting hook would bring a hind 
leg of the yaks into the air; when a butcher slices the throat of yaks, hot blood and cud 
eject out of the throat while the yaks are struggling with no hope of survival, but before 
they are totally dead, their skins are striped off and the innards removed. 
 
Drawing from the Buddhist philosophy of karma, the law of cause of effect, Khenpo 
Jigphun taught that “killing involves the most serious sin (negative karma) among other sinful 
activities. The action of slaughtering (killing), first, causes a person to go to hell for a long term 
suffering; and even when they take rebirth after suffering in hell, the killer (as well as the seller) 
will have a shortened life for many reincarnations. Killing will also lead sentient being to be born 
in miserable places such as deserted and poor places. He emphasized that all sentient beings are 
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the same insofar as all beings desire to live and are afraid of being killed, and because of this, 
human beings should not kill other beings for their own needs. 
Using another Buddhist notion that all sentient beings take so many reincarnations for 
trillions and trillions of years that all sentient beings have the chance to become the mothers of 
all others in some lifetime, he states that what we are killing now were and will be our gratitude-
deserving mothers in other reincarnations. He asked how one could have the heart to kill one’s 
own mothers. He particularly emphasized that one’s merit would has become invalid if the acts 
of karma collection such as chanting mani prayers,22 turning mani prayer wheels, and building 
stupas or statues, was accompanied by actions of hurting others’ life.  From the religious 
perspective, Khenpo Jigphun stressed that killing is the most serious sin among others. 
He teaches, “from a this-worldly perspective, the business involved with killing will never 
bring economic improvement. I personally have never seen any middlemen, who do the livestock 
trading business between Tibetan pastoral areas and nearby Chinese cities, make money from 
their sinful business. I saw many slaughterhouses in Tibet that have slaughtered millions of 
livestock for many years go bankrupt one after another.” He summarized that these sinful 
activities have never brought any economic prosperity in Tibet. Referring to a previous extensive 
deforestation in Tibet that has caused environmental problems, he suggested that the increase in 
the slaughter rate of livestock will ultimately lead to a drastic decrease in the yak and sheep 
population, which will further lead to a situation in which herders will not have enough livestock 
to make a living. So Khenpo Jigphun requested that Tibetan herders reduce, or completely halt, 
their sale of livestock to commercial markets. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Tibetan mantra "Om! Mane Padme Hum!" ("Hail! Jewel in the Lotus!") 
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Secular neo-liberal social transformation and the slaughter renunciation movement 
For Khenpo Jigphun, the recent increase in the livestock slaughter rate in Tibet has not 
brought any economic development, but rather has changed the landscape of Tibet, considered to 
be a holy place where Buddhism prospers, into a place much like a town of demons full of 
hurting or killing. It is clear that Khenpo’s teaching about the slaughter renunciation movement 
is about Buddhist ethical issues, specifically compassion for the livestock that have suffered and 
been killed, and a correction of Tibetan herders’ misconducts of killing and selling livestock. The 
questions to be pursued in this light are how to understand his teaching in the current social 
economic context, how his teachings are related to development, and how the religious 
movement is inserted into social and cultural changes brought by development in Tibet. 
To answer these questions, one needs to situate his teachings in the current socioeconomic 
transformation. Specifically, it is the extension of secular neo-liberal economic development 
discussed in Chapter Two, which has increasingly integrated Tibetan society into larger Chinese 
market economy since 1980s, that has provided the broad context for the emergence of religious 
movements such as the slaughter renunciation movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
starting of secular neo-liberal economic forces in pastoral areas was marked with livestock 
privatization and intensified by the recent “Open up the West” campaign, which translated into 
improvement in infrastructure, increasing demand for yak meat, stimulation of consumption of 
herders, industrialization of the yak economy, and so forth. This is a simultaneous process of 
crippling herders’ spiritual needs and changing their non-modern characters, dislocating their 
attention from other-worldly needs to this-worldly material needs, a product of secular market 
economic development. As one herder states, herders now have to earn more in order to buy 
more things around them. Herders are competing with each other for cars, houses, and interior 
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decoration. The costs of education and health care are very high. He said “the current society is 
like a magic force that leads us to buy more and sell more.” Michael Taussig (1983) observes 
that peasants in South America express that the belief about capitalism that some people can 
magically make more money coming back to them regardless of how much they spent, whereas  
Tibetan herders express the power of secular neo-liberal development as a magical entity that 
forces them into selling more and buying more. 
Situating the slaughter renunciation movement in the neo-liberalization process of China, I 
argue that the slaughter renunciation movement is precisely a product of an encounter between 
Tibetan Buddhism and secular neo-liberal development. That is, the widespread and 
unprecedentedly high slaughter rate in the market economy reflects the force of the secular 
market economy in transforming Tibetan culture, and the slaughter renunciation movement 
works as a moral correction to reverse the social and cultural changes brought by the secular 
economic development in pastoral areas of Tibet. This is the khenpos’ effort to prevent 
unacceptable elements of neo-liberal process with their religious teachings. The change in the 
meaning of yaks in the slaughter renunciation movement can demonstrate this aspect clearly. At 
stake is the question of whether yaks should be seen as commercial products or sentient beings, 
which sheds light on larger questions of what development is, how one should realize 
development, and how development as a powerful discourse is contested by different people with 
different cultural backgrounds. 
Secular economic development, based on secular neo-liberal thinking, has come not as 
neutral as is assumed, but rather with its own value system and worldview that compete with 
other cultural values and worldviews.  The transformation of people’s worldview and the value 
system of neo-liberal economic development will be reflected in a change in people’s social 
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relationship and their relationship with the environment in which live in. In this sense, 
development is another kind of moral cultivation (Pandian, 2008) that produces certain kinds of 
moral standards, some of which are not consistent with Buddhist norms.  
In the case of the slaughter renunciation movement, the transformation of cultural values 
and the contradiction between those values are reflected in changes in herders’ relationship with 
livestock. For Tibetan herders, yaks were not only the livestock to which they owe gratitude for 
providing them with things that they needed to make a living, but also one kind of sentient being 
just like human beings, which should not be killed, tortured, and disposed of. Livestock have the 
same right to live as human beings have according to the law of karma and reincarnations. 
However, the intensification of the market economy has brought a significant impact on the 
traditional herders’ relationship with their livestock, the meaning of having livestock for herders, 
and their ways of dealing with their livestock. With economic development, herders are 
increasingly becoming less sensitive about selling their livestock to meat market and less aware 
about their sinful activities. This change has taken place in herders' daily participation in an 
integrated process of exchange, price bargaining, and production, investment, and competition. 
In the market economic realm, slaughtering a yak or sheep for the meat market is no more 
than a process of production, a transformation from one form of material to another form. 
Slaughtering is a way that employees or investors transform livestock as raw material into meat 
as a product, so for them livestock are not things with life but primary material without life. For 
Han or Hui middlemen, livestock are only a profitable capital and disposable commercial 
products that can be exchanged, tortured, and killed without any other consideration other than 
price and quality. 
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It is this kind of cultural change and contestation that khenpos have been trying to 
intervene in, to restore or reinforce some core Buddhist worldviews and values based on Tibetan 
Buddhism. Using the Buddhist philosophy of karma and the world of samsara, Khenpo Jigphun 
promotes a Buddhist idea of human’s relation with other beings, a relationship that will last 
forever in samsara (Tib. gro ba Rings drings) until one is enlightened. If a herder sold yaks, the 
herder has to pay back what he has done to the yaks in other reincarnations, and gain other 
consequences for involvement with the sin of selling yaks for slaughter. This permanent 
relationship does not exist in the case of secular neoliberal economic development, in which 
herders’ relationship with yaks is ended once the exchange is done between Han or Hui 
middlemen and Tibetan herders. Furthermore, for Tibetan Buddhism, yaks have the same kind of 
lives as human beings have, and all sentient beings are equal in terms of their desire to live. In 
addition, supported by the notion of compassion that humans should have for all other beings, 
the motherhood relationship between human and other beings is a permanent interaction and 
relationship. For khenpos, livestock is not capital that can be invested or products that can be 
exchanged or disposed of, so there is no fundamental difference between killing a human being 
and killing a livestock. To the extreme, khenpos have made an argument that just as it is the case 
that humans should not sell, kill, torture, and sell the meat of other human beings, human beings 
should also not sell, torture, and kill other beings including livestock that they raise. These 
differences project two different developments that are based on two different cultural values. 
The state neo-liberal development is based in a secular and materially driven culture, which is 
concerned only with this-worldly issues. The cultural issue of development that is based on 
Tibetan Buddhism is extended beyond this-worldly concerns to well-being in many reincarnated 
lives in samsara. That is, in Tibetan Buddhism based development, human beings are related to 
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all other sentient beings through the law of cause-effect. Yaks are not commercial products, but 
one type of sentient being, and the way human beings treat them will have results in their future 
lives.   
More fundamentally, khenpos are challenging the dualistic relationship of human beings 
and other beings. In the ideals of the Western Enlightenment, human beings are at the center and 
other beings are treated as “resources” or primary materials that are ready for human’s 
exploitation and modification. In western modernity’s concept of humans and resources, humans 
are proactive and centered, and the resource is a passive or subject to being conquered and 
transformed by human beings. At the macro level of a neoliberal development context, yaks are 
just resources or primary material for the state to translate into regional and national economic 
improvement. This dualistic relationship between human and things around them is clearly in 
contrast with a Buddhist worldview that is based on karma and reincarnation, in which life and 
spirit is permanent through its rebirth in the world of samsara. In the Tibetan Buddhist cultural 
system, being able to obtain the human body is very important for enlightenment, because human 
beings have the agency to be enlightened. Other than that, human beings are the same as other 
beings because the spirit transfers from one form of life to another according to their karmic 
accumulations. Therefore, human beings are not to born to conquer the world and to transform 
its resources, but to live with them harmoniously and escape from the bitterness of samsara.  
In sum, Khenpo Jigphun’s teaching about the slaughter renunciation movement is an 
ethical correction or ethical reform for Tibetan herders in the current sociocultural 
transformation. It is an intervention or making sense of development by guiding Tibetan herders 
living in a development world, and reinforces their relation with other beings from a Buddhist 
perspective. It shows a path for herders to achieve the best material and spiritual conditions both 
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for this and future lifetimes.  Through the establishment of ethical guidance for Tibetan herders, 
khenpos are making development more reasonable from a Buddhist perspective, by reshaping it 
with the Buddhist ethic and its interpretations, as will be discussed more detail in the next 
chapter.  
Slaughter renunciation and sin distribution 
The encounter of religious force with social transformation has brought many unanswered 
questions for Tibetan Buddhism and its elites. One question aroused among Tibetans is the 
different amount of sin involved in the conducts of selling, killing, and trading livestock. That is, 
herders’ selling of livestock to slaughterhouses before 1958 had not been an issue for Tibetan 
religious leaders in most pastoral areas, perhaps because the number of livestock sold to the 
slaughterhouses was not as high as after livestock decollectivization in 1982. During the 
commune system, the state established many slaughterhouses and slaughtered massive numbers 
of livestock, but during that period of time, there wasn’t any space for the Tibetan religious 
leaders to intervene, due to religious repression. The number of livestock sold to the meat market 
since 1980s, after livestock decollectivization and particularly in the last two decades after 
grassland use rights privatization, is unprecedented. This widespread and unprecedented 
slaughter rate brought by the secular neo-liberal economy, which accompanied religious freedom, 
has been new to both herders as well as to Tibetan religious elites, and this new phenomena of a 
high rate slaughter has brought many unanswered questions for Tibetan religious leaders 
regarding yak slaughter from the perspective of Tibetan Buddhism.  
Recently, there have been competing opinions on how sinful it is to become a middleman 
for livestock trading for slaughtering. Some Tibetan herders said that it should not be as sinful as 
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it is to kill to animals and to decide to sell animals, but others think that being a middleman 
should have the same sin as the man who takes the action of actual killing.   
Indeed, the sins of slaughtering involve many stakeholders including the actual killer, 
seller, middlemen, the ones who eat meat, and others who process the meat product, and even 
any others who make a profit by trading the meat as commercial products. There are some 
Buddhist literature related to these questions, but these literatures do not provide the answers for 
these detailed questions. Most of the literature discusses the different sins of eating meat and 
killing animals. One such writing is Rmad Byung Sprul Pa’ Glegs (2004) by Rje Zhabs Dkar 
Tshogs Drug Rang Drol (1781-1851), which cites many of Buddha’s teachings about eating 
animal meat. Many of Buddha’s teachings state that eating meat that is killed intentionally for 
one’s own purpose is as sinful as the killing of animals. However, there are several types of meat 
that are less sinful to consume compared to the meat from animals that are intentionally killed. 
One is the meat of animals that die naturally. Another relatively less sinful meat is mtha' gsum 
yongs su dag pa, which means meat that one is not involved in killing, have not asked others to 
kill, and have not seen being killed (2004). A section of Thugs Rje Chen Po 'Khor Ba Dong 
Sbrug (Tantra) quoted by Rje Zhabs Dkar quantifies differentiations in sins of eating animal 
meats that result from different modes of death.  It states “meat and blood are the main causes of 
the degeneration of three realms (heaven, earth, netherworld). The more owners the meat went 
through, the less negative karma is attached to it. For instance, if a person eats meat that went 
through one hundred owners, the person would go to hell after one hundred rebirths. Similarly, if 
a piece of meat went through ten owners, the one who eats that meat would go to hell after ten 
rebirths. The eating of meat of an animal that is slaughtered for food carries twice the negative 
karma attachment of eating of meat of an animal that has died of natural processes. The eating of 
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meat of an animal that is slaughtered by oneself attaches one hundred times the negative karma 
that is involved with eating meat of animal slaughtered by others [but without one’s awareness of 
the animal being killed]; and the eating of meat of an animal that is slaughtered by others at 
one’s request carries ten times the negative karma of eating meat of an animal which one has 
slaughtered oneself” (29). It is clear that the most sinful meat is the meat of an animal that has 
been killed by others according to one’s own desires. This is followed by the meat of an animal 
that one slaughters oneself. The least sinful meat is from an animal that died naturally. The 
degree of negative karma is also dependent on the number of owners the meat went through – the 
more owners the meat went through, the less negative karma is attached. Many of these writings 
have focused on the intentionality, awareness of killing, and motivations of killing and eating. 
However, this literature does not provide clear articulations about sinful conducts in the modern 
market economic context. In other words, this literature does no cover negative karma related to 
the middlemen, seller (herders), entrepreneurs (slaughterhouses), and meat processors. To 
answer those questions, I conducted interviews with the current leading khenpos in Larung Gar.  
Khenpo Tsullo, now the leading khenpo in Larung Gar, said that among those who are 
associated with slaughter meat products, the one who actually carries out the action of killing has 
the most serious sin.  Secondly, people who sell livestock for slaughterhouses, those who 
purchase them for commercial slaughtering, and others who make profits as middlemen should 
have the same degree of sin.  Though in some of Buddhist literature, it is said that people who 
eat meat have the most serious sins, Khenpo Tsullo thinks that to eat meat is sinful but not as 
serious as the killing, selling, and purchasing of livestock for slaughter. He added that it is hard 
to make precise statements about these variations that are based upon the complex working of 
the law of cause and effect, but generally speaking, it should be something like this. 
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Another highly respected khenpo from Larung Gar had a slight different statement. He 
said that the one who sells the livestock to the slaughterhouses and the one who kills the 
livestock are the same in terms of associated sin. The Spyor Dngos Rjes Gsum, the three 
elements of an action (the motivation, actual practice, and the accomplishment), is important in 
this variation. If the seller has all three elements when he/she sells livestock, the level of sin for 
the selling is same as that of the killing. The reason that people who sell livestock have very 
serious sin is that the seller knows the animals will be killed or he/she sells them for the purpose 
of slaughtering. Of course, the one who slaughters animals also have very serious sin. The more 
he thought about it, the more this khenpo was convinced that the ones who sell animals may have 
more sin than the ones who kill the livestock. This is because their motivation to make money by 
selling livestock to the slaughterhouse is a very bad one. Secondly, their decision to sell livestock 
leads to another sinful action, the actual killing, so that is an additional sin they gain. Therefore, 
they should be ranked at number one in terms of sin, and their sins are worse than the ones of 
those who kill the livestock. He stated that Tibetans don’t really understand what Buddha taught 
about sin and karma.  For instance, if a lady decided to eat the meat of a yak and asked her 
husband to kill the yak, most people think that the husband should have more sin, and the lady 
should have less. But actually, the lady would gain more sin than the husband, because she is the 
one who made the final decision about which yak should be slaughtered, and when it should be 
killed, and so on. In other words, if it weren’t for the lady’s decision, the yak would not be killed. 
The middlemen and one who eat meat gain sin but their sin is not as heavy as the ones who sell 
and ones who kill. 
Khenpo Bsod Dar Rgyas, who has many Chinese disciples, thinks that sins for selling 
livestock for slaughterhouses, middlemen who trade in livestock for slaughter, and actual 
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slaughtering livestock should be the same, because Buddha said one who decided, or lead to, or 
forced others to kill have the same sin. Therefore the three of them should be the same. Eating 
meat should have sin but it should be less sin than selling, buying, and killing. 
Along with the different opinions that khenpos have in sin allocation, herders have their 
own judgments. Traditionally, herders thought that the actual killing of livestock had the most 
serious sin, so herders who took the oath of not killing animals paid other people to slaughter 
livestock for them in a belief that the herders would not gain sin if others slaughtered for them. 
However, in many religious teachings, khenpos pointed out this is very wrong understanding of 
Buddhism and the herders for whom the livestock were slaughtered have the same sin as the 
actual killers. 
With khenpos’ religious teachings on the slaughter renunciation movement in pastoral 
areas, there is a new phenomenon, which is different from this tradition. The herders in Zhenqin 
Township, Yushu Prefecture, Qinghai Province, slaughter their livestock by themselves first and 
then sell the meat in market, thinking that this will reduce the suffering that livestock experience 
during transportation, so herders will gain less sin than if they sell directly to Han or Hui 
middlemen. 
It is the state promotion of animal husbandry as a strategy of economic development in 
Tibetan pastoral areas that has brought these new questions about sins related to slaughter, which 
Tibetan herders and khenpos answer in different ways. Indeed, I argue that to answer those 
unanswered questions is the way that Tibetan Buddhism incorporates, rejects, and compromises 
in negotiation with the changing world, by giving meaning to new phenomena like the 
unprecedentedly high slaughter rates that have accompanied the secular neo-liberal market 
economy. It is secular neo-liberal social forces that have inspired religions to take new shapes by 
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coding those new phenomena with religious meanings. Tibetan Buddhist leaders have become 
the agents who mediate this process in contemporary society. In this sense, religion has never 
been completed, but rather is a process of constant making by competing and negotiating with 
other ideas from within and outside. 
 
Three Related Movements: Fur Renunciation, Vegetarianism, and Humanitarian 
Killing 
 
The slaughter renunciation movement is not the only movement that Tibetan lamas and 
khenpos in Larung Gar have started since Chinese economic development. Many other 
movements have been initiated by khenpos, including the vegetarian movement, fur renunciation 
movement, ten-virtuous-rules, humanitarian killing of livestock, and illiteracy eradication, 
purification of spoken language, and others. Some of them are directly related to the slaughter 
renunciation movement while others are not. However, all of these initiatives were started by the 
khenpos in the Larung Gar, established by Khenpo Jigphun in the 1990s, and all of them took 
place in a context of modernization of Tibet in China. In the following two sections, I will 
discuss three movements that are related to the slaughter renunciation movement: vegetarian 
movement, humanitarian killing movement, the fur renunciation movement, and their 
relationships. 
 
Vegetarian movement and humanitarian killing movement  
One movement that goes hand in hand with the slaughter renunciation movement is the 
vegetarian movement, in which khenpos and lamas have been trying to persuade herders as well 
monks to stop eating meat. Meat has long been a major part of the diet of lay Tibetans and for 
the majority of monks. Traditionally, barley flour, wheat flour, butter, cheese, and meat were the 
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main foods, and meat in particularly provided a great deal of energy for Tibetans who live on the 
Tibetan plateau with an average altitude of 4000 meters and very cold temperatures. Recently 
other foods such as vegetables, fruits, and rice have become available in many Tibetan populated 
regions and Tibetan people have become accustomed to eating these new foods. With the 
increase in food diversity, Tibetan khenpos can plausibly ask Tibetans to stop eating meat for 
both religious reasons and health benefits (Tsullo, 2003 a.b; Bso Dar Rgyas, 2001).  
One of the prominent religious figures who has been promoting vegetarianism is Khenpo 
Tsullo, who is the best-known student of Khenpo Jigphun and who speaks very good Chinese. 
Drawing on extensive Chinese literature on scientific studies on diet and health, he has been 
encouraging Tibetan people to become vegetarian. He encourages Tibetans to be vegetarians 
from two perspectives. The first one is related to health. With the support of much scientific 
research on health and diet, he relates eating meat with diseases including cancer, diabetes, heart 
and blood diseases, and psychological problems. He thinks that the causal relationship between 
eating meat and those diseases is grounded on two aspects. First, the biological structure of the 
human body is born to eat vegetables rather than meat. Second, many meat products in the 
current market contain antibiotics and hormones that are very harmful to human bodies. He also 
boycotts eating meat for ethical reasons. Eating meat leads lots of other sentient beings to be 
slaughtered, which is very cruel and unfair.  
He is particularly concerned about the new phenomenon in which people in inner China 
eat live small animals in very cruel and brutal ways, including eating monkeys’ brains while they 
are still alive, cooking living fish in hot water, frying living chickens in hot containers, and 
stripping off the skin of frogs. In Tibet, Khenpo Tsullo has been making efforts to prevent 
herders from being involved in these brutal ways of eating animals (Gayley, 2011a).  At the same 
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time, his motivation for this vegetation movement is similar to those of the slaughter 
renunciation movement in that eating meat is considered very sinful or an action that collects 
negative karma, because eating meat will ultimately lead more livestock to be slaughtered. 
In addition to books he has written about vegetarianism and the negative karma collected 
from eating meat, he has also used his religious teachings to ask herders and monks to stop 
eating meat. He asks elderly herders to take oath for their rest of lives, and for youth and other 
herders to take oaths for certain periods of time from three years to five years or for religiously 
important days such as the date on which Buddha was born or on the day Buddha gave important 
religious teachings. Many Tibetans have responded positively to Khenpos Tsullo’s call for 
vegetarianism.  In Rakhor Village, Khenpo Tsullo told herders that, according to the Buddha’s 
teachings, eating meat has a similar sin as killing animals, because eating meat is the 
fundamental cause of the killing of livestock in the meat market. In this sense, Khenpo Tsullo’s 
promotion of vegetarianism is also an alternative way to reduce the negative karma and suffering 
of livestock in commercial slaughter, which is the goal of the slaughter renunciation movement. 
As a Tibetan businessman points out, the slaughter renunciation movement is not the best way to 
stop the commercial slaughter or reduce the slaughter rate. If there is demand for meat in the 
market, there will always be livestock to be sold and to be killed.  
Tibetan lamas/khenpos have not only been asking herders to refrain from selling livestock 
for the meat market but they also encourage them to avoid to slaughter livestock for herders’ 
own consumption. Indeed, the vegetarianism movement in the pastoral areas of Tibet has been 
another way in which khenpos try to stop herders from slaughtering livestock for self-
consumption. In terms of these two different types of slaughter (one for market and another for 
self-consumption), khenpos’ first priority lie in stopping slaughter in the slaughterhouses for the 
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meat market, because the number of livestock slaughtered in slaughterhouses is greater than the 
numbers that are slaughtered for herders’ self-consumption. It would be about 1-3 yaks or 4-6 
sheep a year for self-consumption in eastern Tibet, whereas slaughterhouses could kill up to a 
maximum of be 60-100 per household per year.  
Seeing the fact that meat is one of the mainstays of Tibetan herders’ diet, and to change the 
tradition of eating meat right way will be very difficult, Khenpo Tsullo has also been asking 
herders to slaughter livestock in a way that livestock suffer less when they are being slaughtered 
if herders have to kill livestock anyway. This requires herders to change their traditional way of 
slaughtering livestock for their own meat, which is suffocation, a different way of slaughtering 
livestock from the Muslims’ way of slaughtering livestock, which is to cut the throat of livestock. 
In Khenpo Tsullo’s Lugs Gnyis Me long23(2003), he states: 
These days, there are several ways to kill livestock, including suffocation by 
tying animals’ mouths, cutting the throat, bludgeoning the head of livestock with an 
axe, and cutting the veins of live animals by opening a hole in their stomachs. Even 
though all of these methods are very cruel, suffocation is the most common method 
used in many pastoral areas and it is the worst one in that it makes livestock suffer the 
most when they die. For some livestock, it takes about nine minutes to die, and for 
others, as long as fifteen minutes. This is fearsome and of great suffering (Rnam Smen 
Can). If we put ourselves in their situation as we are suffocating, we know how hard it 
is to hold one’s breath for a minute…(70)…we ought to find a less miserable way to 
let livestock die. However, this being said, it is not that less cruel ways of killing have 
no sin. Any kind of killing has serious sin. In any case, se should change this tradition 
by adopting some other means of killing livestock, that entail less suffering, that exist 
in some places. (71) 
 
Similar suggestions are found in Khenpo Jigphun’s teachings. However, neither specified 
what this less cruel way of killing is, perhaps because they are religious leaders who are not in a 
position to teach people how to kill their livestock, and can only give more general suggestions. 
Again, khenpos are not suggesting to slaughter but rather that herders adopt means that will let 
                                                 
23 The full name of the book is Dus su Bab Pa’ Gtam Lugs Gnyis Gsal Ba’ Me Long (Timely Advice: a Mirror 
That Clarifies the Two Systems)  
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animals suffer less when they are slaughtered.  This suggestion is for Tibetans to change their 
traditional ways of slaughtering their livestock the self-consumption. 
 
Fur renunciation movement 
It has long been traditional for Tibetan people to use animal skin or fur to make clothes or 
decorate their clothes. They use sheep and yak skin to make clothes, to use fox pelts to make hats, 
and to the skins of tiger, leopard, and otters to decorate their clothes by sewing them on the trim 
of their clothes. Tibetans wear those clothes during special days including weddings, religious 
gatherings, Tibetan New Year, and so forth. When a new couple is married, they are given 
clothes with fur and pelts, coral, and other jewelries. 
It is said by some Tibetan scholars that this tradition came from a military reward and 
penalty system of the Tibetan army in the distant past. In this military award system,  good 
fighters in wars were awarded with or had marked on their clothes some symbolic pelts of tiger 
or leopard, and those who did not do well during the wars were marked by the fur of fox 
symbolizing cowardice.  This tradition has slowly turned into today’s clothes, which represent 
wealth, identity, and social position of an individual. During the commune system and the days 
before that, only rich households had the ability to wear large size furs, particularly those of tiger 
and leopard. It was after economic reform that many households began to have the financial 
abilities to purchase them, and competition has been aroused among households in terms of the 
size and quality of fur and pelts on each Tibetan robe. Traditionally, these fur-lined clothes was 
not only a fashion but also one form of savings for Tibetan people, because the prices of those 
clothes were very stable and so they could be sold for the urgent needs of a household. The 
quality and the amount of fur and pelt of households were the indication of households’ wealth，
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and those furs and pelts were passed down many generations. With the increase in demand since 
the economic development, the wild animal furs come not only from Tibet, but also from other 
countries such as Pakistan and those in Africa.  
Internationally, wearing of wild animal pelts has increasing been seen as unethical for 
most people in the west, as a result of environment and wildlife conservation movements on the 
global scale. Environment and wildlife protection, embedded in the western worldview of nature 
as static, has become such a powerful ethical force that Tibetans have had to revalue their dress 
culture, as it goes against this trend. Tibetan inconsistency with this global trend would have a 
negative impact on the image of Tibetan people who live peacefully and in harmony with their 
environment and wildlife in western minds. So the fur wearing tradition did not fit the 
stereotypical image of Tibetans as people with compassion in westerners’ minds. 
The widespread fur wearing in Tibet has increasingly become a problem for Tibetan lamas. 
Eventually, the peak of fur renunciation in Tibet was marked by an unhistorical pelt burning 
campaign across Tibetan plateau in 2006, which result in a sudden cessation of the wearing of 
wild animal fur by Tibetan people.  However, as early as 2003, Khenpo Tsullo from Larung Gar 
has already started the fur renunciation movement in the pastoral areas of Tibetan plateau, in 
which he urged people to stop wearing clothes make out of or decorated with animal fur. 
In his book Lugs Gnyis Me long (2003), Khenpo Tsullo used three rationales to encourage 
Tibetans to stop wearing fur. First, as with the slaughter renunciation movement, drawing upon 
the Buddhist norms of cause and effects, compassion, and reincarnation, he was concerned about 
the killings of animals, a direct result of wearing clothes made out of pelt and fur. He stated that 
because of increasing demand for wild animal fur in Tibet, these days, not only are domestic 
animals killed, but so too are wild animals from Pakistan and Africa. Tibetan people have the 
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major sin or negative karma, because their wearing of these furs leads to the killing of these 
animals.  Second, he made an economic cost and benefit analysis for the fur wearing.  He 
calculated how much a fur trim for clothes would cost and how many days or years’ labor is 
needed to earn the cost. However, with these high prices, the fur does not bring any material 
benefit such food to prevent hunger or clothes that protect people from cold. Lastly, he also 
showed how in the west the popularity of wearing animal furs has been challenged by 
environmental movements, a process in which the wearing of fur has become unethical. He says 
that when wearing animal furs has become unethical in the west, it is a shameful thing for 
Tibetans to wear clothes with animal furs. 
In short, Tibetans’ traditional clothes with furs mediated multiple cultural meanings and 
economic purposes. It was a symbol of wealth for households because when people wear them, 
they show the economic condition of the household with the size of furs on clothes; it was an 
important option of investments and savings, because Tibetans could trade their clothes when 
they needed cash for other purposes; and it also represents the conception of beauty of Tibetan 
people. Most importantly, in their status as family heirlooms they represent Tibetan people’s 
attachment to history as well as a significant contrast to the form of value that characterizes 
capitalist mass production.  
The fur renunciation movement has had effect on all of these aspects of Tibetan traditions. 
It has changed their perception of what is beauty and what is not. It has also changed their way of 
saving and the value of assets (Yeh, in press).  More significantly, it has changed Tibetan 
people’s concept of consumption. That is, when Tibetan people traditionally purchased clothes 
with furs, they usually would use them for their entire lives, and sometimes parents would pass 
them to their next generations, with special meanings for the households.  This has changed their 
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decision-making about how and in what to invest, eliminating a space of investment in a 
household’s assets on bodily adornment, channeling their strategies into other kinds of 
commodities. That is, Tibetans must now either find other substitute that can replace all of these 
cultural meanings and economic purposes, or they have to change all of their traditions by 
wearing “instant” modern clothes that do not involve lots of meanings and economic values. 
 
Interrelations among the three movements 
The slaughter renunciation movement, vegetarian movement, and fur renunciation 
movement, all promoted by Khenpo Jigphun and Khenpo Tsullo, are clearly rhetorically 
distinctive from each other, but they are also interrelated. All three movements are concerned 
with Buddhist norms of compassion, the law of cause-effect, and reincarnations, khenpos have 
also deployed other rationales that are more modern and progressive in all cases. For instance, in 
both the slaughter renunciation movement and fur renunciation movement, khenpos have 
deployed economic considerations in light of herders’ involvement in these activities. They made 
arguments that neither slaughter nor wearing fur makes sense in terms of economic benefits.  In 
the vegetarian movement, Khenpo Tsullo has drawn on extensive literature on the benefit of 
being vegetarian and the negative health effects of eating meat.  Khenpo Tsullo has related his 
fur renunciation movement with the endangered wild animal protection movements, which is a 
very significant transnational movement.  
Generally speaking, economic development in pastoral Tibet has provided a condition for 
these religious movements to take place. An increase in the slaughter rate lead to increased cash 
income for Tibetan herders, which allowed ordinary herders to purchase pelts. The recent 
incorporation of the pastoral economy into the Chinese inland economy provided alternative 
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foods options such as vegetables and fruits for Tibetans, which made the vegetarian movement 
possible. The combination of all of these trends has forced Tibetan khenpos/lamas to promote 
these three movements. 
All three movements are concerned with the ethical issue of killing animals from a 
Buddhist perspective, relating to the norms of compassion, the collection of positive or negative 
karma, and the reincarnations of life. However, I also argue that all three movements as ethical 
corrections are Tibetan religious leaders’ efforts to reshape Tibetan pastoralists and their 
societies in order to make them fit well with the stereotyped image of Tibetans in the western 
mind (Dodin and Rather, 2001; Huber, 1997; 2001). In other words, the khenpos’ remaking of 
Tibetans is their response to the globalized Tibet as well a response to the transformation of 
economic development driven by the discourse of the “Open up the West” campaign. 
With the globalization of Tibetans and their society, in the west, there has been a trend to 
unify Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan people, making Tibetan Buddhism an icon of Tibet and 
its people (Lopez, 1998). That is Tibet is the home Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetans must be 
Tibetan Buddhists. The stereotyped Western idea of Tibetan-ness is that Tibetans as a group of 
people are very spiritual, humble, full of compassion (Dodin and Rather, 2001) assumed to be a 
vegetarians, and living harmonistically with their environment and other living beings (Dodin 
and Rather, 2001; Huber 1997, 2001). The fact is that Tibetans slaughter livestock, eat meat as 
their main food, and wear the furs of wild animal that are considered to be nearly extinct.  These 
facts do not fit or go against this typical picture of Tibetans in the western mind. These religious 
movements by khenpos are in some ways a response to international trends, and it is their efforts 
to protect and reproduce the Tibetan image according with the western idea of Tibetan-ness. For 
instance, Khenpo Tsullo states in his book Lugs Gnyis Me long (2003), “we think that wearing 
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clothes with animal furs is beautiful, but it looks not only very ugly in the eyes of other people, 
but it is considered to be very cruel” (5) and, “recently Tibetans have been increasingly wearing 
more and more animal furs and many of their images have gone abroad through media. And 
people abroad will surely think that Tibetans are malicious, disgusting, and ignorant” (10). This 
contradiction between the actual situation and the image of Tibetans held in the western mind 
has been repeatedly mentioned in many cases of religious teachings of khenpos. In this sense, 
these movements are a few examples of how Tibetan people and its society have been shaped by 
the stereotype of Tibetan images in the western mind.   
The reshaping of Tibetans and their society has taken place by fundamentally 
discontinuing some other elements of Tibetan pastoral traditions: the way they generate income 
and make a living, the things they eat, and their dress and aesthetic view. The traditions that 
those movements aimed to change were deeply embedded in the herders’ everyday lives in one 
way or other.  While the slaughter renunciation movement has a significant impact on income 
generation of Tibetan herders that is related to all aspects of herders’ lives, the promotion of 
vegetarianism has had impact on food traditions, herders’ diet, nutrition, and their health. The fur 
renunciation movement has an effect on their dress culture, their way of saving, aesthetic views, 
the symbolic manifestation of social classification, and their valuation of assets. 
Indeed, all these movements reflect a cultural politics of development that is constituted by 
both localized material economic development and globalized images of Tibetanness, combined 
with the continuation of Tibetan historical memories such as Tibetan Buddhism.  The 
combination of these forces has reshuffled Tibetan societies and reshaped the Tibetan people. 
With these negotiations and struggling, some traditions have been magnified while others are 
discontinued. And, to this, some new elements were added, forming a new shape of Tibetans and 
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their society. Buddhist aspects in everyday lives of herders are highlighted and emphasized, and 
the traditions of slaughtering, consumption of meat, and wearing fur-clothes has become the 
target of discontinuation. Vegetarianism and engagement in business are encouraged and 
promoted. Wearing Tibetan clothes is encouraged, but the furs on them are discarded. Tibetan 
lamas and khenpos have become a key agent to bring these changes in Tibetan social structures, 
mediating global and local dynamics. On the one hand, Buddhism has been shaped by new social 
phenomena and cultural discourses, but on the other hand, Buddhism also makes sense of and 
gives meaning to these new phenomena from a Buddhist perspective. 
 
Convergence of Tibetan Buddhism with Tibetan Identity, and Khenpos’ Social 
Engagements 
 
With the increasing globalization of Tibet and its people, the idea of Tibetans as an ethnic 
group has become a very popular and powerful discourse in contemporary Tibetan society. In 
today’s society, where the differentiations of different ethnic groups and nation states are very 
important, there is a historical shift in Tibetan Buddhist leaders’ emphasis in their religious 
teachings and in their strategies to engage in social activities. It is a shift from an emphasis on 
the differentiation between Buddhism and non-Buddhism, and sectarian differentiation within 
Buddhism, to a stress on the differentiation of nations, ethnicities, and globalization (’dzam gling, 
mi rigs, rgyal khabs). This change took place as the awareness of Tibetans as an ethnic group 
that shares religion, language, and custom has increased and has become common sense among 
Tibetan people when Tibetans are increasingly exposed to the outside world at trans-regional or 
global scales. That is, they articulate Buddhism as a “Tibetan” Buddhism in terms of Tibetan 
identity. In many cases, they articulate Tibetan Buddhism as a future path for Tibetan people, 
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highlighting Tibetan people’s ownership of Tibetan Buddhism. In other words, a transition took 
place from sectarian competition to an ethnicity-based religious revival. 
Therefore, I further argue that the articulation of Tibetans as one group is a modern 
discourse with which Tibetan Buddhist leaders have been able to adjust to reinforce their leading 
position in Tibetan society. The incorporation of discourse of modern nationalism into Tibetan 
Buddhism is reflected in Tibetan khenpos’ active engagement in social programs and their 
encouragement of monks to devote their life in preserving Tibetan culture and serving Tibetan 
communities. This section discusses the reactivation of the Ten-virtuous-rules as standards of 
conduct for Tibetans, education promotion, and language purification. It is through such social 
initiatives that Tibetan religious elites position themselves at the forefront of Tibetan people.  
 
Ten-virtuous-rules 
In many places the slaughter renunciation movement is one of what khenpos and herders 
call the Ten-virtuous-rules. It is important to give a brief introduction to these locally initiated 
rules that are very popular in many pastoral areas of the Tibetan plateau. In some pastoral areas 
in Kham, it was a tradition to have these kinds of rules before 1958. However, with the religious 
revival in Larung Gar, and particularly with the expansion of influence of khenpos from the 
institute to these areas, the last one and a half decade saw a widespread proliferation of the Ten-
virtuous-rules in most Kham pastoral areas. The Ten-virtuous-rules that Larung Gar have 
established include: no livestock trading for the purpose of slaughtering, no stealing and 
plundering, no carrying of harmful weapons on one’s body, no use of prostitutes, no drugs or 
firearms dealings, no cigarette smoking and drug taking, no alcohol, no gambling, no hunting, 
and no wearing of animal furs (’Phrin Las, 2010). Through khenpos’ teachings, distribution of 
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DVDs, videos, recorded tapes, and posters in many small Tibetan towns, Larung Gar has 
disseminated these rules into many pastoral areas of the Tibetan plateau. 
Among the different tribes, most of the contents of the Ten-virtuous-rules are the same, but 
there are slight variations. While the banning of livestock trading for slaughter, stealing, 
gambling, and alcohol are the same, because these are the main social problems in many pastoral 
areas, others vary. For instance, some tribes ban internal fighting while other tribes do not have it 
on their rules. While the initiations of Ten-virtuous-rules in many areas have been influenced by 
khenpos’ teachings about the slaughter renunciation movement and other movements, other 
Tibetan Buddhist teachers have also started similar things in other places. For instance, a village 
in Seda County has started Ten-virtuous-rules, including slaughter renunciation movement, 
without any direct relationship with the movement begun by Larung Gar. In the late 1990s, the 
village started its slaughter renunciation movement when one of their lamas was sick. In the hope 
that they could save their lama’s life the herders wanted to buy lots of fish from the market to 
release into the water as tshe thar. However, the lama did not want them to do so. Instead, he 
asked them to promise to refrain from slaughtering their livestock for as long as they could. In 
response to the lama’s call, most of the herders gave up commercial slaughter for three years, 
and others took vows for longer times. 
Even though most of my interviewees were very supportive of what they call “Ten-
virtuous-rules,” which in many places also include no-smoking, drinking, or gambling, doing no 
harm, telling the truth to all beings, abstention from theft and from avarice, they also expressed 
their concern about the way these moral rules are implemented. Larung Gar does not use any sort 
of force to implement these rules, they mostly just encourage Tibetan herders to put these rules 
into everyday practice voluntarily. However, in most of the pastoral areas these rules have been 
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implemented by a collaboration of local monastery and local village leaders by establishing very 
restrict regulations. With these regulations, anyone who violates the rules may be faced with 
monetary sanctions or exclusion from the social relations in the village or from the monastery’s 
services. Many of the interviewees have criticized these strict regulations, stating that obedience 
to these rules should be voluntary. 
There were similar moral rules in Tibetan history. In the seventh century, the Tibetan King 
Songtsen Gampo (Srong btsan sGam po, 617-650 AD) established two types of moral rules for 
Tibetan people on the Tibetan plateau (Ogyan GlingPa, 1986). It is important to explore how 
khenpos refer their current rules to historical rules established by Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo 
to articulate Tibetans as ethnic group by drawing on historical events, but also how the rules 
differ from those of the past, reflecting different social contexts. There were two rules during 
Songtsen Gampo’s time: one was for religious people, called the Buddhist Ten-virtuous-rules for 
clergy (Lha chos dge ba bcu’ khrims), and another one was for lay Tibetans, called the Sixteen 
rules for public conduct (Mi chos gtsang ma bcu drug).   
The Buddhist Ten-virtuous-rules (Lha chos Dge ba bcu’ khrims) are to refrain from the 
following behaviors, speech and thoughts: 
• harming or killing 
• stealing 
• sexual misconduct 
• lying 
• divisive or slanderous speech 
• cursing or using harsh words 
• gossip or idle speech 
• being or having covetous thoughts 
• malicious thoughts 
• bigoted thoughts or heretical views 
 
The sixteen rules for public conduct (Mi chos gtsang ma bcu drug) are: 
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1. Developing devotion for the Three Jewels24 (lha dkon mchog gsum la mos gus  
      bskyed pa) 
2. Seeking out and practicing the sacred Dharma (dam pa’i chos btsal zhing bsgrub 
     pa) 
3. Repaying the kindness of one's parents (pha ma la drin lan ’jal ba) 
4. Showing respect to the learned (yon tan can la zhe mthong yod pa) 
5. Being respectful to those of high status and one's elders (rigs mtho ba dang rgan  
 par bkur sti che ba) 
6. Being benevolent to your neighbors (yul mi khyim mtshes la phan gdags pa) 
7. Being honest (bka’ drang zhing sems chung ba) 
8. Being loyal to close friends (nye du mdza’ bshes la gzhung ring ba) 
9. Emulating those who are polite and decent (ya rabs kyi rjes bsnyeg cing phyi thag 
    ring ba) 
10. Having moderate food and wealth (zas nor la tshod ’dzin pa) 
11. Repaying those who have previously shown kindness (sngar drin can gyi mi 
   rtsad gcad pa) 
12. Being honest with regard to weights and measures (bu lon dus su ’jal zhing pre  
    srang la g.yo med pa) 
13. Having little jealousy (kun la phrag dog chung ba) 
14. Not being influenced by evil companions (ngan pa’i gros la mi nyan zhing rang 
    tshugs ’dzin pa) 
15. Speaking moderately and in a gentle way (ngag ’jam zhing smra ba nyung ba) 
16.  Being patient and farsighted and enduring hardship (theg pa che zhing blo khog 
     yangs pa) 
 
King Songtsen Gampo united dispersed Tibet subkingdoms into one larger one and was 
very active in interacting with neighboring kingdoms such as the Tang dynasty and Nepal, 
importing the then most advanced technologies and cultures through his marriage relationships 
with those neighboring kingdoms (Kun Dga’ Rdo Rje, 1981). Along with agricultural and 
architectural skills from the Tang dynasty, he had also imported Buddhism from India, placing it 
in a very important position in Tibet (NgaWang LobsangGyatso,1957). Today, King Songtsen 
Gampo has become the figure of whom Tibetans are most proud, not only for his military forces 
that threatened the then most civilized Tang dynasty (GtsugLag PhrengBa, 1986) and for other 
economic and technological achievements. More importantly, Tibetans, particularly Buddhist 
                                                 
24 the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha 
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spiritual leaders are proud of the fact that the king was the first emperor who combined 
Buddhism with secular politics, a system they call Rgyal srid chos bzhin skyong ba. 
The Ten-virtuous-rules during King Songtsen Gampo’s time were directly adopted from 
the Ten Misconducts by the Buddha, and thus it is clear that Buddhism played an important role 
in the political system since the seventh century. It is for this reason that King Songtsen Gampo 
and his time have become now a cultural icon for Tibetan people of what a ruler and his kingdom 
should look like. In his Advice to Tibetans of the 21st Century,25 Khenpo Jigphun advises 
Tibetans to follow the Buddhist Ten-virtuous-rules for clergy (Lha chos dge ba bcu’ khrims) and 
Sixteen rules for public conduct (Mi chos gtsang ma bcu drug) established by King Songtsen 
Gampo, and he has linked today’s Tibetan society and people to the cultural icons of the past. 
Khenpo Tsullo did not want to explicitly take the position that the two Ten-virtuous-rules in 
different time periods are directly related. However, I argue that even as we can see that there are 
difference in the contents, the latter is a Tibetan memory of the past, which provides an example 
of an ideal social condition that contemporary Tibetans should follow in social transformation. It 
reflects a unification of Tibetan identity with the Ten-virtuous-rules of the past, which was 
adapted by King Songtsen from Buddhism and which has been reactivated by khenpos in 
contemporary society. The reactivation of this tradition is used as remedy by khenpos to deal 
with what they perceived as moral degradation of Tibetans in a changing society. 
That is, the two different rules reflect different social spaces in which people face different 
social issues. The first one took place in a society in which Buddhism was increasingly taking 
dominant social space, and Buddha’s teachings were incorporated into a political system so as to 
consolidate the power of Buddhists.  The latter reflects or deals with social problems in a social 
transformation of modernizing Tibet, and the new elements such as the ban on gambling, internal 
                                                 
25  “Dus Rabs nyer gcig pa’ gangs can pa rnams la phul ba’ snying gtam sbrin gyi rol mo” 
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conflicts, murdering with guns, stealing of livestock, and taking prostitutes are responses to the 
symptoms of the modernization process, which has been seen by khenpos as moral degradation 
of Tibetan herders. 
In the case of gambling, many herders fall into Chinese Mahjong and poker. People can 
hear many stories about how herders lost their herds, family members, and were trammeled by 
debts. Other things such as internal conflicts, killing with guns, stealing of livestock, and taking 
prostitutes, have become major social problems in many pastoral areas as well. Like the increase 
in the slaughter rate in recent decades, there is a coincidence between the emerging of herders’ 
taking part in these ‘unethical’ or ‘criminal’ things that the Ten-virtuous-rules were initiated for, 
and the intensification of the neo-liberal market economy. It is also at the same time that the state 
withdrew from direct planning of every aspect of herders’ lives, introducing the market economy 
as a way to govern its citizens.  
Neo-liberal development always produces two abilities: to produce disparity in economic 
development, and the ability to make those social problems (caused by disparity) invisible, 
turning them into moral issues or individual faults (Dixon, 2008; Yan, 2006).  It hides the 
unbalanced power distribution among stakeholders and the inclusion or exclusion from access to 
resources, forcing marginalized group to associate with some ‘illegal’ or ‘unethical’ things to 
compete with legalized beneficiaries. When social inequality forces more marginalized people 
into disadvantaged situations or exclude them from accessing lucrative resources, while they are 
lured by the benefit gained by others from development, they venture to take immoral actions to 
make a living, which is a way for them to make sense of or benefit from development. 
For instance, in Hongyuan County, there is a phenomenon of what I call “the exclusion of 
inclusion” in neo-liberal economic development. The market economic development has 
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increasingly manipulated all aspects of Tibetan herders’ lives and forced them to participate in 
the market economy. New social structures have instilled new needs for herders, such as 
education fee for their children, health care, transportation, communication fee, housing, housing 
decoration, and other necessities. They also need to participate in market exchange to sell dairy 
and other products. However, for the majority of herders, the income from their herds is far less 
than what they need to cover all these costs, so they have to find other sources or take loans from 
their relatives or others.  At the same time, the current market economy and the state have 
excluded Tibetan herders. Most relatively scarce and lucrative resources and sectors are 
dominated by state owned companies or outside private investors. For instance, the state has 
contracted the exclusive right over sand and quarries in the entire county and the few tourism 
sites are contracted to the people with capital or with guanxi in the state bureaucracy. The only 
two large factories – a yak milk powder factory and the state owned milk factory  --   have also 
been sold to outside investors.  
In addition to the lack of capital, Tibetan herders do not have the skill or cultural 
background of doing businesses. More importantly, their language barrier (the majority of 
Tibetan herders do not speak and read Chinese) prevents them from communicating efficiently 
with the state and Chinese tourists, making it impossible for them to participate on an equal 
footing in market competition. Herders are not allowed to buy land or build houses, a relatively 
stable investment alternative to herding, in Hongyuan town. Recently, the government has also 
been regulating Tibetan herders’ tents for tourism. Many businesses in the town require Chinese 
language and certain other skills that herders lack, so that few business options left for herders 
are running Tibetan restaurants, selling material for Tibetan clothes, being middlemen to collect 
yak skin and furs, and livestock trading. For the last few decades, there have been many pastoral 
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households who have tried to settle down in town by engaging in these limited businesses.  
Because the competition has been very intense and very few herders have experience in business, 
most households who tried have given up the businesses and went back to their pastures. Even 
the temporary part-time job towns have been difficult for herders to find employment in, due to 
their relative lack of training and language barriers. 
In sum, government regulation for these lucrative sectors and lack of capital and necessary 
skills for business have excluded many active herders from the benefits of the market economy. 
When this new social structure has become advantageous for some, it has also become a 
disadvantage for others, forcing some of them to venture into ‘immoral’ and ‘criminal’ actions 
such as gambling, stealing, and so forth. 
When neo-liberal development brings prosperity and guarantees for one group in society, 
it triggers poverty and conflicts for others. Yet, in most cases, the poverty and related conflicts 
are easily treated as a social disorder by the state, which launches further regulations on those 
unstable marginalized groups.  Similarly, the symptoms of poverty and marginalization are also 
seen as moral degradation by Tibetan lamas that need to be corrected through their religious 
teachings and establishing moral rules, like Ten-virtuous-rules.  
In the pastoral areas of the Tibetan plateau, the transformation brought by neo-liberal 
development is interpreted as well as responded to by the khenpos in ethical terms. And, all of 
these movements are the ethical reformations that reflect as well as confront the transformations 
in Tibetan culture. There are other aspects through which we can see the overlap part of Tibetan 
Buddhism with Tibetan identity. Among khenpos’ active engagement with social programs, 
illiteracy eradication and Tibetan language purification are two examples of many others that 
include schooling and establishing health clinics. 
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Illiteracy-eradication Movement 
The Illiteracy-eradication Movement is a recently initiated effort by khenpos from Larung 
Gar to educate Tibetans in reading and writing by sending educated monks from Larung Gar to 
other parts of Tibet. With this movement, a local NGO was organized by several monks, aimed 
at teaching Tibetan language and Buddhism anywhere they are invited to do so in eastern Tibet. 
The NGO has about 20 members, most of whom have experience in teaching written Tibetan or 
Buddhism in Tibetan primary schools, middle schools, and to Tibetan herders who neither write 
nor read. They do this mostly through their connection with the local schools and monasteries. 
This new movement was also started by Khenpo Tsullo.  His idea is that monks should not 
be gathering in the monastery all the time. Those monks who have the interest and the ability to 
practice their meditations and Buddhist studies should devote their efforts to their careers 
continually. These who do not should go back to their communities to provide service by 
teaching or doing whatever else they can. According to some monks from Larung Gar, Khenpo 
Tsullo says “the monks who can do neither of them and are hesitant to become lay persons or 
even afraid to do so, should do so anyway at an early age.  If this is the case, the earlier the 
better, since at a young age, you have much better brains for working and thinking.”  In response 
to the call from Khenpo Tsullo (in addition to the formation of the relatively formal organization 
mentioned earlier), there are also lots of monks who went back to their communities to teach 
what they learned from Khenpo Gar, mostly writing Tibetan and basic Buddhist study. Most of 
these trainings are short periods of time ranging from one month to three months. 
Two aspects of this movement are important: enhancing lay understandings of Tibetan 
Buddhism and Tibetan community development. Khenpo Tsullo’s advice for different monks on 
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their career directions is one of his efforts to reform Tibetan Buddhism to improve the quality of 
Tibetan Buddhist teachings and monks, and to assign the social responsibility to Tibetan monks. 
There are several intentions for Khenpo Tsullo’s advice. First, keeping the khenpos and monks 
with the highest Buddhist knowledge is intended to ensure the quality of Buddhist teachings and 
practices in the Buddhist institute. Second, his suggestions for ordinary monks to teach written 
Tibetan and to give introductions to basic Buddhism to Tibetans in their communities is linked to 
the community development of Tibetan populated regions, in which the role of education for 
Tibetans and their future is ranked as the highest priority by Khenpo Tsullo and others. The 
teaching of basic Buddhist knowledge to Tibetans is a part of Khenpo Tsullo’s argument that 
even though Tibetans think that they are Buddhists, they don’t know basic Buddhist knowledge 
and the proper way of practicing Buddhism. Here, one important aspect of the illiteracy 
eradication movement is that this movement as a part of community development is not secular 
or pure illiteracy eradication, but rather is a combination of Tibetan Buddhist teachings and the 
improvement of capacity of Tibetan people for development. In this sense, development and 
Buddhism are integrated in khenpos’ social engagement with Tibetan communities. 
Khenpo Tsullo’s advice for some monks to resume secular life can be described as 
unprecedented, because resuming secular life is considered to be very sinful and a failure for a 
monk in Tibet. Then, how should we understand his advice? Khenpo Tsullo has not only been 
guiding Tibetan lay people in the right direction, but he also intends to clean up some elements 
of Tibetan Buddhism and correct misconducts of Tibetan Buddhists. His suggestion for some 
monks to become lay people is to encourage those whose bodies are monk but whose minds are 
not in Buddhist institutes or monasteries to do what they really intend to do. His consideration 
also lies in the sustainability of Larung Gar politically. The overpopulation in the institute is 
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politically sensitive for the government, and it was the large number of monks and nuns gathered 
in the institute that once led the government to control the number of monks and nun in the 
monastery, forcing some nuns to go back to their hometowns. 
 
Purification of Tibetan spoken language 
As many Tibetans see Tibetan language as the cornerstone for keeping Tibetan identity, 
Tibetan khenpos presents themselves as gatekeepers for the sustainability of Tibetan language in 
order to preserve Tibetan culture and Tibetan identity. Again, the effort to purify Tibetan 
language is an effort of khenpos that reflects their adaptation of the popular discourse. What this 
indicates is the Tibetan Buddhists’ emphasis on the differentiation of ethnic groups rather than of 
between Buddhists and non-Buddhists or sectarian differences. The purification of Tibetan 
language highlights the importance of sustaining Tibetan as one ethnic group among the 
competing ethnic groups in the cultural politics of modernization.  
With the development of Tibetan populated regions by the state, new things and new 
technologies have come to Tibetan regions as a flood, but the utilization of Tibetan terms for 
these modern things has been falling behind, and many Tibetans have been using Chinese terms 
for these new things. It is very common for many Tibetans to speak mixed language using 
Tibetan grammar and many Chinese terms. Not only khenpos but also many educated Tibetans 
see this as way to pollute Tibetan language and as a sign of language degradation, which is 
further linked to the danger of losing Tibetan identity and of Tibetan ethnicity itself. Thus, 
khenpos have been encouraging Tibetans to speak authentic Tibetan that does not mix Chinese 
terms in Tibetan grammar. 
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An editing of a trilingual pictorial dictionary (Tibetan, Chinese, and English) 《汉藏英常
用新词语图解词典》 for modern terms is one effort by khenpos as a part of this movement. The 
dictionary is produced by a collective effort of many Tibetan scholars from universities and 
monasteries organized by Khenpo Tsullo in 2007. Khenpo Tsullo has also published a handbook, 
which has pictures of many modern things with Tibetan terms. In addition to the publications and 
teachings, posters that have the names for many vegetables, have been distributed to many 
restaurants in Tibetan populated regions. 
Khenpos’ efforts of purification of Tibetan spoken language have been followed by many 
Tibetan popular singers and crosstalk performers who perform humorous cross-talk skits with 
code switching between Chinese and Tibetan.  In many places in the Kham region, particularly 
monasteries near Larung Gar, purification of language is moralized as a result of all these 
integrated efforts. The sense of the necessity to speak pure Tibetan language is very strong 
among ordinary people. In some areas, it has become very hard for those who used to speak 
mixed language to communicate with owners of the stores or restaurants, because if a Tibetan 
speaks mixed language, the owners of stores or restaurants would either ignore, or laugh at, or 
even impose a fine on these customers. 
Khenpo Tsullo and other khenpos are not only Buddhist leaders and monks, but also 
ethnically Tibetans. It is this overlapping identity that determines their mixed initiatives that 
work as both Tibetan Buddhist teachings as well as social programs. More importantly, it is their 
active engagement with the discourse of Tibetan identity that enables them to gain more support 
among Tibetans than they would gain through their religious teaching itself.  
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Conclusion 
This is an era in which Tibetan Buddhism has been penetrating many aspects of Tibetan 
people’s life in a new stance after the Cultural Revolution, just as economic development has 
been manipulating herders’ lives. However, this new form of religious penetration to Tibetans 
people’s lives is part of larger process of the constant reconstruction of Tibetan Buddhism 
through its adaptation to new socioeconomic situations. If the slaughter renunciation movement 
is an example of an effort to reinforce Tibetan Buddhist core values and main ideologies by 
competing with other values, then the vegetarian and fur renunciation movement reflect a 
reformation of Buddhism by modify its outdated elements for modern times. The teaching 
program in Tibetan writing and basic Buddhism, language purification, and Ten-virtuous-rules 
demonstrate a way that Tibetan Buddhist elites incorporate new popular discourses and 
mainstream cultural elements such as nationalism and development to reinforce its leading 
position in Tibetan society. 
Indeed, for the last two centuries, Buddhism in other parts of Asia has experienced similar 
transformations through its encounter with modernization and globalizing forces. In those 
encounters, a number of Buddhist leaders such as Anagārika Dharmapala, Ariyaratne, and D.T. 
Suzuki, have presented Buddhism as a modern religion based on their own experiences of 
multiple forces, including domestic political and economic situations, the force of globalization 
and improvements in science and technology (McMahan, 2008; Swearer, 1996). With their new 
interpretations of Buddhism, many new Buddhist movements have emerged and socially 
engaged Buddhism has become a very popular theme. These Buddhist movements share both 
similarities with and differences from those of Larung Gar. For instance, in Sri Lanka, as the 
earliest Buddhist modernist, Dharmapala, in his reaction to Westerners and Christians’ critique 
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of Buddhism for its overemphasis on the otherworldly re-presented Buddhism as a this-worldly 
focused religion.  His main idea was that Buddhism should be more about ethical conduct and 
provision of this-worldly service to society as whole as a path to realize one’s liberation. With 
this idea of this-worldly focused Buddhism, Anagarika Dharmapala supported many charitable 
institutions, maintaining hospitals, schools and foundations for spreading Buddhism and helping 
all in need. All of his new reinterpretations of Buddhism were mostly meant to revitalize 
Buddhism in Ceylon and contribute to the nationalist movement in a colonial political and social 
context (McMahan, 2008).   
Influenced by Dharmapala and Gandhi, A.T. Ariyaratne initiated the Sarvodaya 
Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka as a lay Buddhist movement in 1958. The movement was a 
response to the decay in Buddhist practices and identity in Sri Lanka during the colonial and 
post-colonial social contexts. Based on Ariyaratne’s reinterpretation of Buddhist norms that the 
individual liberation should be achieved through the liberation of the whole of society (Bond, 
1996), the movement has launched massive community development programs in the villages of 
Sri Lanka. However, the mundane awakening in individual and social reform has never become 
the supreme goals for the movement.  Rather, the movement has just added a new and important 
step in the long gradual path of enlightenment (Bond, 1996). 
The similarity between the movements in Sri Lanka and the movements from Larung Gar, 
Tibet, is that all of these movements are reactions to dangers brought by outside forces. In the 
case of Sri Lanka, it was the colonial administration and missionaries. In the case of Tibet, it is 
more about the encroachment of the secular and material economic forces that has threatened 
Tibetan identity and Tibetan Buddhism. The Buddhist movements in Sri Lanka were promoted 
by reinterpreting some aspects of Buddhism by scaling up individual liberation to social 
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liberation. In similar way, Tibetan khenpos have also been making some visible reinterpretations 
of Tibetan Buddhism by putting great emphasis on the importance of Tibetan monks being 
engaged more actively in serving their communities by providing them with education and 
religious teachings. At the same time, Khenpo Tsullo has been urging Tibetan monasteries and 
their leaders to focus their dedication to the learning of Tibetan Buddhism rather than to practice 
rituals of Buddhism, and to promote Buddhist teachings among the laity. For this, Khenpo Tsullo 
thinks that it is a big issue that many Tibetans believe in Tibetan Buddhism, but they do not 
understand real Buddhism. It is clear from these points that Khenpo Tsullo himself and the 
movements he has promoted are very modern and reformative. 
It is clear that what Tibetan khenpos have been doing is not preserving traditional culture 
and Tibetan Buddhism in a stagnant way, but rather incorporates new elements, new strategies, 
new methods, and new ways of thinking. It is the combination of forces of globalization of the 
Tibetan image and Tibetan Buddhism and trans-regional developments that conjured these new 
elements with some old traditions, and it is this new conjuncture that have enabled Tibetan 
Buddhism and its leaders to maneuver in the modern world. Now, khenpos have new ideas of 
what should be standards of conduct standards for Tibetan people, how Tibetan people should 
behave in the modern world, who should do what in terms of monks’ social and religious 
responsibilities, what should be the proper way of practicing Tibetan Buddhism, and so forth.  
The slaughter renunciation movement and other movements are not the kinds of passive 
actions of Tibetan religious leaders in preserving traditional Tibetan culture that one might 
assume.  Rather they are Tibetan Buddhist elites’ response to and active intervention in the social 
transformation brought by globalization, the neo-liberal market economy, and the state, in order 
to make these transformations more compatible with Tibetan Buddhist norms and culture. In this 
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way, Tibetan Buddhism shapes development in Tibet, giving it meanings, and incorporating 
development into Buddhist philosophy and world. At the same time, the process of remaking 
development is the process of reshaping Tibetan Buddhism itself, by making itself more 
acceptable to mainstream culture when it posits itself in a leading position. In short, these 
movements are combinations of the past with the contemporary, traditional with modern 
discourses, and religion with national identity.  All of these movements demonstrate that Tibetan 
Buddhism and its elites are presenting themselves as historical agents that makes history and 
their own cultural space.  
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Chapter Four 
The slaughter renunciation movement and neoliberal economic force: 
Competing subject formation in a Tibetan village 
 
In 2010, using the opportunity of a lama’s visit to Rakhor Village, the local khenpos tried 
very hard to lead herders into another vow of refraining from selling their yaks to meat markets, 
but they did not gain the support of the villager leaders and lay herders. For this failure, the 
khenpos were upset and disappointed about the herders’ disregard of their own sinful actions. 
Showing his great frustration, one highly respected local khenpo told me, “because the 
village does not have a powerful lama, herders don’t listen to the local khenpos.”  He said they 
could do nothing about the situation. But what he was really unhappy about was that he heard 
rumors that some herders had been complaining about the local khenpos and monks, claiming 
that monks had plenty of food and clothing, so they did not care about or understand the real 
lives of herders. What the herders really do not understand, he believes, is that what the khenpos 
have been trying to do is all for the benefit of the herders and their future lives and not of the 
khenpos themselves.  
The slaughter renunciation movement in Rakhor Village, which started in 2006 and ended 
in 2009, did not achieve its desired goal as did the same kind of movements in many Kham 
Tibetan areas. That is, even though the local khenpos and monks have made efforts to bring 
herders into another term, most Rakhor villagers were not willing to continue their vows for a 
second term, and only a few herders have continued their vows. This chapter explores why 
herders participated in the first slaughter renunciation movement and why most of them were not 
willing to renew their vows while some households did renew them.  
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Based on the fact that the income from selling yak meat is about 30-50 percent of herders’ 
annual income and participating in the movement means the loss of a portion of this income, one 
would assume that economic reasons by themselves could explain why herders did not continue 
their vow the second time. However, identical economic conditions cut across both groups of 
households who did and who did not continue their vows (there are both rich and poor 
households in both groups), so the economic reasoning alone is insufficient to understand 
herders’ decisions and to explain why households with identical economic conditions made 
different choices. I argue that these questions can only be fully understood in terms of competing 
processes of subject formation. That is, economic rationales play a stronger or more compelling 
role in decisions for certain kinds of subjects than for others.   The competing forces of subject 
formation operate at multiple scales, including the region, trans-local kinship networks, and the 
individual. Indeed, the failure of renewal of the movement illustrates the particular struggles that 
play out between different forces in the current social transformation in Tibetan pastoral areas. 
Among these forces is the recent Chinese market economy, which many scholars label neo-
liberalism in China, but which I call secular neo-liberalism, distinguishing it analytically from 
religiously informed neo-liberalism. 
Neo-liberal governance has been discussed by Michel Foucault, who like Marx and 
Gramsci critiques modern capitalist and liberal society as a society of mass consumption. Unlike 
Marx whose main concern was class straggle and Gramsci who attributed the failure of 
communist revolution to the hegemonic culture, Foucault is more concern about how the modern 
form of governance emerged by tracing the history of the state and government techniques 
(Foucault, 1991) and how neo-liberal economic strategies have become a way of governing 
people with the market logic of individual entrepreneurship and competition between enterprises 
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(Foucault, 2008).  His argument is that the capitalist social relationship is infused into a new 
arrangement that incites the creation of multiple enterprises. Unlike Marx’s seeing of individual 
as labor power to be exchanged and exploited, in this social arrangement, individuals are 
expected to behave as entrepreneurs and they are entirely responsible for administering their 
economic, health and other risks involved in individual existence. Compared with classic liberal 
policy, which emphasized the strong state that regulates the market, neo-liberal strategy sees the 
market as a fundamental power that contains the state within it. Foucault frames governmentality 
as the "the conduct of conduct," which includes "governing the self" and "governing others".  
Drawing on Foucault’s logic of governmentality, Ong and Zhang (2008) treat the Chinese 
free-market economy as a technology of self-governance of Chinese citizens. They argue that 
many Chinese initiatives in economic reform work to create conditions in which citizens govern 
themselves by permitting ownership of property and optimizing their prospects in the free 
market. This approach to self-governance is in contrast with the previous intense state 
surveillance of every aspect of people’s lives during the commune system. They call this neo-
liberalism “socialism from afar” (5). While for Foucault, the state itself is part of neo-liberalism 
as governmentality, Ong and Zhang, in their writing, conceptualize the state as manipulator and 
the market economy as tool for the state to accomplish rule. Instead of treating Ong and 
Lizhang’s governmentality as a misreading or misinterpretation of Foucault’s, I think that both 
Ong and Zhang’s new revised governmentality and Foucault’s governmentality are useful in 
explaining the different but interconnected development processes in contemporary China. For 
this, I suggest naming Foucault’s governmentality as “big governmentality” and Ong and 
Zhang’s new version of governmentality as “small governmentality.” That is, while Foucault’s 
governmentality captures a larger picture of the expansion of capitalism in which the state itself 
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has become part of this transformation (the state has become governmentalized), I suggest that 
Ong and Zhang’s governmentality is more useful for analyzing the smaller scale of cultural 
contestation between different groups over the meanings and practices of larger transformations. 
In other words, “big governmentality” is realized through the contestation of small 
governmentalities. For instance, the state promotion of the market as a neo-liberal technique of 
“socialism from afar” and the Tibetan Buddhist production of religious governable subjects 
converge into one to push pastoralists into certain kinds of social relationships (see Chapter 6). In 
this sense, the struggles between “small governmentalities, which are cultural struggles over 
interpretation and meaning, produce “big governmentality,” which, for Foucault, is capitalist 
expansion. It is on small governmentality that I want to draw to examine the competition 
between the secular neo-liberal force and religious force in case of the slaughter renunciation 
movement in Rakhor Village. 
Doing this, there are two other points that need to be highlighted. Building on Foucault’s 
governmentality, Ong and Zhang conceptualize neo-liberal governmentality only from the 
perspective of the state’s relationship with the market economic development, but they do not 
address other forces like religion, which are also very important in contemporary society. 
Therefore, I argue that religious forces also produce religious subjects that are not always the 
same as those produced by the state. Secondly, rather than seeing the secular neo-liberal force as 
complete, I also want to argue that because secular neo-liberal and religious forces are competing 
at the individual level (in my case Tibetan herders), their achievements are also partial and 
fragmented. This fragmented achievement is demonstrated in recent critical studies of 
development that see development as cultural politics. Those scholars maintain that rather than 
treating development as a completed project that determines the conduct of target groups, 
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development is always contested and reshaped by the target groups with their historical 
memories. By combining these two arguments, I argue that secular based neo-liberal techniques 
in pastoral areas of Tibet also work not in any completed or totalizing way, but that its 
accomplishment is instead fragmented and partial. This partiality is due also to the fact that 
religious forces also produce subjects in a fragmented way as well.  Because the forces are 
competing in subject-formation, variations in their achievement are inevitable. If we see the 
secular-based, neo-liberal technique as a contested governance tool with fragmented 
achievements, then we can understand why most of the herders in Rakhor have not continued 
their vows for the second term of pledge even though the khenpos have made great efforts to get 
them to extend the vows. Only a few herders did take oaths for the second or longer terms, 
presenting an example of a fragmented achievement of religious force. 
In short, here I want to make three points. First, I suggest distinguishing two different 
types of governmentalities: big governmentality and small governmentality. Second, I argue that 
Ong and Zhang’s neo-liberal governmentality in China is about small governmentality, and that 
we need to think about this small neo-liberal governmentality in terms of multiple power holders 
in forming their own subjects rather than seeing it as merely a relationship of the state, market, 
and society.  Third, it is also important to recognize that their achievements are fragmented and 
partial.  
In this chapter, I begin with an exploration of the slaughter renunciation movement in 
Rakhor Village, including an introduction to Khenpo Tsullo as he has become increasingly 
popular in Tibet.  This discussion will also cover his teachings in Rakhor Village, the process in 
which the movement took place, the contents of the teaching, and its impacts on herders’ lives 
and herders’ interpretations of those impacts. In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the 
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failure of the slaughter renunciation movement in the second term in Rakhor and the emergence 
of Tibetan middlemen as a controversial group among Tibetans. The latter illustrates competing 
forces in the subject formation of Tibetan herders, namely the secular neo-liberal force and 
religious force, highlighting the achievements of the former.  
 
The Slaughter Renunciation Movement in Rakhor Village 
Khenpo Tsullo (Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe) 
Khenpo Tsullo (Tib. Mkhan po tshul khrims blo gros) was born in 1962 in Luhuo (Tb: 
Brag ‘go) County, Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan Province. When Khenpo Tsullo was a small child, 
it is said that his fellow villagers found him very different and special, for he always showed his 
natural characteristics of intelligence, compassion, and noble conduct. Later, as it was a 
compulsory education policy during the commune system, Khenpo Tsullo attended a state-
funded primary school, and it is said that his achievement in school was very distinctive.  
In 1983, he became a monk in Larung Gar, and later received the khenpo degree. Through 
his studies in Larung Gar, he became a close disciple of Khenpo Jigphun. When Khenpo Jigphun 
was still alive, Khenpo Tsullo worked as an attendant to his master when he visited Wutai Shan, 
Beijing, Lhasa, and Labrang monastery. Khenpo Tsullo was also assigned by Khenpo Jigphun to 
Malaysia and Singapore to teach Tibetan Buddhism.  
Becoming one of the best students of Khenpo Jigphun, Khenpo Tsullo continued Khenpo 
Jigphun’s meritorious deeds after his master passed away, including the promotion of the Ten-
virtuous-rules among Tibetan communities, the slaughter renunciation and fur renunciation 
movement, and some others. However, Khenpo Tsullo has also started new initiatives for 
Tibetan people and monks and nuns, including vegetarianism, illiteracy eradication, Tibetan 
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language purification, school programs, opposition to Rgya lamas (Tibetan monks who pretend 
to be lamas to collect donations from Han Chinese), eradication of Tibetan beggars in Chinese 
cities, etc.  
Among those religious and social programs, Khenpo Tsullo has highly stressed the 
slaughter renunciation (戒杀) and tshe thar movements (放生). Starting in the late 2000s, he has 
been spending one hundred days every fall in Chengdu, the largest city in Western China, to 
release livestock and other sentient beings from the slaughterhouses and markets. He has been 
releasing those animals by using donations he received from his disciples and donors from Han-
populated inner China.  
Unlike Khenpo Jigphun, who had never attended any formal school, Khenpo Tsullo was 
educated in the state system in his earlier years. This education enabled him to be one of very 
few distinguished khenpos in Larung Gar who speak fluent Chinese. For the past few years, he 
has been giving religious teachings and lectures in Chinese at some top universities like Beijing 
University. Using a blog, he has recently been teaching Tibetan Buddhism to Chinese disciples. 
In addition, he has also published many Buddhist books in both Tibetan and Chinese. In this 
sense, he is not one of the many ordinary khenpos who speak only Tibetan, which limits their 
influence in modern times. 
With the recent rise in his reputation in Tibetan society, it is said that many monasteries 
have invited him to be their reincarnated lama, but Khenpo Tsullo has refused those invitations, 
saying that if one has real understanding of Buddhism and has the intention to do something for 
universal salvation, one does not need such titles. Even though Khenpo Tsullo does not have the 
official title of "Lama", his influence, far greater than that of most lamas, is cross-regional and 
cross-religious sects in Tibet, which is greatly benefited by his mastering of Tibetan Buddhism 
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and his wider understanding of the modern world.  Having achieved the same kind of religious 
influence that his master had achieved over Tibetans and Chinese disciples and donors, now 
Khenpo Tsullo and a few other khenpos have been leading Larung Gar into a new era. 
 
The First Slaughter Renunciation Movement in Hongyuan County 
The process of negotiation in which the religious teaching took place in Rakhor Village 
can demonstrate the process by which the slaughter renunciation movement has reached other 
pastoral areas, and the way it has been carried out on the ground. It also demonstrates that the 
seemingly monolithic “local” is constituted by multiple agents with inconsistent interests and 
that the slaughter renunciation movement took place in a process of negotiation among these 
agents. Indeed, this process was one in which religious forces negotiated with secular neo-liberal 
forces, which are penetrating every aspect of herders’ lives in the eastern Tibetan Plateau. 
Some local lamas in Hongyuan County had begun to teach as early as 2003 about the 
sinfulness of mass-slaughtering for the meat market. The movement gained significant 
momentum at the end of 2006, when Khenpo Tsullo, visited Rakhor village and held a religious 
teaching for herders and monks. After the teaching, a number of traditional communities in 
Hongyuan County began to participate in the movement.  
It is very common in Larung Gar that when a khenpo goes to teach Buddhism or perform a 
religious ritual, khenpos are invited by those local khenpos who had studied or have been 
studying in Larung Gar. In many cases, before visiting a place for religious teaching, khenpos of 
Larung Gar want to make sure that their visit would make some changes in the slaughter rate and 
vegetarianism. Therefore, the real force for the promotion of the slaughter renunciation 
movement in Rakhor is these khenpos of Rakhor Monastery who have studied in Larung Gar and 
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have been strongly influenced by well-known khenpos in Larung Gar. Initiated by the local 
khenpos in Rakhor village, Khenpo Tsullo was invited by Rakhor village with the support of 
another sprul skus (lama) named Tsewang Rigdzen, from another township in Hongyuan, who 
asked Khenpo Tsullo to give teachings in Rakhor.   
It is said that before his visit to Rakhor, there was an agreement between village leaders 
and khenpos from Rakhor and Khenpo Tsullo to the effect that, if he visited the village, leaders 
and khenpos in Rakhor Monastery would be able to persuade herders to join the movement. Most 
villagers in Rakhor had been supportive of the agreement, because it was the chance of a lifetime 
to receive religious teaching from such an outstanding khenpo, but there were others who had 
different opinions about taking vows to stop selling livestock to the meat market, which would 
lead to a reduction in their income. Because the village leaders and the monastery made the 
decision, later all of the herders from Rakhor village swore oaths to refrain from selling livestock 
to the meat market. In addition, and somewhat less difficulty, they also took oaths to refrain from 
other practices such as smoking, drinking alcohol, gambling, and cheating.  
One might wonder where the power of the village leaders and khenpos in the local 
monastery came from and how they could make decisions on the villagers' behalf. In the current 
political system, the team of village leaders is part of a government administrative system that is 
organized to carry out the state's agenda and to serve people as representatives of the government 
in the development of a village. But village leaders also play very critical roles in the traditional 
social unit of the tribe, which in Tibetan is called “Sde pa” or “Yul Tso”, meaning a tribe or 
(administrative) village. This is because there is an overlap of new government administration 
and traditional tribal groups. For instance, a village or township in the current system is also a 
tribe or a sub-tribe in the traditional social sense (Yeh, 2003).  The current village administration 
  
169 
is led by the Party secretary (村委书记) who is elected by village Party members, and village 
leaders (村长) are elected by the villagers.  The powerful assembly of current village leader 
works on one hand as an instrument of the government to carry out the state agenda on the 
ground, but, on the other hand, also represent the traditional communities that share “Skyid 
Sdug,” meaning sharing the same fortune and suffering, in a traditional social structure that is a 
holdover from the past. In some places a village or township is still a traditional community or 
tribe, while in other places many villages or several townships, in some cases crossing the 
boundaries of counties, constitute a single tribe or traditional community. Therefore, village 
leaders are the ones who protect and serve the traditional communities or tribes in the current 
system, by translating resources and power from the state to the benefit of the community in its 
traditional sense. Rakhor was one community that shared “Skyid Sdug” before 1958, but it is also 
a single village in the current administrative system. 
During the commune system, village leaders were still very powerful in their villages, 
because they arranged for the distribution of all the resources in the planned economic system, 
although after the end of the commune system the power of village leaders was diminished. 
However, with the implementation of the “Open up the West” campaign, the state has launched 
many projects, and with those projects village leaders have regained their power as they have 
become the key implementers of those projects. In the process of implementation of projects 
village leaders have the power to allocate resources and benefits of the projects among the 
herders. So the village leaders have the right to exclude or include the villagers from the projects. 
In this power structure, it is the fact that the village leaders, working as traditional tribal chiefs, 
represent the benefit of the traditional community that made village leaders support the slaughter 
renunciation movement as they have seen it as an important for the villagers. The support of 
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village leaders for the slaughter renunciation movement is not a part of the state's agenda but 
rather derives from the role they play in the traditional social structure. So, in this process, the 
social function of the traditional community operates through village leaders, who bear 
responsibility for both the state's agenda and the development of the community in which 
traditional cultural meanings are inherent. With the powers they gained from the state, village 
leaders played a critical role in determining the first three-year term of the pledge in Rakhor 
village.  
The power of village leaders is combined with that of khenpos/monks in the local 
monastery, whose power comes from their authority either to include or to exclude villagers 
from the religious services that they provide. Tibetan herders are Buddhists and need religious 
services from the monastery. With support from the village leaders, monks/khenpos could 
exclude those herders who have not participated in the pledge. It is this power structure that has 
channeled villagers into the slaughter renunciation movement. It is on these grounds that both 
village leaders and khenpos in Rakhor Monastery made the decision on behalf of all herders that 
every household should participate in the movement for at least three years. 
This is also a case in which religious power is translated into secular state power. The 
power of khenpos from both the local area and Larung Gar is realized through the village leaders 
whose actions represent the state's agenda in current administrative structure. In current state 
law, religious figures are not to interfere with people’s secular life, so only village leaders have 
the legal power to decide what the village should and should not do. This is reflected in the 
negotiations when the village decided if they wanted to continue into a second term of the 
pledge. Because village leaders did not support a second term, the efforts of local khenpos 
resulted in failure. 
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Religious teaching in Rakhor Village 
It is said that Khenpo Tsullo arrived at Rakhor in his own car with his own driver, so there 
were no grand welcoming or seeing-off ceremonies for him; this is very different from the kind 
of treatment received by other important lamas, who are usually welcomed and seen off with 
solemn ceremonies. In earlier days, when a very important lama visited, villagers usually rode 
their horses and later motorcycles and cars from five to ten kilometers away from their homes to 
receive him and from the same distance when he left. Khenpo Tsullo did not like this traditional 
reception ritual, so he has never allowed villagers to receive him in such a way.  
In Rakhor village, Khenpo Tsullo offered two days of religious teachings, in which he 
gave herders Tibetan Buddhist empowerments and told them about the impact of the sin of 
killing, dam pa gsum or sbyor dngos rjes gsum (the three stages of actions - preparation, main 
part and conclusion), the empowerment of Skyabs ’dro (the three refuges of Tibetan Buddhism), 
the empowerment of Dge Bsnyen kyi Sdom pa (Buddhist vow for layman), and the teaching of 
'od dpog med kyi rgyud bzhi bo’i (four practices to be born into the sukhavati paradise of the 
Amitabha Buddha). All of these are very basic Buddhist teachings and practices for lay people. 
Though he was supposed to give religious teachings and empowerments, he spent most of 
the two days highlighting his concerns about the increase in the slaughter rate, urging herders to 
stop their sinful actions. He did this by teaching herders how sinful it is to take another's life, and 
how sinful actions would lead to bad results not only after their death, but also in serious 
misfortune in their current lives.  
His teachings display an ambiguous attitude toward Tibetan herders. On the one hand, he 
thinks that the moral standards of the herders have been seriously degraded, and that the herders 
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in this region look more like Han Chinese than Tibetan drokpa (herders), who had a very good 
reputation in the past. On the other hand, he attributes the moral degradation of herders to the 
failures of Tibetan religious elites, who have not been able to teach herders in this region very 
much.  
In his lectures he has also emphasized the collection of karma, the law of cause and effect, 
and this-worldly versus other-worldly happiness, highlighting the inevitability of death for 
everyone, from which Buddhism is the only refuge. He states that everyone needs to leave this 
world one day and go on to the next life, then asks, “Who can really help you? What is your real 
refuge? It is not your relatives, not your wealth, not the state, and there is nothing that can help 
you but Buddhism. It is all about what you are doing now and have done in the past.”  
Integrating them with these Buddhist teachings and empowerments, he covered various 
topics, some directly related to development issues in Rakhor Village or even in all of the 
Tibetan regions. He placed great emphasis on the importance of Buddhism for Tibetan people 
and the proper ways of practicing it. At the same time he maintained that Tibetan people need 
development, but the correct way to achieve development is not the mass-slaughter of livestock 
for the meat market. He thinks that the future path for Tibetan herders lies not in herding 
livestock but in accessing education and active engagement with the market economy in non-
sinful ways. For alternative ways of making a living, he gave very specific guidance, even 
suggesting how herders should spend the money they earn.  
In addition, he repeated the teaching of the cause-and-effect law to highlight how herders’ 
current massive slaughter will cause serious misfortune not only in their next lives, but for their 
current lives in terms of the prosperity of both individuals and communities. He told herders that 
he is not a fortuneteller, but according to the Buddha’s teaching, they will definitely go to hell 
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after they die, because they have sold so many livestock to the meat market for the last two 
decades. He is also very sure that they will not be able to make a living (survive) if they continue 
to sell livestock to the meat market as they have been doing in recent years. Some of his opening 
statements and parts of his speech reflect the main tone of his lecture in Rakhor Village: 
In the past, if lamas or khenpos came to the Mewa tribe, they came here most 
likely asking for donations such as butter, cheese, and livestock, which in the end they 
sold to slaughterhouses, a practice more like that of Mi Rtag Pa’ Chos (non-
Buddhists). I don’t know if you have anything to donate, but I do not want even the 
least thing from you. I come here not asking for donations to give to the Buddhist 
authorities, but to introduce you to some basic Buddhist practices.  
 
I know herders in these areas very well; I have been rescuing yaks from the 
slaughterhouse in Chengdu for the past half decade, so I have met some of you. 
Herders in Mewa have been selling large quantities of livestock to the meat market and 
using that money to build stupas and Buddhist statues, believing that they are making 
good karma, which is very wrong. This is a big mistake. I have never heard that killing 
is good karma in any way. Buddha never taught such a thing in any of his commands. 
 
I come here to teach you real Buddhism, because you have chopped [sold or 
slaughtered] much of your livestock for the meat market for the last decade in the 
belief that you have been practicing Buddhism. If you want to practice Buddhism, the 
first thing that you should know is that killing and hurting others’ lives is one of the 
most serious sins one could commit, and the first thing you should do in order to 
practice true Buddhism is to stop selling livestock to slaughterhouses. This is not the 
way to gain good karma. You need to know what kinds of action constitute good merit, 
and what kinds constitute negative karma. 
 
I have traveled many times in these areas, but I was very upset to see that herders’ 
belief in  Buddhism has become increasingly weak. If you think carefully, it does not 
have to be this way; all of you are Tibetans, in particular Tibetan drokpa, who in the 
past were believed to be true Buddhists and very honest people. These days, let alone 
Tibetans, you can see many Han Chinese, particularly of this generation, practicing 
Buddhism. 
  
It must sound as though I am scolding you and am angry with you -- I am not, but 
I need to  point out your mistakes. I am supposed to come to give you Buddhist 
teachings, and I don’t know why I slip into the topic of slaughter. I cannot help but talk 
about it, as we have a saying, "Where you have pain, there you touch." It is far less 
important to know how to practice Buddhism than to know what Buddhism is not. 
 
  
174 
On the afternoon of the second day of his teaching, he asked herders to raise their hands to 
take oaths for various commitments. As part of a layman’s vow, a majority of the herders took 
oaths to refrain from drinking alcohol, killing human beings, cheating, including making money 
with superstitious practices, stealing, and committing sexually immoral acts that include working 
as prostitutes, having sex with prostitutes, and having relationships with other people's spouses. 
Many of the herder took vows not to smoke or gamble, which are not parts of the Buddhist 
layman’s vow. As a part of the teaching of ’od dpog med kyi rgyud bzhi bo’i (Four practices to 
be born in the Sukhavati paradise of the Amitabha Buddha), many herders promised to commit 
to a seven days’ meditation of ’od dpog med kyi rgyud bzhi bo’i every year for their entire lives. 
In addition, all monks, some elderly people and some young women, took vows not to eat meat 
for three years or longer, and many herders vowed not to eat meat on the most holy days of the 
year and two days every month. The most difficult vow for the entire village was the vow not to 
sell their yaks to the meat market for three years, and some herders even took an oath not to 
slaughter livestock for their own consumption. The majority of households in the village were 
able to keep their oaths for the initial three-year period, and most of households have been 
listening the tapes of Khenpo Tsullo’s teachings in their village to reinforce their memory and to 
gain a better understanding of Tibetan Buddhism. Indeed it has become popular for Tibetans to 
listen to Khenpo Tsullo’s teachings in many Kham and Amdo areas. 
 
Impacts and Interpretations: The Failure of the Second Term of the Pledge 
The first term of the pledge for all Rakhor villagers began in late 2006, when Khenpo 
Tsullo visited the village, and ended in late 2009. After the term ended, even though the local 
khenpos in Rakhor monastery had made many efforts to encourage herders to make another 
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three-year or longer-term pledge, only a few households (accounting for about 10% of the total 
households) continued their vows for the second term, while most households did not swear 
oaths for the second time.  
Many herders expressed that the material impacts of the first term of the movement had 
been significant, the most prominent of which were the reduction of cash income and an 
increased intensity of grazing in the pastures. Many herders who did not participate in the second 
term gave these two reasons as their main reasons for giving up the movement.  However, my 
argument is that income reduction and overstocking in and of themselves cannot serve as full 
explanations for the failure of the movement, but rather that the herders’ subjectivity is a prior 
ground upon which income reduction and overstocking either matter enough for herders to 
overcome their religious ideals, or not.   I make this argument because among the households 
who participated in the second term were rich, medium, and poor households, who faced the 
same economic and ecological pressures as those households who chose not to participate.  
Explaining their participation entails a recognition that other forces beyond economic rationality 
and ecological considerations also play a role in decision-making.  In particular, I argue that it is 
the outcome of the competing cultural forces of the secular neo-liberal market economy and new 
Tibetan Buddhist movements, operating at various scales, that produces a range of subjectivities, 
some of which are more strongly attuned to material needs and economic calculation, and others 
of which are more strongly governed by considerations of karma and other Buddhist norms.  
Before turning more specifically to these multi-scalar processes of subject formation, I want first 
to go over how herders articulate their experience of the movement and their rationales for 
continuing or giving up the second term. 
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Income reduction: better off or worse? 
Yaks are the main source of income for most herders in Hongyuan. All herders in Rakhor 
Village herd yaks and no sheep. Among the 185 households of the village, 30 are rich, owning 
from 150 yaks to up to a maximum of 500 yaks; 70 households with 50-150 yaks are considered 
to be medium-wealthy. There are over 45 households with 15-50 yaks, while over 30 with fewer 
than 10 or none at all are seen as extremely poor, most of whom have settled in the towns. 
However, there are also about 10 households that have settled in town without any livestock but 
have been doing well economically with their businesses or part-time work.  
Generally speaking, in the yak production system, the numbers of female yaks determines 
the differences of wealth between households in a community. This is because female yaks 
produce not only calves to extend or maintain the herd's size but also milk, which herders make 
into butter and cheese or sell directly to companies that produce milk-powder products. Female 
yaks are pregnant every other year, and on average each can produce 1.25 kilograms of milk per 
day for about four months in the summer (they do not produce very much of milk at other times). 
The purchasing price at the powdered-milk factory in 2006, the year in which Rakhor villagers 
took their oaths, was about 1.1 RMB per half kilogram and 1.7 RMB per half kilogram in 2011, 
which was the highest for the past few decades. Most households own about 25 – 40 female 
yaks, which bear calves every other year. Mortality for calves is about 35% on average.  If a 
household has 30 female yaks, the household could earn about 9,900 RMB a year by selling milk 
or butter and cheese, and the household would have at least 4 adult (male) yaks weighing 200 
kilograms, which would earn 8,000 RMB (2000 RMB per yak in 2006, and about 2500 RMB per 
yak with 125 kilograms in 2011; the weight of the largest yak, worth 6600 RMB in 2011, is 
about 400 kilograms) to sell to the meat market. Therefore, theoretically most households lost 
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45% of their income by refraining from selling yaks to the meat market. However, different 
groups interpret this reduction differently and the levels of impact vary according to livestock 
numbers owned by each household. 
Households that took vows for the second term 
Those households that have taken oaths for a second term include those from all economic 
categories: very rich households, economically middle ones, and very poor households. Some of 
them have expressed that they feel there is no difference between selling and not selling the yaks 
for slaughter in terms of their income and livelihood, saying that their effort of collecting 
positive karma made them feel no different in terms of quality of life. Other herders explicitly 
state that the income reduction is significant, but interpreted the reduced income as spiritual gain. 
They explained that when they sold many yaks, they made lots of money but always felt guilty 
and fearful about the associated sin.  However, when they did not sell yaks, they felt much relief 
from guilt and assumed they were making good karma for their current and next lives, which 
they claimed is much more important to them than accumulating money.  They also argued that 
there are many ways to make money. In addition to selling dairy products, which is another 
source of income for herders, many have been selling livestock, mostly female and young yaks, 
to other herders who promise to use those yaks for non-slaughter purposes, for instance, 
transportation and milking. Other income sources include doing small business, collecting herbs, 
working part-time jobs in towns, and so on. Some herders have further claimed that the money 
they earned from yak sales was spent very quickly, but that the lower income they earn now from 
activities such as selling milk and collecting herbs is better-quality income that lasts longer.  In 
other words, they claimed that monetary income from sinful activities is less useful and runs out 
more quickly than income from other activities.  
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Herders state that the movement has also had impact on their way of spending. A herder 
said that when they sold livestock to market in the past, they sometimes faced serious shortage of 
cash in the spring, because livestock do not produce milk or they are too weak to sell during this 
time period. But after they took the oath of not selling their livestock to the meat market, they 
have not been any worse off in terms of cash shortage during the later winter or springtime, as 
might be expected.  He explained that when they sell livestock to the meat market, they have 
more money, but they spend more, particularly on things like gambling, alcohol, eating at 
restaurants or going to teahouses, or on other forms of entertainment like cell phones and TV 
sets. Khenpo Tsullo was greatly concerned about this, saying that Tibetan herders have been 
spending most of their money on unnecessary things, including gambling, purchasing coral and 
animal pelts, and making donations to monasteries.  However, when they took their oaths, 
herders cut these unnecessary expenditures, which Tibetans calls “brlag” or “waste.” 
Furthermore, they have been more careful in spending their money with better planning.   
Herders have also deployed an alternative strategy for selling their yaks to reduce income 
reduction. That is, the slaughter renunciation movement changed how herders dispose of their 
yaks. During the first term of the oath, some households sold their yaks not for meat but for other 
purposes, a new phenomenon. For instance, they sold female yaks, which most herders do not 
sell to the meat market until they are very old; they also sold two- or three-year-old yaks to 
wealthier families, who used the opportunity to expand their herd size, or a few adult male yaks 
to those who promised not to sell them to the slaughterhouses at least for the period of the first 
term. During the three-year pledge, the rule established by the monastery was that if anyone 
wanted to sell their livestock, they had to come to the monastery to register the livestock and 
make sure that the buyer took an oath not to sell the livestock to the meat market for at least three 
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years. However, the income that the herders generated from these methods is not as good as they 
can earn from selling yaks to the meat market, because, first, many herders did not want to sell 
their female yaks considering the sustainability of their herd’s size and milk production. The 
prices of male and small yaks sold on the condition of not slaughtering for the three-year term 
were as low as half of the original prices, or even lower. Therefore, there is still an impact on the 
income of the herders, but the level of impact varies from household to household. 
They said that even though reduction in income is for every household whose members 
took vows, its impacts are different. For instance, if a household of five members had around 
forty female yaks among a hundred, the household would not need to look for other income 
sources if they had taken vows, because the dairy products the household got from the female 
yaks would bring in enough cash to make ends meet. However, a household of five family 
members owning fewer than twenty female yaks would have to look for other supplemental 
income, because the dairy products from twenty yaks would not be sufficient to support a five-
person household. 
After they stopped selling yaks for the promised period, herders who owned only a small 
number of livestock have had to look for other ways of making a living, such as collecting herbs, 
operating small businesses, and finding temporary jobs. However, those alternative income 
resources have been very limited for herders, because many of them do not read or write 
Chinese, which is very important in China for obtaining a job or successfully doing business. 
In addition to those interpretations of impacts, it is very common for villagers to attribute 
their positive experience in the slaughter renunciation movement to the “dkon mchog gsum,” 
which means refuge in the Buddhist three jewels: the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. They think 
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that it is their positive karma collection through slaughter renunciation that has helped them to 
enjoy a good life even though they are losing some of their income.  
The most unaffected group is those who do not have any or many yaks, most of whom 
took oaths for the second period of pledge, because they did not have much livestock to sell 
anyway. There are about 40 households settled down either in Hongyuan County town or in 
Rakhor Village. Some of them have been working in businesses, while others work as part-time 
laborers on seasonal construction projects, meat processing in the slaughterhouses in summer, 
cleaning, and other jobs. 
 
Households whose members did not take vows for the second term 
Many herders at the medium economic level stated that Khenpo Tsullo’s teaching has 
enhanced their understanding of the proper way of practicing Buddhism and increased their 
awareness of their sinful deeds of selling their animals to the meat market. Many expressed their 
great worry and regret for having sold so many livestock in the past. However, at the same time, 
they stated that participating in the movement had already had a significant impact on their 
income, so they did not continue their vows for the second term.  
They said that the primary reason for their non-participation in the second term is that a 
majority of them had participated in the Housing Project for Herders (牧民定居工程), which the 
state designed to settle down herders in small towns, transforming “backward herders” into 
modern, settled herders by encouraging them to live in more comfortable houses rather than 
tents. With the settlement project of 2010, to build a house, herders needed to invest over 60,000 
RMB, including loans of 30,000 RMB from the state bank and 20,000 RMB in cash, in addition 
to the state's contribution of about 16,000 RMB. Thus, herders stated that they needed to sell 
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their yaks to earn cash in order to build the house through the settlement project.26 The Housing 
Project for Herders started in 2008, and has covered most of the townships in Hongyuan County. 
By the end of 2010, about 130 households among 180 in Rakhor Village had built their new 
houses with the help of the state housing project. The incentives for herders to participate in the 
project include the subsidy, a five-year, interest-free loan from the state, and permission to build 
houses in their current locations. The cost for their new house adds to other costs including 
education for the children, medical care for family members, funerals, transportation, 
communication, and other costs. In addition to that, many herders want to buy cars and want to 
decorate their new houses, which requires a greater amount of money compared to in the past.  
 
Pressure on pastures: unintended impact of the movement 
The other reason that some herders have expressed their unwillingness to participate in the 
second term is the discrepancy between the carrying capacity of their pastures and the needs of 
their livestock. The long-term impact of the slaughter renunciation movement on the pastures is 
reflected in the accumulation of livestock as a result of the ban on selling livestock for slaughter.  
Yaks live for around fifteen years and females produce calves every other year. It takes 
five to six years for female yaks to produce calves and milk, which is a very important source of 
income and sustenance for many Tibetan pastoralists. Herders generally keep female yaks to 
expand their herds and do not sell them to the slaughterhouses except in two circumstances: a 
herder needs cash urgently but does not have male yaks to sell; or, the female yaks become too 
old, and herders sell them before they die naturally in winter or spring when they are relatively 
                                                 
26 Note, however, that there were also households who participated in the Housing Project for Herders who 
also participated in the second term of the movement.  
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weak and malnourished.27 Most female yaks are pregnant every other year and the survival rate 
of calves is about 50-80%. If a herder has 40 female yaks, which is the average number most 
households have, each year half of 40 female yaks will produce about 15 calves.  Thus, for the 
three-year term of the slaughter renunciation movement, the number of livestock for the 
household was increased by 45 yaks, which is a one-third to one-half increase in the total number 
of livestock owned by an ordinary household. 
Before motorcycles and cars became widely available two to three decades ago, some yaks 
were trained as pack animals by their owners, but this tradition has faded away from many of the 
pastoral areas in Hongyuan in recent years. With the state infrastructure projects, dirt roads were 
extended into many of the pastures that are close to the towns, so herders in those areas have 
shifted their transportation from yaks and horses to motorcycles and cars. Only in those pastures 
located in very remote areas which have yet to be reached by roads have herders continued to use 
the traditional means of transportation -- yaks for carrying freight and horses for riding.  
Therefore, with these changes, almost all male yaks become meat products. Thirty years 
ago, or during the era of the commune system, yaks were not to be sold until the males had 
reached the age of at least six years. This has changed in recent years. Male yaks have lately 
been sold as early as when they are three years old. Many herders like to expand their numbers 
of female yaks and sell most of the males, on the one hand, to reduce pressure on their pastures, 
and, on the other hand, to recoup their increasing expenses.  
The recent increasing slaughter rate is also associated with state grassland policies. In 
Hongyuan County, the winter pastures were allocated to individual households in 1996, and 
since then each household has a limited pasture on which to graze their livestock (Banks, 2003; 
                                                 
27 The best time to sell yaks is from late through early winter, when they are in their best condition, while later 
winter and early spring are the worst times in terms of prices, because yaks are very weak and many die due to 
heavy snows and other natural hazards.  
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Bauer, 2005; Richard et al., 2006; Yan, 2005).  In addition, for the past decade, the numbers of 
livestock owned by most households have reached the maximum that their winter pastures could 
sustain, and the wealthier households have had to sell their livestock every year to keep a balance 
between their herd size and pasture capacity while there are ever fewer pastures for rent. 
However, whether for the short or long term, the slaughter renunciation movement has become 
an attempt to reverse the increasing slaughter rate of recent years. 
The contradiction between the desire to expand herds and the shortage of pasture has been 
an especially serious issue for those households that own more livestock than their pasture can 
sustain. They usually rent additional pasture in order to accommodate the increased grazing 
intensity brought about by the movement. These pastures are generally rented from herders who 
own no livestock or fewer livestock than the maximum that their pastures can sustain.  
For many wealthy households, the economic reason is not their first reason for giving up 
the second term of the vow. Many of them have savings in banks or private loans, thus, financial 
limitations are not the main reason for them to give up the second term of the pledge. In addition, 
without selling livestock to the meat market, the income from dairy products should be sufficient 
for them to cover their annual expenditure. The main reason for them is the pressure on their 
pastures, because most of them have more yaks than their pastures can sustain, so they have been 
renting pastures from others. The slaughter renunciation movement has intensified the demands 
on pasture. One herder, who is the richest in the village and a previous village leader, stated that 
he had to sell lots of livestock that he had not been willing to sell for the past three years.  He 
said that the three-year period of refraining from slaughter could only extend the lives of those 
animals for a couple of years, that he is very sorry that he had to start selling them again, and did 
so only because he did not have enough pasture to sustain so many male yaks, which become 
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useless if they are not sold for meat. He said he has had enough money in the bank to build a 
house, but he does not have enough pasture to sustain the increasing herd size. 
During the previous three-year pledge, in order to ease the pressure on their pastures and 
increase their income some herders had also sold dozens of female yaks (’bri) and less 
productive, young yaks to others who promised to keep them for at least three years; they also 
entrusted adult male yaks to others for at least three years. However, giving (as opposed to 
selling) livestock happened only rarely.  Since the end of the first term, many of those rich 
households have sold many of the male yaks that they had been holding, easing some of the 
pressure on their pastures. However, for those households who took oaths for the second term, 
the pressure on their pastures is even greater, and their approaches to deal with this challenge are 
also different. For instance herder Gonlo, who pledged for the second term, had 120-130 yaks in 
July 2011, among which about 45 were females producing milk. Another 35 yaks were males 
between seven and twelve years old, many of which would have been sold to the meat market if 
the owner had not renewed his oath. Seven of those male yaks are tshe thars, life-released yaks 
that will not ever be slaughtered for the entire life of the yak, which is different from the 
slaughter renunciation movement (see introduction). During the first term, Gonlo did sell four 
yaks for the price of 1,000 RMB each. Because Gonlo sold those yaks only for transportation, 
but not for the meat market, this price was as low as only one fourth of the price that he could 
have earned if he had sold them to the meat market (and had not taken the oath). The herder who 
bought Gonlo’s yaks lives in another township, and promised that he was buying those yaks not 
for slaughter but for transportation. Since selling the yaks, Gonlo has been checking to determine 
whether the herders have sold any of his yaks to the meat market.  He has said he wanted to sell 
more, and there are many people who have said they want to buy his yaks, but it has been 
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increasingly difficult to find reliable people to whom to sell his yaks as tshe thar. He said that 
there were many stories about how buyers have cheated sellers and broken their promises. 
There are also many rumors that some herders have sold yaks to people from other places 
who have not participated in the slaughter renunciation movement, and that these people have in 
turn sold them on the market. On one occasion, a man from another area came to Rakhor village 
and bought many yaks, saying he was buying them for the purpose of milk production. But after 
a while some villagers found out that the man had sold all the yaks to Chinese merchants. 
Concerned about the situation, the villagers contacted Khenpo Tsullo, who sent money, bought 
all of those animals back and released them as tshe thar. 
Gonlo had also sold another pair of two-year-old yaks to a herder who said he would use 
them for breeding (种子牛). He sold them for 1,000 RMB each, which was half of the price he 
would have asked if he had sold them to the slaughterhouses. Whenever he sells yaks to other 
herders, there is always a guarantor (担保人) who guarantees that the buyer will not sell them to 
the meat market.   
Among those who took oaths, Raga is a very rich herder who took the oath for his entire 
life. He is considered wealthy in the village, owning about 220 yaks in 2011, including about 70 
productive females, but only 2 adult males. The reason he has only two is that since his taking of 
oath, he has been selling his male yaks when they were two years old so that they would not be 
sold for at least three years, because they are too young to sell for meat. Those young male yaks 
brought 700 RMB to 1,000 RMB each. The yaks he currently owns are mostly female and 犏牛
(a type of cross-breed of yaks and cattle). Those yaks produce milk, so it is not necessary to sell 
them to the meat market. He has also given some other male adult yaks to other herders without 
charging them any money. Another strategy to make a profit from yaks other than from their 
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milk is to sell female and cross-bred yaks to other herders, because of the probability that those 
yaks will be slaughtered for the meat market is small.  
Serwa and Soko have taken similar approaches. Serwa had about 220 yaks in 2010 with 
about 70 productive female yaks and about 40 adult males. Soko had 150 yaks including 40 
productive females and 30 adult males. Both of them have their males out in their pastures. In 
2010, both were able to give 20 yaks (12 owned by Serwa and 8 by Soko, which could have been 
worth as much as 100,000 RMB if sold in the meat market) to Khenpo Tsullo, who gave them all 
as tshe thar to his relatives in Luhuo County in Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan. To make this possible 
another lama paid for the truck that carried the yaks to their new homes.  
To give male yaks to lamas is the best way to reduce the numbers of male yaks in the 
pastures, but there are fewer lamas who are willing to take tshe thar yaks because they also have 
found it difficult to find places to take care of them. Those households which had made their 
yaks tshe thar did not want to give them to other herders, very few of whom still use yaks for 
transportation, because they do not trust other herders to keep the yaks as, even many herders 
have said they would.   
Another reason those households did not want to give their yaks to others was that, if they 
did, those herders would keep the yaks they had just received but would then sell their own yaks 
to the meat market instead, because they would have received new yaks that could be used for 
transportation or other purposes. This is a problem for khenpos as well. Rabga and his brothers 
have been told by their khenpos that giving their yaks to other herders is not a good way to ease 
the pressure on the pastures. Even if the yaks they gave away were safe in the keeping of a new 
household, the yaks owned originally by the household might be slaughtered, because now the 
household would have new yaks to replace their own.  This is problem, because while some yaks 
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are saved, others are killed instead. The religious implication for this is that those herders who 
took the oath would gain the same sins in the “causal chain” of killing. That is, in the law of 
cause and effect, killing caused by one's indirect actions commits equal sin as though he/she did 
the killing insofar as herders are aware that their giving away of their yaks will cause other yaks 
to be sold for slaughter.28 Therefore, to give male adult yaks to lamas is the safest way to handle 
those useless yaks, because lamas would not slaughter them, but now the problem is that lamas 
are not taking many of those yaks.   
Serwa did not sell any of his male adult yaks, while Soko sold two as tshe thar, which 
earned only one fourth of the meat-market price. When I asked what they were going to do with 
all those useless yaks to avoid overuse of pasture, they said they will keep them until they die 
naturally or happen to be killed by wolves. Another way they release the pressure on the pastures 
is to rent pasture from their neighbors who have more pasture than their livestock need (Yeh and 
Gaerrang, 2011).  
I also asked if it is acceptable to release those yaks into the mountains on their summer 
pastures, which are shared among a group of households, and let the animals go wherever they 
will, so that they do not need to graze those yaks on their own winter pastures. This is also not 
acceptable from a religious perspective, because herders have to make their best effort to prevent 
those yaks from being stolen by thieves who would sell them for slaughter.  
 The Slaughter renunciation movement has forced herders to hold those useless male yaks 
on pastures, with two negative impacts. First, these unproductive yaks consume a significant 
amount of grass that otherwise can be grazed by female yaks, which will contribute to income 
generation. Second, the accumulation of male yaks has become a burden for the pasture that does 
not bring any benefit for the herders. The state and many Chinese ecological scientists propose 
                                                 
28 This is the herders’ interpretations as well as that of the local khenpos.  
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that grassland degradation is severe and the overstocking is the main cause for it (Harris, 2009; 
Wang et al., 2005; Zhao and Zhou, 2005).29 If that is the case, then the slaughter renunciation 
movement has increased the stocking rate by accumulating more livestock on the pastures. 
Whatever the case may be, one fact is that herders have been facing difficulty in handling these 
male yaks. The slaughter renunciation movement is creating a new quandary for Tibetans in 
terms of whether to follow the lamas or what they know to be best for their grassland.   
The problem of tension between the pasture and livestock increase is a commonly 
expressed concern by many herders. In responding to this issue, Khenpo Tsullo suggests herding 
breeding yaks and female yaks separately, so that the number of yaks does not increase to the 
level that pastures cannot sustain any more. He states, “Birth control is a common measure in 
dealing with over population of human beings, why couldn’t it be used for the livestock 
population control? It is much better to prevent livestock from coming into being than to kill 
them as living beings.” However, this measure goes against another interest of herders. That is, 
herders want to have more female livestock, which they do not need to sell to the meat market, 
but from which they can benefit from dairy products, which is encouraged by khenpos.  
On the one hand, herders feel guilty about selling livestock to the meat market, believing 
that it will result in negative impacts in their current lives and on other lives to come. Such 
worries are instilled by cultural tradition and reinforced by religious leaders. On the other hand, 
the current secular neo-liberal social structure, including grassland privatization (Fernandez-
Gimenez, 2001; Williams, 1996; Yan et al., 2005), housing projects, infrastructure, and other, 
                                                 
29 A. Some Suggestions by the State Council on the better and faster development in pastoral areas of China. 
The State Council[2011] No.17. 
B. A Report in the pre-feasibility study of Rangeland Ecological Compensation in Tibet Autonomous Region 
by Committee of Population, Resources and Environment of CPPCC. 2008. 
C: Some Suggestions by the State Council on the protection and construction of grassland of China. The State 
Council [2002] No.19. 
D: The National Plan for the Conservation of Grasslands by Ministry of Agriculture. [2007] No.17 
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has become another imperative to force them to sell more yaks to the meat market. Tibetan 
herders have been making decisions about their livestock within those competing forces. 
 
Competing Forces of Subject Formation Operating at Different Scales 
The reduction in income and the increased pressures on pastures were important reasons 
for herders who decided not to take a second vow.  However, these rationales on their own 
cannot answer questions such as: Why are there some herders who have continued their vows for 
a second term (or for even longer) given that they knew the impacts of the movement on their 
incomes as well as on their pastures? And why do khenpos from Larung Gar so frequently 
express frustration about trying to persuade herders in eastern pastoral areas of the Tibetan 
Plateau compared to herders from other areas?  To answer these questions, we must turn to 
processes of subject formation that work at different scales.   
During my field research, I observed that there are geographical differences in the relative 
strength of the secular based neo-liberal force and the influence of Tibetan Buddhist elites. If one 
considers the larger geographical location of Rakhor, then it makes sense that many herders in 
Rakhor Village did not continue their oaths for the second term. Rakhor is in the Amdo region, 
where khenpos from Larung Gar have found it very difficult to bring herders into the slaughter 
renunciation movement compared to many parts of Kham. First, this is because herders in these 
areas own larger numbers of livestock than herders in other parts of the Plateau. Second, these 
regions have been more tightly economically integrated into the larger market of major cities in 
the western China. South-eastern Amdo is much closer to major Chinese cities (Chengdu, 
Lanzhou, and Xining). Furthermore, they are further from the center of this movement, Larung 
Gar, where the religious atmosphere is extremely strong.  Thus, herders in Hongyuan feel 
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stronger pressure from economic expansion, but they have less pressure or influence from 
religious forces than do herders in the Kham region.  
In the Kham area, religious influence on herders is much stronger than pastoral areas in 
Amdo, because big religious institutes of Nyingma School like Larung Gar are located centrally 
in pastoral areas, and herders have been exposed to many more religious teachings and rituals 
than the herders in southeast Amdo. Herders in the Kham region are relatively less integrated 
into larger Chinese markets than southeastern Amdo, because of their greater distance from the 
major cities. This is why khenpos from Larung Gar frequently expressed frustration in their 
attempts to promote the movement in most of the Amdo region. What this indicates is that 
geographically the secular neo-liberal technique in south-eastern Amdo has had a stronger 
impact than the religious impact. In other words, Rakhor is an area where one can see the extent 
to which the competing forces have been playing critical roles in the progress of the movement 
that reflects competing subject formation. 
 The fragmented achievement of neo-liberal force is reflected not only at the larger 
geographic scale but also at the scale of the translocal and village-level kinship networks.  For 
example, three related households who took oaths for the second term had three brothers who are 
religious figures in their local monastery. One of the brothers is a respected local khenpo who 
has studied at Larung Gar and has been very active in promoting the slaughter renunciation 
movement. Another is held to be a reincarnation of a lama and the third one is a monk. All of 
these monk brothers have very high reputations in the village and households, and their relatives 
are very proud of their connection to three respected religious figures. Another household is 
home to the head khenpo of Rakhor Monastery. These households who took oaths for the second 
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term were strongly influenced by khenpos who are family members.  The kinship relationship in 
these cases strengthened the force of Buddhist subject formation in these cases.  
The other families who took oaths are those who asked for religious services from Larung 
Gar. For the last few years, it has become popular for many herders in Hongyuan to ask Larung 
Gar to perform funerals for their departed ones. If a household asks for a funeral service from 
Larung Gar, its members need to take the vow not to slaughter livestock for at least three years. 
Most of those who did not have livestock took vows anyway.   The provision of services and the 
authority of monks and khenpos from Larung Gar are all components of the religious force that 
works to constitute Tibetan Buddhist subjects.   
Therefore, the larger geographic differences in the influences of two different forces 
(secular neo-liberal force and religious force) together with the differences at the household and 
kinship level help explain why the numbers of households who took vows the second time are 
very small, not exceeding 10% of all households of the village, but not non-existent. Considering 
the fact that most households have not taken vows for the second term, I argue that to some 
extent the secular neo-liberal technique in pastoral areas in the eastern plateau has had a decisive 
influence over the herders’ decisions. It is also clear that provision of religious services and 
teachings has been the main leverage for khenpos from Larung Gar to carry out their own 
agenda.  However, from the herders’ perspective this is not a direct quid pro quo but rather a 
process of becoming subject to Larung Gar’s religious influence and force.  
At the individual scale, among those who chose to take the second term vow, it is clear 
that religious forces became more dominant in subject formation than secular neo-liberalism.  
Among those who chose not to take the second vow, however, the results were more mixed.  
Although economic calculation dominated over religious concerns in the decision about the 
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slaughter renunciation movement, these herders are still to varying extents also religious 
subjects.  The struggle between forces of subject formation is not a zero sum game but rather one 
that produces a hybrid spectrum of subjectivities in which secular market and Buddhist norms 
have a greater or lesser force.     
This contestation between secular neo-liberal force and religious force is also reflected in 
the everyday conversation of herders. Many in Rakhor expressed the belief that since Khenpo 
Tsullo’s teaching they have seen lots of change in herders’ adherence to Buddhist tenets, because 
now herders have become more aware and more sensitive when they sell their livestock. One 
herder said, “Now we know better about our religion. In the past, herders have never hesitated to 
sell their livestock, and now even though we sell them, but we have become more sensitive and 
we have to think about it. The fundamental change in persuading herders to renounce selling 
livestock to meat market will take a longer time and more effort.” This represents an 
enhancement of religious influence on herders’ lives, and recalls Khenpo Tsullo’s diagnosis of 
current conditions in Rakhor Village: 
I don’t understand why herders in this community have become the way you are 
now, drawing no distinction between right and wrong. The more I think about it, you 
shouldn’t be the only ones to be blamed; we [lamas, khenpos, and monks] should also 
be blamed, because we have not done well our job of teaching you Buddhism and the 
proper ways of practicing it.   
 
Three or four years ago, when I came across some young Tibetans in Longri Ba 
Township of Hongyuan, I observed that they had already lost their Tibetan-ness. Yet, 
from one perspective, you lay people should not be blamed. There have been many 
lamas who had performed religious performances, given religious empowerment, and 
collecting religious donations from you, but very few lamas have given you decent 
religious teachings that introduce you to the real understanding of Buddhism through 
face-to-face education and communication. So it is no wonder that you don’t 
understand Buddhism; but, in the future, if you want to believe in and practice 
Buddhism, you have to understand it. As I said you Mewa people are Tibetans, 
particularly you are decent drokpas [herders], and you are not Han Chinese. 
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For Khenpo Tsullo, his religious teachings are efforts to more strongly assert khenpos’ 
religious influence over Tibetan herders so that Tibetan herders act according with the Tibetan 
Buddhist norms. With his religious teachings, Tibetan herders in this region will not sell as much 
as they do now.  
However, another herder said, “when you read and listen to khenpos’ religious teachings, 
you know how serious a mistake you are making in selling livestock to the meat market; but 
when you see the changes around you and the things you need to catch up, you have to sell as 
much as possible. It is totally two worlds for me.” A monk told me that the reason for the failure 
of the second round of pledge is that herders have been exposed too much to the outside world, 
and there are so many things they want and they have to buy these days.  Needs today are not 
limited to livestock, but also expenditures for education, healthcare, house-building, and 
competition over cars, jewelry and pelts.  
All of these articulations and struggles over the slaughter renunciation movement show a 
cultural politics of subject formation by different forces. More importantly, they demonstrate not 
only that the achievement of secular neo-liberal development is fragmented but also that the 
achievement of religious force is fragmented. They are successful in some cases and fail in 
others. Many herders expressed the view that the slaughter renunciation movement has had a 
significant impact on herders’ religious belief by reinforcing it or deepening their understanding 
of Buddhism. Many households have tapes of Khenpo Tsullo’s teachings of 2006 in Rakhor 
Village. Many said they have been listening to the tapes once in while. Indeed, listening to 
Khenpo Tsullo’s teachings is very common, even in those places where there is no slaughter 
renunciation movement. In Rakhor, herders have been able to keep other vows they made during 
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the religious teaching even those who gave up the vows on the slaughter renunciation movement 
for the second term. 
It is in this contested subject-formation process that the herders made decisions about their 
participation in the slaughter renunciation movement. In other words, this is how religious force 
and secular based neo-liberal economic force competed to bring herders into their own value 
systems.  A more important aspect is that this decision making process is also one in which 
herders become the subjects of those different forces, becoming a certain type of people who are 
guided by a certain value system or who are going back and forth between two competing 
systems.  
 
Tibetan Middlemen 
Another newly-emerged group, middlemen, can further demonstrate how those two forces 
are competing in their formation of herders as certain subjects.  As a very small and exceptional 
but important group emerging in recent years, middlemen are those whose main business is to 
purchase yaks from herders and then sell them to bigger businessmen or assist even bigger Han 
businessman from major Chinese cities. In the Buddhist tradition the trade in livestock for 
slaughter is considered to be a very sinful deed, so it was a business that only Han and Muslims 
engaged in. Only in the last two decades have Tibetan middlemen become involved in the 
business, which has become very controversial among Tibetan herders in Rakhor. 
There are about 10 Tibetan herders working as middlemen in Hongyuan County Town. 
Most of them are from two villages that traditionally belong to one tribe and which are currently 
under the same administrative township as Rakhor Village. It is significant that none of those 
middlemen are from Rakhor Village. The two villages have more government-employed workers 
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and have more Tibetan middlemen, but they have received less religious influences from 
khenpos and lamas.  
A majority of the middlemen were relatively poor before they began participating in the 
business. Most of them expressed that they have been doing this business because life forced 
them to do so. They were either poor or they had too many debts that need to be paid. When we 
had conversations about how much money they were making compared with the money they 
made before, they showed great pride, but when we talked about the sins related to this business, 
they felt very uncomfortable. Most of them said they were about to leave the business once they 
had enough money to pay their debts or meet expenditures, but the fact is that many of them 
have been doing it for many years with occasional breaks from the market.  
The most successful Tibetan middleman refused to be interviewed, because he was very 
uncomfortable about what he has been doing. Other middlemen agreed to be interviewed, but 
most expressed guilt about their sinful deeds. Some of them showed true ambiguity. One herder 
said he saw that there are lots of Han and Hui people who have become very rich by running 
slaughterhouses, but he did not see anything bad happen to them even when they slaughter 
livestock everyday. But he said he felt there is something wrong with his family, because his 
wife has been unable to conceive a child for many years, and this may have something to do with 
the business he has engaged in. Another herder left the business for about two years in seeking 
other business opportunities such as yak skin and fur trading, which is less sinful, but he found 
out that the money he made from yak skins and furs is far less than from livestock trading, so he 
came back to his old business, even though it is very sinful. He said he would be stopping in the 
coming year. One elderly herder left the business a few years ago, because the lama of the tribe 
had forced him to. In a similar way, seeing the business as very sinful, many said their relatives 
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and parents had been putting great pressure on them to leave it. However, all of them were 
excited about how their material conditions improved since engaging in the business. One fact is 
that they have been making more money than most other herders, and their income is as high as 
100,000 RMB per year, three times a herder's normal annual income.  
Many Tibetan middlemen appreciate Chinese businessmen have become very rich through 
livestock trading in the meat market, but very few of them want to be as fully engaged as the 
Chinese businessmen are, claiming that if they had other income sources, they would stop doing 
the business they do now.   Like the overwhelming majority of Tibetans living in the PRC today, 
these middlemen consider themselves to be Buddhists (nangpa) and do the same practice that 
others do, and as a result of some lamas’ teachings, some have stopped participating in the 
livestock business. However, with the changes in their material conditions and their constant 
exposure to the slaughterhouses and the meat market, one common impression for me during the 
interviews is that all of middlemen I interviewed had become less sensitive to the sins, merit, 
slaughter, and livestock trade compared with other herders that I have interviewed. While many 
herders see herding sheep as very sinful (because sheep multiply quickly and thus more must be 
slaughtered), one Tibetan middleman was even thinking about stable breeding of Tibetan sheep, 
in contrast to the less efficient (in his view) free-range herding.  
The middlemen have become a controversial subject among Tibetans, Han Chinese, and 
government officials. Other Tibetan herders see them very negatively while Han Chinese and 
many government officials see them very positively, showcasing them as the first Tibetans who 
have been able to free themselves from old ideas, superstitions, and traditional constraints.  Some 
people see them as the most capable persons, who know how to make money and improve their 
condition, but others see them as the most sinful persons, who do not care about the next life, 
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disrespect lamas and flout Buddhist norms. Many herders think that this would be the last option 
for making a living, even if they can make more money than they can earn from herding. They 
know that livestock trading for slaughter and herding sheep can bring them more money, but 
they do not want to do so because they believe that these businesses involve too much sin.  
In Tibetan society, I found that the middlemen are evaluated by two different standards: 
secular neo-liberalism represented by the state and many non-Buddhist Chinese citizens, and 
Tibetan Buddhist value system. For the former, yaks are raw materials for their commercial 
product, meat, that can be exchanged in the meat market, and they value yaks in the cash income, 
weight and quality of meat, and other market oriented values. For the latter, yaks are sentient 
beings that are no different from human beings in samsara. And, human deeds, whether killing or 
taking care of yaks with compassion, will have ramifications for their relationships in many 
reincarnated lives to come.  Tibetan middlemen have been venturing between these two value 
systems. Tibetan middlemen’s contradictory articulation, ambiguity about their business, and 
double evaluation about their work, all suggest a situation in which they have been caught up in 
the competing cultural forces that work when they make their uneasy decisions about their 
businesses.  
At the core of the articulation between the two value systems is a debate about capitalism 
and neo-liberalism: can the logic of the market expand into every sphere of life (as neo-
liberalism suggests) or should it be severely limited, and why?  Polanyi (1944) argued that the 
expansion of the market logic, for example into the "fictitious commodities" of land and labor 
would inevitably lead to the destruction of society without checks.  Here the Tibetan khenpos are 
making a different argument, based on ethics, but one that is also about a resistance to 
commodification of everything. Grounded on different value systems, Tibetan middlemen are a 
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group of people that Tibetan khenpos do not want to see but they are something that secular neo-
liberal force wants Tibetan herders to become. But because there has not been any slaughter 
renunciation movement in the tribe where most middlemen come from, so far, no religious 
interventions have occurred for Tibetan middlemen to stop their business. Thus, these 
middlemen, though very few in number compared to the majority of Tibetan herders who do not 
engage livestock trading for slaughter, are a critical site where struggles between the values of 
market competition and self-entrepreneurship and Buddhist ethics of selfhood are particularly 
clear. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, I argue that Tibetan middlemen and Tibetan herders’ decisions about their 
participation in the second term of the slaughter renunciation movement demonstrates how the 
forces of secular neo-liberalism and Tibetan Buddhism shape Tibetan herders into certain kinds 
of subjects. Thinking about governmentality and contestations, the case of the slaughter 
renunciation movements in Rakhor and Tibetan middlemen shows that contestation exists not 
only in the various social movements and resistance in political realms, but it also exists among 
different cultural forces in the creation of what Ong and Zhang call governmentality, which, as I 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, is a “small governmentality.” The small 
governmentality can be applied equally to other forces like religion that also have the ability to 
shape the condition in which its followers act in the ways they are supposed to act. Just as neo-
liberal forces create market oriented subjects, religion makes people think, act, speak spiritually 
and religiously in a way that establishes a relationship in which one is in the position of leading 
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and giving meanings to new cultures (chapter Five) and others are the ones that should be led by 
and  receive their guidance passively.  
In the Tibetan Buddhist case, Buddhist teachings, rituals, chanting, performances, 
movements, and all religious facilities (e.g. stupas, monasteries, etc.) all work together to create 
conditions in which people act and think in certain ways, so that religious leaders assert power 
over people they spiritually rule. Indeed, the religious power of the slaughter renunciation 
movement has permeated people’s minds with the flow of the fragmented but persistent religious 
power translated from many discursive practices and articulations. They include the actual 
religious teachings, empowerments, the various vows villagers took during the teachings and 
their follow-up, the religious spaces (monastery), the processes in which the religious teaching 
are prepared, organized, and actually take place, the way khenpos, monks, and herders interact, 
religious gatherings, and even the herders’ discursive conversations in their everyday lives about 
the teachings and movement. Yet, the achievement of this power infusion is fragmented, partial, 
but persistent when it competes with other forces. That is, even though most herders in Rakhor 
did not participate in the second term, the slaughter renunciation movement has had a significant 
impact on their lives by reinforcing their awareness of Buddhist concepts and sensitivity about 
the sin of certain deeds, bringing herders into other vows and religious practices, and being able 
to bring small numbers of households into the second term of the movement.  
Indeed, the process of cultural contestation between secular neo-liberalism and Tibetan 
religious force is exactly the process of the achievement of Foucault’s governmentality, which 
includes the state and the arrangement of neo-liberal social economic conditions that shape the 
acts of people it governs, and which I prefer to call “big governmentality.” In pastoral Tibet, this 
transformation, which pushes Tibetan herders into the capitalist social relationship, has 
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engendered an overlap between state development projects and khenpos’ recommendations for 
Tibetan herders. I will explore this in Chapter Six and the Conclusion. In the next chapter, I will 
demonstrate that development is not only contested between the state secular neo-liberal force 
and Tibetan Buddhist’ religious teachings, but also between different groups of Tibetans. 
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Chapter Five 
Contested development: Buddhism and development in Tibet 
 
To make a living is to make development, and development is mostly understood 
as material improvement...what else do many of our old cultural beliefs do for us other 
than hindering the development of Tibetan society? Those old traditions deeply hurt 
our material development, the development of human nature, and human rights. (52-
53) 
-- ZhogsDung in his book dpyod shes rgyang ’bod (The Call of Rationality) 
(2008) 
 
Traditional culture -- or Tibetan Buddhism -- can eradicate most of our suffering 
and bring peace and happiness to people’s lives, so it is indispensable to our lives, let 
alone its benefit of providing us with happiness and fulfillment in the next life. 
However, some people see the traditions handed down by our ancestors, particularly 
Tibetan Buddhism, as an obstacle or danger to the Tibetan people. Their views show 
no more than their ignorance of global trends and their lack of understanding of the 
longer history of Tibet, and their words are no more than the repetition of biased 
opinions (124). 
The recent argument that practicing Buddhism will hinder the economic 
development of Tibet is a false argument that is based on a mistaken understanding of 
Tibetan Buddhism. Buddha has forbidden ten misdeeds for lay people, but he has 
never forbidden lay people from improving their economy and culture (332). 
 
-- Khenpo Tsullo (2003) in his book Yang Dag Lam Gyi ’jug Sgo Blo Gsar 
Yid Kyi Dga’ Ston (A Gate to the Right Path: A feast for the novice) (hereafter, 
Lam Gyi ‘Jug Sgo)  
 
For the last half-century, development as the most powerful discourse in modern times 
(Crush, 1995; Gupta, 1998; Shrestha, 1995; Yeh, 2007), has been fiercely debated among 
Tibetans around issues like the role of Tibetan Buddhism in development, the relationship 
between the need to change and the need for preservation, what constitutes Tibetan culture, and 
so forth. Both Khenpo Tsullo, one of the most influential khenpos, and ZhogsDung, the most 
radical writer, are concerned about the development issue in Tibet, but they have very different 
positions regarding the future development of Tibet. How should we understand their debate 
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over the Buddhist role in development in light of development as cultural contestation that is 
often framed as a contestation between trustees versus locals? And, how has Khenpo Tsullo been 
engaging with modern discourses of development, science, and technology? 
In the critique studies of development, on the one hand, development can be understood in 
the dual sense of both "little d" development as a name for expanding capitalist relations, and big 
D development as intentional projects of improvement (Hart, 2001). On the other hand, recent 
studies examine development as a specific cultural and historical project that is contested 
materially and symbolically by locals (Moore, 2000; Li, 1999, 2007), and most of them situate 
development in a dichotomous relationship between the trustees as visitors or outsiders and the 
local as home for the transformation. This chapter demonstrates that development has not only 
become a cultural contestation between the trustees and the target group, but it is also contested 
among different groups that most scholars call the “local.” Situating development in Tibetan 
society, this chapter demonstrates that development is not only contested meaning making 
between trustees like the state and local communities, but it has also become a fiercely debated 
topic among different groups within Tibetan society. That is, while many Tibetan radical 
secularists and the state discourse see Tibetan Buddhism as an obstacle for Tibetans to be 
developed, preventing Tibetans from becoming competitive and innovative in modern society, 
Tibetans khenpos and herders have been using Tibetan Buddhism as a spiritual strategy to 
achieve “true development” for the current life and for many coming lives. In short, I want to see 
the local as the home for all agents in their contestation over the meanings and practices of 
development, and indeed, it is their interactions that have pushed forward the uneven 
development in Tibetan communities.  
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I argue that the Amdo writer ZhogsDung represents a model of cultural overlap. On the 
one hand, he shares a similar concern with khenpos regarding the development issues of Tibet 
and Tibetan people’s future well being, but they have different views on the meaning of 
development and the way to be developed. On the other hand, ZhogsDung holds a similar 
cultural position with the state, which promotes a very secular culture in Tibet with its strategy of 
the “Open up the West” campaign. In this sense, I argue that ZhogsDung represents the subjects 
formed by the secularization process in China for the last few decades, mediated by the recent 
“Open up the West” campaign.  
For Tibetan khenpos, the debate is a process in which they give Tibetan Buddhist 
meanings to those new discourses and mainstream culture through debates over development. 
We will see this from Khenpo Tsullo’s articulation of Tibetan Buddhist relationship with 
development, science, and technology in his writings. His ways of giving cultural meaning to 
modern discourses include his suggestion of development as all sentient beings’ relationship in 
samsara, his argument of karma as main regulative force in development, and his suggestion of 
compassion as a strategy to overcome to shortcomings of the achievement of science and 
technology. 
This chapter first overviews the term development in Tibet, which includes original 
Tibetan terms, translated terms, and other cultural idioms. In the second part, I explore the debate 
between Tibetan radical secularists and Tibetan Buddhist elites regarding the issues of 
development, Tibetan Buddhist tradition, and the slaughter renunciation movement.  
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Development as Terminology and Expression 
As the discourse of development has become very powerful among Tibetan people, the 
actual expressions of development are varied according to their context. In addition to the usual 
translations of the word "development" into the Tibetan language, there are many other ways in 
which the Tibetan people express the idea of development in everyday life. Some of those are 
related to their historical memories, while others are related to their religion and cultural 
practices, while others reflect forces of modernization. This range of interpretation shows how 
development as experience of transformation is related to forms and forces of other cultures, and 
the ways in which people express development reflect their experiences of development that is 
situated in specific social, political, and cultural contexts that are informed by Tibetans’ 
traditional culture, globalizing forces, the power of the state, and secular, neo-liberal influence.  
 
Indigenous terms 
In traditional Tibetan literature and spoken language, there are several terms that have 
meaning equivalent to "development" or "improvement." These terms include dar ba, rgyas pa, 
and ’phel ba, which are traditionally used as verbs. Dar ba, the opposite of rgud pa, and rgyas 
pa, the opposite of nyams pa, have the meaning of becoming prosperous or prevalent. ’phel ba, 
the opposite of bri ba, means an increase in the numbers or amount of something. For instance, 
Sangs rgyis kyi bstan pa dar pa, or Sangs rgyis kyi bstan pa rgyis pa, means that Buddhism 
becomes popular or Buddhism is prevalent; rgyu dar pa and ’byor ba rgyas pa mean to become 
prosperous, and mi dar pa means to increase in population. All those expressions carry the idea 
of improvement in material assets or increase in wealth.  
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 Translated new terms and other expressions 
In the 1970s, Tibetan scholars, organized by the Communist state to translate the works of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (马克思、列宁和毛泽东等著作), created many 
new terms in their translations (Shakya, 1994).  Among the many newly created terms, fazhan (
发展), which is a direct translation of “development” in English, was the one that appeared most 
frequently, and based on the basic terms of dar ba, rgyas pa, and ’phel ba, those Tibetan scholars 
created new terms as direct translations of fazhan into Tibetan. In the Tibetan version of 
Materialism and Empiricism by Lenin (1974), fazhan was translated into Tibetan as ’phel rgyas. 
For instance, it says, “rgyal khab de’i ’phel rgyas ’gro tshul” (the way of a country being 
developed) (1974:1227). A translation of Mao Zedong's Works stated, “dpal ’byor ’dzugs skrun 
’phel rgyas sngar las mgyags pa” (the economic development is faster than in the past) 
(1977:402). Since then, the most commonly used translations of “development” include ’phel 
rgyas, yar rgyas, yar rgyas gong ‘phel, dar rgyas, and dar sbel. Those terms could be used as 
’phel rgyas byong, yar rgyas su song, yar rgyas gong ’phel du phyin, dar rgyas su song, and dar 
sbel byas. In most cases, these terms reflect the linear progress of modern development or 
economic development and improvement in prosperity.  
Just like the widely used term fazhan (发展) in Chinese（equivalent to “development”), 
promoted as a universal goal by the state and internalized as a truth by government officials and 
citizens, the formal translations of "development" into Tibetan are used mostly by religious elites 
and educated lay people when they express the idea of development, and herders do not use them 
often. For instance, Khenpo Tsullo frequently uses the terms, yar rgyas and ’phel rgas, in his 
religious teachings. 
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Cultural idioms of development 
In addition to these direct translations of the term “development,” in many cases Tibetans 
also use other expressions that reflect their different experiences and understandings of 
development. For instance, herders generally do not use the official terms ’phel rgyas, yar rgyas, 
yar rgyas gong ’phel, dar rgyas, and dar sbel in their everyday lives. Instead, to describe their 
conditions, they use other expressions such as rjes lus, which means “backwardness” or “lagging 
behind” and other terms. Even khenpos and educated lay people sometimes use those related 
terms to express the meanings of development and underdevelopment (Cowen and Shenton, 
1994; Gupta, 1998; Pandian, 2008; Shrestha, 1995). Some of these expressions are related to the 
gathering of wealth, others to religious norms, and some to memories of past events. Even 
though those terms are not direct translations of “development,” because people use them 
frequently in political and social-economic contexts, the traditional terms related to current 
development issues are included in this discussion of development as alternative expressions of 
the development experience, which reflect the specific cultural context in which the idea of 
development is formed and reshaped by local forces. 
Among others, the expression most widely used by all Tibetans, including khenpos, lamas, 
lay educated, and herders, is their expression of rjes lus (backwardness or lagging behind), 
usually expressing the idea that Tibetans are falling behind other nationalities in many respects, 
particularly economically and educationally (Tib. rig gnas). This indicates their common desire 
to make collective progress or change engendered by their common experience of development 
in the current social and economic transformation. Khenpo Tsullo has used the expression 
frequently in his books and religious teachings. For instance, he said during his recent teachings, 
“Tibetan herders are lagging behind economically, and there is space where we can make 
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improvement”, and “if you [herders] continue the misconduct of slaughtering and gambling, we 
are not only lagging behind economically and in modern knowledge (rig gnas), but also 
culturally, because we have been increasingly losing our essential Tibetan-ness, the people’s 
belief in Tibetan Buddhism.” In addition, the common expression for lagging behind raises many 
debates and arguments regarding how to make change and how to catch up around the issues of 
the role of traditional culture, particularly Buddhism, in development, the dilemma between 
change and preservation of language and everyday cultural practices, the attitude toward new rig 
gnas such as science and technology, and so forth.  
Another very common expression is the kha gso rgyu dang rgyab ’geb rgyu (working for 
foods and clothes), which is an old expression meaning to be able to make a living, or be able to 
survive. This expression reflects past conditions in which herders have had to make a living 
while affected by unexpected natural hazards. This idea is being used today by herders as well as 
in khenpos’ religious teachings. Khenpo Tsullo has frequently used the term. For instance, he 
often says that unlike the traditional society, in which Tibetan herders faced many difficulties to 
kha gso (make a living), these days there are lots of kha gso thabs (ways to make a living), so 
Tibetan herders should not slaughter their livestock for the meat market, and should change their 
ways of kha gso thabs. But he does not understand why herders in the current society, where 
every one has enough food and clothing, have been carrying out such sinful activities even 
though they do not have to face threats to their survival as they once did. In a similar way, many 
herders in the slaughter renunciation movement have said that they did not notice any serious 
impact on their kha gso rgyu. Similar to kha gso rgyu, skyid sdug, meaning a group of people 
sharing the same happiness and suffering or the same prosperity and poverty, is another term that 
herders use to express their collective linkage. Related terms include sde mi skyid sdug gcig pa 
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(community members share the same prosperity and sufferings) and bod skyid sdug gcig pa 
(Tibetan people share the same fate). 
At the community level, villagers see religious practices as a strategy for improving their 
current collective condition and keeping themselves from falling behind. Those practices include 
Buddhist teachings by khenpos, collective religious chanting by monks on regular days in the 
monastery, and other religious rituals like making offerings to the mountain gods. Related to 
these religious practices, they use the expression of bya pa lam ma ’gro rgyu (lam ’gro byung 
Rgyu), which means good fortune in business, and sde ba yar la ’gro rgyu or dar rgyu, which 
mean to make progress in their community. Progress involves the projects, community collective 
wealth, education access, health care, and narrowing the gap between themselves and other, 
more highly developed traditional tribes.  
Many herders in pastoral areas interpret the state development projects in two ways. Some 
see them as ’dzugs skrun, a translation of "construction" in Chinese (建设), which is a cultural 
sediment of the commune system in which the state was the only agent pushing the country to 
realize socialist modernization. Even after economic reform, herders and even some Chinese 
people refer to state development projects as the construction of hometowns or the building of 
the nation state. The other interpretation of state development by herders is rogs skyor, meaning 
help, support or subsidies from the state to the locals, implying that insiders receive help from a 
distant state the locus of which is the far away cities of eastern China. 
Another group of terms that are related to the idea of development consists of those that 
have something to do with wealth, fortune, and material prosperity, including rgyu nor, longs 
sbyod, ’byor ba, rgyu ’byor pa (rgyu ’byor), dpal yon, phyugs pa, sdobs ’byor, and ’byor phyugs. 
Most of those terms are traditional, and Tibetans still use them in both writing and speaking. For 
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instance, Khenpo Tsullo has used the terms rgyu nor, longs sbyod, and ’byor ba when 
recommending that Tibetan people need material wealth in the present era, but that material 
wealth alone does not bring sustainable happiness, so people need Buddhism in order to achieve 
permanent happiness. For others ideas, terms are used such as sde ba phyungs pa, (the tribe is 
rich); rgyal khab stobs ’byor ldan pa or rgyas pa (the nation is strong economically); and sa cha 
’byor phyung dang ldan pa (a place with prosperity).    
In addition, there are also some religious expressions and practices that need to be 
explained, because they have mediated people’s experience of development. The most frequently 
used expressions in khenpos’ teachings and practices among herders include: the norm of karma 
or the law of cause-effect, reincarnation, compassion, the bde ba dang skyid pa30, tshogs bsags31, 
bsod nams,32 lab rstse33 rituals, and the g.yang ’gug ritual.34 Tibetan people, both khenpos and 
herders, use these religious norms and practices to make sense of the world and of their situation 
in the developmental social context. Because Buddhism is so much a part of their lives, herders’ 
negotiations in the current social transformation brought about by economic development can not 
be understood fully unless we bring Buddhism and development together in a single dialogue. 
It is hard to make the argument that all of those terms indicate an idea of linear progress. 
However, it is, indeed, through those different articulations by Tibetans that we can understand 
how development has interacted with other ways of life and of thinking. This will also allow us 
to see the complexity of the process, in which contestation coexists with embrace, resistance 
takes place in the overlap, and the actual experiences of people in development have never been 
on a single trajectory.     
                                                 
30 peace and happiness 
31 the collection of positive karma 
32 With positive karma 
33 Offering to mountain deities 
34 A ritual for summoning the forces of prosperity 
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Development as Contested Discourse in Modern Tibet 
Among the many expressions related to the issue of development, an especially important 
one is their common sense feeling of being rjes lus, “lagging behind” compared with other 
peoples and the urgent feeling of “the need to make change” to catch up. The expression rjes lus 
as applied to the notion of development has taken shape hand in hand with the very modern 
formation of Tibetans as one nationality among fifty-six ethnic groups in China. The presence of 
both rjes lus discourse and Tibetan identity as one nationality among others in the same state are 
informed by Tibetan people’s increasing trans-regional interaction and global connections, which 
have become possible with the state's neo-liberal economic development. This increase in 
Tibetans’ interaction with the outside world has, on one hand, reinforced Tibet as a nationality: 
Tibetans share the same culture and live in the same time and space. On the other hand, their 
increasing interaction with the outside has led them to realize that they also share the same skyid 
sdug,35 which is reflected in their common expression, rjes lus. Most often Tibetans use rjes lus 
to express their lagging behind the other nationalities in economic growth, science, and 
technology in the linear progress of modernization. However, this common expression has 
become contested terrain for many Tibetans, particularly educated ones, in regard to issues such 
as what development is for, how to achieve it, and who needs it. Young, educated lay people, 
khenpos, and herders all have their own interpretations of development based on their social and 
cultural experience, suggesting that the meaning of development is not articulated in any 
universal way, but rather is contested by different groups.  
 
                                                 
35 A group of people who share the same happiness and grief/sadness/misery, or share wealth and poverty. 
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Radical Secularists: Development as escape from Buddhism (Buddhism as an enemy 
of development) 
For many young, educated Tibetans, development means getting rid of the past as well as 
some old traditions in order to realize a new era and condition. This view is quite similar to the 
state's development discourse about Tibet and Tibetan people. Many propose to separate religion 
from the secular development, while others go to the extreme that Buddhism has become an 
obstacle to the progress of Tibetan society.  
Among the many discussions about lagging behind, one serious debate is focused on the 
role that Buddhism plays in economic development. Just as Chinese officials criticize religious 
belief as old and backward, hindering the economic and cultural development of Tibet, many 
educated lay Tibetans have been questioning the idea that Buddhism can play a positive role in 
economic development, suspecting that it represents a culture that cannot lead to progress in 
linear development. The strongest expressions of this concern comes from some younger 
Tibetans, who argue that the main reason for Tibetans' “backwardness” is that Buddhism as the 
dominant ideology prevents them from becoming competitive and innovative in modern society 
(Tomalin, 2006).  
Many such arguments are based on the notion of authentic Buddhism. Many of the 
criticisms start with enlightenment, the ultimate object of practicing Buddhism, and its related 
practices. They think that there is a basic inconsistency between material development and 
Tibetan Buddhism (Thek pa chen po, Mahayana). The most fundamental contradiction is the idea 
that the main source of suffering is the attachment of oneself to things around oneself, and being 
free from these attachments is the way for one to become enlightened and escape the suffering of 
the world. So the monastic education of Tibetan Buddhism places great emphasis on detachment 
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from the material world and demonstration of the impermanence and the meaninglessness of 
worldly happiness. It further implies that because everything is impermanent, it would be 
meaningless to struggle to improve one's living conditions, because when one dies, there is 
nothing that really belongs to oneself (Yeh, 2007). A similar notion exists in regard to the 
accumulation of wealth, which is considered to be one of the most unstable things for a person to 
have. The critics believe that all of these fundamental ideas of Tibetan Buddhism go against the 
current culture of economic development that requires people to have an endless desire for 
material possessions, to be competitive, and to accumulate wealth to one’s best capacity.  
Therefore, the idea that material progress or development is considered the first principle flies in 
the face of authentic Tibetan Buddhism.  
One typical example for this is ZhogsDung, a Tibetan working for the Qinghai 
Nationalities Publishing House in Xining city, who has written several books regarding Tibetan 
Buddhism and development issues. Since his books have been published, he has become an icon 
of the younger generation of Tibetans in Amdo, who question the positive role that Tibetan 
Buddhism might play in development. He is one of the most controversial writers in 
contemporary Tibet, and his observations about traditions, in particular Buddhism, and the 
modernization of Tibet have generated fierce debate among the religious elite and educated lay 
people in regard to the role of Buddhism. ZhogsDung is very critical of some traditions in the 
modern context. For instance, in one article “bag chang dong sprug” (2008) (Shaking off of the 
outdated conventional beliefs) he states: 
The world that is constituted by the vessel-like external worlds and their inner 
contents of sentient beings is abundant and excellent, and the way that human beings 
make a living is very beautiful and wonderful! 
The world offers a powerful lure to us to survive and to live…the instinct to live 
has become stronger and stronger…In order to live continually in the world that is a 
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combination of both happiness and suffering, we have to launch wars against the most 
destructive enemies -- old ideas and beliefs -- uncovering their faults and evil natures.  
Those old ideas and beliefs have stopped us from making progress for a long 
time, and it is time to eradicate those old ideas! 
 
He summarizes four major beliefs that have been keeping Tibetan people from making 
progress in their material lives: ya thog lha ’dre bag chags,36 ya thog shes rig bag chags37 (the 
practice of ancient cults and rituals), Buddhist bag chags, and dpe lugs goms srol bag chags (old 
customs and habits). He stresses the idea that Buddhism is an enemy that Tibetans should 
eliminate from their lives. In order to do this, his main argument is that Tibetan people should 
separate secular life from spiritual, that is, those people who want to devote themselves to 
spiritual improvement should invest themselves fully into that sort of career, and lay people 
should engage fully in their secular lives by learning things they need to understand to succeed in 
secular life. He conceptualizes two distinctive knowledge systems: one secular 
knowledge/culture (mi chos rig gnas),38 which enables secular people to make progress in this 
worldly life, and the other the spiritual knowledge/culture (lha chos rig gnas) for people in 
pursuit of spiritual achievement. He (2008) writes in "To answer some questions":  
I think that many people who asked questions during my lecture at Qinghai 
Nationality College and others who have read my written works have misread my 
writings and do not understood very well my intentions in regard to bag chang dong 
sprug (shaking off outdated conventional beliefs) and others.  Many people ask, if I 
destroyed all of the old things, then, what is the new thing that would replace them? 
They read my article as similar to things that happened to Tibetan culture during the 
Cultural Revolution, but that is a total misreading. I myself have very strong lha chos 
rig gnas kyi bag chags [spiritual knowledge/culture] as I was raised in this cultural 
environment, and I have the same attachment to this culture as you do. Indeed, it is 
because I love our nationality do much that I had to write those articles (in another text 
he writes, "My writings have become controversial and have caused debate and 
                                                 
36 the tradition of worshiping different gods and goddesses.  
37 Cult rituals including fortune telling, casting a horoscope, practice of divination, spirit possession, and so 
forth. 
38 His examples of secular knowledge/culture include modern natural and social sciences and technologies that 
he feels are needed to achieve material improvement.  
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discussion among Tibetan students, which is a good sign that I want to see"). People 
who read my writings should know that I don’t have any intention of wiping out the 
very culture that shaped my personality and way of thinking, and that, even if I wanted 
it, it is impossible…What I am talking about is ’tsho gnas.39 From the perspective of 
our current ’tsho gnas, there is no one who does not agree that we are backward or 
lagging behind. I am talking about the challenge to our ’tsho gnas40 that we have never 
seen in our history before. Then where does this challenge come from? It is the fault of 
our Lha chos rig gnas (spiritual knowledge/culture). It is the fault of our culture of 
worshiping gods/Buddha and trying to defeat demons.  
Who can deny that what people have called a "splendid" culture including the 
ancient rituals of gods and demons, the ancient civilizations, and Buddhism all are 
spiritual knowledge/culture?...All of that knowledge is about spiritual improvement, 
but it is not specialized for progress in this world. Therefore, what I call secular 
knowledge/culture (mi chos rig gnas) is all about the way to make a living and the way 
to be developed. (47-49) 
  
ZhogsDung thinks that Switzerland, Austria, Australia, and New Zealand have physical 
and environmental conditions similar to those of Tibet, but are better developed; on the other 
hand, China and India have very favorable conditions and easy access to the outside world, but 
they are relatively backward compared with the western nations. He thinks that the fundamental 
problem is people’s outdated beliefs and the culture they live in. Therefore, to change the 
backward condition, people have to get rid of their old culture that hinders progress. 
Interestingly, he does not refer to any power relationships connected with resource allocation and 
decision-making regarding development issues. He also thinks that it is vain and impossible to 
try to improve or modify the traditional culture so that it can better serve or at least coexist with 
modern development. 
ZhogsDung sees development as merely material improvement and Buddhism as not part 
of that process. More importantly he sees it as an obstacle to development, in striking contrast to 
the khenpos' understanding of development in which religion is inevitable and necessary for 
                                                 
39 ’tsho gnas is an abbreviation of ’tsho zhing gnas pa, which means to live and to be existent, or a sustainable 
life, or the condition of life. 
40 “the challenge to our ’tsho gnas” is the challenge of the ability to be developed. 
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Tibetans and their development. He states in his book dpyod shes rgyang ’bod (2008) (The Call 
of Rationality):  
Since every one agrees that Tibetans do need to improve their living condition and 
need development, then, why should we not think seriously about the way to be 
developed? To make a living is to develop, and to develop is mostly understood as 
material improvement. From the perspective of material improvement, what else do 
many of our old cultural beliefs do other than hinder the development of Tibetan 
society? Those old traditions include believing in karma and bsod nams (fortune), 
Buddhist philosophies of egolessness and shunyata (emptiness), the tradition of 
making offerings to gods and demons, and other negative and inadvisable customs, 
traditions, aesthetics, and values … 
…It is not hard to see specific examples of this: is the conflict over making 
offerings to the Shugs Ldan deity in Tibet caused by the lha ’dre bag chags? Is the idea 
that whether one wins or loses depends on offerings to deities caused by lha ’dre bag 
chags? Is interpretation of one’s success and failure in karma related to the Buddhist 
bag chags? Are the shortsighted decisions about the improvement of material living 
conditions and the trembling from fear of accepting new things caused by old ideas?  
(52-53)  
 
In his essay in the same collection, “hol rgyug thod rgal" (a rushed scamper or careless 
movement), he states that in the history of Tibet, Buddhism has never done any good for the 
people: 
Lha chos rig gnas is the traditional culture or pre-civilization of human beings 
before we achieved self-awareness. Because it is the heritage of human wisdom, it will 
and should continue forever. However, our Lha chos rig gnas [spiritual 
knowledge/culture] did not make any contribution to our social development and 
Tibetan people’s moving forward as other Lha chos rig gnas did in other places. To a 
certain degree, our Lha chos rig gnas has prevented our society from making progress. 
The contradictory goals of our Lha chos rig gnas and mi chos rig gnas [knowledge 
needed for well-being in this world] was manifested in the painful lessons that we have 
learned from the system of religion and politics united. (2008:83) 
 
Here ZhogsDung, like many other educated lay people, recalls the moments in Tibetan 
history in which religious-sectarian struggles have sacrificed the interest of Tibetans as a 
nationality when they faced internal religious conflicts and sought the military support of 
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outsiders (StagTshang RdzongPa, 1985; Rgyal Mo ‘Brug Pa, 2004; Dung Dkar Blo bzang ‘Phrin 
Las, 2007), a historical failure to unify and to develop Tibet as a distinct nation.  
ZhogsDung’s writings represent the views of many educated Tibetans who concern 
themselves with development issues. In a similar vein, one highly educated Tibetan who is a 
government official and has studied abroad said that he was "not surprised that business in Lhasa 
has been dominated by Han Chinese people when he saw that the majority of Tibetans were 
going on a circumambulation of the Jokhang at five in the morning while many Han Chinese in 
Lhasa were working at their business at the same hour.” He said he is not saying that one way of 
life is better than another, but the phenomenon of Han people’s domination of businesses in 
Lhasa has something to do with the people’s beliefs and cultural values, and the related decisions 
such as time allocation and the willingness to make sacrifices of time and energy for the sake of 
making money. In other words, when Han Chinese devote all of their time to doing business, 
Tibetans have invested large amounts of their time in their spiritual practices. They could put that 
time into doing business if they did not have such religious beliefs. He also thinks that Buddhism 
makes people too easily satisfied with their material condition (Yeh, 2007). He said, “The 
majority of Tibetans think that if they have enough money to use, then that is good enough,” 
suggesting that Tibetan Buddhism has weakened their desire for the sort of material 
accumulation that Han people are engaged in now. 
It is mostly radical secularists who criticize the khenpos' religious movements. Seeing the 
impacts on herders’ lives and nomadic culture in general, many educated Tibetans, including 
government officials, entrepreneurs, and even young monks, have been criticizing the khenpos’ 
slaughter renunciation movement for various reasons, including the movement itself and the way 
in which it has been conducted.  
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A government-employed teacher said, “I personally don’t agree with what khenpos have 
been doing about bringing herders into the vow of not slaughtering their yaks. They should think 
about the real lives of herders. The income from selling yaks for the meat market is very 
important not only for their livelihood but also for their kids' access to education; in addition, 
herders need to work to improve their living conditions, since they are not monks.” Similarly, a 
Tibetan businessman said, “The slaughter renunciation movement is not the best way to address 
the problem that the movement is trying to solve. What the khenpos need to do is to promote an 
anti-meat movement. If no one eats meat, then no livestock will be slaughtered. As far as there is 
demand, livestock will be slaughtered anyway.”  
An extreme view for the critics is a statement by a monk in his 40s who said, “These days, 
there are two forces that are destroying Tibetan culture, and one of them is Khenpo Tsullo, who 
has been transforming herders’ way of life through his various religious movements.” To pass 
his concerns on to Khenpo Tsullo, the monk said he had written to him, but had not received any 
response. It is not very common for monks to criticize khenpos or their religious work, but this 
shows the extent to which the khenpos and their movement have become controversial among 
Tibetans in regard to the issues of economic development and the preservation of traditional 
culture. Some consider the religious movement as a way of reinforcing Tibetan culture, mostly 
Buddhist teachings and practices, while others see it as a way to destroy some other aspects of 
Tibetan culture -- nomadism, traditional dress, diet, and so forth. 
There are also online debates about khenpos and religious movements from Larung Gar. 
On Baidu, one of largest search engines in China, where people from the same town can share 
messages on their home message board, there is a discussion by people from Seda County about 
Tibetan religious elites and their religious movements. Most of them seem to be Tibetans, but 
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they communicate in Chinese. Some are very critical of the khenpos and their movement; others 
defend their efforts. The debate started with the first quote below:  
I think we don’t need lamas any more in the current society, particularly those 
fake lamas; what they have done for our society? What is the benefit of having them? I 
say nothing. We give them too much respect, and they impose what they call the “Ten-
virtuous-rules” upon the lay people, putting great pressure on them. Lay people can’t 
handle that much responsibility. Staying in their high position, they have never thought 
about the real lives of lay people. We may need to reduce the numbers of those fake 
lamas or we may not need them at all. What does everyone else think about this issue? 
 
Those fake lamas often say that “to release lives and to build monasteries" they 
need money…The fact is that there isn’t a single outstanding building that they have 
built. I saw another phenomenon in which they have been competing with fancy cars, 
houses, and so forth. It is more for what they call “空行母”, (mkha’ ’gro ma, meaning 
“she who traverses the sky” or “she who moves in space”). Wearing Buddhist cowls, 
those fake lamas defraud the lay people and impose what they called ““Ten-virtuous-
rules.” They are the scum of the Tibetan people. These days, many lay people have 
expressed their great stress under those rules. The majority of people in the world have 
to follow only one constitution, but we need to follow two: the government's 
regulations and the laws that religious elites have established. 
 
Dear friends, I think that Buddhism “exists when one believes in it, but does not 
when one does not.” It is hard to have this realization when our people have indulged 
so much in the belief. They do not have any desires other than praying for happier lives 
in the sense that Buddhism has deeply embedded in their hearts. However, now 
Buddhism has been interfering with both development and independent life of herders, 
and many of them have been loaded down with burdens. Seeing this situation, how 
could one not be sad about it? (Baidu, 2009-2010)41 
 
The contributors seem to be Tibetans, because they use the first person instead of third, 
and it is clear from their skill in Chinese writing that they must have been educated in state 
schools where Chinese is the only language used in teaching. Those critics represent very 
common sentiments in Tibet, mostly those of Tibetans who are not educated in traditional culture 
or Buddhism. However, many educated Tibetans who are bilingual (Tibetan and Chinese) make 
similar arguments about Buddhism and religious movements.  
                                                 
41 http://tieba.baidu.com/p/669286120 
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This group represents a generation produced by the state education system and by the 
increasing transnational interaction following neo-liberal economic reform that has reinforced 
Tibetan identity. They have a strong awareness of themselves as Tibetans, but act and think 
differently from the khenpos and herders. In many cases, they promote the idea of the necessity 
to separate religious matters from the business of the state, from economic development, and 
from secular affairs. They advocate promoting modern education, science, and technology. They 
emphasize worldly, material development rather than otherworldly betterment. In short, they are 
the subjects of modernization and neo-liberal economic reform, but they also have strong Tibetan 
identity, that is embedded in secular values and modernization. They often believe that they are 
the ones who will carry out the historic modernization of Tibet, a belief that resonates with the 
position of young, educated Han Chinese.   
While some young Tibetans totally reject the religious movement, others are concerned 
about the way in which it is being carried out. One common comment is that the slaughter 
renunciation movement is good in reinforcing Tibetan culture and identity, but it reduces the 
income of herders who do not have alternative income sources. So interviewees suggested the 
need to provide some supplementation for these herders whose livelihoods have depended on 
selling their livestock, and who do not have any other sources of income. For the herders who 
participated in the movement but are located in the pastoral areas such as parts of Dege County, 
Ganzi Prefecture, Sichuan, where collection of caterpillar fungus (dbyar rtsa dgun ’bu) has been 
the main and most lucrative source of income, the movement has not had any impact on their 
lives. But for other herders in whose grasslands caterpillar fungus does not grow, the movement 
has a huge impact. Many interviewees, including some monks, stated that given that herders 
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cannot be fully engaged in Buddhist practice, they need to improve their livelihoods; so, their 
material condition should be considered when the movement is being carried out.  
Interviewees also expressed concern about the way in which the moral rules are 
implemented. Larung Gar has not been using any sort of force and has usually just urged herders 
to participate voluntarily in the practice of not selling their yaks. However, many pastoral areas 
have localized these moral rules (some of them are earlier than the movement from Larung Gar), 
so there are variations in the content of the rules. Moreover, in some pastoral areas these rules 
have been implemented by collaboration between local monks and village leaders who have 
established very strict regulations; anyone who violates the rules is faced with monetary sanction 
or exclusion from the village moral structure or from the monastery’s services. Most of 
interviewees have criticized these strict regulations, asserting that obedience to them should be 
voluntary. 
In response to critics of the slaughter renunciation movements, Khenpo Tsullo has recently 
been highlighting his great concern about the serious impact of the reduction of livestock, which, 
in turn, will force herders to give up their nomadic culture and subsistence livelihood entirely. 
He said, “In the past, there were over 700,000 yaks in Chumarleb (Qumalai County, Yushu 
Prefecture, Qinghai), but three years ago, there were only 270,000. Many herders do not have 
yaks to herd, so they have to move to towns to look for other jobs.42…If herders keep up the 
current scale of mass-slaughter, one day there will be no more yaks left on the Tibetan plateau.” 
In responding to other critics, he said that because people use the term khrims (law) in dge 
bcu’i khrims (ten virtuous rules), some others think that the khenpos are imposing some type of 
regulation on herders, but it is a misunderstanding. The Ten Virtuous Rules are not rules or 
                                                 
42 My understanding is that he is expressing a concern about the decrease in the yak population as a result of 
integrated forces, including increasing slaughter rate, grassland degradation, and state ecological resettlement 
projects.  
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regulations; rather they are a tradition for Tibetans that has been passed down from their 
ancestors. He said moreover that they are not forcing any one into these traditions, but it is up to 
the majority of herders. It is something that should be decided by a majority of the people 
through democratic decision-making. He said, “In short, we are just trying to give herders some 
advice about making a living in a way that is consistent with their tradition and that does not 
bring negative karma for their next life. We are doing this for their sakes, not for the monks and 
khenpos. We gain nothing from this.” 
 
Tibetan Khenpos: Development for Infinite life (Buddhism as a solution to 
development) 
Tibetan religious elites, like lay educated Tibetans, also maintain that Tibetan people are 
lagging behind other nationalities and areas. However, their use of the expression, “lagging 
behind,” has meanings different from what many lay people have been suggesting. For them, the 
lagging behind means the need to improve the material condition of Tibetan people in 
accordance with Buddhist norms; it means to continue Tibetan culture, particularly Buddhism, in 
such a way as to reinforce Tibetan identity. It is also means to integrate Buddhism with modern 
development to make them more compatible and to code modern discourse and mainstream 
cultures with Buddhist norms and ideologies. As a leading khenpo in contemporary Tibet, in his 
teachings and books, Khenpo Tsullo makes compelling arguments that Tibetan Buddhism is not 
only compatible with modern development, but more importantly the only solution to the lack of 
material development in the modern era. His argument can be explored in three aspects: 
Buddhism and economic development, including Tibetan culture and identity; development and 
the law of cause-effect; and Buddhism and modern science and technology. 
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Tibetan Buddhism and Economic Development    
In response to those who see Buddhism as an obstacle to and incompatible with 
development, Khenpo Tsullo argues that, far from hindering development, Buddhism is the real 
solution to the lack of material development and can bring real, sustainable happiness to people. 
Rather than being irreconcilably contradictory, he maintains that Buddhism will guide 
development in the right direction so that it is beneficial not only to the Tibetan people but to the 
entire modern society that is ruled by secular and material forces. 
He first of all maintains that the Tibetan people need development. In many religious 
teachings and in his books he highlights the claim that Tibetan people are lagging behind others 
in material conditions, and there is room for progress. However, he has different understandings 
of how to develop and how to understand material improvement based on the larger, Buddhist 
framework of reincarnation and the law of cause-effect. As he advised Rakhor herders in 2006, 
“We are not saying that Tibetans don’t need development. Yes, Tibetans need development, but 
the misconducts such as mass-slaughtering of yaks and stealing will not bring development.” 
 He stresses two very important aspects that Tibetans, even all human beings, should be 
aware of.  He advises that material development should not be seen as the ultimate goal of 
people’s lives or the core meaning of development, because material development does not bring 
sustainable happiness, and moreover, it has never been the solution for the suffering of human 
beings. He says in many of his teachings that people with less money or no money may think 
that money and wealth bring real happiness and comfort, but if one has lots of money, one will 
realize that wealth is not really related to sustainable happiness and satisfaction. 
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In his essay43 “Shar Nub Kyi Bde Skyid” (2003b) a discussion of the different 
understandings of happiness (Tib. bde ba) in eastern and western cultures, Khenpo Tsullo argues 
that Buddhism cultivates the knowledge/culture that brings real, sustainable happiness to people 
and peace to society, demonstrating many shortcomings and negative aspects of modern 
development that is based on purely secularism and materialism. He cited many Buddhist 
teachings to highlight the importance of maintaining the balance between the need to make 
material improvement to have enough and not becoming too attached (contentment). In the 
essay, he uses the phrase mtha’ gnyis su ma lhung ba in Tibetan Buddhist teachings, which 
means that people should avoid the two extremes, being too poor or having too much wealth, 
both of which are harmful and not desirable. He said it is not desirable to be very poor 
economically, but it is also harmful and destructive to indulge too much in material wealth 
accumulation because the achievement in material improvement does not satisfy people’s 
ongoing search for happiness and peace.  
The themes in Khenpo Tsullo's essay have been supported extensively in many studies by 
many western social scientists. He argues that many social problems in the developed countries 
are related to the fact that too many people have become excessively materialistic. Those social 
problems include environmental degradation, conflicts and wars over resources, the creation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the exploitation of the poor by the rich, mass-butchering of animals 
for food, increasing rates of suicide, and increases in drug use and crime. He states that many 
trends including the higher rates of suicide in the developed countries, the loss of intimacy in 
relationships, the absence of real correlation between economic growth and increase in people’s 
feeling of happiness and satisfaction, and the fact that people have become increasingly selfish 
                                                 
        43 “’Dzam Gling Shar Nub Kyi Bde Skyid Bsgrub Tshul La Dpyad Pa” (“Thought on the Seeking 
Happiness in Global East and West”) 
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and greedy in highly developed countries all clearly demonstrate that material improvement itself 
does not bring real happiness. Indeed, he said all of those problems are the result of people's 
fundamental misunderstanding that material improvement can bring happiness and peace to 
society, and of their ignorance of the importance of understanding human beings' nature and 
mind, for which Buddhism is in the best position to provide the remedies. He states in Lam 
Gyi ’Jug Sgo,  
The egocentric and materialist culture is like a flash flood widely spreading all 
over the world, forcing people to follow its norms. This culture has enhanced material 
conditions, but at the same time it has engendered many undesirable behaviors and 
ideologies. This is just like a man pretending to be rich by consuming all of his food 
within a month that is supposed to last for the whole year. Therefore, it is hard to tell if 
this is progress or degeneration. (2003b: 121) 
 
For Khenpo Tsullo an ideal social condition should be based on a combination of 
Buddhism and modern knowledge/culture, because Buddhism is the part of the culture that 
provides people with real happiness and peace. In other words, Buddhism can bring permanent 
happiness and peace while material prosperity (rgyu nor longs sbyod) is only a short-term 
comfort in this life, so Buddhism is what everyone should learn and practice in the modern day. 
As he summarizes in his essay: 
If people want to have happiness in life, they should make adequate improvement 
in their material condition with the support of science and technology. At the same 
time, popularizing the traditional worldviews and value systems, they should also 
practice good behavior with compassion in order to achieve higher rebirths and 
liberation with the support of both worldly morality and Buddhist norms and teachings. 
It is only in this way that we can accomplish development and enjoy a happy and 
comfortable life that is peaceful, just, and compassionate. Otherwise, the one-sided 
pursuit is always like an attempt to walk with one leg or to fly with one wing. (2003b: 
121) 
 
In short, he thinks that, with only materially driven development, the more people struggle 
to obtain happiness and peace, the farther out of reach happiness and peace become. Buddhism 
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examines the real nature of human beings and shows the roots of their desires and suffering. It is 
only with Buddhism that all human beings can find real happiness and enjoy freely the material 
improvement they have achieved by the improvement of science and technology. Therefore, for 
Khenpo Tsullo, development is not about the accumulation of material wealth through expanding 
greed, but more about satisfaction, contentment, comfort, peace, love and compassion, the things 
on which a community or society should be built. This is in contrast to the logic of capitalist 
economic development, which demands constant growth.  
In regard to Tibetans and their future path, Khenpo Tsullo thinks that Buddhism has 
significant meaning for Tibetan people, and therefore it is the main aspect of their traditional 
culture. However, he has recently seen a very worrying trend. For one, he thinks that Tibetans’ 
devotion to Buddhism has become weaker with market economic penetration, and there are more 
and more Tibetans who even criticize Buddhism when they are frustrated with development. He 
is more concerned about his trend than with the material development of Tibet. As he said in one 
religious teaching in Dartang Monastery in Guoluo Prefecture, 
Tibetan people need to improve their living conditions, because we are still 
economically lagging behind. However, it is not such a big issue, because the whole 
world is getting better, and there is no way that we will always stay behind others. 
Unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, which is like a realm of hungry ghosts with lots of deserts, 
drought, and disease, we are rich in resources and have a healthy environment. 
Therefore, our economic condition will improve gradually in the future, so this is not 
something we should worry about. What we really do need to worry about is the 
danger of losing our worldview, our [proper] behavior…If we lose our worldview and 
morally adequate behavior, even if one day we have the wealth that Americans 
currently have, it will be very hard to have a happy life, even hard to find a place to 
live.  
   
Similarly, he stated in Rakhor 
 
Instead of learning rig gnas [knowledge], you are selling great numbers of 
livestock to slaughterhouses in order to do meaningless things such as gambling. You 
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have to get serious. This is not an issue for a village or a household, but for the Tibetan 
people as a nation. Things will be getting worse for all of us if you continue what you 
have been doing these past few years. You have been making no effort to learn 
Buddhism and rig gnas, nor to behave in accordance with the law of cause-effect. 
What you are good at is stealing, fighting with villagers, and murdering. If you 
continue what you have been doing, we will be not only economically backward in the 
world, but backward in our virtue.  
  
Khenpo Tsullo’s concern about Tibetans’ lagging behind economically is not as great as 
his concern for the loss of Tibetan character that is embedded in their unique culture. For 
instance, he informed Rakhor villagers that in China and in western countries there are more and 
more people who have begun to practice Buddhism, including scientists, political leaders, movie 
stars, and others, so there is no reason for Tibetans to give up this treasure in their seeking of 
material development. He said during his teachings in Rakhor that “Buddhism is the only asset 
that Tibetan people have now. If they give up this tradition, then they will become 'backward' not 
only economically, but also culturally.” He emphasized during his teachings in Dartang 
Monastery in Guoluo, “It is certain that the farther the society goes forward, the more valuable 
Buddhism will become...Therefore, Tibetan people should not only learn new knowledge, but 
they should also keep up their tradition of Buddhism.” He claims that “real development in Tibet 
is constituted by both material and spiritual improvement that bring happiness to people in their 
current lives and in many lives to come,” and “the chance to achieve the material and spiritual 
development of Tibetan communities is very small if young Tibetans are not educated." 
Therefore, he encourages Tibetan students: 
Tibetan kids should not only learn useful new knowledge and techniques from 
schools which will help to improve our material living condition, but they also need to 
learn how to improve our traditional knowledge/culture (rig gnas), so that Tibetan 
people can enjoy material prosperity while at the same they do not lose their traditions 
and cultural identity. (35) 
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For him, Buddhism is the most important aspect of Tibetan tradition and identity. He 
argues that the farther the society moves forward, the more important Buddhism will become, 
throughout the world. The loss of Buddhism would mean a total collapse of Tibetan culture and 
identity. In his book, Lam Gyi ’Jug Sgo, he stresses the need for Tibetans to help their children 
become educated: 
As far as you are Tibetans, you should learn and improve your traditional culture 
and knowledge; in addition to that you have to study and use the beneficial aspects of 
other nationalities’ culture and knowledge, which will help us to improve our material 
living conditions. In this way, we will not lose our Tibetan character while we can 
enjoy material prosperity... 
We should be aware that Buddhism is the foundation of our culture…A life 
without Buddhism should be considered only half of a life. It is a very sad situation 
that people have only material comfort but no other enjoyment... Therefore, it is our 
desire to develop Tibetan society (bod kyi sbyi tshogs yar rgyas yong ba). What 
everyone should be aware of is that it is very important to have a balanced inner and 
outer development. (2003b: 190-191) 
 
Here, Khenpo Tsullo emphasizes the importance of continuity of tradition along with 
adequate change in the material condition of Tibetan people. The inner development is to keep 
tradition and to follow and improve Buddhism as part of everyday life. The outer development is 
to improve their living conditions by gaining new knowledge, technology, and new skills.  
To maintain a balance between economic development and spiritual improvement, Khenpo 
Tsullo has very specific suggestions for herders as to how they should spend their money. He 
suggests that, if herders have money, the first thing they should spend it on is improvement of 
their living conditions to make sure they have enough food, clothing and housing. Second, 
herders should spend money on their children's education. Finally, if they have more money, 
they should spend it for the accumulation of positive karma. There are two other ways in which 
Khenpo Tsullo wants herders to change their traditional ways of spending money. He urges them 
not to spend their money on gambling and purchasing jewelry made of silver, gold, coral, and 
  
228 
turquoise. Second, he emphasizes that the way to accrue good karma is not necessarily to spend 
money on building monasteries, Buddhist statues, and stupas, but to help others and to behave in 
everyday life in accordance with Buddhist teachings. In this way, he shows that Buddhism is to 
be practiced not only in the monastery, but also in how people spend money, how they behave, 
and how they relate to each other.  
While ZhogsDung portrays Tibetans as potentially failing in the process of modernization, 
for Khenpo Tsullo, the real failure is not Tibetans' inability to embrace modern development but 
the danger presented by the loss of the core of their culture and tradition. Opposite to 
ZhogsDung, who sees Buddhism as the chief obstacle to development, Khenpo Tsullo sees it as 
the best long-term path for the Tibetan people, even for all human beings. In Khenpo Tsullo's 
framework of development, ZhogsDung is a victim of the “flash flood” of egocentrism and 
material culture who is struggling for the short-term, shortsighted worldly benefit. However, in 
ZhogsDung’s worldview, Buddhism is nothing more than an outdated old idea and a very minor 
part of his larger scenario of the linear progress of human beings. In some sense, they are 
proposing two development paths for the Tibetan people, Khenpo Tsullo suggesting that people 
in the “developed” countries follow the Tibetan model, where inner development is much more 
important than outer, and ZhogsDung calling on Tibetans to follow the model of “developed” 
countries. The common ground of the two is that both see the Tibetan people as an agent who 
can make their history with their own efforts. In short, Khenpo Tsullo wants to keep a balance 
between materialism and renunciation of material comforts; at the same time, he stresses the idea 
that economic development should not be seen as the only or first principle, nor should it require 
the sacrifice of well-being in future lifetimes, which constitute his main conceptualization of 
development.  
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By responding to those who assume that there is a fundamental contradiction between 
Buddhism and development, Khenpo Tsullo has taught herders that Buddhism and material 
development do not oppose each other if people have a clear understanding of Buddhist 
principles. There are many ways of making a living without hurting or killing other beings. He 
has said that it is perfectly fine to be rich if the ways of making money do not involve intentional 
killing, robbing, cheating, or hurting others. This is true even for monks and lamas and khenpos, 
who may enjoy material comfort if they do not become attached to it and do not waste time and 
resources to gain that comfort. He said during one of his teachings performed near Qinghai Lake, 
…then, do accumulations of positive karma and material improvements in this 
world go against each other? They are not contradictory. In secular moral standards, it 
is important not to use morally inadequate means, including stealing, cheating, 
robbing, and killing, to achieve economic development. Indeed, those sorts of 
misconduct are what Buddhism tries to stop…Therefore, the collection of positive 
karma and material improvement do not go against each other in practice. 
 
He argues that material improvement is necessary, but the accumulation of wealth should 
be consistent with the accumulation of religious merit. If people do not adhere to the law of 
cause-effect, believe in death and rebirth, and refuge in the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, and 
the Sangha), then they will do whatever they can do, including stealing, slaughtering, cheating, 
and fighting, and all of those cause social disorder. In “’Dzam Gling Shar Nub”44 (2003b), he 
says that Buddha has never asked people to give up their dedication to working for a better life, 
but what Buddha has asked is to refrain from exclusive dedication to material gain without any 
consideration of future lives. He said that even though devotion to the comforts of this life is 
considered to be the smallest achievement among three devotions, including to happiness in the 
next life and to be liberated from the suffering of samsara, if people have good motivations, their 
                                                 
44 “’Dzam Gling Shar Nub Kyi Gna’ Deng Rig P’i Rnam Gzhag Mdo Tsam Brjod Pa Blo Gsar Yid Kyi Bdud 
Rtsi” (“A Brief Presentation of the Ancient and Modern Knowledge/culture of Global East and West”) 
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dedication to earning comforts in this life could work to accumulate positive merit. That said, 
motivations and intentions determine if a conduct is positive karma collection or negative karma 
collection. A good motivation brings positive karma, while a bad motivation results in negative 
karma, and a selfish motivation has no merit. As all Tibetans believe in karma and refuge in the 
Three Jewels, he urges them to work hard to make improvements in their material condition in 
ways that are consistent with Tibetan Buddhism norms that contribute to positive karma 
accumulation. 
Specifically, Khenpo Tsullo thinks that there are many ways for lay people to make a 
living without having to engage in sinful conducts. The most important thing to keeping in minds 
is to make sure that one does not hurt others and intentionally kill others. In “’Dzam Gling Shar 
Nub” (2003b), he says,   
Farming, herding, industrial work, and trading business do not go against Tibetan 
Buddhist norms. It is said in Buddhist teachings that if a farmer kills small insects 
when he or she plows the fields without being aware of it, the sin of that killing is 
small, and the sins can be erased with confession of misdeeds. In a similar way, it is 
not very sinful if herders make a living by collecting milk and furs from their livestock 
without slaughtering, torturing, or beating the animals, and treat them with great 
appreciation. Factories produce products that people need, so they do not violate 
Buddhist norms. Manufacturing or handicrafts are not mentioned in traditional 
Buddhist teaching, but if a factory produces commercial products that benefit people, it 
should not be seen as sinful conduct, though, if it produces harmful weapons and other 
things that hurt others, then it involves sin.  
Trading business is fine unless it is deceptive. In the Vinaya,45 doing business for 
the sake of Sangha (Buddhist practitioners) is approved, and a monk is allowed to do 
business if he is doing so to be able to pay a debt. Therefore, if doing business is not 
considered to be sinful even for monks, it should be fine for lay people to make a 
living with it. A similar logic applies to other conducts not mentioned in Buddhist 
teachings. Therefore, it is no more than a misunderstanding of Buddhism to say that 
lay people should not practice Buddhism, because practicing Buddhism requires people 
to live in isolated areas in order to achieve detachment from worldly things. (331) 
                                                 
45 The Vinaya (a word in Pāli as well as in Sanskrit) is the regulatory framework for the Buddhist monastic 
community, based in the canonical texts called Vinaya Pitaka. The teachings of the Buddha, or Buddhadharma can 
be divided into two broad categories: 'Dharma' or doctrine, and 'Vinaya', or discipline. At the heart of the Vinaya is a 
set of rules known as Patimokkha (Pāli), or Pratimoksha (Sanskrit). The Vinaya was orally passed down from the 
Buddha to his disciples. 
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Here, emphasizing the importance of motivation in practice and conducts, Khenpo Tsullo 
reinforces the idea that Buddhism will never go against lay people’s desire for a better life. He 
argues that to say that Buddhism hinders the development of Tibet or to say that Buddhism is 
incompatible with modern society is an indication of not understanding real Tibetan Buddhism.  
In contrast to ZhogsDung’s zero-sum game idea of inevitable contradiction between 
Buddhism as an old idea and development as a new condition, Khenpo Tsullo suggests that there 
is no fundamental contradiction between the two.  Moreover, his teachings and suggestions for 
the herders suggest a dynamic and reflective kind of Buddhism that is always ready for new 
circumstances. Khenpo Tsullo states in his book, Lam Gyi ’Jug Sgo, that many secular practices, 
including herding, industry, commerce, and others, are lung ma bstan pa, which means that they 
are not mentioned in Buddhist teachings, but he imputes karmic meanings to those secular 
practices by referring to them as "other conduct" (lung bstan pa) as defined by Buddhist 
teachings. In this way, those practices are now coded within Buddhist norms and can work well 
within the Buddhist concept of development. In this way, new culture and new practices have 
been "baptized" by religious meanings, which further regulate people’s conduct and ways of 
thinking about religious subjects. Finally, there is another difference between the positions of 
these two figures. Khenpo Tsullo has been trying to make Buddhism an everyday practice of 
Tibetan people by giving religious meaning to their daily activities, whereas ZhogsDung 
suggests that Buddhism should be limited to religious sites and practiced by only monks and 
lamas, a position that is in line with modern states’ relationship with religions. 
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Karma as Regulative Force in Development 
Khenpo Tsullo discusses development not in terms of secular materialism and linear 
progress, but in reference to the Buddhist norms of karma, reincarnation, and compassion in the 
framework of samsara. His articulation of development with the law of cause-effect is an effort 
to bring modern discourses of the differentiation of nationalities associated with 
development/underdevelopment into dialogue with the religious concept of the six realms of 
existence. The modern narrative of nationalism is one of relationships between groups of people 
in this world that are marked by social and political meanings including "lagging behind," 
cultural preservation, marginalization, and globalization, all of which carry connotations of 
power relationships among the different groups -- a sort of “foreground” story. Samsara is a 
religious narrative that embraces all sentient beings, in which the life of each being transits from 
one to another category (gods46, asuras, humans, animals, pretas, hell beings) in accordance with 
its collection of karma -- more of a “background” story. Khenpo Tsullo’s interpretation of 
development, which is intended to bring these two conceptions together, has changed the 
meaning of secular, material development. In other words, he discusses development within the 
larger framework of samsara that is constituted by eternal lives and regulated by the law of 
cause-effect. In that sense development is for all forms of life in the samsara, in which human 
beings are just one form. 
Khenpo Tsullo has emphasized the importance of learning new knowledge/culture (rig 
gnas gsar ba) for the sake of material improvement, but the achievement of development is not 
totally determined by the “new knowledge/culture” itself, but by the combination of the law of 
cause-effect on both individual and collective levels (community, regional, national, and global) 
and proximate causes, say new knowledge and skills. Moreover, “sustainable development” is 
                                                 
46 Gods are different from that of western religions. 
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informed not only by the generational concerns regarding limitations of material resources but 
also by the continuity of the eternal lives of all sentient beings that are related to one another in 
producing specific outcomes in the cycle of existence. Regarding the law of cause-effect, 
Khenpos Tsullo states, 
All of the experiences of comforts or sufferings we see now are the results of two 
causes: remote causes (ring ba’i rgyu) and proximate causes (nye ba’i rgyu). The 
remote causes are the negative or positive karma that one collected in previous lives, 
and the proximate causes are those we can see in the present life. Ordinary people only 
see the proximate but not the remote causes, and so assume that all of these comforts 
and sufferings are results of the interaction of current material and events, and 
believing that there are no other causes. (2003b: 380) 
 
To illustrate this idea, he offers an example of Tibetan herders to demonstrate human 
misunderstandings. He says that people who are ignorant of or non-believing in karma are just 
like the herder who, seeing lights in the houses in the towns, bought a light bulb and hung it up 
with a yak-fur rope in his tent, where there was no electricity, waiting for the light without 
understanding why his new light bulb did not produce light as they did in town. He says that just 
as the herder sees only the light bulb and wires but does not understand other causes that produce 
the actual lighting, we do not see the remote causes in the previous lives, but only the current 
causes. The implication of development is that all of those sinful conducts bring only 
misfortunes and miseries to people and their communities, and vice versa. As in many other 
religious teachings about the slaughter renunciation movement, during his teachings in Rakhor 
Village, Khenpo Tsullo told the villagers, “The mass-slaughter of yaks for the meat market is not 
the way to be developed…You will never gain any benefit by slaughtering your livestock, and 
there definitely will come a time when you will have to pay for what you are doing now; if it is 
not in this life time, then you will have to pay them back in your other rebirths.” He also said, 
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with the logic of more selling meaning more money, now you should have a 
better life and more savings, because you have sold so many of your livestock for the 
past few decades; but as far as I can see, you are not any better off compared with 
those who have not sold any livestock for slaughter. The reason that you have never 
become better off by slaughtering is that the sinful killing will never bring fortune to 
people or community. If you continue the slaughtering, you will become worse and 
worse. 
 
He thinks that because all Tibetan people are Buddhists, and believe in karma and 
reincarnation, it is very important that they make sure that they do not damage their next lives 
when they make improvements in their current living conditions. He states that it is very 
important to think about both material development in this life and spiritual development in the 
next life, pointing out that meaningful development is a combination of learning to live by 
Buddhist principles and adequate improvement of living conditions. He argues in Lugs Gnyis Me 
Long, "It is not that there are no other ways of making a living other than those that disregard the 
law of cause-effect. Being honest and following the law of cause-effect will allow one to avoid 
suffering for this lifetime as well as for future lifetimes." 
Therefore, Khenpo Tsullo, first, sees the law of cause-effect as an invisible force that 
regulates people’s gains and losses according to their accumulation of positive and negative 
karma. Second, with the articulation of the law of cause-effect, Khenpo Tsullo has extended the 
meaning of development beyond this-worldly material improvement to the betterment of many 
reincarnations of people’s lives. In a religion in which death represents not the end but the 
beginning of another life, the idea of development must be related not only to things in this world 
but also to seeking improvement for the entire cycle of eternal life.  
The response47 of another prominent khenpo in Larung Gar, Khenpo Bso Dar Rgyas, to a 
question asked by an entrepreneur about the frequent occurrence of natural disasters on the 
                                                 
47 http://www.zhibeidy.com/2011/0407/2840.php 
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global scale, represents a common interpretation of the undesirable events associated with the 
law of cause-effect. The student asked, “My question is: the natural disasters have been very 
frequent these years, particularly for the last two years, including earthquake, drought, and 
floods. What has caused all of them?” 
Khenpo Bso Dar Rgyas responded, 
Many people are concerned about this. The number of disasters since 2001 has 
been more than twice the total for the ten years before 2001. Regarding the causes, 
religious people have different interpretations from those of scientists. However, 
generally speaking, all agree that the past few decades have seen massive damage to 
nature, including the mining of sacred mountains, deforestation, and the slaughtering 
of many animals with the use of technology. All of those misconducts result in 
outrageous disasters. In addition, the compounding of people’s increasing worries 
about the outside environment could also cause those disasters. In short, the collective 
accumulation of negative karma by our people has caused all of the disasters that we 
are experiencing. 
 
Khenpo Bso Dar Rgyas is highlighting the regulative force of collective karma in modern 
development. It is his view that all of natural disasters are related to the misconduct of human 
beings who are driven by their excessive material desire in disregard of the law of cause-effect. 
Indeed, the khenpos’ conceptualization of development in the framework of samsara is woven 
into the complex fabric of the everyday life of Tibetan herders. Yet, it is the connection of this-
worldly and other-worldly as a conceptualization and a reality that ZhogsDung and government 
officials try to break or at least ignore.  Those religious norms are superstitions in the eyes of 
those like ZhogsDung. However, the concept of “superstition” could equally apply to other 
rationales of modernization. For many khenpos, modern people’s excessive devotion to 
materialism, science, and technology is another type of superstition or empty promise that drives 
people to move forward in certain directions. In a similar way, the khenpos’ suggestion that 
Tibetans follow the law of cause-effect could be argued as a rationale for real happiness.  
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Tibetan Buddhism and modern science/technology 
For ZhogsDung, science and technology, as part of secular knowledge/culture, are the 
absolute solution to the problems that Tibetan people face. In a similar way, khenpos have also 
suggested that Tibetans learn science and technology, as proximate causes of the economic 
development of Tibet, to improve their living conditions. However, khenpos do not see science 
and technology as a universal remedy for the problems that human beings face, or as means of 
bringing people everything they need. Khenpo Tsullo states in his suggestions about food 
consumption and hygiene,  
It seems that science and technology have improved our living conditions, but our 
physical bodies, minds, and behavior have increasingly been degraded. Let alone the 
threat from wars and destructive weapons, the food we eat -- our most basic need -- has 
become harmful to our health. When one think about such matters, it is hard to judge 
whether we are improving or jumping off a cliff. (2003b:170)48 
 
Khenpo Tsullo thinks that what science does is to provide solutions for material problems, 
but it cannot eliminate the suffering of sickness, aging, and death. It is Buddhism that can 
address those fundamental sufferings. In addition, khenpos insist that new kinds of knowledge 
require Buddhist guidance if they are to bring material prosperity and not have negative impacts 
on people and on their environment. In Lugs Gnyis Me long (2003a), Khenpo Tsullo articulates 
the relationship between Tibetan Buddhism and science, pointing out the shortcomings of 
science: 
New knowledge or science has both advantages and disadvantages...for the 
disadvantages, science is used by those who do not have faith in the law of cause-effect 
to create extremely destructive weapons, including nuclear and chemical weapons, and 
many people have started to suffer from the creation of those weapons. The pollution 
in the soil, in the oceans, and in the air, magnified by the improvement of science and 
                                                 
48 “Deng Rabs Kyi Bza’ Btung Ge ’Phrod Bsten Bya Tshul Mdor Bsdus” (“Modern Diet and Hygiene”) in 
Lam Gyi ’Jug Sgo. 2003.Hongkong. 
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technology, has made it hard for people to live on their own planet. The improvement 
in outer material conditions brought about by science and technology has multiplied 
anger, laziness, and indulgence. All of those changes in people's hearts have become 
the roots of the degeneration of clear moral standards. (36-37) 
 
…Tibetan Buddhism can provide great support and guidance to science; without 
Buddhist support, science can bring damage to human beings in both the short term 
and the long run (44)...Therefore, without compassion or belief in the law of cause-
effect, science and technology do not follow the right track, and they will hurt people. 
(46) 
 
Khenpo Tsullo suggests that Tibetan people should take a selective approach to new 
knowledge, adopting the learning of the real benefits that science and technology can bring to 
their lives and keeping a safe distance from the harmful ones.  
In responding to some people’s estimation that with the achievement in science and 
technological development Tibetan Buddhism will become less important than it is now for 
Tibetan people, Khenpo Tsullo argues that they may distract people from practicing Buddhism, 
but other than that they do not bring any harm to it. As a result they will never be able to prove 
or disprove the very secret parts of Tibetan Buddhism including the law of cause-effect, the 
remarkable ways in which the human mind works, and the path of enlightenment. The 
improvements afforded by science and technology will only make Tibetan Buddhism more clear 
and consolidated. He maintains that in most respects science and Buddhism do not conflict with 
each other, and it is evident from the past findings of science that the two do not have tensions, 
mainly because Tibetan Buddhism is not based on faith (dad pa la bsten pa) but on reason (rig 
pa la bsten pa) (Khenpo Tsullo, 2003a:40). Moreover, Khenpo Tsullo (2003b) states that even 
though there are cases in which they are not consistent with each other or do not agree, in those 
cases, people should not regard science as the only source of truth: 
In general, there is no need for all religions to be consistent with science, and it is 
not a problem that religions are not consistent with science. All of those beliefs, 
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including that science is the truth (Tib. rigs pa yang dag – correct reasoning), that truth 
is determined by science, and other truths are to be denied if they are outside of the 
scientific way of knowing, and the assumption that all the knowable things should be 
known through science, are of a bias -- "scientism." Recently scientists have 
overthrown some of the findings of the great scientist, Isaac Newton, all of whose 
findings were what most scientists believed to be truths for over two hundred years. No 
one can guarantee that there will be no similar cases among more recent scientific 
findings. (Khenpo Tsullo, 2003b: 395-396) 
 
 Religious beliefs should be based on the truth, otherwise they will lead people in 
the wrong direction. However, it is unreasonable to think that all religious truths 
should be approved by science…I don’t agree that Buddhism is science, because they 
are different knowledge systems. (Khenpo Tsullo, 2003b: 399)  
 
If people say that the improvement of science is good enough for everything, so 
that we do not need traditions, particularly Buddhism, their words show their 
ignorance of both worldly knowledge and Buddhism. Regardless of how advanced 
science has become, it will never be able to replace Buddhism, because the two 
systems have different functions and achievements...Not only can science not eradicate 
human beings’ suffering of birth, aging, illness, and death, it also cannot provide them 
real peace in this life…that is why there are many scientists practicing religion. 
(Khenpo Tsullo, 2003a: 45). 
   
Unlike many Buddhist modernists, including Dharmapala, Olcott, Carus, and the Dalai 
Lama, who embrace thoroughly modern science in presenting Buddhism to Westerners 
(McMahan, 2008), Khenpo Tsullo does not take the position that anything about Tibetan 
Buddhism needs to be proven by science or that they should be consistent, but argues rather that 
they are two different knowledge systems, and that therefore, science cannot prove Buddhism. 
He does believe that Buddhism fills gaps left by the shortcomings of science. 
In sum, Khenpo Tsullo and ZhogsDung are both concerned about the lagging behind of the 
Tibetan people and about the future path of Tibet. However, their understandings of lagging 
behind and the way to catch up are different. While ZhogsDung talks about lagging behind in 
terms of economic and secular social development of Tibet, Khenpo Tsullo refers to lagging 
behind more as the danger of losing Tibetan culture (Tibetan Buddhism) that comes with the 
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improvement of the economy. Khenpo Tsullo articulates the idea of development as inner and 
outer development; at the same time, he proposes a combination of material and spiritual 
development that is beneficial for this life and the next.  ZhogsDung seeks the development of 
Tibetan people only for this lifetime through secular and materially based culture.  However, this 
is a huge shortcoming of modernization that Khenpo Tsullo suggests Tibetan Buddhism as the 
best and only solution for. More importantly, Khenpo Tsullo’s articulation of development 
emphasizes the continuity of traditional Tibetan culture with the adequate embrace of new 
culture, which is a serious problem for ZhogsDung, who suggests development of Tibetan people 
as a radical departure from their past requiring the wholesale giving up of traditions from the life 
of lay Tibetan people.   
For Tibetan khenpos, Tibetan Buddhism is the better method forward in that it can provide 
real happiness and peace that modern development and science have failed to provide, and it also 
balances many negative aspects of modernity and development.  Therefore, the khenpos’ 
articulations of development do not sacrifice Buddhism for the sake of development or 
development for Buddhism; rather they present them as mutually constitutive, or at least 
potentially compatible. More importantly, they have placed great emphasis on the role that 
Buddhist cause-effect law plays in development, suggesting that development is not achievable if 
people disregard Buddhist norms of karma, the law of cause-effect, and compassion. Khenpo 
Tsullo points out that the real failure of modern development, with its excessive emphasis on 
outer material development and secularism, is its failure to pay enough attention to people's inner 
development, the study of human minds and the nature of inner happiness.  
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Conclusion 
Development is contested not only between trustees and their target groups, but also 
fiercely among different groups in the targeted zone. In Tibet, Buddhist leaders and radical 
secularists have very different understandings of what development means and how to go about 
it. On the one hand, the very process in which development is contested and negotiated among 
Tibetans is a simultaneous process in which Tibetans try to remake their culture and reinforce 
their identity in contemporary society. That is, with the articulation of and debate over 
development, Tibetan people reflect upon their culture and current situation by relating to the 
outside world. With this reflection, many have realized not only that they share the same 
language and culture, but also that they are collectively facing another common challenge, the 
common sense of lagging behind in economic development, science and technology, and other 
aspects of mainstream culture. Their articulations of falling behind, the expression of the need to 
improve, and the debate over the means and direction of development have all worked to 
demarcate Tibet spatially and enhance its cultural unity (Pigg, 1992). 
On the other hand, this contestation over the meaning of development has not only shaped 
the current and future culture, but has also been reshaping history. ZhogsDung’s critical 
overview of some historical events represents a recent trend, in which secular Tibetans, who see 
themselves as lagging behind and in a disadvantaged situation, have been rethinking events that 
shaped their present situation. Like many contemporary secular Tibetans, ZhogsDung has 
different views of parts of Tibetan history, including the constitution of the political system by 
both secular and religious power, the role of King Glang Dar Ma and that of the monk who killed 
him. The last Tibetan king, Glang Dar Ma (838 to 841 CE), has often been portrayed as a king of 
the demons, who attempted to destroy Buddhism, and the monk who killed the king is presented 
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as a hero in histories written by Tibetan Buddhist elites (’GosLo GzhoNu Dpal, 1982; 
StagTshang RdzongPa, 1985). But recently many educated Tibetans, mostly secularists, 
reevaluate this story about the king and his death, suggesting that the king was making an effort 
to reform social and economic conditions then dominated so much by the Buddhist hierarchy. In 
contrast to conventional Tibetan history, they portray the monk, called Lhalung Paldor, as a 
criminal who both killed a reformer-king and brought an end to the united Tibetan kingdom. As 
ZhogsDung affirms, “I have said that Lhalung Paldor was a criminal in Tibetan history, and 
many people agree on that.” Because ZhogsDung is critical of Tibetan Buddhism in relation to 
the development issue, there are many monks who say that ZhogsDung has been doing the same 
thing as both King Glang Dar Ma and the Cultural Revolution did to Tibetan Buddhism. 
ZhogsDung and many other Tibetans have been rereading history from the pro-development 
angle. Here development has become a force that leads to re-interpretation of historical events 
and figures in the modern/development context. 
Considering all of the debate over the meaning of development, the role of Buddhism in 
development, and the issues of Tibetan tradition and new culture, one may wonder how Tibetan 
herders in their specific locations have been experiencing the forces of development and religion, 
how they negotiate their needs among those forces, and how they make sense of contemporary 
social and economic transformation. In the next chapter, I will explore the Rakhor herders’ 
experiences of secular state development and Tibetan Buddhist movements.  
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Chapter Six 
Secular Development and Religious Force 
in a Tibetan Community  
 
 “We want our kids to be government officials.”  
  “It is bsod nams can (blessed with good fortune) to  
  become a government officials.”   
        - many herders’ dream jobs for their children.  
 
A herder from Rakhor Village said, “My son is going to the county town primary school 
[where all subjects are being taught in Chinese], and my daughter is going to County Tibetan 
Middle School. We hope at least one of them gets a government job; if this does not happen, we 
hope they will, at least, not follow our [the herders’] footsteps. We are just like the yaks we herd, 
knowing nothing.” He also said, “There are many lifelong benefits that can only be gained by 
gaining access to education.”  This is almost the universal expression of herders when they talk 
about their children’s access to education.  
The herder who made this statement is one of the very few who has participated in the 
second term of the slaughter renunciation movement and his wife became a vegetarian when 
Khenpo Tsullo visited Rakhor. He travels five kilometers between his pasture and the school by 
motorcycle about six times each day so that his son can attend the best school in Hongyuan 
County.  His embrace of education represents a radical change in most herders’ attitudes toward 
education over the last few decades. He thinks that one of the best things his children can do is to 
become fluent in Chinese and obtain other skills through education.  There is a serious deficiency 
of these skills among Tibetan herders, which puts them at a disadvantage in the current society. 
 Considering the political issues of Tibet in China, it may seem ironic to western people that 
a government job has become the dream career for Tibetan herders, but this has become a reality 
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in pastoral areas of Tibet. Even though there are many possible interpretations for this 
phenomenon, we should not ignore this reality in searching for a deeper truth concerning their 
desires. Indeed, I argue that their desires for education and for employment in government 
administration are the result of the Tibetan herders’ experience of neo-liberal economic 
development, state power, and new religious forces. In other words, this radical change in 
Tibetan herders’ attitude toward state education and the state paid jobs reflects both Tibetan 
herders’ experience of the secular neo-liberal development as well the recent religious 
movements, which recommend education as the best alternative to the sinful (negative karma) 
and harsh herding practices. 
In addressing the problems associated with the discrepancy between the Western model of 
neo-liberalism, which is claimed to be universal, and the neoliberal phenomenon in Russia and 
China, Hoffman, Dehart and Collier (2006) suggest a new way of conceptualizing it: neo-
liberalism as conjuncture and contingence in the process of social transformation. They suggest 
that a good start would be to deconstruct neo-liberalism and trace its elements in their multiple 
configurations in the West, so that one can see how neo-liberalism is rooted in different cultural 
and historical contexts. This would help anthropologists reframe important questions such as 
“the future of welfare state, de-statization of government activities, and the emergence of new 
forms of personhood and political agency” (Hoffman, Dehart and Collier, 2006: 10). The 
patriotic nationalism and bureaucratic culture in China, the emphasis on individual freedom and 
egalitarianism in the West (Harvey, 2005) and belief in karma and enlightenment in Tibet are all 
cultural forces that have shaped development and neo-liberalism in different cultural spaces. Just 
as the cultural values of individual freedom and egalitarianism were foundations for the neo-
liberal ideology becoming the dominant political and economic strategy in American history, the 
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combination of relative individual freedom in economic activities and the authoritarian state 
embedded in patriotic nationalism and bureaucratic culture has formed a nest for neo-liberalism 
in China. In a similar way, Tibetan Buddhism has become the agent giving cultural meaning to 
neo-liberalism in pastoral areas of Tibet. In Rakhor Village, Tibetan herders have been deeply 
influenced by the forces of a strong state power, intensified neo-liberal economic development, 
and reinforcement of Tibetan Buddhist practices and new movements, forming their own ways of 
community development in the current neo-liberal social arrangements manipulated by the 
strong state. 
By discussing Rakhor herders’ expressions of lagging behind, their embrace of state 
education and government jobs, and their mixed strategies for improving the well-being of the 
community, I will demonstrate that they are influenced both by state neoliberal development 
ideologies as well as Tibetan Buddhist conceptions of development. Though they are different, 
these expressions and strategies often converge toward similar recommendations that encourage 
free market development as well as closer integration with Chinese state and Chinese citizenship. 
In particular, I will demonstrate how both secular neoliberal development projects and Tibetan 
Buddhist khenpos' recommendations encourage Tibetans to go into labor markets and become 
entrepreneurs (in certain areas of the economy) and that they reshape Tibetan herders to desire 
Chinese education and employment in Chinese government administration.  Why do the state 
projects and khenpos’ recommendations overlap in many areas? I argue that the process of 
cultural contestation between state development and Tibetan religious elites, indeed, is the 
process of moving toward uneven development in pastoral areas, despite the fact that they are 
pushing the process with different cultural agendas. In other words, both of them are engendering 
the same social arrangement in pastoral areas of Tibet, but with different motivations and 
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codings of cultural meaning. Thus, the chapter concludes the dissertation by showing how two 
very different forms of “small” governmentality can ironically converge and how they work 
together in moving toward the “big” governmentality. 
In the following three sections, I want, first, to discuss how the changes in Rakhor herders’ 
attitude toward education are informed by the Tibetan religious leaders’ teachings, which are 
embedded in both secular and religious rationales. Second, I want to discuss their embrace of 
education and state paid jobs in light of Rakhor herders’ feelings of lagging behind, informing 
their experience with the state projects and neo-liberal social arrangements, and their spiritual 
interpretations and measures for community wellbeing. In the last section I will discuss how 
these two forces deployed exactly same the strategy in their different agendas, leading Tibetan 
pastoralists into a new, uneven social relationship. 
 
A radical shift from resisting to embracing state education 
Since the economic reforms of the 1980s, the Chinese state has implemented many neo-
liberal oriented projects in the pastoral areas of the Tibetan Plateau, among them, education. For 
the past few decades, with the notion of “发展经济，教育先行” (For economic development, 
education should be first), the state, by investing billions of Yuan, has made education the most 
important component of the development strategy in many pastoral areas of Tibet. In the pastoral 
areas of Sichuan Province, for instance, in order to implement the Liangji Gongjian (两基攻坚) 
2004-2007 program to promote nine-year compulsory education and to eradicate illiteracy 
among the young and middle-aged Tibetans, the Sichuan government initiated the "Ten-years 
Action Plan” (2000-2010) (十年行动计划) to improve infrastructure of primary schools. With 
those projects, many schools have been refurnished and expanded, and in many county towns, 
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new boarding schools have been built to accommodate the children of herders. The number of 
teachers in schools has been increased and the enrollment of school-aged children is reaching 
new highs.  
One online report in 2008 demonstrates this achievement of the program to some extent. A 
vice director of the Sichuan Provincial Education Department told a journalist in 2008,49 “The 
Sichuan provincial government planned in 2000 to invest three hundred million yuan over the 
following 10 years to implement the “Liangji Gongjian.” And the journalist added, “with this 
provincial education program, all tent schools, schools with tamped-earth houses, and unsafe 
buildings have disappeared, and new teaching buildings and dormitories have been built in many 
schools, achieving significant improvement in the school conditions.” Furthermore, “in Ganzi 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, the enrollment rate in pastoral areas was 47.89% in 
2003, but it has increased to 90% by this year (2008). In addition, the students in these areas do 
not need to pay school fees. The state provides free books, 2 RMB daily subsidies to each 
student, and free use of laundry facilities on a weekly basis.” 
There are many other stories about the success of the state education program in pastoral 
areas. For instance, in Hongyuan County, there is a township school called the “5+7” school, 
meaning that once upon a time there were only 5 students and 7 teachers in the school, but it now 
accommodate about 700 students and over 27 teachers with the state education programs.  These 
stories reflect a real change in education in pastoral areas of Sichuan province. However, they do 
not show the process by which these achievements took place, a process that is also enforced by 
the Tibetan religious movements that have made great contributions to this change in herders’ 
attitudes toward education in recent years.  
                                                 
49	  “10年30亿 川助推民族地区完成"两基"任务”,	  “Spending a Three Billion Yuan for the next Ten years, 
Sichuan Government promote the ‘Liangji Gongjian’ Pragram in Sichuan Minority Areas”,	  	  
  http://bbs.sjtu.edu.cn/bbstcon?board=sichuan&reid=1209995839  
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At the early stage, many Tibetan herders were disinterested in, and even resistant to, the 
state education programs for several reasons. These included their need for assistance from their 
children for herding and help with collecting herbs, and their low opinion of the quality of the 
school education. There were many pastoral areas where herders did not want to send their kids 
to schools in the early phase of the program. There were also many scandals in the 
implementation of the compulsory education among herders. For instance, in some places, the 
herders were trading their quota for their school-aged children to circumvent the state 
requirement that each household can keep one child at home to assist their parents on their 
pasture but must send the rest of them to the schools. Some rich households who did not want to 
send their kids to schools were paying the poor households for sending their children to schools 
on the behalf of the rich ones, and some poor households with many children were making 
money out of this. There were also many cases in which students escaped from their boarding 
school at night, and the teachers were chasing them to their parents who were said to have hidden 
the fugitive children on their pastures. In another pastoral area, the herders resisted the state 
compulsory education so much that the local government arrested some of the leading herders 
for a short time to scare the other herders, and demonstrate their determination to carry out the 
program. However, the situation has changed radically over the last few years. Now, many 
herders in Rakhor Village not only want their kids to be educated, but they want to send their 
kids to the best schools. This change is correspondent with recent religious movements like the 
slaughter renunciation movement, in which education has been of highest priority.  
Seeing herders’ negative attitude toward the state education programs as a serious issue, 
for the last ten years, many Tibetan religious elites have made efforts, similar to those of the 
state, to encourage herders to send their kids to schools. In the slaughter renunciation movement, 
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the importance of education has become the number one message that khenpos wanted to deliver 
to Tibetan herders during their teachings. There are several aspects for the promotion of 
education by Tibetan religious leaders that are important to highlight. First, as the state education 
programs are embedded in Chinese nationalism, khenpos’ vision for education (Tib. slob gso or 
rig gnas sbyong pa) is also embedded in the future wellbeing of the Tibetan pastoralists, 
proposing that education is the only path for the Tibetan herders. For Khenpo Tsullo, on the one 
hand, education has become critical to Tibetan herders as a means of obtaining new knowledge 
that can improve their material living conditions (see Chapter 5). More importantly, on the other 
hand, khenpos see accessing education as the best way in which development and Tibetan 
Buddhism converge to further avoid the contradictory situation in the current livestock 
slaughtering process.  
As Khenpo Tsullo put it, “education is Tibetan Buddhism” and “a change that must be 
made in the Tibetan herder’s means of making a living.” He sees education as the only possible 
future for Tibetans herders, and says that herding of livestock is the worst way to make a living 
in the pastoral areas for two main reasons. First, herding livestock is very hard work and second, 
it involves lots of serious negative karma with the slaughtering of the animals. To this end, he 
particularly uses the state education program as a way for the younger generation of Tibetan 
herders to leave their traditional way of life (Tib. kha gso thabs). With education, young Tibetan 
herders will have wider options to obtain non-sinful careers, which, according to Khenpo Tsullo, 
are consistent with Tibetan Buddhism. His suggestions for Tibetan herders in his book Lugs 
Gnyis Me long represent most of his advice in many of his religious teachings in the past: 
…Tibetan herders need to stop selling their livestock to the meat market, 
and instead, send their kids to schools… 
…The Tibetan children are the future owners of Tibetan Buddhism 
(Chos) and this-worldly development (’jig rten). The future destiny of Tibet 
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depends on the young generation. If they become ignorant like the livestock 
they herd, the chance of material and religious (Buddhist) development and 
continuity of Tibetans as one nationality is very small…Therefore, the 
forcing of Tibetan kids to become herders of sheep and goats is to destroy 
their bright future. Many parents do not want to send kids to school because 
they feel sorry for their kids, who are becoming homesick in the schools. 
Indeed, the real pity that the parents should feel is about excluding their kids 
from a human life and letting them live among their livestock for their entire 
lives in an isolated valley, knowing nothing about material improvement and 
Buddhist practices, while spending their entire lives without having one day’s 
enjoyment of material comforts-but full of serious negative karma [by selling 
their livestock to the meat market].” (32-33) 
 
Education, even the state education program, has become a strategy for khenpos to reverse 
the current situation in pastoral areas where Tibetan Buddhist norms and this-worldly 
development go against one another in the case of the herders’ increasing slaughter rate. With 
education, young Tibetan herders will leave behind cultural practices including herding practice, 
life in their isolated valleys, and sinful livestock trading. The khenpos see education as the 
turning point for the young Tibetan herders and see it as a future path for all Tibetans. Thus, in 
many of his religious teachings, Khenpo Tsullo often highlights the importance of education 
among herders.  
Even though Khenpo Tsullo has great concerns about the quality of the state schools, he 
thinks that it is better than nothing. Therefore, he sees the current state education program as one 
very important space where Tibetan Buddhism and the means of material improvement in Tibet 
are not contradictory, in contrast to livestock slaughtering within the herding tradition. As he 
states, “it is time to make changes of how Tibetan herders make a living,” and the opportunities 
for the younger generation of Tibetan herders are contained in the state education programs. For 
Tibetan khenpos, the state education has become a place where Tibetan herders make progress in 
a way such that that secular improvement is consistent with Tibetan Buddhist norms.  
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In addition, unlike the state education that is designed for only this-worldly improvement, 
Khenpo Tsullo sees education not merely as a matter of this-worldly material improvement, but 
also as a way for people to make both spiritual and material progress. By accessing state 
education, young Tibetan herders, at least, do not need to engage with sinful conduct of 
slaughtering, which is negative karma accumulation and will bring them miseries in the future. 
With education, the young generation of Tibetan herders would be employed in new careers that 
would be beneficial for both this life and for their next lives. 
During the religious teachings in Rakhor Village, Khenpo Tsullo states, “We are not 
saying Tibetans don’t need development. Yes, Tibetans need development, but the massive 
slaughtering of their yaks to the meat market is not the way to be developed...you will never win 
by slaughtering your livestock, and there definitively will be a time when you will have to pay 
for what you are doing now; if it is not in this lifetime, then you will have to pay in your future 
rebirths.”  
Khenpos think that people should be aware that death is not the end, but it is a starting of 
another life. So the proper conduct in this life, including believing in the Buddhist Three Jewels, 
is to act in accord with the law of cause and effect, and to have compassion in one's heart. These 
are the critical ways to make this life beneficial for many other lifetimes. Therefore, the effects 
of herders’ slaughtering transcend this world in the many rebirths of people. To attend state 
schools is to avoid the misconduct of massive slaughtering that brings misfortunes and miseries 
in many lives of Tibetan herders. Therefore, khenpos’ suggestion of education for Tibetan 
herders is not only a matter of this-worldly development, but it is also related to the infinite life 
of human beings. In this sense, I argue that the embrace of the state education by Tibetan 
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khenpos and herders is towards a religious practice to gain spiritual benefits that go beyond the 
state intent of education that is designed for worldly profit. 
In this way, khenpos’ and lamas’ teachings on education have been very pervasive and 
effective in persuading herders to send their kids to schools, because these religious elites have 
very strong influence over Tibetan herders who are Tibetan Buddhists. This is clear from what 
some herders say about why they are sending their kids to school now in a much more active 
way. For instance, it is very common for herders to express that they are sending their kids to 
school because khenpos and lamas have asked them to send kids to the state schools. Others say 
that by letting their kids be educated, they do not need to engage in the sinful practice of 
livestock slaughtering, because with education, they will have options to work on less sinful 
occupations even if they could not become government officials.  
Tibetan religious leaders’ influence over Tibetan herders’ attitude toward education is 
reflected in the change in the enrollment and quality of the Serde township school. This school 
went from being the worst to the best township school in Hongyuan County. The major change 
took place when a new school leader invited an influential lama as the honorary head of the 
school and the lama gave religious teachings about education to Tibetan herders when the state 
leader was facing difficulties in improving enrollment and in gaining support from parents for 
the school. The strategy of school head has been very effective.  Within two to three years, the 
school has become the best among other township schools. A teacher from that school said that 
the promotion of education among Tibetan herders through those influential lamas and khenpos 
has been very effective, and the Tibetan religious role in the success of this school is very 
significant. 
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Therefore, even though based on both secular as well as spiritual reasons, khenpos’ and the 
local lamas’ efforts in the promotion of education are critical for the change in herders’ 
motivation for education. Of course, recognizing the importance of this religious movement in 
the change of herders’ attitude toward education does not deny the importance of the role played 
by the state education program itself and the herders’ experience of the current state power and 
economic development.  I turn next to a demonstration of how herders’ embrace of education is 
also influenced by the state power system, projects, and market economy, by examining Rakhor 
herders’ expression of lagging behind and their embrace of state education as well as state 
employment. 
 
Lagging behind, state projects and education: 
Herders’ awareness of Education as result of experience of secular development  
 
During my field research, I frequently encountered villagers saying that their village has 
increasingly been falling far behind in comparison with other villages or traditional tribes. The 
puzzle is why they are lagging behind given their favorable location in Hongyuan County. The 
village is located about three kilometers away from Hongyuan County Town, and this location 
allows them to have frequent access to the largest market town, the county administrative town, 
in Hongyuan County. This is an advantage by which many people would assume that Rakhor 
should be more highly integrated into modern society than other villages located further away 
from the County Seat. But the fact is that Rakhor Village is far less integrated into modern 
society than many other traditional tribes like Zangkar, Tsoshi, and Amchok, which are located 
much further away from Hongyuan County Town. Then the questions are: Why has Rakhor 
Village remained so traditional or lagging behind even though it is located next to the County 
Seat? How do they interpret their current situation? And, what do they try to do about it?  In 
  
253 
what follows, I will explore, with these questions, how herders in Rakhor experience 
development and how their experiences have influenced their attitude toward education and 
employment in the government administration.  
 
The expression of lagging behind 
When Rakhor people express their lagging behind, they often compare themselves with 
other traditional communities in terms of the number of people employed as state officials and in 
the numbers of people who received a higher level of education. First, herders of Rakhor Village 
say that they do not have rigs gnas can,50 meaning people with knowledge. Even though in 
Rakhor there have been fundamental changes in the herders’ awareness of the importance of 
education and even though the enrollment rate in the primary school has reached about 99 % for 
the last few years, there are very few villagers with a higher level of education and there aren’t 
many government officials from Rakhor in government administrations. Herders see this as a 
very serious problem for the overall development of the village.51   
Other communities that Rakhor herders often compare theirs with include the two other 
villages under Qiongxi Township and another traditional tribe in Hongyuan County called 
Zangkar (currently under two townships). Zangkar tribe, located about 100 kilometers way from 
Hongyuan County Town, has the highest number of government paid workers, and Rakhor is 
among those communities which have the least number of government paid workers or officials. 
A herder from Rakhor told me that one retired teacher made a comparison among three places on 
how many students who have graduated from the Tibetan middle school have gone on to become 
                                                 
50 People who possess knowledge or people with higher levels (college level or higher) of secular education 
experience. 
51 In the village of Rakhor, as in other pastoral areas, herders had to send their kids to school during the 
commune system time, but they all took their kids back from school soon after the livestock decollectivization, and 
they did not want to send their children to schools when the state restarted the compulsory education program. 
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government paid workers over the 20 years that he been teaching in the Tibetan middle school of 
Hongyuan County. Sixty-three students from Longri Township, one township of the Zangkar 
tribe, have become government paid workers, seventeen students from Village Two in Qiongxi 
Township have become government paid workers, and only one student from Rakhor Village in 
the last twenty years has become a government employee. This comparison indicates serious 
situation for Rakhor villagers.  The numbers of people with higher education and employed in 
the government administrations are very important indications for the overall well-being of a 
community in the Hongyuan County. The difference in these numbers has both material and 
symbolic implications for these different communities. 
 
Interpretations and measures 
Of importance to note here is that Tibetan herders do not use the term slob gso (教育) to 
refer to modern education. Herders instead use the terms rig gnas pa or rig gnas can, meaning 
people who possess knowledge and who have a higher level of secular education. This refers to 
specific people such as government officials with a higher degree of school education, or monks 
and lamas with higher levels of monastic education. By combining officials, students with higher 
levels of secular education, khenpos, and monks into one category, herders categorize 
themselves as a group that does not possess rig gnas, meaning knowledge. It also reflects the fact 
that herders are mostly illiterate. They have no school or monastic education, and they don’t read 
or write.  When they contemplate their disadvantage in the current social process, they primarily 
attribute their lack of rig gnas to their failure in careers other than herding. They think that 
people with the rig gnas have a better chance to be successful, and most importantly, have a 
better chance to be employed in the government offices. 
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Rakhor Villagers frequently express that they do not have government officials, and they 
consider this a very serious issue with regards to the wellbeing of their community. On an 
individual level, employment in the government-paid job positions means more stability and 
much higher salaries than can be obtained by herding yaks. On the community level, the more 
people who work in government, the higher the probability that some of them will obtain key 
positions in the government power system so that they can allocate more state projects to their 
own communities.52 Rakhor people often complain that members of other communities are 
employed in key government positions, allowing them to obtain more benefits from the state, and 
because the people of Rakhor lack these key positions, they also lack the benefits that come with 
the positions.  As a result of their lack of these key positions, the people of Rakhor have been 
marginalized or put at a disadvantage in many respects, including the allocation of the state 
projects, access to high quality of education, their children’ employment, and so forth. Moreover, 
having more workers in the government would provide a better understanding of the state 
policies and accessing information from the state, which could be used to their own ends. The 
formation of an informal network among government officials from the same community does 
not only help the officials within that network, but also the overall of wellbeing of the 
community they come from. Therefore, the level of access to state education and the state power 
system/resources indicates the level of development a community has achieved. Because of these 
disadvantages, herders in Rakhor Village often feel they are marginalized and at a disadvantage 
in term of many benefits from the state, particularly in state projects allocation. 
                                                 
52 The idea that government officials can bring benefit to their own communities is considered to be a conduct 
of corruption by the state and it is not encouraged as the state sees it as nepotism. This social arrangement is 
embedded in the relationship of the state as the neutral and public manager and the citizen as the target of 
governance. However, nepotism is not considered as corruption but as a praiseworthy conduct in the traditional 
kinship social relationship, in which those capable ones are encouraged to help their fellows. In some sense, this is a 
space where the new social arrangement and the old social relationship overlap, forming a new form of social 
arrangement, in which the common understanding of corruption in the modern state is reinterpreted and reworked.  
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Rakhor herders attribute their situation to historical and cultural factors. Many villagers 
maintain that the reason Rakhor has relatively few government officials is that during the 
commune system time, Rakhor was a very rich village in terms of livestock production. After 
livestock decollectivization, herders in Rakhor received much more livestock than other villages, 
which was one thing they were very proud about in the past. Because they had more yaks, they 
needed more family members to work for the livestock production, and as a result, they 
neglected the benefit of education that could have aided their current condition. With the 
collapse of the commune system, most herders in Rakhor Village withdrew their kids from 
schools, believing that traditional livestock production was the only way that herders could make 
a living. At that time, they were also very proud of their identity as being Tibetan herders, “’brog 
pa”, which has been their main culture for thousands of years. One herder said “We had too 
much attachment to the life of being herders, and we were too late in awakening to such things as 
the importance of education, doing business, and other new things.”  
By contrast, historically, the Zangkar tribe had more government officials during the 
commune system and some of them had become very high government officials. In fact, many of 
their relatives have since been educated and have gone on to become government officials as 
well.  All of these have become an example, to other herders in the tribe, of how herders can 
benefit by accessing education and by becoming government workers. At the same time, during 
the livestock decollectivization, the households of the Zangkar tribe had received a relatively low 
number of livestock in comparison with that of other villages such as Rakhor Village.  Therefore, 
livestock production had become less attractive to herders of the Zangkar tribe, and many of 
them did not withdraw their kids from school as other herders had after the livestock 
decollectivization.  This increased the probability that the children of other herders in the 
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Zangkar tribe would end up employed as government officials. All of these facts have become 
forces for the current phenomenon that herders from the Zangkar tribe have obtained better 
awareness of the importance of education and that their tribe has the highest numbers of 
government officials and leaders.  
Due to influences such as the example set by the Zangkar tribe, government jobs have 
become the jobs herders in Rakhor want most for their children, as is the case in many other 
pastoral areas.  Therefore, among those job opportunities requiring higher education, all of my 
interviewees see the government paid jobs as their first and best choice. When I asked herders to 
rank potential jobs with their preference, government paid jobs were always the first priority, 
followed by jobs requiring business skills and other vocational skills. As herders said, “To 
become a government worker is the best. If they are employed as government officials or 
salaried employees, they do not have to be herders, which entails very sinful and hard work. 
They (government officials) have very comfortable and stable circumstances. It is bsod nams 
can53 to become government officials.” They think that becoming government officials, 
particularly in important positions, not only allows one to have a comfortable life, but also helps 
one’s relatives and communities, which they associate with “sems can la phan thogs pa”, which 
means, “to be helpful to others.”  
When I asked why they think education is important and how education is a benefit to their 
children, the most common answers were along the lines of, “even if they cannot become 
government workers (Tib. las byed pa), they can do lots of things by being educated. Becoming 
educated will benefit them for their entire lives.” Thus, herders see education as very useful in 
dealing with the state, accessing the market, and public services such as medical care and 
                                                 
53 Bsod nams can means in Tibetan “to be blessed with having fortune”, or to be someone with positive karma 
accumulation. 
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education. Many herders say that becoming a government official is too difficult of a goal for 
their children to achieve. Herders don’t want their kids to become like themselves, who know 
nothing but yaks. One herder said, “At least, my children will become more independent when 
they go to the hospitals and markets in the towns and cities. If we (the older generation of 
herders) go to the big towns or cities, we can hardly even find a toilet.” Expressions such as this 
one indicate that the herders have been awakening to the importance of education over the past 
few years.  This awakening is directly influenced by the Rakhor herders’ experiences of the 
government power system and its project/resource distributions. 
In addition to their severe deficiency in government officials, Rakhor villagers also think 
that the economic situation of the community has been getting worse over the last few years. 
There is an increasing trend of a widening gap between rich and poor households in the 
community, which is reflected in the fact that there are more and more herders who do not have 
enough livestock to make a living.54  One herder told me that there were only about 10 
households who did not have any livestock 20 years ago, but now there are about 50 households 
who either do not have any livestock or don’t have enough livestock to make a living,55 whereas 
some rich households have more than 500 yaks and an income as high as about 100,000 RMB a 
year, which is high by local living standards.  The increasing number of economically poor 
households is one contribution to the sense of lagging behind.   
                                                 
54 Their interpretations of this disparity are various but they can be categorized as follows. Some households 
did not have labor or did not have good herding skills or strategies, so they have slowly lost their livestock after 
livestock decollectivization.  Other herders were not interested in herding so they sold or slaughtered their livestock, 
left their pasture, and settled in town and worked part time or started small businesses. Most of them do not have 
enough grassland allocations, because many of them were married after grassland decollectivization, and others 
have alternatives to herding by which they can make a living.  Some have lost their entire livestock herds by 
gambling, or through theft. Moreover, additional factors -- including the occurrence of snow disasters, livestock 
diseases, medical expenses due to serious health problems of family members, and education costs for those with 
many children attending school at the same time -- are all major causes for a drastic reduction in their livestock 
numbers over a short period of time. 
55 Most households need at least 10 female yaks to make a living. 
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Another reason for their feeling of lagging behind is the villagers’ increasing awareness of 
the huge differences between their income as herders and the income of government officials and 
Han businessmen. The richest herder in Rakhor, who has the highest number of livestock, told 
me that the wealth he has is tiny in comparison to that of some of government leaders and Han 
businessmen.  He has been having a very difficult situation surrounding the investments of his 
savings.  Though his savings are considerable when compared to the savings of other herders, 
inflation increases more rapidly than his savings accumulate.  As a result, the value of his 
savings decreases.  He cannot invest his savings in the expansion of his herds, as is generally a 
good way for herders to invest if they have the means to do so, because the capacities of his 
pasture and labor are at their limits.  Because he feels that he lacks the knowledge and education 
necessary to invest in other ways or to start a business of some sort, he keeps his savings in the 
bank where it continues to diminish in value.  This scenario resonates with the expressions of 
many other herders who feel that the main reason the village does not have any businessmen 
(only one or two very small businessmen) is that they lack the education necessary to engage in 
new areas of business. 
With this general awareness of education, many herders express that when sending their 
kids to school, they don’t have ambitious expectations that their kids will get government jobs 
once they finish school, but they do believe that by gaining an education, their children will have 
more options than they would if they were to stay home to become herders, which they consider 
to be the worst option for their children.  As one herder said, “whatever people want to do 
nowadays, they need rig gnas (the knowledge), even for starting a business.”  
Many herders express that the consequences of lacking education have been the hardest 
lesson they have had to learn.  They hope to pass this lesson on to their children so that they, at 
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least, can be spared learning this lesson the hard way (through their own experience).  The lack 
of education has put them in many disadvantaged situations in the government power system and 
in the economic development of community and individual households. With their observations 
and the feelings of differences, over the last several decades, there has been a radical change in 
their awareness of education and their embrace of the state power system, and they have been 
very supportive of the state education programs by sending their kids to schools. With this 
awakening, some herders have even given up their herds and their pastures entirely in order to 
send their kids to the best primary school in Hongyuan County Town.  In these instances, the 
parents find themselves, out of necessity, working part-time jobs and renting houses to take care 
of their kids while they are going to school.  This idea is reflected in the herder mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, who travels five kilometers between his pasture and the school by 
motorcycle about six times each day so that his son can attend the best school in Hongyuan 
County.   
In short, education is one of the most important components of state development over the 
last decades; at the same time it is also strongly emphasized by khenpos in their religious 
teachings. Influenced both by state education policies and khenpos’ teachings, herders’ attitudes 
toward state education, state paid jobs, and government officials have changed radically in recent 
years.  This change also reflects their experience in the market economy and state development. 
In other words, the herders’ embrace of education and state employment has been influenced by 
the state and its neo-liberal economic force as well as Tibetan religious forces. They are shaped 
by both forces.  Though these forces may have different agendas, the recommendations they 
yield lead to the same social relationship for Tibetan herders. 
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Traditional religious rituals and community well-being: 
 Reversal of Collective Karma as development strategy 
 
In terms of Tibetan Buddhist elites’ influence over the Tibetan community, other than their 
advocating education for herders, there is another aspect with which we can see the religious 
force in shaping the articulation of community development. That is, when Rakhor herders 
express their situation of falling behind, other than the secular reasons, they also use religious 
norms and rituals in their interpretations of their situation and take religious measures to improve 
the condition of the community.  
For the last few years in Rakhor Village, there has been a strong atmosphere among 
villagers and monks that something has not been working well spiritually for their community. 
There are several indications for this. Economically, they see that the number of poor households 
has been increasing recently; they did not see any change in the number of their people employed 
in the government administrations while the number of people employed in government offices 
has been increasing in other tribal communities. In addition there are more and more people in 
Rakhor who engage in misconducts such gambling, stealing, and internal conflicts. All of these 
downward trends in the community have become worse with the events of the two most 
important lamas of Rakhor Village dying a few years ago. As a result, for the last few years there 
has no lama, only khenpos, to spiritually lead the village. This incident has hit hard for the 
villagers. The combination of all of these factors contributed to the common sense of herders that 
there is something that has not been going well with the community. 
 Community members were not sure what it was. It might have something to do with their 
collective misdeeds, for instance, slaughtering, gambling, and stealing during their current lives, 
or it may because of their collective karma has not been so positive in their past reincarnations, 
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or because they have not done enough offerings for their mountain gods so that mountain gods 
had not been working hard to protect them from misfortune and to bring the prosperity. To 
correct those spiritual failures, they have launched a number of religious measures. Those 
religious measures include inviting khenpos and lamas to perform Buddhist teachings, 
empowerments, and offering to mountain deities; and the performance of monthly religious 
practices and rituals by local monks in the monastery.  
Because these religious practices are the traditions of many Tibetan communities, one may 
ask: how can they be treated as development or related to development? It is true that many of 
those rituals and religious practices are the traditions of many traditional tribes, but I want to 
argue that we cannot separate them from the current socioeconomic context, a context in which 
the communities are situated and that community members make sense of through their 
traditional practices. That is, when community members express their concern over their 
situation of falling behind economically and the need to make changes, those traditions, indeed, 
are added new social meanings.  Those religious practices and rituals are related to their desires 
and wishes including letting their kids be enrolled in the schools with a better teaching quality 
and to be employed in very important key government offices, having their village members be 
employed and promoted in government administration, preventing villagers from engaging in 
gambling and stealing, success in their wealth generation, and the overall improvement in the 
economic condition of the community. All of their concerns, desires, and those traditions are 
situated in the current socioeconomic context that is informed by the state apparatus, neo-liberal 
market economy, and Tibetan people’s own imagination of development that is related to their 
traditions and new religious movements.  
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At the same time, Rakhor herders’ religious practices and rituals inform another form of 
development suggested by Khenpo Tsullo (Chapter 5), an articulation of development including 
both this lifetime as well as the future lifetimes. Many of these religious practices and rituals are, 
on the one hand, the investment into their next lives by accumulating positive karma, and on the 
other hand, they are ways in which Tibetan herders can gain real happiness and peace in their 
current lifetimes. This is what Khenpo Tsullo called “the balance of one’s inner and outer 
development” (2003b:190-191).  
In the case of Khenpo Tsullo’s visit, even though most herders in Rakhor have not 
renewed their vows of stopping the selling of massive numbers of yaks to the meat market, 
which was said to have serious negative impacts on the individual and community well-being, 
they deployed education as a strategy in which herders strive to let their children avoid sinful 
slaughter. Many herders expressed that Khenpo Tsullo’s religious teaching have increased 
Tibetan herders’ awareness and understanding of Tibetan Buddhism. Many herders have been 
keeping the religious practices that Khenpo Tsullo asked for and the vows they took during his 
teachings. In short, Khenpo Tsullo’s and other lamas’ teachings have reinforced Tibetan herders’ 
religious belief and understanding, which, according to Khenpo Tsullo, is very important for 
herders to gain real happiness and peace for their current life as well as for the next life, which is 
also part of the larger framework of development that Khenpo Tsullo articulated. As Khenpo 
Tsullo suggests, Tibetan herders are trying to keep a balance between spiritual investment and 
secular material improvement in their everyday lives.  
However, the spiritual development and the secular development are not separated but are 
related through the law of cause-effect, which works through both remote causes (Tib. ring ba’i 
rgyu) and proximate causes (Tib. Nye ba’i rgyu). That is, with karma or the law of cause-effect 
  
264 
(Tib. las or las rgyu ’bras), the level of collective development (a village, tribe, a region, a 
nationality, and so forth) (Tib. sems can sbyi mthun gyi las dbang) and the success of individuals 
in collecting wealth, having a good reputation, and the feeling of contentment and happiness are 
determined by the condition of karma accumulation. The amount of positive karma determines 
the level of fortune and happiness that an individual or collective (a group of people) can enjoy; 
the amount of negative karma determines the level of suffering that the individual and collective 
people will experience (Tsullo, 2003a, 2003b; Rdza Dba’ Sbul, 2008; Khenpo Ye Shes Phun 
Tshogs, 2006). According to the Buddhist teachings, Rakhor people’s collective feeling of 
lagging behind and the individuals’ poverty and illness are the results their negative karma 
accumulation. However, it is important note, as Khenpo Tsullo taught during my interview, that 
Buddhists believe that some past negative karma is relatively light and can be mitigated in the 
current conditions with one’s works of tshogs bsags sgrub sbyong,56 meaning religious rituals 
and practices. Further, the collective development and the well being of individuals for the future 
can be improved through merit accumulation with virtuous conduct and religious practices. It is 
from this religious norm that Rakhor people interpret and took spiritual measures for the 
improvement of their collective development and individual well-being. 
From the material perspective, even though Khenpos Tsullo was not primarily invited to 
solve the village’s problems, during the two days’ of religious teachings, other than the specific 
religious teachings, empowerments, and the taking of vows on slaughter renunciation, Rakhor 
village leaders and local khenpos also asked Khenpo Tsullo to address some material issues that 
Rakhor people were concerned most. Those issues included the importance of education, the 
proper way to improve living conditions, internal conflicts, the negative results of gambling and 
                                                 
56 tshogs bsags pa - accumulation of positive karma; the virtuous practices of perfecting the 'two 
accumulations' of merit and wisdom.  
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stealing, and others. In this sense, many of those religious movements initiated from Larung Gar 
are the collaborative result of khenpos from Larung Gar and local communities. They are a mix 
of Tibetan Buddhist interests and local communities’ interests when they dealing with social and 
economic challenges in development.  In other words, Khenpos Tsullo’s teaching in Rakhor 
worked as guidance for the community to go forward. As Khenpos Tsullo told herders, “what I 
have been doing for these two days, including Buddhist teachings, empowerments, making 
suggestions, pointing out your mistakes, and even my hard attitude toward you, are all about you 
and your future; you will benefit from those teachings for this life and for many other lives. I am 
doing all of these for your own sake.” As a spiritual leader, Khenpo Tsullo’s teaching, correcting 
the collective misdeeds of community such as massive slaughter, works as an effort to make 
positive change for the community. In this sense, his teaching was about the well being of 
community as a group of people in this lifetime and their betterness in other lifetimes. Therefore, 
this was about Tibetan Buddhism as well as about the development of the community, which are 
inseparable from the perspective of Tibetan people. 
In the summer of 2010, Rakhor Village also invited another highly prestigious lama, 
Kalzang Nyima, from Guoluo Prefecture, Qinghai Province. This has been another very 
important measure villagers have taken to reverse the downtrend in their collective fortune. 
According to some informants, the main reason for Rakhor to invite this lama to give religious 
teaching and empowerments is a response to some events that took place in Rakhor in the 
preceding few years, including the loss of the head lama of Rakhor Monastery, the sudden death 
of their outstanding khenpo, the conflicts and fighting between villagers, and the recent increase 
in the cases of stealing and gambling. More generally, the lama was invited in the hope that his 
religious teachings, empowerment, and fortune telling would bring prosperity and luckiness to 
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the community. As a herder told me, that they invited Lama Kalzang Nyima because they 
wanted to reverse the recent downtrend of their village and to have their community lam la ’gro 
rgyu or yar la ’gro rgyu, meaning to be successful in making progress or to make sure things go 
smoothly. Another reason that Rakhor wanted to invite him is that the monastery where the lama 
came from is the headquarter monastery57 of Rakhor monastery, so this is way to reinforce 
traditional social connections and monastery networks. 
As the lama’s visit was a very important event for the village, the local khenpos and 
village leaders made many efforts for the preparation of the religious teachings a month ahead, 
holding numerous meetings, during which the main agenda was to encourage herders to take a 
second oath of refraining from massive slaughtering, to persuade herders to contribute as much 
donations as possible for the visiting lamas (the minimum was 100 RMB per household), and to 
discuss the arrangement for the welcome ceremony. Because there were very few herders who 
have cars, village leaders asked herders to borrow fancy cars from others for the welcome 
ceremony. Traditionally horse riding was the only way to receive important lamas; this was 
replaced by motorcycle a few years ago, but now is gradually being replaced by cars.   
 
In August 18, 2010, Kalzang Nyima, the lama from Payel Monastery arrived at the 
monastery of Rakhor village in his Landcruiser. The lama was welcomed by cars from 
about 30 kilometers away from the monastery, and by horse riding within one kilometer 
away, and by the khenpos and monks two hundred meters away from monastery.  He 
stayed three days in Rakhor Village, with two and a half days’ Buddhist teachings and 
empowerments with occasional lectures to herders. Because this was a very special day 
                                                 
57 Headquarter monastery is a monastery that has several branch monasteries, which are established by the 
lamas from the headquarter monastery.  
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for the herders, all herders, male and female, gathered to that religious event, giving up 
herding for those days. In addition to herders, there were also many Tibetan government 
officials both currently in position and retired ones, and their family members who came 
to receive the empowerment of the lama and his teachings. 
During the religious teaching for lay herders, the lama was sitting on a throne 
inside of a room in the second floor of the hall of the monastery. The lay herders were 
sitting outside on the ground where they could see the lama through the windows. The 
sound of the lama’s speech was delivered to the lay herder through a very good 
microphone and well-equipped audio system. The site of the religious teaching was 
surrounded by cars, which is different from a decade ago, when there were only horse and 
motorcycles available for herders. On the first day (August  19, 2010), the lama gave 
religious teachings only to local khenpos and monks in the monastery. For the second day 
and the afternoon of the third day, the lama gave lay people various Buddhist teachings 
and empowerments. 
 
 As lamas and khenpos are different (see the footnote in the Introduction), unlike 
Khenpo Tsullo’s style of giving lots of lectures and religious teachings that is more a way to 
educate herders on both secular and religious issues, Lama Kalzang Nyima did not give long 
lectures.  Instead, he spent most of his time on religious empowerments and chanting, with a few 
short speeches. Though one is a lama and another a khenpo, Lama Kalzang Nyima showed great 
respect to Khenpo Tsullo; in several cases during his teaching, Lama Kalzang Nyima referred to  
Khenpo Tsullo’s teachings in his emphasis on the necessity of refraining from slaughtering and 
eating meat. Showing his support for Khenpo Tsullo, Lama Kalzang Nyima also suggested 
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herders to stop the larger scale of slaughtering, eating meat, gambling, stealing, internal conflicts, 
and others, but he did not force herders into the vows, but asked them to participate in those 
vows voluntarily. Though using the opportunity of the lama’s present, local khenpos had tried 
very hard to bring herders into the vows of not slaughtering, but they did not gain support from 
the villager leaders and lay people. By the end, there weren’t many herders who took vows of not 
slaughtering for the meat market; yet, there were some villagers who took vows of refraining 
from eating meat, drinking alcohol, smoking, and gambling as those conducts are considered to 
be sinful and are destructive for the community. 
Another very important ritual performed by the lama with the community members was 
the offering to their mountain deity. On the morning of the third day of the lama’s stay in 
Rakhor, the lama led villagers to offer lab rtse, that is to make an offering to the mountain deity, 
located at a site on the top of a hill near the monastery. Khenpos, monks, and male herders were 
gathered on the hill, and with the lama’s attendance and chanting, villagers renewed the core 
flags of the lab rtse and made the offering to the deities. This offering to the mountain deities 
with the lama’s attendance has a special meaning. The lama’s lead in the offering means that the 
deities will work harder in the task of protecting the village and in bringing fortune to the 
community in the future. The lama’s presence at the site of offering has a symbolic meaning of 
strengthening the relationship between deities and the community.  In other words, with the 
lama’s authority, now Rakhor people and the mountain gods have a better connection with 
villagers and a new start for the overall improvement of the community.  
Therefore, in Rakhor, the performance of the lab rtse ritual and religious teachings 
together have become a spiritual strategy for the community members to make positive changes 
for the well being of their community, and the lama’s attendance has become a very important 
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mediation in this spiritual enhancement. The potential changes expected by villagers with this 
religious ritual may include many things, but to name a few, they include more students being 
able to go to a higher level of education or becoming government officials, less sinful deeds such 
as stealing and gambling, increase in livestock population, and other forms of prosperity for  
Rakhor Village. If any positive changes take place in Rakhor after the lama’s visit, it would be 
very possible that the villagers would make a causal connection between the lama’s visit and 
these changes, as is very common in Tibetan society. For instance, it was the case in another 
village of Qiongxi Township that when villagers saw three government officials from their 
village receive promotions in government offices, they connected those promotions with their 
previous religious rituals.  As a government employee who is from that village said, “after our 
village had moved one lab rtse to the new location, three officials from our tribe have been 
promoted to a very high level in the county government,” and very recently another three 
officials from that village have gotten promotions as well. This has been interpreted as a result of 
their visiting a lama; as one herder put it, “after we visited a reincarnated lama, our village had 
three government officials promoted.” Through their link to the wellbeing of community 
members, these spiritual efforts are situated in the current social and economic arrangement. 
Other than religious rituals and teachings performed by lamas, local monks and khenpos in 
Rakhor monastery, like many other Tibetan community monasteries, have been doing monthly 
chanting and rituals, such the sde ba’ rim ’gro and sbyi srong to pray for the well-being of their 
community and its members.   
The herders’ recent embrace of state education marks a radical change in their relationship 
with the education programs and the state apparatus. This change, on the one hand, is informed 
by the Tibetan Buddhists’ religious movements; and, on the other hand, it is associated with the 
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Tibetan herders’ experience of the state and neo-liberal development. More importantly, this is a 
simultaneous process in which the herders are making their own sense of development by 
integrating the secular interpretations and spiritual interpretations with corresponding measures. 
The community economic wellbeing, the engagement with the state and its projects, and 
accessing modern education, are not separable from their religious practices and rituals; instead, 
the religious practices and rituals are highly compatible with their sense of development. In other 
words, development is infused into their religious traditions and beliefs in their articulations and 
everyday practices. The conjuncture of development with religious norms and practices is 
informed by their experience of the forces of recent religious movements, the state apparatus, 
development projects, and their religious tradition in contemporary social-cultural transformation 
brought by the secular, neo-liberal project of “Open up the West” campaign. 
In short, Tibetan herders have continued their sedimented cultural memory of the past 
(Moore, 1996), one aspect of which is tribal nomadic culture, and another aspect of which is 
Tibetan Buddhism that is recently reinforced by Tibetan religious elites with their various 
movements. At the same time, they are also embedded in the secular neo-liberal social structure 
that works as “socialism from far” (Ong and Zhang, 2008). Yet, their negotiation is situated in a 
social context in which development has become a decisive yet controversial topic for different 
agents that encounter each other in development: development is the only logic for the state 
while khenpos articulate their own way of development, and herders experience development 
within these forces. 
 
 
 
  
271 
Overlapping forces of state development and the slaughter renunciation movement 
 - Pushing toward a neo-liberal social relationship 
 
As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, the different forces of secular neoliberal development 
and religious elites’ interpretations of and teachings for Buddhism in the contemporary world 
produce competing subjects among Tibetan herders, but these competing forces are not totally 
opposite.  It is not the case that they never speak to each other. Rather I observed lots of 
overlapping parts between these forces while they can still be distinguished in forming different 
kinds of subjects. In this sense, development is not only a matter of contestation and resistance 
that many political activists and scholars have conceptualized, nor is it the single harmonious 
voice that the state has portrayed. Instead it is much more complex process of contestation that 
exists simultaneously with a process of mutual constitution and a relation of embracing one 
another. This section explores a phenomenon in which the state neo-liberal development strategy 
and religious teachings have overlapped to the extent that they all have been bringing a similar 
transformation to Tibetan pastoralists. The efforts made by both khenpos and the state to achieve 
that transformation include the provision of modern education to the younger generation of 
herders, encouragement of adult herders to participate in the market economy by doing business 
or being employed in part time wage labor, and the promotion of sedentarization of herders. In 
the process, all of these moves have had a significant impact on the Tibetan nomadic culture and 
the traditional production system, which has further triggered a debate about what constitutes 
Tibetan culture: Tibetan Buddhism or Tibetan nomadic culture. Yet, all of those moves, in the 
long run, turn Tibetan herders from a moral economy based on kinship social relationship into 
the neoliberal social relationship, which is at the core of the uneven process of development. 
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If one asks what herders should be doing if they should not sell livestock for the meat 
market, given that it is a very important income source, Khenpo Tsullo has generationally 
specific suggestions for the alternatives.  Many of those suggestions are the same in many of his 
religious teachings in different pastoral areas, but others are location-specific.  Four common 
suggestions cut across many of his teachings. His first message for herders in many places is to 
urge herders to send their kids to the state schools, suggesting that learning knowledge both 
traditional and new is the only path for Tibetan herders. Second, he encourages adult herders to 
make a living by working in wage labor in towns including construction work, the service 
industry, and other work that is not related to killing and hurting. Third, if possible, herders are 
also encouraged to learn different skills or arts. Fourth, Khenpo Tsullo encourages herders, if 
they can, to making money by engaging in business with one’s honesty and without involving 
killing and hurting. For instance, during his teaching near Qinghai Lake, he was very supportive 
of herders who have been making a living with tourism business instead of herding livestock. In 
another teaching in Guoluo Prefecture, his first suggestion for herders was to make a living by 
collecting caterpillar fungus and other herbs, because these regions are rich in caterpillar fungus 
and other medical herbs. Other than these new suggestions, selling dairy products and livestock 
wool while treating livestock well, is always encouraged.   
These suggestions represent a common expression of many khenpos in the promotion of 
the slaughter renunciation movement. However, ironically, their suggestions and efforts have 
been exactly the same as what the state has been promoting in the pastoral areas of Tibetan 
plateau for the past several decades. The overlap is in their similar efforts to integrate herders 
into the market economy by transferring herders from their traditional livestock production to the 
settled life in the towns. Khenpos’ recommendations for educating young Tibetan herders in 
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modern education system, encouraging adult herders to be employed in part-time labor in towns, 
and cultivating herders into entrepreneurs by encouraging them to engage in business, and 
making a living in other ways such as collecting or cultivating herbs, has become a force that 
reinforces the recent state strategy of integrating herders into Chinese neo-liberalization process 
intensified by the recent “Open up the West” campaign (see Chapter 2). This overlap is well 
demonstrated by comparing a religious teaching of Khenpo Tsullo with a statement of the Party 
Secretary of Sichuan Province.   
Khenpo Tsullo stated in Rakhor Village: 
…Economically, Tibetans are lagging behind, and Tibetans need 
more economic development, but slaughtering yaks and gambling will 
never bring prosperity to herders…   
...If we continue what we are doing now, after ten to fifteen years, the 
future scenario of Tibetan people will be that some Tibetan herders will be 
living on the top of mountains herding yaks and another few will be doing 
farming in some valleys. In the towns and cities, there will be no Tibetans, 
but there will be other nationalities like Han people and Hui people. Then, 
why is it that there will be no Tibetans in towns? Because Tibetans do not 
have knowledge and skills to live in the towns, and without knowledge, 
people cannot live in the towns. … 
 
The Party Secretary of Sichuan Province, Liu Qibao, stated during his visit to 
the sites of the Housing Project for Herders in 2010: 
By providing herders with public infrastructure and service facilities, 
[the housing project] is to help Tibetan herders to improve their living 
conditions and to be fully integrated into modern civilization, ensuring that 
modern concepts are integrated into the entire project of houses for herders.   
The permanent houses for herders in the settlement sites should be 
supported by the industrialization to make sure that herders are settled and 
have jobs. With a strategy that is long term, better prepared, and localized, 
the local government should help those settled herders develop their 
economic industry and to make sure that they are employed. With the 
housing project, local government should guide herders to gain market 
awareness and commodity consciousness to commercialize traditional 
livestock production… in order to realize the transfer of labor from 
pastures, the local government should enhance the vocational training 
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programs to improve the suzhi of herders to further help herders working in 
the secondary industry and service sector. 
 
Both suggest that herders need to be settled in town by adopting more market-oriented 
practices. What all of these suggestions do are alter the traditional livestock production system 
and the related nomadic culture. That is, as herding has been the main means of subsistence for 
Tibetan herders for over a thousand years, continuing during the commune system, this 
production system has produced a rich nomadic culture, constituting a very important aspect of 
Tibetan culture. Most Tibetan herders make a living with the livestock production of mostly yaks 
and sheep, and most of them consider themselves as drokpa, Tibetan herders. However, this 
production system and its cultural practices have become problematic for both the state/neo-
liberal economy and Tibetan religious elites in their articulation of development.  
For the state, its rationales for getting rid of traditional herding are that the way Tibetans 
herd livestock has been economically inefficient and ecologically destructive. A common 
discourse of the state about Tibetan herders and their way of life is that herders’ lives are harsh, 
their way of thinking is backwards, and the traditional production system is economically 
inefficient. All of these should be changed with many of state measures through many policies 
and projects, including the housing project, compulsory education promotion, vocational skill 
training, the current attempt to establish cooperatives among herders, and other economic 
policies.  
The housing program is provided with the rationales that herders can be settled so that they 
can benefit from modern services such as school education, health care, and others provided by 
the state, and that they can therefore better participate in the market economy (Chapter 1). The 
state wants herders to become competitive market actors, a status that is supposed to be achieved 
through state education programs including Nine-years’ Compulsory Education Program, “9+3” 
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Vocational Program (nine year compulsory education plus three years of vocational training, a 
Sichuan provincial program that is designed for Tibetans), and “Ten Years’ Action on Education 
Construction Program” (provincial program). With these education programs, the suzhi of the 
younger generation of herders will be improved in a way they can become future human capital 
in the market economy that can be exchanged in the labor market. It is also strongly encouraged 
for herders to participate in the market economy. The state has highly stressed the importance of 
increasing the off-take rate for herders and to run their pastures and livestock through an 
entrepreneurial logic.  Other recent state efforts include those to reduce the number of herders 
relying on pastoralism in order to eliminate the “overgrazing” problems that has been considered 
to be the critical cause of grassland degradation in pastoral Tibet. The programs of Rangeland 
Ecological Compensation Mechanism and the establishments of cooperatives among herders are 
also being introduced to many pastoral areas, with which herders are trained to become 
entrepreneurs. The overall goal of those programs is to remove most of the herders from their 
pastures and settle them in towns working as hired labor in the businesses started with the 
establishment of cooperatives and in other sectors.  
In a similar way, Tibetan religious movement like the slaughter renunciation movement 
have put another layer of pressure on traditional livestock production and the nomadic way of 
life. With the slaughter renunciation movement, grounded in both religious and secular reasons, 
khenpos have not only been encouraging herders to give up income from slaughtering yaks, they 
have also been suggesting alternative ways for Tibetan herders to make a living, which will have 
a similar outcome as that promoted by the state agenda. In other words, khenpos’ alternative 
suggestions for Tibetan herders take place in a larger socioeconomic context in which Tibetan 
herders have been facing social-cultural transformation through the state development program 
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designed for the economic integration of marginalized region into eastern economic zone (“Open 
up the West” campaign), and the larger cultural integration of different ethnic groups into one 
cultural assembly which will contribute to the stabilization of western regions. In the process, to 
some extent, khenpos advice for herders reinforces the state neo-liberal policies to transform the 
moral economy and the nomadic cultural identity into a neo-liberal uneven social relationship. 
Therefore, khenpos’ suggestions, overlapping with state efforts, have two significant impacts on 
Tibetan pastoralists: cultural transformation of the nomadic way of life, and pushing toward new 
social relationship formed in the process of uneven development. Khenpos’ suggestions are 
specific, generational, and gendered, but they will have a profound impact on nomadic culture 
and moral economy in pastoral areas of Tibet.  
 
Education for younger generation of herders  
Education is one of the most important components of khenpos’ teachings. Most of the 
khenpos suggest that education (that best be consistent with Tibetan Buddhism) or becoming 
persons with knowledge is the best way for Tibetan herders to get rid of their sinful and harsh 
livestock herding practices, and it is also suggested as the only future path for the Tibetan people. 
Khenpos Tsullo taught herders during Rakhor Village: 
…herders should work hard to let their children be educated. There are 
some herders like those in Seda County who spent lots of money in order to 
avoid sending kids to schools and becoming educated. You should not do 
that. That is paying money to cause harm to yourself…if your kids are well 
educated in school, then they will not need to do what you are doing now…  
…We should not continue what we have been doing recently. 
Otherwise, we will be going further downward… 
… if you do not let your kids be educated, your children will follow 
your footsteps to make a living by slaughtering yaks and gambling. There 
will be no place for the next young Tibetans to live in towns if they are not 
well educated. Even if they live in the towns, without being educated, they 
will become the underworld in the towns… 
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As suggested by khenpos, with an integrated effort of state education policies, khenpos’ 
and lamas’ teachings, and herders’ own marginalized experiences, for the last few decades, 
herders have increasingly embraced the state education program. From the religious perspective, 
the idea is that with education, at the individual level, young herders will have wider options of 
making a living that are not very sinful. As the state education system is designed to produce 
Tibetan herders as competitive market actors by improving their suzhi (quality) in the job market 
and business industries, by accessing modern education, khenpos want Tibetan herders to be 
better equipped and with better skills and knowledge for the employment in non-sinful positions 
in the job market. This will benefit their material improvement in the current life, and it is also 
good for their future lives. However, khenpos’ recommendation of education for herders is very 
similar to the state education programs in the sense that, for both the state and khenpos, the 
advocacy of modern education is a generational project with which the next generation of 
Tibetan herders will be relocated from their pastoral production and their culture. Education for 
both the state and khenpos is the project with which the next generation of herders will be settled 
in towns and fully integrated into neo-liberal social arrangement.  
This future will can be seen from some current trends. First, this can be seen from herders’ 
embrace of modern education in their effort to catch up to the more developed ones. For 
instance, in order to let his daughter be educated in the Hongyuan County Primary School, the 
best school where the entire curriculums is in Chinese, a herder from Rakhor recently left his 
pasture and settled in the county town working as a doorkeeper for a hotel. While he is in town 
with this daughter, his wife has been taking careful of their 40 yaks on their pasture. He thinks 
that this is in the best interest of his daughter for her future as she will learn very good Chinese 
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language and many other new things. Many herders express that they do not want their kids to be 
herders because of both the sin involved in slaughtering and the hard and harsh work related to 
traditional herding practices. 
Secondly, we can see this transitional trend by looking at the current situation. Even 
though the numbers of young herders who have gotten government jobs or stable jobs are small 
compared to those who remained unemployed, one trend in Tibetan pastoral areas is that those 
educated and unemployed young herders do not want to go back to the pastures they come from, 
and they rather prefer to stay in towns working in part-time jobs. Because young herders usually 
leave their pasture when they are young and get used to the life in the towns or cities, it is very 
hard for them to return back to their pastures herding livestock. Elderly herders sometimes 
complain that those young Tibetans did not learn enough to get stable jobs on the one hand, but, 
on the other hand, they lost the skills and experiences needed for working as herders and they 
cannot get used to the hard work required for livestock production, so they are wandering around 
on the streets like “street boys.”  An observation of this current trend suggests that the promotion 
of education for the young generation means that there will be fewer and fewer young Tibetan 
herders going back to their pastures. Considering the facts that the positions in the state apparatus 
has its limit to absorb the unemployed and that herding is encouraged by neither khenpos nor by 
the state, the future option for the most of those young herders is either to become entrepreneurs 
who own their own business or to be employed by those with capital and resources in the towns 
and cities, leaving their hometown in searching for the jobs.   
For the state, with education, there will be fewer and fewer primitive and backward 
herders who live outside of neo-liberal social realms. This has significance for the state, 
including social stability, cultural integration, economic development, and ecological security 
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related to overgrazing. For Tibetan khenpos, with the transition from uneducated herders to 
educated Tibetans, these Tibetans will have gain better ways of life that are consistent with 
Tibetan Buddhist norms and that will be positive karma collection for their future lives, 
conceptualized in a broader framework of development, related to samsara. 
 
Working part-time jobs in towns 
It is the main strategy of the state to settle the herders down and let them work as part-time 
laborers or to start their own businesses becoming entrepreneurs. This is very clear from the 
housing projects for herders as well from recent rangeland ecological projects such as the 
Rangeland Ecological Compensation Mechanism. All of these projects encourage herders to 
leave their pastures and to make a living by means other than herding. Similarly, Khenpo 
Tsullo’s main suggestion for adult herders is to make a living by working in part time labor such 
as construction works and the service sector in towns. Compared with making a living by 
slaughtering yaks, these physical forms of labor are las rgyu ’bras las ka red, which means that 
they are work consistent with the law of cause-effects and the money they earned from these 
forms of work are clean. He states in his book Lam Gyi ’jug Sgo, 
Herders should keep small numbers of yaks and sheep to use them 
without harming them; this is to keep herders’ pastures. Male herders 
should go to their own towns or other towns to look for income sources. 
Most herders are illiterate, they cannot collect wealth with their knowledge, 
but they can make a living by working with manual labor. To make a living 
by engaging in physical work should be encourage and praised, because it is 
an honest and fair way of making a living. One does not need to feel guilt 
about making a living with physical work for this lifetime and for the next 
lifetimes, so herders should work hard to do this. (2003b:201) 
 
He encourages herders to change their old attitude toward these new jobs. During his 
religious teachings in Rakhor, he said:  
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...for the older ones, it is too late to learn new things, but they should at 
least try to make a living by engaging in physical work. It doesn’t really 
matter whether one works in construction jobs or even shoe shining in the 
streets. Some people may say they feel shame to engage in such dirty works 
like shoe shining. However, this is wrong. There is nothing to be ashamed of 
in shining shoes. What you really should be ashamed of is to make money by 
slaughtering a dozen livestock in slaughterhouses, and to see it as an 
admirable thing…. 
  
As suggested by khenpos and encouraged by the state, there has been a trend recently in 
which more and more herders have left their pastures and work in the daily or hourly wage labor 
jobs in towns in many pastoral areas of Tibet. These part-time jobs include construction, street 
cleaning, doorkeeper, and working as daily or hourly paid labors for mushroom cultivation bases 
and meat processing in slaughterhouses. With these jobs, settled herders do not earn as much as 
those herding livestock who sell dairy products and livestock as their main income sources. For 
instance, herders who work in construction earn 60-80 RMB per day in Hongyuan County and 
this is only available for the five months of summer time. People usually see these forms of 
physical work as “fair work and clean earnings” without serious sin involved. As a herder said, 
“you will earn what you worked for, and it is not sinful.” However, many Tibetans who work in 
meat processing in the slaughterhouses have become controversial for their work, because their 
work is related to slaughtering. Similar issues exist for the truck drivers who transport livestock 
in the meat market. Moreover, those part-time jobs have not been highly valued by many herders 
who have sufficient livestock to make a living, who see those forms of work as the last option for 
“those who do not have sufficient livestock to make a living” as herders put it.  
 
Venturing into the business world 
Even though Khenpo Tsullo does not recommend excessive attachment to material wealth 
or to believe that material development is the only source to gain real happiness and peace, he 
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has been putting great emphasis on doing business as an alternative to the income from selling 
livestock to the meat market. The three stories about herders who have become entrepreneurs 
with the Housing Project for Herders that I introduced in Chapter Two, the recent state 
encouragement of herders to establish their own cooperatives for their dairy products, the 
establishment of the ranch model of livestock production, and the yak economic park, are all 
designed to generate competitive entrepreneurs out of previous herders. Those state efforts share 
much similarity with the Khenpo’s recommendation of business for herders as an alternative 
income source. During his visit to Rakhor, he said:  
Do you know how many restaurants and shops there are in Mewa 
(Hongyuan) County Town? How much money are those restaurants and 
shops making? Where does the money come from? Who is making and taking 
the money away? … How many Tibetans are there making the money? There 
are not Tibetans making money. Most of them are Han Chinese or Shar Rgya 
people (small minorities between Han Chinese and Tibetans). For instance, 
the most lucrative herb, caterpillar fungus: Tibetan people collect them on 
their own land, but Tibetan people do not know how to do make money out of 
it, but other people are making far greater more out it. A similar case is with 
the butter and cheese that Tibetan herders collected from their yaks, but 
Tibetans do not know how to run business with them.  In those cases, 
Tibetans are doing the hardest works, and making the smallest profit. Do all 
of you know that? 
 
Herders’ engaging in business that does involve very sinful conducts like hurting or killing 
is highly encouraged by Khenpo Tsullo, who in contrast to the traditional view of business as 
dishonest, does not consider doing business as being sinful conduct.  He said in the religious 
teaching near the Qinghai Lake, “If people become super rich with their hard work and honesty, 
it is not a problems with respect to Buddhist norms.”  
For the last two decades, in Hongyuan County town, there have been many herders who 
have attempted to engage in doing businesses in the towns, including running small stores, 
restaurants, and small hotels; making money by driving trucks and vans for transportation; being 
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middlemen for dairy products, yak furs, and medicinal herbs, and others. Many of them have 
failed in their adventuring in business but others have survived and become successful in their 
new careers. During my field research, in many pastoral areas of Tibet I encountered many 
herders who expressed their strong desire to do business, but many of them shared similar 
concerns, including their lack of experience, skills, and capital to start businesses. In addition, in 
China, to achieve high performance in business requires not only general business skills, but also 
fluency in Chinese language, which makes a huge difference in one’s success. However, most of 
herders do not have this skill. Even faced with many challenges, some herders have been trying 
repeatedly after failures.  There is certainly enthusiasm about doing business among Tibetan 
herders. There are herders in Hongyuan and other places who have started their own small 
businesses including brickyards, dairy processing factories, clothing factories, furniture 
factories, hotels, tourism sites, and so forth.  Successful former herders have become models for 
other herders to “jump into the sea,” where some have survived and many have drowned.  
One scenario in Hongyuan County Town represents an ideal model for khenpos for 
Tibetan herders to make a living in the future. An exceptionally successful Tibetan businessman 
from Mewa tribe who left his pasture more than ten years ago and ventured into doing business 
selling materials for Tibetan clothes, has recently started to run a hotel in the buildings he built 
recently. He hired a herder from Rakhor village, who had recently moved to town working as a 
doorkeeper for the hotel in order to take care of his daughter in the county primary school. 
The Tibetan businessman does not need to make a living by herding livestock and selling 
his yaks, and his running of a hotel is considered to be clean earnings. He is also a Buddhist and 
has been hiring young Tibetans in his hotel. The herder from Rakhor village has also been 
making an effort to change the life of his daughter by providing her with a modern education. 
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The important aspect of this scenario is that both the businessman and the herders are Tibetan 
Buddhists who are making a living ways that do not involve serious sins. This scenario is 
simultaneously that which Khenpo Tsullo wants to see, and at the same time, what the state 
wants to see insofar as all are participating in the market economy each playing their own roles: 
one with capital and another with labor power to sell.  
 
Collecting Herbs 
Another alternative income for Tibetan herders is collecting herbs, including yartsa gunbu 
(Caterpillar fungus), beimu (Fritillaria), qianghuo (Notopterygium incisum), and other medicinal 
plants. The most lucrative one is yartsa (Caterpillar fungus), but the level of yield has 
geographical variation. It is abundant in some areas in the eastern TAR, northern Sichuan, and 
western Qinghai Province, where herders mostly do not sell yaks to slaughterhouses because the 
income from yartsa is high enough. However, many pastoral areas do not produce enough yartsa 
for herders to make a living from it. Other herbs also have geographic differentiations in their 
production. In Hongyuan County, the last few decades have see more and more herders 
collecting herbs. In Hongyuan, yartsa is not very abundant; the income from it is not as lucrative 
as it is in other pastoral areas in western Naqu and Changdu Prefectures, TAR, and in Guoluo 
and Yushu Prefectures, Qinghai, and Ganzi Prefecture in Sichuan.58 In Hongyuan, yartsa could 
earn herders about 1,000 – 2,000 RMB for a year, which is tiny compared with some other 
pastoral areas in Naqu and Guoluo Prefectures where some households can make more than 
200,000R MB per year. In a village in Naqu Prefecture in the TAR, for example, the sixteen 
households surveyed earned 24,866 RMB on average, ranging from 12,000 RMB to 54,000 
RMB per family from harvesting in 2009; these households do not sell their yaks to the meat 
                                                 
58 http://www.danielwinkler.com/caterpillar_fungus_in_tibet.htm  
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market (Yonten, 2012). In Hongyuan, herders harvest Beimu as a very important income source 
in addition to dairy and meat products.  
 Tibetan religious elites have different opinions about the collection of herbs regarding the 
question of whether it is a sinful deed or not. One highly respected lama in Mewa tribe in 
Hongyuan County suggested that collecting herbs is sinful because it entails the killing of many 
insects, and it also causes damage to the surface of the ground. But Khenpo Tsullo maintains that 
collecting herbs is not that sinful or it is not as sinful as is slaughtering. Ironically when Khenpo 
Tsullo met this lama a few years ago to discuss the urgent need to stop the massive slaughter in 
the tribe headed by this lama who is also of the Nyingma sect of Tibetan Buddhism, the lama did 
not force his people into the slaughter renunciation movement as Khenpo Tsullo expected, but 
had been making lots of efforts to stop herders from harvesting herbs.  
The potential for herders to make a living with herb harvesting is unclear, because many 
companies from outside have been making great efforts in research on artificial cultivation of 
those herbs, particularly yartsa. For instance, the artificial cultivation of beimu has been 
successful in northern Sichuan Province, which will have a huge impact on market. These home-
based herb cultivation bases have become a new industry that the state encourages, in particular 
encouraging herders to start their own plantation bases or to be employed in these new 
companies. 
All of these suggestions and trends in herders’ changing livelihoods represent a radical 
break from the pastoral lifestyle.  As an alternative to the practice of herding, khenpos’ 
suggestions indicate a new direction in which a gradual transition of pastoralist population from 
their pastures to the towns will take place, suggesting the necessity of social-cultural 
transformation in pastoral areas in the near future.  This transformation will have significant 
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impacts on nomadic culture, which is a unique and very distinctive culture and production 
system of Tibet on the Tibetan plateau. However, this production system and cultural practices 
have become problematic for both the state/neo-liberal economy and Tibetan religious elites in 
their articulation of development. For the former, their rationale is that the way Tibetans herd 
livestock has been economically inefficient and ecologically destructive. For the latter, it is new 
articulations of Buddhist norms that are pushing herders to new directions. Therefore, ethical 
reforms, such as ten-merit-rules, slaughter renunciation, fur renunciation movement, 
vegetarianism, disassociation from knives and weapons, and others, have increasingly become a 
real agent of social change in Tibetan areas that participate in the slaughter renunciation 
movement, and many of them have ironically overlapped with state efforts.  
Even though both Khenpo Jigphun and Khenpo Tsullo had the intentions to ask herders to 
make a living on dairy products, but Tibetan herders in the eastern Tibetan plateau are under 
pressure of needing more cash to cope with their increasing expenditure generated by the neo-
liberal market economy, and the pressure of overstocking problems on herders’ pasture that is 
associated with the slaughter renunciation movements. Therefore, to achieve an ideal condition 
where Tibetan Buddhism and traditional cultural practices can happily co-exist seems to be 
difficult in the current socioeconomic structure. That is, in Tibet, Buddhist ethical norms and 
Tibetan cultural practices have always existed in tension around issues like slaughtering animals 
and consuming meat. The slaughter renunciation movement has exacerbated these tensions by 
asking nomads to give up their traditional lifestyle in order to adhere to a Buddhist precept, 
which has involved a negotiation of giving up one part of Tibetan tradition, the nomadic culture, 
for the sake of preserving and improving another part of Tibetan culture, Tibetan Buddhism. 
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One potential change coming from these new suggestions and trends is that herders will 
increasingly depart from self-sufficient livestock production and be integrated into a more cash 
based market economy. Those settled herders now need to buy butter, cheese, and meat from the 
market with their cash income, which is different from other herders who have their own 
livestock with which they can produce those products by themselves. A shift in social relations 
taking place with these changes is that the settled herders are no long independent household 
production units, but rather they have new social relationships with others in which they are 
either the ones with capital who can hire others or the ones without capital but who have labor 
power and time to sell to others. Khenpos’ religious movements and the state secular neo-liberal 
force have been working together to engender a similar social relation constituted by the 
exploiters and the exploited (Marx, 1978) among those settled herders.  
Yet, this unevenness is normalized by the neo-liberal free market norms on the state side 
and is masked by the religious norms such as karma and tshogs bsags bsod nams on the religious 
side. In the secular neo-liberal norms, the economic differences among regions and among 
people are masked by the notion of self-responsibility and self-entrepreneurship and the 
seemingly fair and free competition (Foucault, 2008). With those notions, if people feel they are 
falling behind and marginalized, the causes for those differences are not structure and power 
relationships in resource access and distribution, but rather are searched for in the individual 
factors such as capabilities, hard work, adequate attitude, and others. Within the Buddhist norms, 
the economic differences between collectives and individuals are interpreted as well as masked 
with the norms of karma accumulation. That is, the condition of lagging behind of a group of 
people (for instance Rakhor Village) and the poverty of individual households (for instance, 
those poor households who left their pastures and work in part-time labor in towns) are 
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spiritually attributed to their negative karma accumulation. At the same time, those in better 
conditions, including better developed communities, lamas and religious leaders, state officials in 
powerful positions, successful businessmen, and very rich herders, are labeled as bsod nams can, 
which means person with good merit or fortune, that are attributed to their previous positive 
karma accumulations. With Buddhist-informed neo-liberalism, outcomes are not attributed to the 
structural inequality of power relationships and resource access, but rather to karma collection 
and morally adequate behavior. According to Buddhist norms of remote causes (Tib. ring ba’i 
rgyu) and proximate causes (Tib. Nye ba’i rgyu) (Khenpo Tsullo, 2003b:p.380), what those poor 
people need to do is to accumulate merit and work hard for their future fortune.  The expression 
of tshogs bsags bsod nams was common in the old days before 1959, but those expressions were 
considered as superstitious and they had become a forbidden expression during the commune 
time by the Communist state, which believed that poverty was caused by rich people and people 
with power. But these expressions have become common again with economic reform and 
liberalization of religious freedom in Tibet since the 1980s. Yet, one thing that should be noted is 
that to recognize these common expressions in the development context does not deny the fact 
that there is debate over the extent of the role that karma and bsod nams play in one’s success 
and how what role personal effort and larger structure play in people’s different conditions.  
While all of these forces including state ecological policies, khenpos’ religious 
movements, and the lures of the market economy, are channeling herders into settled market 
based social relationships, there are structural inequalities that prevent them for them being fully 
engaged in market competition. First, with the coexistence of the neoliberal market economy and 
the strong state in China (Yeh and Gaerrang, 2011), many lucrative resources and sectors are 
controlled by the state and big corporations. In Hongyuan, at the same time, many small 
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businesses including cultured mushroom bases, motor repair, greenhouses, Beimu cultivation 
bases, high-end restaurant and hotels, and home-run tourism services, have also been mostly 
dominated by outsiders. There are many obstacles for local herders to compete in these sectors, 
including a lack of capital, experience and cultural knowledge, language barrier, and so forth. 
With this structural arrangement, the only option for most resettled pastoralists is to be employed 
in low wage part-time labor. 
  
Conclusion 
The overlap of the state's development goals and those of religious leaders has occurred in 
the attempts at state settlement projects, the establishment of the Professional Cooperative 
among herders, and in the khenpos’ promotion of the slaughter renunciation movement. One of 
the main goals of the state's projects is to settle herders in permanent housing, moving them into 
cities or towns to become profit-driven market actors. These goals are achieved coincidently 
through the slaughter renunciation movement. Khenpos as well as herders have described the 
hardness and sinfulness of the animal husbandry that they engage in, and encouraged herders to 
find other sources of income. Businesses that do not involve killing or lying have been suggested 
by most khenpos as alternatives to herding. In a similar way, khenpos have also stressed the 
importance of education for herders to be able to make a living in ways other than herding. The 
neoliberal idea of entrepreneurship, the state's attempt to make market actors of herders, and the 
khenpos’ encouragement of herders to do business have all been leading in the same direction, 
but have different motivations and goals supported by different ideologies. Khenpos want the 
herders to engage in business mainly for religious and cultural reasons, but the neoliberalization 
of herders has become a tool used by the state to integrate Tibetan herders into the larger market 
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economy, and thus for the unification of the nation. In other words, the state has been using the 
neoliberalization of herders to further economic development and to strengthen its governance of 
people with different cultural histories. 
Relating to the governmentality issue, it can be argued that the overlap of state projects 
and khenpos’ recommendations for herders can be seen as Foucault’s governmentality, which is 
the force of global capitalist expansion that has enveloped all, including the Chinese state, 
Tibetan Buddhist force, and Tibetan herders. Both the Chinese state and Tibetan religious 
teachings are trying to selectively give cultural meanings for this larger transformation, but 
through both of them Tibetan herders have been moving toward the large transformation, which I 
call “big governmentality.” And, big governmentality as global capitalist expansion is realized 
through all forms of cultural contestations between multiple agents with different cultural 
backgrounds. To me the real forces embedded in this transformation are those modern discourses 
that most of us take for granted in our everyday lives. These discourses include science, 
education, the notion of nature and environmental protection, nationalism, and, of course, 
development and modernization. To understand the process of this expansion, we need to relook 
at these discourses and cultures and tease out what they do in carrying out the task of the larger 
transformation, global capitalist expansion.  
At the same time, it is important to examine small governmentality as cultural 
contestation, through which the big transformation takes place with or without the awareness of 
the people in the cultural contestation.  Tibetan khenpos see the larger process of transformation 
as both a challenge as well as an opportunity just as the state does. For Tibetan Buddhism, the 
transformation brings new cultural practices (increasing slaughtering rate and excessive 
materialism) that go against Tibetan Buddhist norms. At the same time, it has become an 
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opportunity for Tibetan Buddhist to revise some old cultural practices (for instance, slaughtering, 
wearing animal furs, and eating meat) that have been inconsistent with Tibetan Buddhist norms. 
In addition, the new job opportunities, new science and technologies have become useful for 
Tibetan Buddhism to expand its influence and to improve its competiveness in this 
transformation. 
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Conclusion 
Development and spirituality 
Secularization and materialism dominates the world we live in and the manmade 
separation of spirituality from reality has become a “fact” for many people living in modern 
society. However, recently, some scholars have made meaningful efforts to bring spirituality and 
neo-liberal capitalism into one dialogue. Among others, Comaroff and Comaroff (1999, 2000) 
argue that the failure of development to deliver on its promises, in the face of spectacular 
inequalities and speculative wealth, has caused “occult economies” and new religious 
movements, founded on the effort to conjure wealth through enchanted means, to accompany the 
global rise of neo-liberalism. Pentecostalism in Ghana, for example, emphasizes the dangers of 
globalization, but also presents itself as the only way in which people can handle it, rather than 
becoming its victim (Meyer, 1998; Nyamnjoh, 2001; Smith, 2001; 2005). On the basis of a study 
of a “spiritual reform” program in Indonesia, Rudnyckyj (2008, 2009) argues that a supplement 
is needed to understand the processes conjoining neo-liberalism and religious revival that are not 
captured in the Comaroffs’ “occult economies” approach. He proposes “spiritual economy,” a 
new assemblage of Islamic and capitalist ethics in which being a pious Muslim becomes 
equivalent to “inculcating the ethical dispositions deemed conducive to market success” 
(2009:130). In other words, both religion and neo-liberalism enlist subjects in their own self-
government, redefining work as a form of spiritual practice and personal responsibility for both 
this and other-worldly salvation (cf. Pazderic, 2004).   
In the case of my study, I argue that Tibetan Buddhism works as a tool for Tibetan people 
to domesticate neo-liberal development. In other words, my main argument is that, through those 
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Tibetan Buddhist movements and religious teachings, Tibetan Buddhism has become an agent in 
localizing neo-liberal development to make it less culturally destructive, and to make it 
consistent with Buddhist norms and moral standards. This transformation is a selective process in 
which Tibetan Buddhist elites and herders embrace some elements by giving meaning to them, 
and making corrections of others, both traditional and new phenomenon, and totally rejecting 
some others. This argument is my discussion in this dissertation about Buddhist movements, 
Khenpo Tsullo’s articulation of Tibetan Buddhism and its relationship with modern science and 
materialism, and Rakhor villagers’ experience as well their religious practice in their experience 
of lagging behind.  
 
Correcting Neo-liberal development 
The religious movements in Chapter Three are about corrections to and adaptation of 
Tibetan identity. One aspect of those social movements by Tibetan khenpos is the moral 
corrections of Tibetan people, particularly those misconducts that are either brought by or related 
to neo-liberal development. Some of these are corrections of their traditions while other 
problems are news. Slaughtering livestock, eating meat, and wearing animal furs, and the 
specific ways of slaughtering animals, are all traditions of Tibetan pastoralists. But with the 
process of localizing the uneven neo-liberalization, these traditions have become immoral and 
need to be changed with the neo-liberal development that is coded by Tibetan Buddhism. 
The slaughtering of livestock has become a problem, because the neo-liberal social 
condition made it possible for this tradition to become seen as an ethical problem by Tibetan 
religious leaders. As Khenpo Tsullo has said on many occasions, Tibetan herders now have 
many other options to make a living without selling livestock, emphasizing that today is different 
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from times past in which it would have been impossible for slaughter to become religious or 
moral problem. During the time before 1959, slaughtering livestock for the meat market was not 
widespread among Tibetan herders. It was also impossible for Tibetan religious leaders to ask 
people to stop slaughtering livestock, because at that time there were not many options for 
Tibetan herders to make a living other than herding livestock. It would have been impossible 
during the commune system because the state made decisions about everything and religious 
elites did not have power to assert their influence over Tibetans. It is the neo-liberal market 
economy that has made all of these movements possible. In other words, Tibetan khenpos’ 
alternative job suggestions for Tibetan herders with the slaughter renunciation movement are 
those that have been made possible through conditions brought by state economic development, 
including urbanization, infrastructure improvement, and other various state projects. And, in 
terms of the vegetarianism movement, it is the availability of vegetable and other foods in Tibet 
brought by the economic integration of the state that have made it possible. The other part of 
ethical corrections are the new issues, including purifying spoken language, banning gambling, 
stealing, prostitution and having relationships with prostitutes, and accessing drugs. All of these 
issues are directly brought up by the neo-liberal social arrangement or they are related to it. 
Tibetan khenpos are trying to stop these newly emerged phenomenon through their religious 
influence. They are the ethical corrections of these newly emergent social problems that translate 
structural problems into moral problem. Therefore, the ethical correction involved both traditions 
and new misconducts, but both of them are informed by the neo-liberal development process. 
The reinforcement of Tibetan identity and the Tibetan people’s feeling of the need to be 
developed came hand in hand. The people who speak the same language and share the same 
culture across the Tibetan plateau also face another common challenge, which is the feeling of 
  
294 
lagging behind and needing to be developed. Khenpos, as very modernist Buddhists, actively 
engage in the Tibetan society that is very different from monastic tradition, in which Buddhist 
monks and leaders were encouraged to stay in the monasteries focusing on their Buddhist 
practices. The movements of illiteracy eradication and purification of spoken language are the 
ways in which Tibetan khenpos and monks are actively involving themselves in society, to solve 
social problems that are both religious as well as related to development issues. For instance, 
illiteracy eradication is aimed at improving Tibetan lay people’s understanding of Tibetan 
Buddhism and at building the capacity of Tibetan lay people in the development of their living 
condition and their communities, so it has both a religious purpose as well as a development 
agenda that reinforces Tibetan identity. In short, the people’s desire for development reinforced 
their identity, and the reinforcement of identity has led to more desire for development, which is 
highly contested among Tibetans. Thus, I argue that the ethical corrections and adaptation of 
Tibetan identity by Tibetan khenpos are the results of the encounter of Tibetan Buddhist 
modernization and uneven development, and this encounter has led some traditions to be 
transformed and other new misconducts to be corrected with Buddhist norms.  
 
Coding material development with Tibetan Buddhist norms 
In Chapter Five, I discussed how Khenpo Tsullo relates Tibetan Buddhism with 
materialism, science and technology, and the role of karma in development. In terms of material 
improvement, while he sees the necessity of economic development for Tibetan herders through 
all kinds of means that do not accrue negative karma, but he maintains that economic 
development and material improvement itself is not the solution to bring people happiness and 
peace of mind. In his writings, Khenpo Tsullo maintains that material development is not the 
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ultimate meaning of life and it does not bring real happiness and peace. This suggests that 
material improvement and secular-based development do not fulfill their promises. Instead, he 
suggests that Tibetan herders, even all human beings, need to learn and practice Tibetan 
Buddhism which will bring about stable happiness and peace through an understanding of the 
nature of our life, and it is only with Tibetan Buddhism that people can enjoy the material 
improvement they have gained through scientific and technological improvement. In a similar 
vein, Khenpo Tsullo suggests that science and technology also need to be guided by Tibetan 
Buddhist norms such as compassion and the law of cause-effect. Khenpo Tsullo thinks that 
Tibetan herders should learn both traditional Tibetan Buddhism at the same they should learn 
new science and technology to improve their lives.  He calls this inner development by Tibetan 
Buddhism and outer development by new knowledge. As a result, I argue that Tibetan khenpos 
are giving meanings to new discourses and cultures through Tibetan Buddhist norms, so that they 
are less destructive and more beneficial. That is, for Tibetan elites, material development should 
be guided by Tibetan Buddhism, so that it brings that which people need from them. 
 
Collective karma collection and well being 
Another Buddhist idiom that Tibetan khenpos articulate with the discourse of development 
is the force of karma that is a regulative force among all sentient beings in samsara. That is, 
development is not merely a matter concerning human beings, but it also related to other beings 
that are no different from human beings in the realm of samsara. In Tibetan Buddhism, it is 
believed that in samsara, spirit is permanent but it appears in one form of life in one time and in 
another form of life at another time, and that rebirth of life in different forms is regulated with 
the law of cause-effect, which is ultimately determined by the balance of positive karma and 
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negative karma accumulation. For this reason, for Tibetan khenpos and herders, development is 
not merely a matter of this-worldly life and people in the current life, but it also related to 
people’s lives in the past and in the future.  
Taking an individual example, it is very common to believe in Tibetan society that a 
person with a good amount of positive karma would be in a better situation for success whereas a 
person with negative karma may have a hard time to achieve success regardless of his or her 
efforts. Some khenpos state that the level of previous karma accumulation will determine his or 
her fortune in the current life. However, as important as previous karma accumulation may be, 
khenpos also think that efforts in the current life are critical to make significant changes in one’s 
karma collection for the future. As Khenpo Tsullo explained, if they are not very serious, some 
past negative karma can be easily mitigated with positive merit collection and religious rituals in 
the current life, while other serious negative karma is hard to change with the efforts in one 
lifetime. The implication for development is that the past is not really the past, but it is related to 
one’s current and future lives, and that these must be considered in the issue of development.  
Moreover, karma is also applied to the collective well being. Some khenpos have 
frequently used collective karma to interpret the larger historical patterns in the rise and fall of 
nations in different regions of world to demonstrate the importance of karma in development. 
Khenpo Bso Dar Rgyas used western history as an example to interpret collective karma. 
Western history from the peak of the Roman empire has seen the rise of finance, followed by the 
British and American empires; these are being followed by the rise of China and India, and they 
in turn will be replaced by other regions in the future. This is a similar history to the history of 
inner Asia, Tibet, Tang dynasty, the Mongolian dynasty, and the current state led by the Chinese 
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Communist Party. All of these broad historical trajectories of the rise and fall of powerful 
empires and countries are governed through the logic of collective karma.  
The most important aspect of this is development is ultimately not determined by secular 
measures such as better development programs and calculations based on scientific research 
carried out by the state or trustees, but rather by another energy flow, the law of cause-and-
effect.  It is the cause-and-effect that determines all of these elements that contribute to the final 
outcome. That is, development is not only a matter of material transformation through demand 
and supply calculation, capital investment, exchange, profit making, and so on, but also has 
something to do with investment in merit and mitigating sinful deeds supported by the idea of 
karma and reincarnations.  With this articulation of development with Tibetan Buddhist idioms 
and Tibetan herders’ experience in development, Tibetans insert the success of economic 
development into a larger system that couples the law of cause-effects with human beings’ active 
efforts for improvement in the current life. 
 As Tibetan khenpos and herders see karma as a regulative force in development, in order 
to reverse the downward trend in their situation, in addition to secular measures, Rakhor herders 
have deployed many religious measures, including inviting lamas to give empowerments and 
religious teachings, recitations of Buddhist texts, and offerings to mountain deities. All of their 
spiritual efforts work to correct their collective karma, which is negative. Religious teachings 
and rituals performed by lamas in Rakhor Village work to erase of their negative karma in the 
way of their collection of positive karma.  In Rakhor Village, the Tibetan Buddhist rituals and 
practices have become a critical strategy for Tibetan herders to become developed. Tibetan 
herders see the religious strategy as one very important factor that contributes to better 
performance in development, among many others, including diligent, thoughtful plans, capital, 
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resources, and better understanding of the system in which they live. Therefore, it is important 
for villagers to have a proper management of their karma and to maintain an adequate 
relationship with those who mediate these relationships. 
At the same time, the development that herders want to achieve through their various 
efforts including religious rituals and practices, and their secular measures including education, 
is not only for this worldly material improvement, but also related to rebirth and karma collection.  
Khenpos suggest that the adequate way of making a living and activities that are motivated by 
positive intentions are also ways to collect positive karma for their future life. That is, herders’ 
proper ways of making a living or being developed is also a way to be better-off or to be 
developed in their long term development in samsara.  
In short, Tibetan khenpos do not see “small d development” as a power relationship or 
class-based social relationship, but rather see it as an inevitable social process, but which is 
compatible with Tibetan Buddhism. Rather than becoming a refuge for exploited ones and 
making profits with magic rituals in “occult economies,” or presenting it as the only agent to 
handle the dangers of globalization through its prayer rituals in Pentecostalism, or converging it 
with disciplines of corporate success in the neo-liberal world as is the case of Islam in Indonesia, 
Tibetan Buddhism through various movements, religious teachings, and ritual practice, works to 
modify as well to code neo-liberal development with Tibetan Buddhist culture so that neo-liberal 
development proceeds smoothly in Tibet, where Tibetan Buddhism constitutes the core value 
system and main culture. 
What the slaughter renunciation movement demonstrates is that religious rituals and 
idioms are not far away from the modern discourse of development, as educated lay Tibetans and 
the modern states suggest, but rather are interwoven and rearticulated with each other in the 
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cultural politics of Tibetan society. However, these spiritual measures for the improvement of 
community or the khenpos’ karmic interpretation of development are considered be superstitious 
and irrational by the modern state rhetoric. Religious intervention to the state agenda such as 
development is not acceptable, nor is it beneficial to development in this modern logic. In the 
modern Chinese case, development is achievable only through the path of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristic,” which is the free market plus the strong state intervention. However, 
another layer is added to this development articulation in the Tibetan cultural context. 
 
Overlaps and contestations: Tibetan Buddhism and Neo-liberal development 
As it is conceptualized as discourse, development is not a one-way driving force from the 
west, nor it is warlike relationship between trustees’ will to change and resistance from the local. 
Indeed, development works through a complicated relationship among multiple agents with their 
own cultural agendas. These agents contest both the meanings and practices of development in a 
way to reshape one another; many parts of their agenda also overlap and sometimes embrace 
each other. In the case of the slaughter renunciation movement in pastoral areas of Tibet, the 
state, Tibetan religious elites, Tibetan radical secularists, and Tibetan herders have entangled 
with each other in the contested concept and practices of development, which I framed as an 
entangled “knot” of cultural contestations. 
The state, on the one hand, has promoted many projects in pastoral areas of Tibetan based 
on their own cultural agenda, forming neo-liberal social arrangements. On the other hand, the 
state has also provided a space for Tibetan religious elites to perform their agency that some 
times contests and overlap with state agendas.  
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At the same time, Tibetan Buddhist leaders have been promoting many similar initiatives 
that the state has been promoting, including compulsory education, illiteracy eradication, and 
encouraging herders to participate in the market economy. However, the state and religious elites 
contest development in the formation of Tibetan herders into certain subjects: one working 
toward the transformation of Tibetan herders into secular market oriented actors while the other 
is struggling to make them more religious subjects. 
In the eastern Tibetan plateau, Tibetan herders’ livelihood and their experience of 
development is informed by both the secular-neoliberal social arrangement and the religious 
forces as traditional practices as well as new religious movement. Tibetan herders want their kids 
to be educated, to be employed in the state administration, and to be successful in wealth 
collection. However, at the same time, they want to be very spiritual and want to keep their 
Buddhist traditions. Their negotiation between these forces has formed new kinds of community 
development that are coded by Tibetan Buddhist norms. 
Their relations are complicated with another group, Tibetan radical secularists. Tibetan 
radical secularists, share with the state views on modernization and secularization. Both the state 
and Tibetan radical secularists maintain that secularization and improvement in new knowledge 
including science and technological innovation are the key to make changes in material 
improvement, which they believe is fundamental in bringing people happiness. However, they 
may not share similar agendas in terms of Tibetan identity and Tibetan people’s future path in 
the Chinese nation state. At the same time, Tibetan secularists share a similar agenda with 
Tibetan religious leaders in their concerns about Tibetan people’s lagging behind and their path 
and identity. Even though they do not agree on how to achieve development, they share the same 
concern. That is Tibetan people are lagging behind and they need to be developed.  
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It is in these contested articulations and practices of development that Tibetan khenpos 
push Tibetan herders toward a neo-liberal social arrangement informed by Tibetan Buddhist 
norms, many parts of which overlap with the state neo-liberalization process. That is, in their 
promotion of the slaughter renunciation movement, khenpos feel frustrated by challenges from 
secular neo-liberal economic forces. In facing these challenges, instead of total rejection of neo-
liberal development, khenpos have selectively embraced many of these neo-liberal practices with 
their religious interpretations. As an alternative to the herding, for which massive slaughter is an 
important part of this production system, many khenpos have been suggesting herders to 
participate in neo-liberal practices by educating their children, working part-time in towns, being 
engaged in businesses becoming entrepreneurs, and being settled in towns. Even though many of 
these practices overlap with the state’s efforts in pushing pastoral Tibet toward “small d 
development,” I argue that Tibetan khenpos are making a Tibetan Buddhist-informed neo-liberal 
social arrangement by making Tibetan herders more religious subjects. With the khenpos’ 
religious interpretations and engagement with new cultures, all elements of neo-liberal social 
arrangement are coded by Buddhist norms and meanings. The formation of Tibetan Buddhist 
neo-liberalization took place with competition with secular neo-liberalization promoted by the 
state agenda and Tibetan radical secularists. This is clear in the case of Tibetan middlemen and 
Tibetan businessmen. 
Tibetan middlemen are not the type of subjects that Tibetan khenpos want herders to 
become, because they disregard the Tibetan Buddhist norms of karma and reincarnation, and 
only believe in secularly driven material improvement, which khenpos think do not bring real 
happiness and peace. In other words, the Tibetan middlemen can be seen as the achievement of 
secular-based neo-liberal development, mediated by the “Open up the West” campaign. Taking 
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another example, if a herder has become very rich through a conduct that is consistent with 
Tibetan Buddhism and they believe in Tibetan Buddhism and behave in accordance with 
Buddhist norms, this is encouraged by Tibetan khenpos. On the other hand, if a herder has 
become super rich, but he loses his belief in Tibetan Buddhism, then he is not the type of subject 
that Tibetan khenpos want to see, but rather one that the secular neo-liberal arrangement is 
designed to produce among Tibetan herders. 
At the same time, it is in this contested and overlapping process that inequality and 
unbalanced social relationships have been deepened. In the pastoral areas of Tibet, those 
inequalities include the increasing disparity between rich and poor, the uneven development 
among different communities, and the social disorders engendered by the transformations. 
However, the neo-liberalization process normalizes all of these social issues. In the secular-based 
neo-liberalization, this works through norms of competition among individuals and enterprises, 
self-responsibility, the free market, and so forth. In the Buddhist-informed neo-liberalism, those 
inequalities and power relationships related to these inequalities are interrelated and normalized 
by the religious norms and idioms such as collective karma collection, reincarnation, bsod nams, 
kha las rlung rta,59 and others. New social disorders (internal conflicts, engaging in gambling, 
stealing, and others) that are brought about by social and economic transformations are explained 
and corrected in these moral terms. 
Moreover, it is in this contested process that some cultures have become dominant and are 
reinforced while other cultures are marginalized or become the target of erasure. Tibetan 
nomadic culture is one such culture that has become the target of transformation for both the 
state and Tibetan religious elites. Traditional diet and dress cultures have been in the process of 
transformation with khenpos’ religious movements. In this sense, the Buddhist-informed neo-
                                                 
59 Good luck  
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liberalization can also be seen as a process of “small d development” as a name for expanding 
global capitalist relations, which is related to big “Development” as intentional projects of 
improvement (Hart, 2001). 
In sum, the slaughter renunciation movement works as a window through which we can 
see a complex intersection that reflects many aspects of contemporary Tibetan society including 
religious force, pastoralists, state projects, and market economic development. The dimension of 
development promoting by Tibetan khenpos is extended beyond the framework of secular and 
material development that the “Open up the West” campaign is designed to achieve in western 
China. Khenpos’ conceptualization of development encapsulates both this-worldly and other-
worldly well being, based on the logic of the law of cause-effect, reincarnation, and compassion 
in samsara. This extension is an effort to integrate the modern concept of development as a social, 
economic, and power relationship, with the religious concept of samsara, which is the 
relationship of all sentient beings and their death and rebirth in different life forms. This 
integration makes the meanings of neo-liberalization in Tibet different from secular-based neo-
liberalism, and this difference is reflected well in the debate about whether or not Tibetan herders 
should sell their livestock to the meat market, the main question of the slaughter renunciation 
movement. 
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       Glossary of Terms 
 
’brog pa (drokpa)          Tibetan herders   
bsod nams                        “to be blessed with having fortune”, or to be someone  
                                         with positive karma accumulation. 
karma                               the law of cause and effect (law of cause-effect) 
khenpo                             the title of the highest degrees of the Nyingma school  
                                         of Tibetan Buddhism 
las or las rgyu ‘bras         the law of cause and effect 
Nyingma                          the Nyingma tradition is the oldest of the six major  
                                         schools of Tibetan Buddhism.    
rig gnas                            knowledge or culture 
rjes lus                             lagging behind 
samsara                           the six realms of existence in which all sentient beings  
                                        suffer through the cycle of rebirth. The six classes of beings  
                                        in samsara are gods, asuras, humans, animals, pretas, 
                                        and hell beings. 
Larung Gar                      Seda Buddhist Institute  
Skyid Sdug                      a group of people sharing the same happiness and suffering  
                                        or the same prosperity and poverty 
Three Jewels                   the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha 
tshe thar                          livestock that are ritually liberated from intentional slaughter 
tshogs bsags                    collection of positive karma 
Tuimu Huancao              an ecological program that aims to restore degraded grassland, 
                                        using three techniques: banning of grazing on certain pastures  
                                        for ten years, three months’ closing of some pastures annually,  
                                        and seeding on some heavily degraded pastures 
 
